2. Proselytization in international human rights

The record of the evolution of UN international human rights instruments shows awareness of the broad diversity of individual and relational dimensions at play in religious freedom and, specifically, how those dimensions are at stake in religious proselytization. The way in which these concerns were debated and translated into human rights instruments, and later taken up by the institutional interpretive bodies of the HRC and the SRFRB, emphasized the individual and downplayed the collective and relational dimensions. One key challenge that the drafters faced when developing the protection of religious freedom in the UN human rights instruments was whether to specifically enumerate the right to change religions as part of the freedom of religion. The travaux preparatoires of the UDHR, the ICCPR, and 1981 Declaration reveal that the various positive and negative attitudes regarding proselytism were present in these discussions. Those opposed to including a right to change religions were concerned about the social and political disruption that these changes could bring and, in particular, the way in which these social disruptions could be coopted to serve foreign political interests. Those in favour of including a right to change religions focused on the centrality of religious proselytism to religious beliefs and practices.

Even though the final version of the UN human rights instruments ultimately settled on embedding an individual’s freedom to change or to choose their religion, which seems to privilege the individual’s autonomy and downplays the socio-political concerns with proselytism, other aspects of proselytization that resonate with the socio-political concerns remained present, albeit in the background. For example, recent research into the theoretical and philosophical perspectives of the early drafters of the UDHR (and the ICCPR) shows that there was a deep appreciation and concern for the process of religious exploration, including interacting with others of different religious traditions.Footnote ²⁴ Likewise, recent reports of the SRFRB have drawn attention to similar features of religious freedom in its relation to free expression and free thought.Footnote ²⁵ There is, I argue, an abiding connection between individual freedom and relational interdependence at the heart of the conception of religious freedom in international human rights law, which I will explore later in this article in terms of the spiritual freedom dimension of human dignity.

But, first, in order to set the background, I will review the evolution of the freedom of religion in the UN human rights context in relation to religious proselytization. The UDHR provides protection for freedom of religion in the following terms: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”Footnote ²⁶ This declaration of religious freedom does not explicitly provide protection for religious proselytization. However, it does implicitly recognize religious proselytization as a central part of religious life. This can be seen in two ways. First, the freedom to “manifest … religion … in teaching” might be interpreted to include proselytizing, which is a form of teaching and expression of one’s own religious beliefs. Second, the inclusion of the “freedom to change” one’s religion implies that people should be able to hear about other religious ideas, which assumes the occurrence of religious proselytization.

This reading of the UDHR is confirmed when one looks at the travaux préparatoires of the UDHR. In particular, those opposed to including reference to the freedom to change religions point to practices of religious proselytism as part of the problem. They have argued that overtly protecting the right to change religions encourages proselytism, which would lead to conflict between religions, threats to local religious groups, “unethical” or improper acts of proselytism, and the proliferation of political ideology under the guise of religion. Jamil Baroody, the representative from Saudi Arabia, forcefully argued this, claiming that “throughout history missionaries had often abused their rights by becoming the forerunners of a political intervention, and there were many instances where peoples had been drawn into murderous conflict by the missionaries’ efforts to convert them.”Footnote ²⁷ This perspective was echoed by the representative from Egypt, who said that “by proclaiming man’s freedom to change his religion or belief the declaration would be encouraging, even though it might not be intentional, the machinations of certain missions, well known in the Orient, which relentlessly pursued their efforts to convert to their own beliefs the masses of the population of the Orient.”Footnote ²⁸

Other related concerns were also raised by representatives of non-Islamic states. For example, the representative of Greece expressed concern that the reference to the freedom to “manifest” one’s religion or belief would encourage “unfair” practices of proselytism and would result in unfair competition between religions. He stated that, “[i]n fact, free lodgings, material assistance and a number of other advantages were offered to persons who agreed to belong to one religion or another. … While, admittedly, every person should be free to accept or reject the religious propaganda to which he was subjected … an end should be put to such unfair competition in the sphere of religion.”Footnote ²⁹ Those who supported the freedom to change religions argued that the concerns expressed about the right to change one’s religion were misguided and that freedom to change religions was essential to the guarantee of freedom of religion more generally. For example, Fernand Dehousse, the representative of Belgium, argued that proselytism is a matter inherent to all religions: “In professing or propagating a faith one could, to a certain extent, interfere with the freedom of others by seeking to impose an unfamiliar idea upon them. But proselytism was not limited to any one faith or religious group. If it was an evil, it was essentially an evil from which all sides had to suffer.”Footnote ³⁰

Ultimately, the right to change religions remained in the final text of the UDHR. In spite of this, the attitude of the international community regarding proselytism was divided among those viewing it as inherent to freedom of religion as compared to others concerned about socio-political disruption and foreign political interference. This division did not dissipate with time. The same issues raised in the UDHR drafting continued in the other UN human rights instruments and affected the language adopted. For example, the right to freedom of religion included in Article 18 of the ICCPR generally reflects the Article 18 of the UDHR, with the notable difference that the freedom to change religion is rephrased as the “freedom to have or adopt a religion” of one’s choice.Footnote ³¹ The right to change one’s religion was part of the original draft of the ICCPR, but it was later amended. Likewise, Article 1(1) of the 1981 Declaration, which is nearly identical to Article 18(1) of the ICCPR, only provides for the right to “have” a religion or belief of one’s choice, which is a further move away from the explicit protection to change religion found in the UDHR.

