¹ See, e.g., Valkenier, Elizabeth, “New Soviet Thinking about the Third World,” World Policy Journal 4 (Fall 1987), 653–54Google Scholar; and Gustafson, Thane, “Conclusions: Toward a Crisis in Civil-Military Relations?” in Colton, Timothy and Gustafson, , eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 343.Google Scholar In the popular press, see “Think-Tanks: The Carousels of Power,” Economist, May 25, 1991, p. 26; and “This Year's Economist,” New York Times, June 23, 1991, p. 14.

² Allen Lynch provides a good overview of the intellectual origins of the new thinking; Lynch, , Gorbachev's International Outlook. Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences, Occasional Paper no. 9 (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989).Google Scholar

³ See, especially, Zimmerman, William, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–67 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969)Google Scholar; Valkenier, Elizabeth, The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind (New York: Praegar, 1983)Google Scholar; Hough, Jerry, The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986)Google Scholar; Lynch, Allen, The Soviet Study of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Shenfield, Stephen, The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987).Google Scholar

⁴ Snyder, Jack, “The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?” International Security 12 (Winter 1987–1988), 93–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Snyder essentially makes this argument. See also Tetlock, Philip, “Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept,” in Breslauer, George and Tetlock, Philip, eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 36.Google Scholar

⁵ Stephen Meyer stresses the importance of leadership variables; Meyer, , “The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security,” International Security 13 (Fall 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ For a comprehensive overview of the epistemic-communities approach, see Haas, Peter M., ed., “Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46 (Winter 1992).Google Scholar This is a special issue of 10 dedicated to the epistemic approach.

⁷ Deudney, Daniel and Ikenberry, G. John, “The International Sources of Soviet Change,” International Security 16 (Winter 1991–1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar The authors list no fewer than eight international sources for the changes in Soviet foreign behavior under Gorbachev.

⁸ The epistemic-communities literature is an exception to this generalization; see Haas (fn. 6).

⁹ This essay thus contributes to a growing body of international relations literature that combines levels of analysis to arrive at more comprehensive explanations of state behavior. This literature has developed partly in response to Kenneth Waltz's theory of structural realism, with its heavy emphasis on one level—international system structure—for understanding state behavior. See Waltz, , Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).Google Scholar For important critiques of Waltzian and other structural arguments see Robert Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Keohane, , ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; McKeown, Timoth, “The Limitations of ‘Structural’ Theories of Commercial Policy,” International Organization 40 (Winter 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph Jr, Power and Interdepen dence, 2d ed. (Boston: Scott, Foresman, 1989)Google Scholar, afterword; and Odeli, John S., “Understands International Trade Policies: An Emerging Synthesis,” World Politics 43 (October 1990).Google Scholar

¹⁰ See, e.g., Legvold, Robert, “Soviet Learning in the 1980s,” in Breslauer and Tetlock (fn.4), 684–87, 720–26. Also addressing this issue is Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Did ‘Peace through Strength’ End the Cold War? Lessons from INF,” International Security 16 (Summer 1991).Google Scholar

¹¹ The seminal work on the level-of-analysis problem remains Singer, J. David, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics 14 (October 1961).Google Scholar This debate continues to the present. See, e.g., the divergent predictions of a number of international relations specialists on the future of European security in the new, post–cold war world, in Lynn-Jones, Sean, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).Google Scholar

¹² A point clearly recognized by Kenneth Waltz (fn. 9), 122–23. See also Christensen, Thomas and Snyder, Jack, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44 (Spring 1990), 137–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ See, e.g., Mandelbaum, Michael, The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Mandelbaum utilizes—unsuccessfully—international-level structural theories to explain the security policies of particular states.

¹⁴ McKeown (fn. 9), 56.

