I. Introduction
The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the main instrument of the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) package adopted by the European Union (EU) to help Member States become more resilient after the Covid-19 pandemic. Regulation (EU) 2021/241 (the “RRF Regulation”) establishes a temporary mechanism providing €648 billionFootnote 1 to Member States to offset the negative socio-economic effects of the crisis at the domestic level. To receive funding, EU countries must implement their National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) which includes milestones and targets (M&Ts) to be fulfilled by mid-2026. This is the performance logic behind the RRF spending conditionality.
Performance has become a key element of EU governance. Since the end of the twentieth century, the global predominance of neoliberalism has impacted the EU, spreading an economic, financial, and managerial logic in public policy.Footnote 2 According to Foucault, “neoliberal governmentality” implies that neoliberal rationality and economic principles become a model for political conduct and the object of public policy even in non-economic fields.Footnote 3 Moreover, New Public Management (NPM) accentuates the primacy of performance in public policy by transposing the private eco-managerial logic into the public sphere.Footnote 4 New methods, tools, and indicators have been developed, including incentivisation, spending conditionality, coordination, benchmarking, targets, best practices, input-output efficiency, reform plans, etc.Footnote 5 The dissemination of economic neoliberalism in the European public sphere also extends to policies for which the EU has more limited competence, including rule of law enforcement.Footnote 6
The economisation of rule of law protection in the EU corresponds to three elements: the development of measurement indicators for justice systems; the idea that rule of law protection is conducive to the EU’s economic growth and financial interests; as well as the use of budgetary instruments to foster rule of law compliance. In particular, the European Semester is an annual framework for economic and fiscal policy coordination since 2011, which adopts country-specific recommendations (CSRs). CSRs can address rule of law issues that impact domestic economies, like anti-corruption, public procurement, anti-money laundering or judicial independence. Moreover, the EU’s shift towards “governance through funding”Footnote 7 includes the protection of values.Footnote 8 Since the 2021-2027 period, three budgetary instruments can make EU funds conditional upon respect for European values – one of them being the RRF.
The RRF indeed reflects this economisation process.Footnote 9 First, M&Ts may address rule of law principles, depending on CSRs. Their fulfilment is assessed according to the content of the plans, which act as contract-like roadmaps.Footnote 10 The disbursement of the associated recovery funds is conditional upon a positive assessment by the European Commission. Second, adequate domestic control and audit systems are required to prevent fraud, corruption, and conflicts of interests for the sound management of EU funds.Footnote 11 Third, the RRF must be implemented in accordance with Regulation 2020/2092, which creates a general regime of spending conditionality against domestic breaches of rule of law principles that (seriously risk) affect(ing) the financial interests of the Union.Footnote 12 Therefore, the rule of law is primarily safeguarded as a prerequisite for protecting the EU’s financial interests, in line with neoliberal governmentality.Footnote 13
Therefore, this economisation process not only reinforces the reluctance to consider the RRF as a complementary instrument of the rule of law toolkit, but also questions the level of rule of law protection that can be expected from performance-based spending conditionality. Some scholars have argued that current performance frameworks are not well-suited for the safeguard of values.Footnote 14 Politico-legal indicators are developed to turn abstract concepts into measurable variables, in order to (1) back the decisions made by public authorities with objective data and (2) improve compliance by the targeted actors thanks to clear goals.Footnote 15 However, on the one hand, institutional and academic stakeholders acknowledge that the design of performance regimes stems from a normative framing process, whereby empowered authorities prioritise certain principles, objectives, and variables over others.Footnote 16 On the other hand, the features and use made of performance-based frameworks influence policy results. The academic literature has already documented the limitations of performance systems, including minimum and short-term compliance at the expense of long-term impact; cherry-picking whereby targeted actors partially comply with the objectives; an inability to address unexpected environmental change; or distortion of performance measurement to ensure positive evaluations and instrument credibility.Footnote 17
New modes of governance now rely more on incentivisation, coordination and flexibility, since top-down and rigid approaches have failed to produce satisfactory policy results.Footnote 18 The RRF is rooted in this perspective, establishing a quasi-contractual relationship between EU institutions and Member States, balancing discipline and flexibility, coercion and coordination, as well as supranational authority and national ownership in order to maximise compliance.Footnote 19 Yet, it may seem contradictory to allow flexibility in reforms linked to a European value and an EU membership criterion like the rule of law, when rule of law spending conditionality has initially been considered a more coercive solution to end domestic backsliding. In addition, scholars have already warned that financial instruments (including the RRF) only cover a limited number of aspects that align with the economic rationale.Footnote 20 Therefore, research on RRF spending conditionality is relevant not only for a better understanding of the effects of performance-based governance on public policy in general, but also on rule of law protection in particular. Based on the comparative case study of the Hungarian, Polish and Slovak plans, this article addresses the following question: How is the RRF performance-based framework applied to the safeguard of the rule of law? Section II develops the research design; Section III explains the rules of the RRF model applied to rule of law protection; Section IV assesses this performance framework in practice, against the findings of the Hungarian, Polish and Slovak plans; and Section IV concludes with the lessons learnt from applying the RRF performance logic to the rule of law.