One way to explain why both the ICCPR and the 1981 Declaration successively step back from the freedom to change religions asserted in the UDHR is that the United Nations was responding to the ongoing pressure from Islamic states to remove the language and sought to achieve as broad of a consensus on the instruments as possible.Footnote ³² Although there may be some truth to this view, it does not fully account for the fact that it was not only Baroody, or representatives from other Islamic countries, that expressed concern about the relationship between certain religions, colonialism, and aggressive proselytism in certain regions.Footnote ³³ Baroody was, however, the ringleader, so to speak. He was incredibly persistent in his argument, raising the issue at every opportunity over a span of approximately fifteen years through the drafting of the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the 1981 Declaration. It is interesting to note that he did not oppose the freedom of people to change their religions per se but, rather, the explicit inclusion of that freedom in the human rights instruments.Footnote ³⁴ His arguments typically revolved around three points: first, it is redundant to include the freedom to change religions as it was already implied in the guarantee of freedom of religion; second, it was suspicious that no similar “freedom to change” was stated regarding opinions and beliefs (such as political ideologies); and, third, he was concerned that there would be an adverse effect on Muslim populations.Footnote ³⁵

The key problem for Baroody had to do with the cultural and political forces at play in religious proselytization. During the drafting of the 1981 Declaration, he argued that special consideration regarding the differences between religions — such as the fact that not all religions were active in proselytism and because of the imbalance of resources between different religions and their associated governments — should be reflected in the principle of the freedom of religion.Footnote ³⁶ According to Baroody, missionary activities often were related to political propaganda, both in terms of methods and in terms of historical coincidence. He went so far as to say that “[missionary activities] had merely been the precursors of [political propaganda]. … The crusades, in particular, had concealed undeniable economic and political ambitions under the cloak of religion.”Footnote ³⁷ He went on to argue:

In one sense, Baroody was right. There is evidence that missionary organizations actively lobbied to have the freedom to change religion included within the human rights texts.Footnote ³⁹ However, Baroody’s subsequent point that missionary activity cloaks other political agendas solicited strong objections. Costa Rica, for example, felt that concerns about missionaries acting as “enemy agents” was overblown and that the non-discrimination principles in the 1981 Declaration did not prevent a country from protecting its policies and citizens from missionaries that are acting illegally, even if certain freedoms to seek to convert others were expressed therein.Footnote ⁴⁰ Likewise, the representative from the Netherlands argued that, although there were connections in the past between religion and colonialism, this was no longer the case; rather, religious, and, specifically, missionary, activity was more of a force of good than evil in the international context.Footnote ⁴¹

In the drafting of the ICCPR, the representative of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) argued against Baroody’s suggestion to remove the freedom to change one’s religion, noting the importance of having a historical perspective when looking at the issue of freedom of religion. He argued that the freedom to change religions was achieved through significant conflict, in that it was won through the religious wars in Europe and ought not to be given away lightly.Footnote ⁴² The right to freely change one’s religion can easily be lost in the development of societies and should therefore be protected in the freedom of religion.Footnote ⁴³ It is worth noting that, even though he argued for the inclusion of the freedom to change religions in the ICCPR, he was still critical of historical examples of religious proselytism, noting that the European powers, specifically the Portuguese, caused much conflict in Asia when “fired by religious zeal, had sought to impose Catholicism on the indigenous peoples.”Footnote ⁴⁴ Nonetheless, the freedom to change religions should remain specifically protected. Although the representative of Ceylon did not argue that proselytism should be banned, some of the other representatives expressed their views that the right to change one’s religion should not include the right to proselytize.Footnote ⁴⁵

As mentioned earlier, some legal scholars have argued that the West wanted the language of the 1981 Declaration to explicitly guarantee the freedom to change religions to make clearer the freedom to propagate one’s own religion, but they chose to compromise on the language used in order not to jeopardize the ongoing development of international human rights instruments.Footnote ⁴⁶ Despite giving up specific reference to the freedom to change religion, Article 8 of the 1981 Declaration maintained that “[n]othing in the present Declaration shall be construed as restricting or derogating from any right defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights” and so in a round-about way retained the freedom to change one’s religion as included in prior instruments.Footnote ⁴⁷ This view was confirmed by the HRC in its General Comment 22, where it said that “the freedom to ‘have or to adopt’ a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief.”Footnote ⁴⁸ The HRC went on to relate this idea to the prohibition against religious coercion in Article 18(2) of the ICCPR:

The HRC has not directly commented on religious proselytization often, although the topics of proselytism and conversion regularly arise.Footnote ⁵⁰ The HRC did comment directly on the issue of proselytism in 2010 in a report regarding Uzbekistan laws that punished religious proselytism.Footnote ⁵¹ In this comment, the HRC said that proselytism is inherent to religion and protected under international law, although in variegated form. One committee member said that the right to proselytize others is implied in the right to manifest religion in teaching, as referred to in Article 18 of the ICCPR. Footnote ⁵² Another member said that the right to proselytize should be read in conjunction with Article 19 of the ICCPR as implying a corresponding right to receive information.Footnote ⁵³ The committee members also expressed an understanding of proselytism that distinguished between aggressive and non-aggressive proselytizing, where the former was unacceptable for assaulting the conscience and employing non-peaceful means, while the latter was permitted and should not be restricted by law.Footnote ⁵⁴

