Introduction
In recent years, experimental, participatory, inclusive, and deliberative practices have captured attention across the globe. The hope is that such innovations in citizen engagement may stem the growing tide of citizen disillusion with the ‘politics as usual’ of representative democracies (Elstub and Escobar Reference Elstub, Escobar, Elstub and Escobar2019). Australia has not been immune to growing public disaffection with representative politics (Cameron Reference Cameron2020), yet frustration with the current set up of representative politics and the reluctance of national political institutions to address these challenges is matched by the creativity and energy of democratic forces outside of traditional political structures. Community and citizen-led movements in Australia are finding novel ways to organise shared interests and participate in bottom-up efforts to ‘mend’ democracy (Hendriks, Ercan, and Boswell Reference Hendriks, Ercan and Boswell2020; Hendriks and Reid Reference Hendriks, Reid, Gauja, Sawyer and Sheppard2023). These initiatives, however, remain scattered and ad hoc, relying on the time and energy of individual actors.
Democratic innovations are implemented in diverse settings across the globe, yet the mobility of such innovations is not dependent on design of practices alone. The diffusion of democratic innovations is also heavily dependent on contextual factors, including institutional, cultural, and historical conditions that either foster or inhibit their uptake and embedding (Nabatchi and Amsler Reference Nabatchi and Amsler2014; Pradeau Reference Pradeau and de Oliveira2021).
Historically speaking, Australia has been celebrated as a world leader in democratic innovations, lauded as a ‘laboratory for new ideas about democracy, and new methods for achieving them’ (Brett Reference Brett2019: 8). Australia was an early pioneer of modern electoral democracy, experimenting with voting reforms including the secret ballot, women’s suffrage, and compulsory voting, dating back to the late 19th century (Hill Reference Hill, Lewis and Tiernan2021). Despite maintaining one of the most well-managed and trusted electoral systems in the world, the Australian story is also one of resistance to non-electoral democratic innovations, especially at the federal level. There exists a tension between the celebration of Australia’s relatively stable majoritarian system of government on the one hand and a reluctance to diversify Australian democracy beyond its traditional, aggregative, and electoral forms of political expression on the other. This reluctance to fostering more inclusive and deliberative forms of citizen engagement at the national level stands in contrast to the growing global interest in deliberative democratic innovations. In Ireland, for example, citizens’ assemblies have shaped constitutional reform on marriage equality and reproductive rights (Courant Reference Courant2021). In Germany, the national parliament has convened citizens to advise on deliberative democratic renewal (Dean, Hoffman, Geissel et al. Reference Dean, Hoffman, Geissel, Jung and Wipfler2024).
In this article, we argue that there is no outright rejection of democratic innovations in Australia, but there is resistance to certain kinds of democratic innovations at the federal level. To provide greater clarity in the analysis of Australia’s trajectory of democratic innovations, we distinguish between two kinds of innovations that are particularly pertinent to the Australian context: electoral and deliberative. While both types of innovations aim to enhance the interface between citizens and government, electoral innovations are based on a narrow understanding of participation that confines citizens to aggregative forms of political expression, through voting and elections. Deliberative innovations seek to enhance participatory governance by providing opportunities for citizens to contribute to constructive discussion and reasoned exchange and emphasise listening during political conversations.
What explains the conflicting trajectories of electoral and deliberative innovations in Australia? To answer this question, we employ an analytical framework that pays attention to the legal-institutional and cultural-historical setting for democratic innovations in Australia. We find that the uptake of deliberative innovations at the federal level in Australia is constrained, not by lack of civic energy but by institutional stubbornness. Citizen-led, place-based efforts for democratic change such as the Community Independent Movements, for example, seek to enhance the deliberative quality of political representation in national politics (Hendriks and Reid Reference Hendriks, Reid, Gauja, Sawyer and Sheppard2023). Yet, they clash with federal institutions, including established political parties, that tenaciously hold to ‘traditional’ and aggregative forms of representation. Two features of the Australian context help explain institutional stubbornness towards deliberative innovations. The first is Australia’s Westminster-inspired system of majoritarian government that favours adversarial over consensus-building politics. Second is Australia’s settler-colonial history, a factor that is rarely discussed in literature on democratic innovations. Both features culminate in a formal political environment that is hardened against empowering non-aggregative forms of participation in political decision-making.