II. Research design
Performance is a complex concept that can have different meanings. Selecting indicators is a normative task that directly influences processes and results, and the collected data can also face different interpretations.Footnote 21 Therefore, the features of a performance framework are crucial for the conduct of public policies. NPM places a great emphasis on result-oriented performance through efficiency and effectiveness.Footnote 22 Moreover, previous regimes have demonstrated that rigid and top-down approaches produce limited compliance, as in the aftermath of the 2008 economic and financial crisis, hence the need for adaptability and cooperation.Footnote 23 Conversely, coordinative instruments without coercion are also imperfect, like CSRs in the European Semester.Footnote 24 The RRF thus adheres to an output, short-term, contractual if not transactional performance logic, predicated on the exchange of recovery money for the fulfilment of M&Ts listed in a country-specific plan.Footnote 25 It aims to strike a balance between discipline and discretion, coercion and coordination.Footnote 26 This article examines the performance framework in the safeguard of rule of law protection from various perspectives. Firstly, it addresses the coverage and significance of rule of law protection in the rules of the RRF performance regime. Secondly, it defines the type of measures related to the safeguard of this value. Thirdly, it includes performance measurement via the behaviour of assessing bodies. Fourthly, it addresses performance results through compliance with the set conditions by implementing authorities.
This study compares the RRF model of rule of law spending conditionality with the empirical study of the NRRPs of Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. This case selection is justified by several reasons. First, these countries experienced a similar framework of rule of law conditionality through the application of the Copenhagen political criteria during the 2004 enlargement wave. Second, these Member States have been or are led by a government considered responsible for rule of law backsliding: the Morawiecki government in Poland (2017–2023), the Orbán government in Hungary (since 2010), and the fourth Fico government in Slovakia (since 2023). Therefore, the three countries share relatively comparable historical and contextual similarities regarding rule of law protection. Third, the rule of law has played a crucial role in the adoption of their NRRPs, leading to heated debates and/or numerous M&Ts on this issue. Moreover, supranational authorities keep monitoring the three countries, in case other spending conditionality instruments need to be activated.Footnote 27 Fourth, the relative weight of recovery funds in relation to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is in a similar range. The comparable financial pressure should therefore result in a relatively close leverage being exerted on these Member States.
Lastly, this article is based on a variety of sources. Institutional documents from the European Commission, national authorities, the Council of the EU, the European Court of Auditors, and the European Parliament have been consulted. A dataset from the European Commission provided detailed information on the implementation of all M&Ts by each Member State by July 2025.Footnote 28 Furthermore, this article incorporates the results of sixteen semi-structured elite interviews with civil servants working at the EU level.