The SRFRB has affirmed and developed the principles outlined by the HRC. The SRFRB solidified the view that there is an individual freedom to proselytize as well as a right of others to remain free from religious coercion.Footnote ⁵⁵ There are several contexts in which the SRFRB has dealt with conversion and proselytism, including situations involving Greece,Footnote ⁵⁶ Sri Lanka,Footnote ⁵⁷ Tajikistan,Footnote ⁵⁸ Lao People’s Democratic Republic,Footnote ⁵⁹ Turkmenistan,Footnote ⁶⁰ and Azerbaijan.Footnote ⁶¹ In addition, there are reports from the SRFRB to the UN General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and the HRC that have dealt with the issue of religious proselytism.Footnote ⁶² The SRFRB affirmed that, despite the divergent wording in the UDHR, the ICCPR, and 1981 Declaration, international human rights law ensures the freedom of individuals to change their religion or beliefs.Footnote ⁶³ The SRFRB viewed the matter as being already settled and has relied on this principle as axiomatic. The legal guarantee to freely choose and change religions, including non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, is understood to be one of the fundamental principles of religious freedom in the UN system of human rights. Indeed, the SRFRB has said that religious conversion and proselytization are both core to the freedom of religion.Footnote ⁶⁴ The first statement in this regard was from a SRFRB report pertaining to the anti-proselytism laws of Greece: “The Special Rapporteur notes that proselytism is itself inherent in religion, which explains its legal status in international instruments and in the 1981 Declaration.”Footnote ⁶⁵ This statement was carried forward and referred to in future reports of the SRFRB.Footnote ⁶⁶

The SRFRB’s discussion of religious proselytism is just as variegated as the HRC’s. The principle of non-coercion, which has taken a prominent role in the SRFRB’s commentary on religious proselytization,Footnote ⁶⁷ implies several rights, including the right to change one’s religion, the right not to change one’s religion, and the right to try to share one’s religion and try to convert others.Footnote ⁶⁸ The HRC noted that, “[o]n proselytism, the Special Rapporteur is of the view that no restrictions or sanctions should be imposed on peaceful missionary activities which do not amount to coercion.”Footnote ⁶⁹ Non-coercive religious proselytism is protected as part of the “freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief,” which means that it may be limited but only under certain conditions — in the terms outlined in Article 18(3) of the ICCPR,Footnote ⁷⁰ in a manner that is narrowly defined, proportionate, and not discriminatory in its implementation.Footnote ⁷¹

Whether private actors can effectively coerce someone regarding their religious beliefs (to change or maintain them) will depend on different factors and the use of different tools and techniques than state actors. The most common accusation against non-state actors is that they engage in “unethical” conversions, such as promising some material benefit or taking advantage of the vulnerable situation of a person whose conversion is sought — practices often associated with missionary activity. The SRFRB has described a fine line between proselytism that is or is not coercive. In 2005, the SRFRB said that “[m]issionary activity cannot be considered a violation of the freedom of religion and belief of others if all involved parties are adults able to reason on their own and if there is no relation of dependency or hierarchy between the missionaries and the objects of the missionary activities.”Footnote ⁷² On the other hand, in 2012, the SRFRB indicated that organizations taking advantage of situations like humanitarian disasters to try to convert others may justifiably be restricted by state actors.Footnote ⁷³ Having said that, the SRFRB insisted that such restrictions may only be justified on a case-by-case basis if the conduct is found to constitute religious coercion.Footnote ⁷⁴

On the application of this standard, the SRFRB has confusingly distinguished between coercive proselytism, which may justifiably be restricted, and “unethical proselytism.” This can best be seen in a statement made by the SRFRB to the UN General Assembly:

It is not clear how unethical conversion is simultaneously not contrary to international standards and that it also may not be protected under human rights law. If unethical proselytism is not protected under human rights law, then on what basis does the SRFRB assert that it ought not to be criminalized? How does the fact that it ought not to be criminalized affect the permissible scope of non-criminal regulation and sanction of religious proselytism by a state? A charitable reading would be that the SRFRB intended to say (1) that religious proselytism ought not to be severely restricted unless something more than mere “unethical” conduct is present and (2) that the regulation of religious proselytism ought to be regulated contextually rather than categorically. The mere fact that a proselytizer is using unethical means, such as offering material benefits to a materially needy group of people or people in crisis, does not automatically justify state restriction (especially not criminal sanction). This also speaks to a broader point: the legal regulation of religious proselytism must not look solely at the method used by the proselytizer and must also account for circumstances affecting the relationships and interactions between parties.Footnote ⁷⁶ It is necessary to demonstrate that the actions of the proselytizer, in the context of the material and other relational dynamics of the encounter, is coercive.

The challenge is that there are competing contextual and categorical features of religious proselytism in such an analysis, which need to be connected to each other and weighed against each other. Categorically, religious proselytization is central to religious practice, to the freedom to choose one’s own religion, and to the freedom from coercion, whereas the nature of the relationship and circumstances of the interaction between the persons involved in proselytization is affected by various social, cultural, material, and political contextual factors. It is unclear, based on the HRC’s and the SRFRB’s commentary, how these categorical and contextual features of proselytization are to be used together in an analysis under international human rights doctrine. How are they to be balanced together in light of a unified conception of religious freedom?

These questions return us to Baroody’s arguments regarding proselytization and to a bird’s eye view of the evolution of the international human rights approach to religious proselytization. The specific socio-political and historical concerns expressed by Baroody were overcome by the growing consensus that changing one’s religion is connected deeply to the internal aspect of religious belief, which religious freedom was meant to protect. The commentary by the HRC and the SRFRB over the years shows that the practice of religious proselytization itself is connected in some way to the core of religious belief and religious expression. However, on the other hand, the contextual concerns expressed by Baroody have continued to define the limits placed on religious proselytization. Social and political contexts, as well as the effects felt in these spheres, are relevant for evaluating religious proselytization, but they are now viewed through the lens of the individual’s right to free religious choice and freedom from coercion.