The article proceeds in the following three sections. First, we present our definition and classification of democratic innovations. Second, we trace the broad trajectories in Australia of two types of democratic innovations: electoral and deliberative innovations. Third, we examine the sources of institutional and structural resistance to deliberative innovation by exploring two contextual features of the Australian setting and the ways in which they inhibit progress.
Democratic innovations: Definition and classification
Democratic innovations are commonly understood as new participatory practices of citizens’ engagement such as citizens’ assemblies and participatory budgets. While some definitions focus on the institutional design of innovations (for example, see Smith Reference Smith2009: 1), the term can also refer more broadly to the process of introducing novelty into systems of democratic governance. Michael Saward observes democratic innovation as the continuous renewal and transformation inherent to the history of democracy: ‘the malleability of democracy’s core ingredients enables complex permutations and possibilities; there is much in the menu of historical possibilities to be revived, reshaped and applied to the demands of today’ (Saward Reference Saward and Saward2000: 5). Elstub and Escobar (Reference Elstub, Escobar, Elstub and Escobar2019: 12) define democratic innovation as an ongoing societal practice that goes beyond designed institutions. Asenbaum takes this logic further and conceptualises democratic innovations as interruptive moments, during which hegemonic orders are temporarily undone and freedom and equality can be fully experienced (Asenbaum Reference Asenbaum2021; Reference Asenbaum2023).
In this article we define democratic innovations by their position between citizens and governments. Democratic innovations serve as an interface that brings citizens into direct or indirect contact with their governmental representatives. Democratic innovations’ interfaced nature has always been central. Whether defined as the historic evolution of institutions from democratic struggles for expanded suffrage, or as institutional designs that invite citizens into deliberation, democratic innovations are situated at the encounter between the governing and the governed.
The trajectory of democratic innovation in Australia is best understood by distinguishing between two types of innovations – electoral and deliberative. Both work at the interface between representatives and citizens, but they hold distinctive features that make them suited to promoting different kinds of democratic goods. Electoral innovations predominantly focus on improving aggregative voting mechanisms. Examples of electoral innovations include lowering the voting age and implementing postal voting, electronic voting, compulsory voting, and shared mandates (Stewart Reference Stewart1996; Smith Reference Smith2005; Newton Reference Newton, Geissel and Newton2012; Mendonça, Gelape, and Cruz Reference Mendonça, Gelape, Cruz, Bua and Bussu2023). While crucial to systems of representative democracy, one-person-one-vote electoral processes face limitations, especially when it comes to understanding and responding to the needs and interests of diverse publics and giving voice to minority groups (Leidner Reference Leidner1991; Elstub and Escobar Reference Elstub, Escobar, Elstub and Escobar2019).
In contrast, deliberative innovations are presented as having potential to supplement conventional practices of electoral democracy, particularly as a strategy to improve the quality of public engagement in democratic governance. Drawing on deliberative democratic theory, proponents of deliberative innovations imagine that democratic legitimacy and the justification of collective decisions require more than periodic citizen voting (Dryzek Reference Dryzek2010). They emphasise the creation of opportunities for informed and inclusive debate, with listening and reflection. Deliberative innovations encompass a wide range of activities and instruments beyond the often-cited citizens’ assemblies or other types of deliberative mini-publics, extending to public conversations, yarning circles, alternative dispute resolution methods, and many others.
In practice, the distinction between electoral and deliberative innovations is not fixed. Indeed, the implementation of democratic innovations often results in hybrid processes, for example when deliberative processes such as citizens’ initiative review (Gastil, Richards, and Knobloch Reference Gastil, Richards and Knobloch2014) and citizens’ assemblies (Farrell and Suiter Reference Farrell and Suiter2021) are used to enhance electoral instruments such as referendums. Nonetheless, the analytical distinction between electoral and deliberative innovations remains useful for examining historical trajectories.