III. The rules of the RRF performance model: the case of rule of law protection
The RRF legal framework provides information on the performance model applied to rule of law spending conditionality. Rules are detailed in Regulation (EU) 2021/241 and the guidelines published by the Commission.Footnote 29
The design stage informs on the significance and framing of rule of law protection in NRRPs. This value could be addressed via two of the criteria listed for the NRRP adoption in the RRF Regulation.Footnote 30 The draft arrangements were expected among other things to (1) address “all or a significant subset of challenges” in CSRs and (2) “prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests.”Footnote 31 Thanks to this general wording, Member States could adjust measures according to their national specificities, but this flexibility also meant discrepancies in the coverage of rule of law protection between NRRPs. Nevertheless, this value was given particular attention in several respects. Both adoption criteria required the highest rating for the plan to be adopted.Footnote 32 Although not all CSRs had to be addressed, certain fields had to be prioritised including “respect of the rule of law,” “the anti-money laundering framework, anti-fraud and anti-corruption.”Footnote 33 Furthermore, a plan could not be approved if control systems were deemed “insufficient” to protect the Union from corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests.Footnote 34 In the end, despite its relatively important status, the safeguard of the rule of law is aimed at ensuring the institutional resilience of national economiesFootnote 35 and the sound management of EU funds.Footnote 36 The effectiveness of justice or control and audit systems is seen as a precondition for the swift implementation of the NRRPs.Footnote 37 However, the aspects of this value that do not align with this logic are left aside.Footnote 38
Moreover, the RRF measurement framework reflects the influence of NPM. Planification turned NRRPs into a form of checklists. The European Commission supported a staged approach to reforms and investments,Footnote 39 dividing them into a sequence of specific acts across time, each corresponding to a milestone or target to be fulfilled. It recommended to drive the implementation process with input or output indicators, considered more controllable and independent from external factors contrary to impact indicators.Footnote 40 It follows that the fulfilment of rule of law-related M&Ts depends on short-term qualitative or quantitative results, such as specific legislative changes, a number of trainings, or a certain quantity of additional equipment. The clarity of these specific objectives is intended to facilitate completion and assessment. But according to Kim Lane Scheppele,Footnote 41 a checklist approach to the safeguard of the rule of law fails to grasp the systemic essence of this value. The RRF managerial and fragmented vision thus hinders the potential for long-term and impactful effect of rule of law related reforms.
Lastly, the rules of the implementation process strike a balance between flexibility and discipline in the assessment of rule of law related M&Ts. Article 24 of the RRF Regulation details the rules on payments and suspensions. Once a payment request is submitted, the European Commission must check whether the concerned M&Ts are actually fulfilled. Some room for manoeuvre is left to national authorities during the implementation process, since the de minimis principle allows for minimal deviation from the initial substance and timing of reforms.Footnote 42 Yet non-fulfilment or reversal of fulfilment automatically leads to a partial suspension of money, amounting to the funds associated with the specific M&Ts.Footnote 43 If control and audit systems are involved, the suspension concerns the entire instalment and all the future instalments until non-fulfilment is remedied.Footnote 44 Therefore, specific and stricter rules apply to control and audit systems, due to their significance for the sound management of EU funds. For this reason, this type of milestones often has the status of “super” milestones, which means that their fulfilment is required before the first payment request. Furthermore, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 also applies to RRF funds, meaning that the Council of the EU can adopt restrictive measures when a Member State conducts rule of law violations that (risk) affect(ing) the EU’s financial interests during the NRRP implementation. Overall, rule of law protection is given particular attention during the RRF implementation because it plays a role for the safeguard of the EU’s financial interests.
Ultimately, the design of NRRPs has prioritised the safeguard of the rule of law, although the scope and impact of the measures have been limited by the RRF economic, output-driven and short-term essence, in line with the principles of NPM and neoliberal governmentality. Nevertheless, this value is subject to a rigorous assessment during the implementation process, given the involvement of the EU’s financial interests.Footnote 45
IV. The RRF performance model in practice: implementation of rule of law-related conditions
1. Hungary
Hungary’s NRRP amounts to €10.4 billion, representing 4% of its 2019 GDP.Footnote 46 Yet despite its reliance on EU funds, Hungary has not sent a payment request as of mid-2025.
Rule of law protection is a central issue in Hungary’s plan, which sparked intense negotiations during the drafting process. Already submitted on 11 May 2021, the Hungarian NRRP was the last plan to be adopted on 15 December 2022 – just before the 2023 deadline implying the loss of most recovery funds.Footnote 47 Supranational actors would not adopt a draft without significant provisions on this value, so the initial version proposed by the country was updated twice.Footnote 48 In the end, almost 80 M&Ts relate to rule of law protection.Footnote 49 Among them, 27 “super” milestones must be complied with before the first payment request.