In sum, the international human rights approach to religious proselytization is messy. A broad range of historical, contextual, political, relational, and individual concerns are present, but the relation between them is not clear. Despite the efforts of the SRFRB to synthesize and rationalize these concerns, there still seems to be something at work that has not been captured in the principles articulated. The approach taken to religious proselytization in the international system of human rights points towards ideas that lie beyond the principles of individual freedoms to change/abandon religion, to share religion, and to be free from religious coercion, even though these principles are the preferred language of analysis. There is something at the foundation of religious freedom that gives rise to these principles and that keeps alive the contextual concerns of the relational dimensions between persons involved in proselytization. In the next section, I pursue this line of thought in terms of human dignity.

3. The dignity dimensions of religious freedom

From the forgoing discussion, we can see that the global international human rights instruments frame religious proselytism with particular emphasis on the individual. Starting with the travaux preparatoires for the UDHR, there was a fairly broad understanding of the interests involved. But these discussions crystalized around the question of the right and the freedom of the individual proselytizee to change their religion. The freedom of the proselytizer to seek to make converts was assumed and was not given much explicit attention. Over time, the broad assertion of the right to convert gave way to a narrower expression of religious freedom to “choose” or to “have” a religion of one’s choosing. Although the force of the specific right to change religion was pressed underground, so to speak, it remained core to the conception of religious freedom, which is apparent in the comments from the HRC and the SRFRB. This represented a shift in focus from the freedom of the proselytizee to change religions to their right to be free from religious coercion. As a result, the legal discourse surrounding religious proselytization also shifted its focus to the scope of the freedom of the proselytiser to proselytize and to the proper limits that may be placed on the practice.

The process of the interaction occurring in proselytization, and the relational dimensions of the interaction, seem to have fallen into the background of this account of religious proselytization. It is worth noting at the outset that these interactive and relational aspects bring into focus the ways in which moments of religious change are connected to broader processes of change in other, smaller thoughts, feelings, and practices. Religious proselytization involves the exchange between individuals regarding their spiritual and metaphysical ideas as well as personal identification with the religious traditions to which they belong. In terms of relationships, there are numerous dynamics of what it means for an individual to belong to a community, to interact at the boundary of other communities, to leave a community, and to cross (sometimes crisscross) between communities.Footnote ⁷⁷ Religious ideas are not merely metaphysical abstractions acquired through intellectual activity; they are embodied in persons, whether those persons are friends and family or institutional actors and role models, and they take shape in us through our interaction with others.Footnote ⁷⁸ Proselytization involves the relationships between the individuals and their religious communities, as much as it involves individual intellectual choices about religious beliefs.

The interactive processes and relational dimensions at stake in matters of religious proselytization are, although not front and centre, foundational to the UN conception of religious freedom. This can be seen in the philosophical ideas and opinions of some of the drafters of the UDHR, which will be discussed below. Despite the move towards an individualized right, it is still possible for the interactive and relational aspects to play a role in religious freedom analysis in international human rights law. But it is also possible for these dimensions to fade into the background. If this happens, then a crucial element for analyzing religious proselytization — and the conception of religious freedom — may be lost.Footnote ⁷⁹ It is important to draw attention to those elements and bring them to the foreground of the international human rights discourse on religious freedom and religious proselytization.

Before developing this interactive and relational aspect of religious freedom, and its relation to dignity and spiritual freedom, it is important to note that the concept of dignity plays an important, broad structural role in the United Nations and its human rights framework. Human dignity is referenced in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations in connection with the project of international human rights.Footnote ⁸⁰ Similarly, the preamble to the UDHR begins with a reference to human dignity that indicates the universality of the concept and its role as the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.Footnote ⁸¹ The preamble to the ICCPR affirms both the UN Charter’s and the UDHR’s preambular statements and then emphasizes that the rights enumerated in the treaty are derived from the inherent dignity of the human person.Footnote ⁸²

The meaning of “human dignity” generally, and its meaning within the context of these UN human rights instruments, is neither obvious nor settled, and the broader scholarly literature on human dignity and its role in law and human rights is extensive and varied.Footnote ⁸³ It is beyond the scope of this article to summarize and comment on this literature. But there are a few points about human dignity that help lay the groundwork for my discussion. First, the basis of the worth of humans, which underwrites the notion of human dignity and demands respect in the form of rights, is not universally agreed upon. There is quite a bit of evidence indicating that the architects of the UDHR and the ICCPR were aware of this issue and intentionally selected dignity because it is vague and amenable to being filled with content from different world views (philosophies, theologies, or whatever). The goal was for all of the different cultures and peoples of the world to embrace international human rights on their own terms, by enabling them to articulate the justification for those rights through their own intellectual traditions.Footnote ⁸⁴ This means that dignity may serve as much of a structural role as a substantive role in international human rights.Footnote ⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the concept of human dignity invariably ascribes an inestimable value to all human persons equally. Dignity is universal and individualized, it is something common to all humans, it is something that persists in the mere fact of being human, and it demands respect.