The trajectories of electoral versus deliberative innovations in Australia
Australia is no stranger to democratic innovation. Demands for democratic reform date back to the early to mid-19th century. ‘Chartist’ agitators and dissidents who were either expelled or voluntarily emigrated to the Australian colonies from the United Kingdom pioneered a working-class movement to demand democratic rights. Core demands, including universal male suffrage and the secret ballot (which became known as the ‘Australian ballot’), were implemented in the Australian colonies long before their realisation in Britain (Brent Reference Brent2006; Pickering Reference Pickering2011). Women’s struggle for suffrage and for the right to stand for national parliament benefited from the 1901 federation of former colonies into the Commonwealth of Australia, with the passing of the Commonwealth Franchise Act in 1902 (Hill Reference Hill, Lewis and Tiernan2021). Other early distinctive voting features introduced to Australia’s electoral system include compulsory voting and ‘preferential voting’ (Hill Reference Hill, Lewis and Tiernan2021). Today, the Australian electoral system is characterised as one of the most well-managed, inclusive, and accessible electoral regimes in the world (Hill Reference Hill, Lewis and Tiernan2021), enjoying widespread public satisfaction and trust (Strengthening Democracy Taskforce 2024: 7).
Notwithstanding Australia’s recognition as a global leader in electoral innovation, it is crucial to note that this history of experimentation with electoral reform involved the formal exclusion of certain minority groups. The Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 wrote into federal law a disqualification for ‘aboriginal natives’ of Australia, Asia, Africa, or the Islands of the Pacific (except New Zealand) that was consolidated in 1918. Only in 1962 did the Parliament of Australia pass the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1962, which gave Aboriginal Australians the right to enrol and vote federally, although enrolment was not compulsory until 1984 (Brooks Reference Brooks1993).
Experiments with deliberative innovations were first advanced during the 1990s by non-state actors, in attempts to tackle controversial issues such as constitutional reform, Indigenous recognition, and climate change (Hendriks Reference Hendriks, Lewis and Tiernan2021). Since the mid-2000s, local and state-level public authorities and statutory agencies in Australia have been experimenting with deliberative processes as a way of connecting the needs and priorities of end-users with public service decisions and spending commitments. Indeed, because of the number of mini-publics at the sub-national level, Australia is regarded among the leading contexts in the practical use of deliberative innovations in public policy (Escobar and Elstub Reference Escobar and Elstub2017). Notable state-based examples occurred in Western Australia (WA) and South Australia (SA) (Carson and Hartz-Karp Reference Carson, Hartz-Karp, Gastil and Levine2005), the latter being a citizens’ jury on the prospects of building a nuclear waste facility in the state. In a more recent landmark development, the Victorian state government introduced legislation in 2020 mandating ‘deliberative engagement practices’ (Government of Victoria 2020: 55). The act requires local councils to undertake ‘deliberative engagement practices’ when engaging communities on community vision and council plans. For the first time, deliberative innovations are embedded into state legislation.
Beyond the emphasis on creating spaces for voice (Hendriks and Colvin Reference Hendriks, Colvin, Perch, Barry, Fenna, Ghazarian and Haigh2024), deliberative processes at the sub-national level continue to face considerable challenges in making a meaningful and sustained impact. While the Victorian legislation mentioned above is celebrated, the legislation fails to define what exactly is meant by the term ‘deliberative engagement’ (Savini Reference Savini2023), fomenting concern it will lead to conventional consultation practices being relabelled (mislabelled) as deliberative (Carson Reference Carson2022). Instances such as the ‘Nuclear Citizens’ Jury’ in South Australia, where the jury’s recommendation has been overlooked by subsequent governments, raise doubt about the capacity of governments and public officials to listen to the public (Hendriks and Colvin Reference Hendriks, Colvin, Perch, Barry, Fenna, Ghazarian and Haigh2024). Moreover, most sub-national initiatives have been led by and depended upon individual champions (Parry, Alver, and Thompson Reference Parry, Alver, Thompson, Elstub and Escobar2019), making them vulnerable to changes of government and personnel. Another concern is the reliance on a professional community of practice for implementation of these initiatives (Hendriks and Carson Reference Hendriks and Carson2008), which again poses a challenge to the embedding of deliberative innovation in Australia’s formal participatory infrastructure (Parry Reference Parry2025).