The prioritisation of rule of law protection in the Hungarian NRRP must be analysed in light of all the files going on at the time.Footnote 50 Several instruments involving rule of law spending conditionality became intertwined. On the one hand, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 was activated against Hungary on 27 April 2022 and led to restrictive measures for the protection of the Union budget against rule of law violations.Footnote 51 The two Council Implementing Decisions (CIDs) adopted on 15 December 2022 reflected a correspondence between 17 super milestones from the Hungarian NRRP and remedial measures from the application of the “Conditionality Regulation” (CR). On the other hand, an overlap emerged in the application of the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR). On 22 December 2022, the Commission confirmed that the features of the Hungarian judicial system did not comply with the enabling condition related to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR).Footnote 52 Therefore, four super milestones in the Hungarian NRRP address the judicial issues identified via the CPR.Footnote 53
In particular, the safeguard of the rule of law is centered on “the anti-corruption framework, competition in public procurement, judicial independence, as well as the predictability, quality and transparency of decision-making.”Footnote 54 The plan explicitly states that the persisting issues “have implications also on economic and social processes in the country.”Footnote 55 This economic perspective resonates with the CSRs adopted in the framework of the European Semester on which the Hungarian NRRP is based.Footnote 56 Four super milestones also concern the protection of the EU’s financial interests through the effectiveness of control and audit systems. In addition, the influence of NPM is reflected in the operationalisation of rule of law protection. Multiple reforms directly aim at improving performance, like Reform 12 on the “Performance measurement framework for public procurements.” Output indicators drive the assessment of M&Ts, including quantitative benchmarks for targets. Some requirements clearly impact the safeguard of the rule of law within a policy area, such as the progressive decrease in the share of single bids in public procurement procedures. But the direct effect of other measures is less convincing, such as the mere publication of a governmental assessment regarding an anti-corruption strategy. Although procedures and practice play a key role in the safeguard of the rule of law, the risk is to deprive measures from their substance and to fall into a box-ticking exercise, which is even more likely in Hungary where the government is known for its engagement in “symbolic” compliance.Footnote 57
Moreover, the impartiality of evaluation processes and the exclusive reliance on performance-based criteria have been called into question, given the politicisation of rule of law spending conditionality procedures. According to several scholars, Hungary’s veto threat strategy in the Council creates a risk of “transactionalism,” meaning the use of external files to support domestic interests in rule of law spending conditionality processes.Footnote 58 For example, the Council’s decisions to adopt Hungary’s NRRP and to reduce the suspension proposed by the Commission in the CR procedure have been interpreted as a transactional move to neutralise Hungary’s veto threat against EU aid to Ukraine.Footnote 59 Yet institutional actors remain divided.Footnote 60 Some EU officials consider it as a coincidence with unfortunate timing.Footnote 61 Others observe an instrumentalisation of procedures resulting from an issue-linkage practice in the Council.Footnote 62
Overall, the salience of the rule of law topic impacted the NRRP adoption.Footnote 63 Rule of law protection is mainly considered as a means for the sound management of EU funds and a favourable investment climate, rather than an end. In mid-2025, Hungary has not submitted any payment request. The fact that recovery funds have not been disbursed so far has several implications. It reinforces the idea that RRF rule of law spending conditionality follows a strict performance-based approach, meaning that no money can be injected unless the requested reforms are implemented – especially super milestones. Furthermore, for some institutional actors, this situation proves that Orbán’s bargaining attempts are counter-productive, isolating Hungary within the Council and reinforcing an uncompromising attitude within the Commission.Footnote 64 Yet, it is detrimental to the RRF image, insinuating that governance through funding is not sufficient to trigger reforms in a Member State. The limited leverage of financial pressure remains surprising for some EU officials, since Hungary remains a high beneficiary of EU funds and since the country is already in a problematic economic situation.Footnote 65
2. Poland
Poland’s NRRP is worth €59.8 billion, representing 11.2% of its 2019 GDP.Footnote 66 Unlike Hungary, Poland has already received recovery funds, some of which linked to rule of law provisions.