Second, there is an inescapable connection between the rights enumerated in the international human rights instruments and their basis in human dignity. As Jacques Maritain, a key theorist working behind the scenes of the development of the UDHR, said, “[i]f the affirmation of the intrinsic value and dignity of man is nonsense, the affirmation of the natural rights of man is nonsense also.”Footnote ⁸⁶ Scholars have been unable to identify and agree on what it is about humans that supports ascribing dignity and respect to humans.Footnote ⁸⁷ But insofar as the rights enumerated in international human rights treaties are understood to express some of what is required to respect human dignity, the rights themselves can help elaborate what it is about humans that deserves respect. The inverse is also true — namely, that the concept of human dignity, in spite of its variegated nature, can also help elaborate the content of human rights protections.Footnote ⁸⁸ This is not to say that rights and dignity are synonymous. Instead, the two — human dignity and human rights — work and evolve symbiotically.Footnote ⁸⁹ This means that to consider aspects of the concept of human dignity alongside the specific rights enumerated in the UDHR and the ICCPR is mutually enlightening.Footnote ⁹⁰

Returning to interactive and relational ideas, which are latent in the UN discourse on religious freedom, we can trace a deep connection between religious freedom and human dignity. The idea that I will focus attention on in the following discussion is the notion of spiritual freedom, which is about the exercise of human reason in the pursuit of truth. The pursuit of truth through human reason is often seen in terms of individual autonomy and conscience, but, as I argue below, it is also deeply connected to relationships of interdependence. This connection between individual reason and relational interdependence as constituent elements of human dignity offers a conceptual basis for a more robust account of religious proselytization in international human rights law and, in particular, the freedom of religion. It links the individual concerns of religious choice, expression, and non-coercion to the contextual concerns of relationships of interdependence of which individuals are a part.

In a recent book on the philosophical perspectives of the drafters of the UDHR, Linde Lindkvist described the philosophical views of Charles Malik, the representative of Lebanon, who was highly influential in drafting the UDHR. Footnote ⁹¹ Malik was deeply committed to the idea of the spiritual freedom of humanity, which was for him a key animating principle for the entire international human rights project. Malik was of the view that religious freedom is not simply a freedom to choose or to believe and practice one’s belief but also a process freedom — it is the freedom to become.Footnote ⁹² Freedom of religion is, from this view, something that empowers people to grow in their souls, to search for the truth, and then to follow their conscience in that regard. Protecting the right to change religions was not, for Malik, intended to grant special privilege or protection for the “horizontal” conversion between religions. Instead, Malik had in mind to protect the “vertical” process of becoming, which was the acquisition of knowledge and adjusting (converting) one’s life in response to it, which may just as well occur within one’s own religion or outside of religion. As Lindkvist explained,

The significance of spiritual freedom reached beyond the right to religious freedom. For Malik, this was a central part of the human person that the nascent system of international human rights was meant to honour and protect. Articles 1 and 18 of the UDHR were key for Malik because they most clearly articulate the “true mission” of the human person to freely search and to change.Footnote ⁹⁴ According to Lindkvist, this explains why Malik supported framing Article 18 of the UDHR as protecting the “conscience” of individuals to follow a religion of their own choice, and why he supported including the right to change religions in the text. Prior to the UDHR, the protection of religious freedom was often framed primarily in terms of the freedom to “worship.”Footnote ⁹⁵ Shifting the focus in Article 18 of the UDHR to the protection of “conscience” elevated the importance of the spiritual freedom of humanity, and of the necessity of human choice to this freedom, within the context of religious life. From this view, religious freedom is a crucial recognition of the human spirit and protects the practices related to the freedom of the human spirit.

Malik’s concern for the spiritual freedom of human persons — which manifested in the freedom to change religions — grew in response to the powerful influence of Communist materialism and a desire to ensure that the human rights project and the work of the United Nations more generally were not overtaken by Communist ideology.Footnote ⁹⁶ The freedom of religion was an important site for defining and protecting the soul of the human person. Lindkvist summed up Malik’s view in this way:

The debates in the travaux preparatoires mentioned earlier appear differently in light of these observations about Malik’s view of spiritual freedom. In particular, Baroody’s opposition to the freedom to change religion, the responses to this opposition, and the ultimate adoption of the right to change one’s religion in the text of the UDHR can be viewed as a proxy debate regarding a deeper dispute over the philosophical conception of the human person, the purpose of human rights, and the role played by religious freedom. By suggesting this, I do not mean to dismiss the substantive concerns that Baroody raised regarding the abuse of religious proselytism for political and cultural imperialist ends. Rather, I want to draw attention to the way in which the dispute over religious proselytization meant more to those involved in drafting the UN human rights instruments than what Baroody’s words literally suggest.

The integration of spiritual freedom in human rights can be seen in an important conceptual feature of religious freedom — the distinction between the so-called forum internum and the forum externum aspects of religious freedom.Footnote ⁹⁸ The idea here is that the internal aspect of religion — inner beliefs, knowledge, and conscience — can be distinguished from the external aspect of religion — the manifestations of religion, such as public expressions and acts of religious devotion. One of the key reasons for this distinction is pragmatic. It identifies what cannot be regulated (the internal) and what can be regulated (the external) through law in relation to religion. The freedom of the former is considered to be absolute, whereas the freedom of the latter is not and may be justifiably restricted in law.Footnote ⁹⁹ But the internal/external distinction is also connected to the present discussion of spiritual freedom in two ways.