Despite ongoing challenges, the scale of experimentation at the sub-national level far surpasses that observed at the federal level. In contrast to the historical record of electoral innovation, the introduction of deliberative innovations at the national level remains very rare. National political institutions in Australia are notable for a striking lack of political will and even resistance to experimentation with deliberative processes, despite acknowledgement that civic engagement strengthens democracy and counters anti-democratic influences (Strengthening Democracy Taskforce 2024: 42). Federal-level deliberative processes not only provide a means for directly engaging citizens on pressing national issues such as climate change and Indigenous recognition but also offer an opportunity to bridge the trust gap between national government and regional or remote communities, where national decision-making is often disconnected from lived realities. Without such engagement, the public’s satisfaction with federal democracy may continue to erode. For these reasons, the absence of deliberative democratic innovation at the federal level is a cause for concern that deserves closer examination.
From the perspective of political elites and parties, resistance to reforms that enhance the deliberative role of citizens exposes ideological differences in how elected officials’ representative role is understood and the logic of party competition, whereby opposition parties favour democratic reforms that weaken the power of the incumbents (Núñez, Close, and Bedock Reference Núñez, Close and Bedock2016). A 2010 proposal by then Labour Prime Minister Julia Gillard for a national Citizen’s Assembly on Climate Change was met with thunderous critical voices from opposition and political outsiders, claiming the initiative posed a threat to ‘the established Madisonian norms of legitimate, democratic decision-making by elected representatives’ and ‘the time-honoured traditions and institutions of Australia’s parliamentary democracy’ (Boswell, Niemeyer, and Hendriks Reference Boswell, Niemeyer and Hendriks2013: 169). More recently, these dynamics were demonstrable in debates around constitutional reform to meaningfully incorporate the voices of Indigenous Peoples. The Indigenous Voice to Parliament (‘the Voice’), examined further below, stands as an example of a genuine deliberative democratic innovation which sought to bring the voices of Indigenous Peoples to the fore and enhance inclusive policy development. Yet it was rejected through a deliberative act of non-listening, actively encouraged by influential political actors. Opposition parties at the federal level urged uncertain citizens to remain uninformed and disengaged from critical reflection on the proposed constitutional amendment (encapsulated in the campaign slogan, ‘Don’t know, vote no’).
Beyond evident party dynamics and elite preferences, the next section examines the broader structural and institutional conditions underpinning supply-side inertia in the federal-level adoption of deliberative innovations in Australia.
Institutional stubbornness and democratic creativity
We use the term ‘institutional stubbornness’ to describe the resistance of the prevailing political establishment to revise traditional mechanisms of decision-making and roles of actors, making them unresponsive to external forces, including changing citizens’ preferences and community demands. Institutional stubbornness inherently opposes democratic innovations that appear as challenges to the status quo. In this sense, institutional stubbornness appears as a certain stickiness and conservatism that is not only attributable to individual actors but also resides in cultural, institutional, and contextual structures. The concept of institutional stubbornness becomes more pronounced when contrasting it with democratic creativity. We understand democratic creativity as the inventive forces of renewal and transformation that take the form of community-led movements and bottom-up initiatives outside institutional settings (Della Porta Reference Della Porta2020), or that may emerge within formal institutions and rework the institutional structure from within (Dzur Reference Dzur2019). Either way, democratic creativity seeks to introduce innovations to democratise representative governance and, in doing so, often provokes institutional stubbornness.
In this section, we introduce two key systemic features of the Australian context that drive institutional stubbornness towards deliberative innovation at the national level: first, the institutional barrier of the Westminster-inspired parliamentary architecture, particularly the majoritarian design of the lower house; and second, the structural barrier found in Australia’s settler-colonial status. These institutional and historical-cultural dimensions place constraints on Australia’s capacity and appetite for democratic innovation. In practice, we argue, they sustain a political culture where non-listening is normalised.
Australia’s Westminster-inspired institutional architecture
The first way in which institutional stubbornness manifests in the Australian context is through the architecture underpinning its system of democratic governance. Australia’s political system derives from the Westminster model developed in England and exported as a colonial institutional structure in the late 18th century. Upon federation in 1901, Australia adopted the majoritarian features of England’s Westminster system while also establishing a strong bicameral parliamentary system with a proportionally elected Senate. Although Australia’s system is considered less strongly majoritarian than either the United Kingdom or Canada, its institutional design nonetheless limits deliberation in several ways.