The Polish NRRP triggered heated debates on the coverage of this value. Although the draft version was submitted in May 2021, the final plan was adopted by CID on 17 June 2022. The politicisation of the rule of law issue contributed to the one-year adoption delay, instead of the two-month assessment period set by the RRF Regulation. First, the plan had to be redrafted to include the ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) rendered on 15 July 2021, finding that the Polish disciplinary regime did not protect judicial independence.Footnote 67 Second, at the stage of the Commission assessment, five Commissioners expressed their concern regarding the coverage of the rule of law. Commissioners Timmermans and Vestager even voted against the proposal,Footnote 68 while Commissioners Reynders, Jourová and Johansson sent letters of concern after the College meeting.Footnote 69 Following the NRRP adoption, four organisations representing European judges launched actions for annulment at the EU General Court against the CID, claiming that the respective milestones did not meet the standards of judicial independence set by the CJEU case law.Footnote 70 Rule of law protection was therefore already into the limelight at the time of the NRRP adoption.
In the Polish plan, only a few milestones address the safeguard of this value. F1G, F2G, F3G focuses on the justice system by strengthening the independence and impartiality of courts and judges, F4G aims at improving law-making, while F7G concerns the audit and control systems.Footnote 71 The low number of milestones is aligned with the limited coverage of the rule of law in CSRs.Footnote 72 The Commission’s official position is that the related measures are limited in number but demanding and impactful. Their significance and prioritisation are also reflected by the status of super milestone that is attributed to F1G, F2G, and F7G.Footnote 73 In this case, the influence of NPM and neoliberal governmentality is also clear. The objective of this section of the plan is “to improve the investment climate in Poland.”Footnote 74 Fulfilment is to be confirmed by output indicators, such as the enactment of a piece of legislation, case adjudication or the publication of an audit report. However, in this case, the milestone descriptions provide extensive detail on the required provisions, thereby enhancing the substantive effect of reforms and mitigating the risk of formalistic compliance.
Afterwards, the implementation stage also faced controversy – especially the first instalment. Poland submitted its first payment request on 15 December 2023. On 29 February 2024, the Commission published a positive evaluation, confirming inter alia the satisfactory fulfilment of the three super milestones.Footnote 75 Nevertheless, additional measures were required by the Commission during the assessment process, illustrating the incomplete nature of the reforms at the time of the request. The entry into force of a piece of legislation in July 2022 had to be supplemented by an order of the Ministry of Justice in February 2024 for the fulfilment of F1G. In addition, remaining weaknesses of control and audit systems were identified by the Commission in December 2023 but corrected before the final assessment for the fulfilment of F7G. These examples reflect the application of the de minimis principle, authorising minimal deviation from the timing (and substance) of reforms.
But domestic politics nurtured suspicions of a permissive evaluation by the Commission, allegedly acting on promises rather than actual reforms, which would be contrary to a strict performance-based approach. In February 2024, the new governmental coalition led by Tusk presented an Action Plan for restoring the rule of law.Footnote 76 As the positive assessment of the Commission was published the same month, some political and academic actors considered that it was based on the promises of the action plan. In particular, Hungarian opponents from PiS denounced the existence of double standards and arbitrariness in the Commission assessment process, implying a laxist and partisan attitude towards some governments but not others.Footnote 77 On the contrary, according to Commission officials, a positive assessment can only be based on factual legal elements, even though the willingness of a government to overcome political obstacles is also taken into account.Footnote 78 While the timing questioned the RRF evidence-based approach to performance, the Commission demonstration is particularly detailed.Footnote 79
In parallel, in the CPR procedure, Poland had admitted the non-fulfillment of the CFR horizontal enabling condition, leading to a freezing of €76.5 billion.Footnote 80 In January 2024, Poland notified the Commission that it had fulfilled the required condition thanks to the reforms of the justice system, which led to the suspension being lifted on 29 February 2024 — the same day the first RRF payment was confirmed.Footnote 81 It proves that the EU tries to adopt coherent and coordinated decisions on rule of law spending conditionality, as the Commission preferred to synchronise the disbursement of EU funds from two instruments.
Therefore, the Polish case demonstrates that the influence of neoliberal governmentality and NPM can nevertheless lead to more substantial reforms of the justice systems, and therefore have potential for lasting impact on the safeguard of the rule of law. It follows that the nature and detail of the requirements listed in the plan play an important role on the final result. So far, the Commission has justified its assessments against factual elements, beyond the promises made in the political context. On 13 September 2024, Poland sent a payment request for the second and third instalments, positively assessed by the Commission on 12 November 2024.Footnote 82
3. Slovakia
The Slovak NRRP is considered as an ambitious plan, also on the safeguard of the rule of law.Footnote 83 The value of Slovakia’s NRRP is €6.4 billion, representing 6.8% of its 2019 GDP.Footnote 84 Five payments have already been disbursed.