First, the concept of religious freedom is framed in terms of the agency of individual persons to determine their own religious path. The absolute freedom of the inner self — the forum internum — echoes the idea of human self-determination, which is a core part of the modern idea of human dignity and spiritual freedom that is often traced back to Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola’s Oration on the Dignity of Man. Footnote ¹⁰⁰ As Pico Della Mirandola explains, “[t]he nature of all other creatures is defined and restricted within laws which We (God) have laid down. Thou (humanity), impeded by no restrictions, according to thine own free will, in whose hand We have placed thee, shalt define thyself.”Footnote ¹⁰¹ Recognizing that the interior of the person must never be deprived of its freedom to think and believe what it wants about the ultimate questions of human life is a declaration of the spiritual freedom of humanity.Footnote ¹⁰² From this view, humanity is uniquely dignified because people are not determined but are able to choose their own path. Human persons are more than the product of their material conditions (whether their economic class or their historic cultural identity) — they are free in their personhood, whether that be called a soul or something else, to question and to affirm what they believe to be true.

Second, the concept of religious freedom goes beyond the inner aspect of belief to include an external aspect. As Max Stackhouse and Deirdre Hainsworth have noted, “[t]he point of all conversion is that we are not simply what we are but are related to a greater reality than most of ordinary life discloses and have a duty, and thus the right, to turn to it intellectually, morally, and relationally.”Footnote ¹⁰³ Religious freedom is not simply about having a free mind and conscience, but also includes having the freedom to live life consistent with one’s internal conscience. The concept has multiple dimensions. Religion is expressive, which means that religious freedom must protect external manifestations that flow from what one thinks and feels inside. Religion is also communal, insofar as it involves interactions between persons in terms of their religious thoughts and beliefs. For someone to be free in their religious beliefs means that they are free in their individual outward expression of their beliefs, as well as in their communal practice and engagement with others.

Religious proselytism is a challenging practice because it defies a simple and neat division between the internal and external aspects of religion. To proselytize is in one sense purely external — it cannot be mistaken with purely personal practices of religion, such as prayer — because it necessarily involves the interaction between people. On the other hand, proselytization is deeply connected to, and flows from, the internal aspect of religion. As mentioned earlier, proselytization reflects the interior conviction of the truth of one’s religious beliefs. Furthermore, proselytization is part of the process by which a person can develop their internal thoughts and feelings about religious truth and belief. The internal and external aspects of religious belief are closely aligned — the freedom to have and to choose one’s own internal beliefs includes the freedom to externally engage in the necessary “communicative interactions” that enable someone to seek, receive, and impart ideas as well as to try to persuade others (or oneself) of these ideas.Footnote ¹⁰⁴

It is interesting to note at this point that the travaux préparatoires of the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the 1981 Declaration addressed the issue of proselytism primarily in terms of the forum internum’s right to change one’s religion, as if the right to change religions implies the right to proselytize. As the concept of religious freedom developed through the work of the HRC and the SRFRB, religious proselytism came to be seen primarily as a manifestation of religion, which locates it in the forum externum. Footnote ¹⁰⁵ From this, the language of coercion as the limitation to the external action of proselytism came to dominate the international human rights discourse. In both situations, though, the discussion does not really engage with the inter-relation between the internal and external dimensions of religious life.

Although the forum internum and externum distinction is important and helpful in many ways, there are also some risks that come with its usage. The distinction may lead to the incorrect view that the internal and external lives of people can be neatly segregated and treated separately — that human minds and thoughts are separate from human actions and relationships. The connection between the internum and externum is undoubtedly more complex and integrated. This has been acknowledged by many who employ the distinction — for example, former SRFRB Heiner Bielefeld did not shy away from using the internum/externum distinction,Footnote ¹⁰⁶ but he has also identified the intricate connection between the internal dimension of religious belief and the external communicative discourses on religious beliefs.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ Even so, the internal/external distinction in religious freedom doctrine tends to enable analyses of religious proselytization that focus on one aspect and de-emphasize the other. This may be one way to view the discussion in the UN human rights context, where the emphasis flipped from the internal to the external. In the former, the contextual factors mentioned by Baroody were sidelined; in the latter, the internal features of proselytization were sidelined, and context came back into focus. This is not to say that the internum and externum distinction is incorrect or totally unhelpful but, rather, that careful attention must be given to ensure that the nuances and complexities of the inter-relation between the internal and external aspects of religion are not lost from view.Footnote ¹⁰⁸

Turning to consider the idea of spiritual freedom in further depth may be helpful for holding the internal and external dimensions of religious freedom together, in the way that it brings to the foreground the relational dimensions of religious freedom. Although it is crucial to preserve the agency of individuals to pursue and decide for themselves questions of religion, it is not the case that this can be done in isolation. This notion is apparent in how humans exercise their rational capabilities. It is necessary to protect and to foster the kinds of encounters on which human reasoning and choice depend. To focus on the separation between religious internum and externum may inadvertently downplay the way in which relationships and community affect the internally held beliefs of individuals. The notion of spiritual freedom, on the other hand, emphasizes the connection between these elements. Religious belief and membership are more than individual matters. Although the degree to which religion penetrates a person’s social life may vary from place to place and from person to person, religion is never separate from relationship. Religion is inherited first and only later taken up as one’s own.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ The processes of originally “inheriting” and later “taking up as one’s own” religion is not straight-forward or uniform amongst all people. Neither is accomplished in isolation, but they always involve the individual’s interactions with others.Footnote ¹¹⁰ Religions are living traditions, not simply creedal statements, practices, or theologies.