First, the partially majoritarian system, particularly the structure of the House of Representatives, tends to constrain the inclusive and meaningful participation of citizens beyond the right to vote. Power is concentrated within the governing majority, encouraging adversarial politics rather than the broad inclusion of diverse voices. The combination of single-member electorates and preferential voting fosters two-party dominance, which not only reinforces adversarial dynamics but also enables governments to legislate with minimal negotiation or consensus-building (Uhr Reference Uhr2005). While the Senate’s proportional representation serves as a check on executive dominance, legislative decision-making remains elite-driven and non-deliberative. Majority governments, with control at least of the lower house of parliament, have little motivation to pursue deliberative innovations that might constrain their own discretion (see Rose-Ackerman Reference Rose-Ackerman and Levi-Faur2011: 171–177). In short, the system offers little to no incentive for the introduction of participatory mechanisms that channel citizens’ input into parliamentary decision-making (Hartz-Karp and Briand Reference Hartz-Karp and Briand2009).
Second, alongside the adversarialism fostered by Australia’s majoritarian electoral system, the norms of the Westminster tradition further impede parliamentary listening – particularly the principle of cabinet solidarity and the formal practice of party discipline. Under Westminster conventions, a Minister’s public expression of a view on proposed legislation that differs from that of the Prime Minister constitutes a breach of Cabinet Solidarity (Dalla-Pozza Reference Dalla-Pozza2016). In practice, this expectation of party consensus extends beyond cabinet, to all members of the major political parties. Strong party discipline constrains elected representatives from expressing independent views in response to public deliberation, posing a significant obstacle to the uptake and diffusion of deliberative innovations.
The constraint of party discipline is demonstrated with the trial of the deliberative town hall (DTH) model that was developed in the USA by Esterling, Neblo, Lazer et al. (Reference Esterling, Neblo, Lazer and Minozzi2015). The DTH is designed to strengthen the connection and exchange of views between elected officials and their constituents. When conducted in the USA with members of Congress, these initiatives proved effective in enhancing citizen engagement with their representatives and in rebuilding trust in individual members of Congress as well as the wider democratic political system (Neblo, Esterling, and Lazer Reference Neblo, Esterling and Lazer2018). However, when applied to the Australian context, the strict conventions of cabinet solidarity and party discipline present institutional barriers, limiting the potential for more direct representation and hindering the development of meaningful connections between constituents and elected representatives (Alnemr, Ercan, Vlahos et al. Reference Alnemr, Ercan, Vlahos, Dryzek, Leigh and Neblo2024).Footnote 1
Third, the administrative law framework of Australia’s federal parliament effectively enables executive rulemaking without public participation or debate. This non-deliberative model of law-making shapes the practice of political representation in Australia. Rather than ensuring that the administrative process of making regulations or modifying existing ones is responsive to the public and open to public scrutiny, the framework prioritises parliamentary supervision. Public consultation on the content of new regulations – including laws concerning highly contentious or divisive issues – is treated as optional and left to the discretion of the government. Only where explicitly prescribed under statute do public consultation provisions become an enforceable feature of political decision-making (see Edgar Reference Edgar2018). This stands in contrast to equivalent processes in Canada, for example, where a participatory architecture of regulation-making is more strongly institutionalised. In that context, following cabinet approval, proposed regulatory changes are published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, with stakeholders and members of the public invited to react. Following consultations, amended regulations are then published a second time, in the Canada Gazette, Part II, where the date of enforcement is announced (Salembier and Bernhardt Reference Salembier and Bernhardt2002). While not impervious to the influence of vested interests, such institutionalised public consultation processes treat the public as legitimate and valid sources of information on regulations that affect their lives, while also conforming to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) best practice (OECD Reference Della Porta2020; 2005).
Taken together, these dimensions of parliamentary architecture create an institutional arrangement that is largely disinclined to consider innovations aimed at increasing meaningful interactions between constituents and elected representatives between elections. Efforts to reform parliamentary processes, including efforts to improve the quality of institutional listening by creating invited participatory spaces to facilitate public input, advice or even decision-making, face significant structural obstacles.