The drafting period was more expeditive than for Hungary and Poland. The Slovak RRP was submitted in April 2021 and adopted in July 2021. In total, 13 milestones and 5 targets directly relate to rule of law protection. The number of M&Ts on this topic is aligned with the coverage of this value in CSRs, focusing on the judicial system, public procurement, anti-corruption and anti-money laundering frameworks.Footnote 85 According to institutional actors, CSRs reflected the situation before 2021, which means that rule of law protection was not a significant priority at the time of the drafting process.Footnote 86 Since the change of government at the end of 2023, new threats to the rule of law have emerged (see below), suggesting that the current domestic context may have warranted stronger language in the NRRP.Footnote 87
The economic framing of the rule of law is particularly strong in the Slovak plan. For example, public procurement reforms are included in the component on improving the business environment. Justice system reforms seek to improve “efficiency, integrity and independence,” such as a new judicial map designed to enable “better and faster court decisions.”Footnote 88 Anti-corruption or anti-money laundering efforts directly impact the protection of the EU’s financial interests. Furthermore, the fulfillment of M&Ts is assessed against output indicators: the entry into force of specific provisions for milestones (e.g., the revised Act on Public Procurement Procedures) and precise quantitative results for targets (e.g., the replacement of 700 police vehicles).Footnote 89 Overall, the nature of the requested changes limits the potential effects on the safeguard of the rule of law in Slovakia. Moreover, the Commission has kept the protection of the EU’s financial interests as a priority by supervising control and audit systems. For the adoption of the Slovak plan, it has imposed an additional control milestone to be fulfilled before the first payment request.Footnote 90 For the adoption of the NRRP revision in 2025, it has added another control milestone to be met before the sixth payment request.Footnote 91
Since the beginning of the implementation stage, Slovakia has faced difficulties to maintain the initial ambition of the plan, leading to several amendments. The changes have also impacted measures related to the rule of law. They have been justified by several reasons, such as delays in public procurement or the reduction of the maximum financial contribution granted to Slovakia.Footnote 92 They have led to deadline extensions, lower targets, but no suppression of measures. Similarly, the fulfilment of milestones of the first, third and fourth payments has been delayed, but the Commission considered this extra time as justified, limited and proportional – in line with the RRF de minimis principle.Footnote 93 This situation illustrates that performance can be reframed in the specific cases delineated by the RRF, when adaptation to contextual elements is required.
However, beyond performance challenges, the fourth instalment raised concerns of potential backsliding. At the time of the assessment, legislative amendments to the Slovak Criminal Code and other related laws of 8 February 2024 were subject to constitutional review by the Constitutional Court, questioning the reversal of the previously fulfilled milestone 15.5 on anti-corruption and justice system.Footnote 94 Yet, the European Commission could not act on amendments under review, so it chose to continue monitoring the situation in case a suspension decision became necessary later on.Footnote 95 On 1 July 2024, it finally validated the fourth payment request, which had been submitted six months earlier. In the end, the concerned legislative provisions changed twice, partially because of the Commission’s request to maintain compliance with the RRF.Footnote 96 Eventually, the risk of reversal was deemed resolved.Footnote 97
Therefore, the Slovak case confirms that governance through funding can be effective, reflecting a balance between discipline and flexibility in the RRF performance-based approach – even in the case of rule of law protection. Nevertheless, in Slovakia as well, the managerial and neoliberal economic framing of these M&Ts limits their potential for long-term impact on rule of law protection.
V. Conclusion
To conclude, the principles of the RRF performance framework apply to the safeguard of the rule of law. Recovery funds can only be disbursed as long as the conditions related to this value are fulfilled. Although the principle of national ownership leaves national representatives free to choose the level of ambition of rule of law reforms included in their plans, the design and practice of the RRF instrument set its safeguard as a priority. NRRP adoption or revision criteria require the highest rating for the coverage of CSRs (favouring those involving rule of law principles) and the effectiveness of control and audit systems. Moreover, the Commission often influenced the content of NRRPs via the addition or special status of milestones linked to rule of law protection, depending on the Member State’s financial situation (dependency on EU funds) or political context (e.g., parallel application of rule of law spending conditionality instruments). At the NRRP implementation stage, the RRF “comply-or-do-not-get-paid”Footnote 98 logic is taken even further when rule of law principles are involved. Non-compliance with or reversal of control milestones not only suspends the concerned funds, but all the recovery money left to be disbursed. Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 also protects recovery funds from rule of law breaches. In the Hungarian, Polish and Slovak cases, the safeguard of this value is set as a priority given the significant number, status or substance of the related M&Ts.