Choosing, changing, or abandoning religious belief and institutional membership is not simply an intellectual process. It is deeply personal, moral, and ethical — it affects one’s view of oneself, one’s view of their relation to reality, and one’s relationships with others.Footnote ¹¹¹ Choosing or changing one’s religion is also not entirely a matter of exercising individual will. It may, for many, be experienced not as a choice at all but, rather, as feeling chosen or responding to being called.Footnote ¹¹² It is easy to focus on the moment of decision regarding religious beliefs and membership when, in reality, change in one’s religion occurs slowly over time, through what some have called a crystalline process of personal transformation — a kind of long prelude to the moment of conversion.Footnote ¹¹³ Change in religious belief, like changes in human beliefs more generally, involves more than affirming or denying truth propositions. It also encompasses a deeper sensibility of what is good and right. This sensibility is not just a “feeling” or a preference, but it is a kind of proto-rational knowledge of the truth. Some have called this “connatural” knowledge or inclination.Footnote ¹¹⁴ Here, “the intellect is at play not alone, but together with affective inclinations and dispositions of the will, and is guided and directed by them.”Footnote ¹¹⁵ Connatural knowledge is not developed through pure or abstract intellectual pursuit. It is produced by demonstration and discipline, through which one learns to shape their desires with direction and guidance. The end result is that the thing known is “embodied in ourselves … or co-natured with it, in our very being.”Footnote ¹¹⁶ Intellectual and rational evaluation of propositions, as well as practical reasoning about what is true and good and making choices that reflect these judgments, involves connatural knowledge in addition to propositional knowledge. Choices about religious beliefs, such as in moments of conversion, are influenced by changes in connatural knowledge.

There is a strong relational dimension at work in the development of human knowledge. There is also a strong relational dimension to the development and exercise of human rationality. Alasdair MacIntyre went so far as to argue that humans are dependent rational animals.Footnote ¹¹⁷ According to MacIntyre, the rational capacity that distinguishes humans from other intelligent animals is the ability to self-reflect on our reasons for action, which enables the constant critique of one’s own understanding of the ultimate good, the adjustment of the order that one gives to various goods and desires, and the ability to learn and establish related practices that support this reasoning process.Footnote ¹¹⁸ This unique human capacity for autonomous reflection and choice — which is related to the notion of spiritual freedom and human dignity discussed aboveFootnote ¹¹⁹ — is, according to MacIntyre, never exercised in social isolation. The capacity of persons to reflect on their own reasons for judgment presupposes that persons already have a conception of the ultimate good in the first instance, which means that they have inherited a conception of the ultimate good, and related virtues, from others (typically parents and other caregivers).Footnote ¹²⁰ Even at the height of human independent action, people still depend on others (typically friends) to help them see the assumptions and desires that are otherwise hidden from their perception.Footnote ¹²¹ Human autonomy is only possible within the context of interdependent human relationships.

Emerging from these ideas are some indications of the anthropology and ontology of human rights that Malik may have been fighting to embed in the UDHR and may also be alive in other references to dignity in other UN documents. Human dignity is grounded in our intellectual and relational capacities. The human person is capable of pursuing the truth, of questioning their beliefs and knowledge, and of hearing and learning about new ideas and, therefore, has dignity as a rational agent.Footnote ¹²² But, simultaneously, the human power to reason, which is the hallmark of spiritual freedom and autonomous agency, is inextricably tied to human social relationality — in particular, relationships (and accompanying structures and processes) of interdependence. The freedom of religion, as the guarantor of this central spiritual freedom of the human person, is a multifaceted protection of the processes of intellectual and relational interaction.

Religious proselytization, from this view, is as much of a relational encounter as an intellectual encounter. Also, religious proselytization is, from this view, a very important practice that provides the opportunity for the exercise of spiritual freedom to flourish. A full and proper analysis of religious proselytization in international human rights law must account for the individual and relational aspect of religious belief and choice. Religious proselytization must be understood in terms of the process of the interaction between individuals and the relationships within which they live. Recovering the dignity dimensions of religious freedom, especially the notion of spiritual freedom, enriches the analysis of cases of proselytization in human rights law.

4. Case example

It is difficult to articulate the full range of implications that flow from incorporating the interactive relational dimensions of spiritual freedom into a religious freedom analysis of religious proselytism. Some of this can be seen in a unique case of proselytism discussed by Israel Doron and Charles Foster in their article “Is There a Duty to Respect ‘Historical’ Faith? Christian Proselytism of an Older Jewish Woman with Dementia.”Footnote ¹²³ This case study involved an elderly Jewish woman, “M,” who was being proselytized by her Christian caretaker, “B.” “D,” M’s daughter, hired B to care for M because of the rapid deterioration of M’s condition due to Alzheimer’s disease. At first, things appeared to be going well with the arrangement, but, as time went on, D discovered that B was singing and reading Christian scriptures to M.Footnote ¹²⁴ This made D quite upset so she fired B and initiated a criminal complaint against B for abusing and humiliating M.Footnote ¹²⁵

There are two challenges to analyzing this case in terms of religious freedom. First, B’s actions may not immediately appear as “proselytism” in the classic sense because she does not seem to be trying to convert M. Having said that, B’s actions clearly line up with the concerns expressed throughout the UN human rights discourse regarding improper proselytism. B is in a position of power over M so that M is a captive audience, and M has no way to withdraw from B’s care or to avoid B’s religious expressions.Footnote ¹²⁶ Even still, it is difficult to recognize this as proselytism because of the complicating fact of M’s illness. This leads to the second challenge, which is that M may not have the capacity to make the kinds of evaluations, engage in the kinds of communicative interactions, and make the kinds of choices that are normally associated with the exercise of religious freedom. Although M is captive to B’s religious expressions, M’s lack of capacity may mean that she cannot be “coerced” in the sense of being forced to abandon her religious convictions or to hide her true religious beliefs.