Settler colonialism
Analysis of democratic innovation trajectories also requires sensitivity to the way the broader social-political and cultural-historical context shapes their uptake. Australia is distinct to other cases discussed in this special issue because of its foundation as a settler-colonial state. Settler-colonial states colonised by the British, including Canada, Australia, Aotearoa New Zealand, and the USA (the ‘CANZUS’ states), share ‘a common colonial history, of genocide, massacres, assimilation policies and settler denials’ (Moore, Stanton, Fan et al. Reference Moore, Stanton, Fan, Rose and Jones2024: 4). Yet, the influence of settler colonialism on political and legal systems remains under-theorised in the democratic innovations literature (Asenbaum Reference Asenbaum2023).
Settler colonialism is a mode of colonial domination in which the central logic is the elimination or permanent replacement of Indigenous Peoples and Indigenous political authority to secure land for an incoming settler population. It involves not only territorial acquisition but also the reorganisation of legal, social, and economic orders to privilege settlers, and is best understood as an ongoing structure rather than a singular historical event (Wolfe Reference Wolfe2006). Consequently, political conflict between Indigenous People and the state remains a defining feature of contemporary politics in settler-colonial states (Anaya Reference Anaya2004; Gover Reference Gover2015), rather than a phenomenon of the past. This is reflected in a persistent asymmetry of power between Indigenous communities and the settler-colonial state apparatus, as well as continuing political and epistemic violence because of dispossession. For Australia and other settler-colonial democracies, building just relations between the state and colonised Indigenous People is therefore a continuing political and legal challenge (Ivison, Patton, and Sanders Reference Ivison, Patton and Sanders2000: 2). Crucially, these dynamics operate at the national scale, with constitutional arrangements and federal policy frameworks themselves both products of, and mechanisms for reproducing, settler dominance.
The exclusion of Indigenous People from Australian democracy began with colonisation and the application of the legal doctrine of terra nullius (‘empty land’ or ‘land belonging to no one’) when the continent, now known as Australia, was said to have been ‘discovered’ by Captain James Cook in 1770 (Borch Reference Borch2001). The British returned in 1788 to establish the colony of New South Wales and were instructed to secure and take possession of the land with the ‘consent of the natives’. Consent from Indigenous People was neither sought nor granted, however (McRae, Nettheim, Anthony et al. Reference McRae, Nettheim, Anthony, Beacroft, Brennan, Davis and Janke2009: 17–18). British settlers proceeded to install a legal system ‘on the edge of a continent where Aboriginal political societies had long been organised as sovereign peoples exercising their own inherent law-making authority’ (Gover and Cubillo Reference Gover, Cubillo, Cane, Ford and McMillan2022: 227).
It would take more than two centuries for Australia’s High Court, through the historic 1992 Mabo decision, to overturn the doctrine of terra nullius and belatedly recognise precolonial land rights of Indigenous Peoples. Despite this legal breakthrough, contemporary Indigenous–settler relations remain dominated by matters of dispossession and the struggle for Indigenous sovereignty and the right to self-determination (Gover and Cubillo Reference Gover, Cubillo, Cane, Ford and McMillan2022; Behrendt, Cunneen, Libesman et al. Reference Behrendt, Cunneen, Libesman and Watson2019). Throughout the 19th century, the status of Indigenous People could be described as legally indeterminate – considered neither British nor citizens protected by colonial law. The constitution that federated Australia’s six colonies in 1901 expressly excluded Indigenous People (Yu Reference Yu2022). Exclusion was also practiced in the form of harmful policies that socially ostracised and physically separated Indigenous People from the rest of Australian society. Governments neither consulted with nor sought consent for the various laws and policies enacted by state governments that forced Indigenous People to be removed to special reserves or to work cattle stations where they lived under surveillance regimes (Moreton-Robinson Reference Moreton-Robinson2015: 13).