Nevertheless, the safeguard of the rule of law results from the economisation of political values in EU governance, which remains ruled by the principles of neoliberal governmentality and NPM. The rule of law is covered insofar as it ensures the resilience of domestic economies, the safeguard of the EU’s financial interests and the sound management of EU funds. It is mostly framed in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, while it relates principally to justice, public procurement, anti-corruption, anti-money laundering systems. In other words, the rule of law is viewed as a means more than an end in the RRF. This economic rationale is also reflected in the selection of indicators used to assess the fulfilment of the related M&Ts. Output indicators are considered more controllable by domestic actors and more easily verifiable by supranational bodies. But the risk of this approach is to fall into a checklist method that contradicts with the systemic and intertwined essence of rule of law protection.Footnote 99
However, rule of law spending conditionality in the RRF demonstrates that performance regimes do not necessarily guarantee effectiveness. In the domestic perspective, output indicators are meant to facilitate compliance in a short-term period. In the supranational perspective, they are meant to make the decisions made by assessing authorities more objective and legitimate.Footnote 100 But this choice also prevents the long-term and lasting impact of reforms.Footnote 101 In addition, regimes based on M&Ts and instalments risk to face partial or symbolic compliance,Footnote 102 whereby domestic authorities conduct a box-ticking exercise or only comply with the reforms that align with their interests. Reforms can be obstructed for political reasons by politicians, in particular with sensitive topics like the rule of law, as demonstrated in Hungary, or to a lesser extent in Poland and Slovakia. Sometimes, the leverage of spending conditionality is insufficient to trigger reforms, despite financial pressure or national ownership. The Hungarian RRP is the most explicit example of this issue. These challenges question the effectiveness of performance regimes to trigger change on the ground.
Moreover, the promise of impartiality is challenged by the normative essence of performance frameworks. By nature, indicators are linked to a specific vision of the public space and a set of preferences, in line with the essence of the incentivisation method.Footnote 103 Room for manoeuvre is also required to adapt assessments to contextual changes, as public policies are not conducted in a vacuum. The RRF takes up this challenge through tailored national plans, the possibility to reform NRRPs and the principle of minimum deviation in implementation. However, this limited capacity for objectivity creates a risk of politicisation, particularly regarding sensitive or complex issues such as the rule of law. It is easy for policies and politics to become intertwined. The Polish case is a relevant example where the European Commission has been accused of double standards or partial assessment of rule of law reforms. Impartiality is even harder to achieve when there is temporal, financial and reputational pressure to succeed, like in the RRF.Footnote 104
Overall, the RRF provides key lessons on performance regimes and their application to values like the rule of law. It confirms the need for specificity and adaptability, given the importance of national ownership and context management for the effectiveness of performance frameworks. At the same time, discipline and transparency are also core principles mitigating the risks of politicisation and instrumentalisation of decisions. Indicators require a careful choice to address political principles in their entirety, potentially going beyond the output-oriented and purely economic perspective. In this regard, the legal basis chosen for the regulation governing spending conditionality instruments is crucial, as it determines the extent of the EU competence to incentivise domestic reforms and the national policies that can be targeted.Footnote 105
For the 2028–2034 period, the EU has already planned to repeat the experience at the larger scale of the entire EU budget. The project of the European Commission published in July 2025 envisages a performance framework combining financial support for rule of law reforms in tailored national and regional plans, together with a system of conditionalities ensuring the safeguard of the principles of the rule of law.Footnote 106 It seems to adopt a broader understanding of this value, considered not only essential for economic stability but also for Europe’s democracy and rights protection.Footnote 107 In any case, the last year of the RRF implementation and the follow-up process will provide more information to improve both performance regimes and rule of law spending conditionality.
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