The challenge posed by this case study underscores some of the limitations with the way in which religious proselytism has been framed in the international human rights discourse. M’s condition pulls in both directions in the human right analysis. On the one hand, as already mentioned, M is vulnerable, especially to those who have charge over her care. On the other hand, M’s condition leaves her in a place where she does not have a clear set of religious beliefs that she can be “coerced” to leave behind. It must be the case that M’s lack of capacity to make religious choices does not leave her subject to the whims of those who have care over her.Footnote ¹²⁷ She must still have spiritual freedom as part of her human dignity, but how is this to be described? Focusing too much on the individualized concerns of religious choice and belief makes it difficult to analyze the situation with any clarity. As mentioned, it is unclear how to explain the problem with B’s conduct in terms of coercion. It is also difficult to explain why this is a case of proselytization in the first place.

As I have already argued, there are resources within the international human rights discourse that can offer some clarity. For example, there are contexts where the religious lives of persons who do not have the capacity to make independent religious choices are placed in the hands of those who have care over them (for example, children and their parents).Footnote ¹²⁸ The fact that the religion of some may be bound up in their dependence on others does not vitiate the concept of freedom.Footnote ¹²⁹ And it need not be conceptualized as an exception to the general rule of autonomous religious choice. Rather, as I noted earlier, the exercise of individual spiritual freedom is always in some way dependent on others, even for those acting with what we call full autonomy. Spiritual freedom is a relational as well as an individual concept.

The role of relationship is relevant for analyzing religious freedom as well as the ethical concerns that Doron and Foster discussed in their article. Doron and Foster explored various conceptual approaches to frame the ethics of B’s conduct, which includes focusing on M’s autonomy, on her “new personality” due to the progression of Alzheimer’s, on her connection to her family and community, on her “best interests,” and on the implications of a Jewish religious perspective.Footnote ¹³⁰ They conclude that all of these conceptual approaches are inadequate, and they suggest instead a holistic view of autonomy and relationality that is grounded on human dignity. This viewpoint, according to Doron and Foster, enables a novel construction of M’s identity that is connected to all of her many relationships, current and historical.Footnote ¹³¹ Doron and Foster observe that, because M’s religious identity is bound up in her various relationships of dependence, an assessment of her dignity requires more than looking at her autonomy. It requires looking at the nexus between M’s dignity and the dignity interests of the other persons implicated in the situation.Footnote ¹³²

Similarly, in terms of religious freedom, the relational dimension of spiritual freedom enables us to recognize M’s case as a matter of religious proselytism. The reason for this is that B is able to influence M’s religious beliefs at a sub-rational level, or what may be called the formation of connatural knowledge or instinct. B’s conduct may lead to real change in M’s religion, although it may be slow and imperceptible or “crystalline.” This is where the concept of proselytization, as a broad process that encompasses individual acts of proselytism and moments of religious change, proves its salience. The relational dimension of spiritual freedom also provides a way to frame the problem with B’s conduct. Although B rightly recognized the need to support the spiritual life of M as a matter of her dignity, B failed to consider the role that M’s other relationships of dependence play in her spiritual freedom. The other relationship that matters greatly to M’s religious beliefs is her relationship with D. Not only does M depend on her daughter to maintain her dignity in a broad sense, but, in this case, D’s religious identity also directly depends on M because, as Jews, D inherited her religious identify from her mother. The religious identity of M is intricately tied to the religious identity of D. In a very real way, then, the threat that B’s actions posed to M’s Jewish identity is also a threat to D’s Jewish identity. B wrongly assumed a primary role in guiding the spiritual life of M when B should have deferred to D. Failing to do so interfered with M’s spiritual freedom by undermining the core relationship in M’s religious life.

The relational dimension of spiritual freedom affirms that relationships of dependence matter for preserving and fostering the human dignity of a person. Those who are not capable on their own to exercise their spiritual freedom depend on others to sustain their spiritual freedom. What dignity prescribes for religious freedom analysis is the identification and preservation of the relationships of interdependence in which people live their religious lives. Of course, this may include multiple relationships and requires characterizing each relationship and establishing the hierarchy between them. This example demonstrates that an overly individualized notion of choice and coercion is inadequate to assess B’s proselytization of M in terms of religious freedom. To frame the question in individualized terms ignores the concerns and interests at stake that really matter — how does B’s conduct affect the relationship between M and D? The larger question that has to be addressed is how to properly account for and incorporate the relational dimension of M’s religious beliefs and identity into an account of her religious freedom?

To develop this fully would take us beyond the scope of this article and will have to be left for future scholarship. But from the brief discussion above, it is apparent that the discourse on international religious freedom will have to evolve to include the relational dimension of religious belief and practice as an aspect of the individualized principles of religious coercion and choice. It will also be necessary to develop a set of criteria for analyzing the different relationships that a person has, how these relationships intersect with each other (perhaps as a hierarchy of importance), and how these relational dimensions connect to the notions of religious belief and practice. The notion of spiritual freedom, as a dimension of human dignity at work in the right to religious freedom, provides the conceptual coordinates to begin to formulate these answers.