Indigenous People in Australia have long sought innovative solutions to address the problems of political marginalisation and exclusion, advocating for ‘differentiated inclusion’ and not simply formal inclusion within Australian democracy (O’Sullivan Reference O’Sullivan2020). Indigenous deliberative innovations represent an important and untapped source of democratic creativity that can advance these efforts. At the sub-national level, a significant development was the 2016 Victorian State Government initiation of a dialogue with Indigenous Peoples, which subsequently led to establishment of the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria, an autonomous, democratically elected institution designed to represent the interests of traditional owners and Indigenous Peoples throughout the state. In 2021, Victoria formed the Yoorook Justice Commission – Yoorook meaning ‘truth’ in Wemba Wemba (Moore, Stanton, Fan et al. Reference Moore, Stanton, Fan, Rose and Jones2024). As Australia currently has no treaty or treaties with Indigenous Peoples, this truth-telling commission marks the first initiative of its kind.
The situation at the federal level presents a starkly different picture. The National Aboriginal Conference (NAC) began calls for a treaty between Indigenous Peoples and the Commonwealth government in 1970, adopting the terminology of ‘Makarrata’ – meaning conflict resolution, peacemaking, and justice. It was not until 2016, however, that the Referendum Council, an Indigenous steering committee, was established with bipartisan support to begin a ‘yarning’Footnote 2 process involving extensive national consultation resembling enclave deliberation (Moore, Stanton, Fan et al. Reference Moore, Stanton, Fan, Rose and Jones2024). Following this year-long, Indigenous-designed and -led process of 12 regional dialogues, the National Constitutional Convention convened at Uluru in central Australia to ratify the Uluru Statement from the Heart. The Statement called for the creation of two new democratic institutions: (1) an Indigenous Voice to Parliament (the ‘Voice’), and (2) a Makarrata Commission for truth telling and negotiating agreement-making between governments and Indigenous People (Referendum Council 2017). The first innovation, the Voice, would have been a new deliberative institution enshrined in the Australian constitution, with the aim of enabling Indigenous People to have a greater role in the development of law and policy.
However, the political fate of the Voice demonstrates the normalisation of a political culture of non-listening in Australia. The conservative government in power at the time the Uluru Statement was developed immediately dismissed the initiative as an unconstitutional ‘third chamber’ of parliament, a claim made by then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull (Grattan Reference Grattan2017). It was not until a change in government in May 2022 that the new prime minister, Anthony Albanese, pledged to hold a national referendum on the Voice proposal and the necessary constitutional amendments. However, the issue of an Indigenous Voice to Parliament became highly partisan. The conservative Liberal National party (LNP) and opponents of the Voice urged citizens to vote against it if they were uncertain about the proposal. They deployed the slogan ‘Don’t know, vote no’ as a tactic to dissuade voters from listening to Indigenous concerns and reasoning (Manns Reference Manns2023). Despite widespread support from diverse sectors including legal, business, and academic communities, the Voice was rejected at a national referendum in October 2023.
The resistance to more inclusive and pluralistic democratic processes, particularly those attuned to Indigenous collective decision-making and self-determinative methodologies (Davis Reference Davis2024), extends beyond the defeat of the ‘Voice’ referendum. Settler colonialism presents obstacles to deliberative innovation that are not only institutional but ideological, rooted in what Veracini (Reference Veracini2007) terms the ‘settler colonial state of mind’. The settler states’ legitimacy is sustained by a foundational myth: that it emerged in a ‘historyless reality’ (Veracini Reference Veracini2007: 273) – a body politic formed in a ‘quiet continent’ (Pike Reference Pike1962). This hegemonic national narrative normalises the exclusion of Indigenous Peoples from the nation’s political story, and in turn, suppresses the democratic creativity embodied in Indigenous deliberative systems to maintain the settler community’s claim to an inherent and uncontested sovereignty over the land and its political institutions.
The settler-colonial mindset does more than this, we argue. It also narrows the political imaginary of federal institutions and predisposes them towards conventional, status quo frameworks of participation. Within this logic, the settler project positions itself as ‘the beginning of history, but […] also its end’ (Veracini Reference Veracini2007: 281), denying the legitimacy, and even possibility, of alternative political futures. The imperative for innovation and transformation is not simply overlooked; it is actively negated. Just as terra nullius once justified the dispossession of Indigenous Peoples from the land, a corresponding ‘historia nullius’ in the settler political consciousness (Veracini Reference Veracini2007: 281) sustains as an ongoing defence of non-listening – to the voices of Australia’s First Peoples, and by extension, to the wider public.
Conclusion
This article examines the institutional stubbornness that characterises Australia’s democratic governance, particularly in relation to the resistance to deliberative innovations and the persistent marginalisation of Indigenous voices. Rather than optimistically zooming in on discrete efforts for participatory reform in the Australian case, we take a wider view, outlining the landscape of democratic experimentation in Australia, and offering explanations for the poor uptake of deliberative democratic innovations at the national level.
Australia has long been considered a pioneer in electoral reforms. However, when it comes to democratic innovations that enhance the voice and listening capacity of the national democratic system, Australia’s trajectory is best characterised by the clash between forces of democratic creativity and institutional stubbornness. While there exist individual ‘champions’ advocating for and practicing more deliberative innovations, especially at the sub-national level, they remain limited in their capacity to change the way federal politics operates and to address the challenges, including growing public distrust and disengagement, that confront Australia’s democratic system.
At the core of the resistance lie two deeply embedded contextual factors. First is the institutional architecture inherited from the Westminster system, which privileges majoritarianism, centralises power in the governing majority, and enforces strict party discipline. As a result, policy-making is typically driven by partisan competition rather than the inclusion of broad and diverse voices. Moreover, the emphasis on electoral mandates and majority rule leaves little space for meaningful citizen participation between elections, thus marginalising the forms of public conversations that deliberative innovations seek to promote.
The effects of this parliamentary architecture are not only procedural but also cultural. The dominance of adversarial politics nurtures an ‘all or nothing’ mentality in which public deliberation is often perceived as a threat to effective governance, rather than a means of enhancing democratic legitimacy. As a result, deliberative innovations are often viewed with suspicion or dismissed as impractical, constraining their institutional uptake.
Second, this article emphasises the significance of Australia’s settler-colonial context as a foundational force shaping political culture and practice. The ongoing asymmetry of power between Indigenous Peoples and the settler-colonial state, alongside enduring political and epistemic violence, underpins the federal government’s reluctance to embrace democratic innovations that might disrupt the status quo. Despite the barriers, Indigenous Peoples in Australia have continually pursued innovative deliberative approaches, as exemplified by the Uluru Statement from the Heart and sub-national initiatives such as Victoria’s treaty process and the Yoorook Justice Commission. These efforts demonstrate the potential for democratic creativity grounded in Indigenous epistemologies and practices.
At the federal level, however, such efforts to institutionalise Indigenous voices have exposed the persistence of exclusionary political dynamics and the limits of deliberative democracy in the Australian context. The legacy of terra nullius and the historyless political consciousness of the settler-colonial state perpetuate a mode of non-listening that not only silences Indigenous calls for meaningful political inclusion but also more broadly resists calls for innovation and transformation of settler-colonial frameworks. Confronting the legacies of settler colonialism and renegotiating the relationship between the state and Indigenous Peoples requires national-level action; without federal leadership, the possibility of building a new, inclusive political narrative remains limited.
Foremost for those of us who are non-Indigenous allies, this work begins with confronting our nation’s collective failure to engage in truth-listening Footnote 3 – a practice that demands not only a willingness to confront difficult truths about historical and ongoing impacts of settler colonialism but also a commitment to engaging with deeper histories of Indigenous Peoples’ struggles for treaty, land rights, self-determination, and truth-telling. These struggles often exceed the boundaries of liberal democratic frameworks and conventional rights-based approaches to political voice (de Souza and Dreher Reference De Souza and Dreher2021), calling for a more fundamental reckoning with the foundations of the settler state.
The two features highlighted in this article are not determinant characteristics of the Australian political system, however; they are constraints to be overcome. Indeed, the tension between democratic creativity and institutional stubbornness can be productive, generating breakthroughs that open space for progressive democratic change. Changing the trajectory of democratic innovations in Australia requires inviting new ways of living together based on justice, genuine political equality, and a politics of reconciliation.
Data availability statement
The authors confirm that all data analysed during this study are included in this manuscript.
Funding statement
This research received no external funding.
Competing interests
On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.
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