¹⁵ In the IPE literature, see, among others, McKeown (fn. 9); Rohrlich, Paul, “Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policymaking,” International Organization 41 (Winter 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Haggard, Stephan and Simmons, Beth, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), 513–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keohane and Nye (fn. 9), 257–67; Odell (fn. 9); and Adler, Emanuel and Haas, Peter, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program,” in Haas (fn. 6), 367–69.Google Scholar In the foreign policy/security studies subfield, see McKeown, Timothy, “The Foreign Policy of a Declining Power,” International Organization 45 (Spring 1991), 278–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barnett, Michael and Levy, Jack, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignment: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73,” International Organization 45 (Summer 1991), 370–74, 393–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar; RisseKappen (fn. 10); and Haftendorn, Helga, “The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline Building in International Security,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (March 1991), 13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Robert Putnam provides an important theoretical treatment and argument for integrating domestic and international levels. See Putnam, , “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ For a recent and perceptive review of the debate over structural/systemic theories, see Haggard, Stephan, “Structuralism and Its Critics: Recent Progress in International Relations Theory,” in Adler, Emanuel and Crawford, Beverly, eds., Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).Google Scholar

¹⁷ In the IPE subfield, this dynamic has recently been theoretically argued and empirically demonstrated by G. John Ikenberry. See Ikenberry, , “A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement,” in Haas (fn. 6).Google Scholar

¹⁸ McKeown (fn. 9), 56. Advancing a similar argument are Ferguson, Yale and Mansbach, Richard, “Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (December 1991), 374–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar In an interesting parallel to the move away from structural/systemic theories within the international relations field, several scholars in the comparative politics literature have recently argued that domestic-level structural arguments must likewise be supplemented, in this case, to makebetter sense of the political phenomena of concern to comparativists. See especially Hall, Peter, “Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas,” in Hall, , ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989)Google Scholar, chap. 14; Sikkink, Kathryn, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 19Google Scholar; Kuran, Timur, “Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” World Politics 44 (October 1991), 13—25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bova, Russell, “Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective,” World Politics 44 (October 1991), 122, 126–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁹ Deudney and Ikenberry (fn. 7). The authors are to be commended for their systematic treatment of this neglected issue.

²⁰ Deudney, and Ikenberry, themselves admit that their explanation is overdetermined: “Given the number of variables that suggest shifts to accommodation [in Soviet policy], the question may not be why it happened, but why did it not happen earlier?” Deudney and Ikenberry (fn. 7), 116.Google Scholar

²¹ A point clearly recognized even by Deudney and Ikenberry (fn. 7), 116.

²² On this, see, especially, Evangelista, Matthew, “Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy,” in Tetlock, Philip et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).Google Scholar

²³ These literatures, which sit at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations, include Odell, John, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Adler, Emanuel, “Ideological ‘Guerrillas’ and the Quest for Technological Autonomy: Brazil's Domestic Computer Industry,” International Organization 40 (Summer 1986), 673–705CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Hall, Peter, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 276–280Google Scholar; Hall (fn. 18); and Sikkink (fn. 18). For especially useful definitional and theoretical overviews of the role ol ideas in politics, see Odell, chap. 6; and Sikkink (fn. 18), chap. 1.

²⁴ Kingdon, , Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 75–77.Google Scholar

²⁵ See, e.g., Odell (fn. 23), chap. 2.

²⁶ See, especially, Goldstein, Judith, “Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of U.S. Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies,” International Organization 43 (Winter 1989); and Sikkink (fn. 18), chap. 7.

²⁷ Hall (fn. 23), 259–60. See also Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Using slightly different language to make the same point, Gilpin argues that “eclecticism may not be the route to theoretical precision, but sometimes it is the only route available.” As I will suggest in the last section of the article, the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the USSR—by providing a large set of real-world cases where states are undertaking major reorientations in their foreign policies—offer an important opportunity to control more carefully for the influence of each of the four causal variables in the framework.

²⁸ Recently, a number of scholars have suggested another mechanism—transnational epistemic communities—by which external-level variables can enter the domestic policy process. See, e.g., the contributions in Haas (fn. 6). I will address this literature in the article's concluding section.

²⁹ Previous analyses of these specialists do see constraints on their behavior, but they are of a general nature and apply equally to most other participants in the process as well. See, e.g., Hough (fn. 3), 16–18.

³⁰ For the theoretical and empirical justification of this viewpoint, see Checkel, Jeff, “Organizational Behavior, Social Scientists and Soviet Foreign Policymaking” (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991).Google Scholar

³¹ See, especially, March, James and Olsen, Johan, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984), 734–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and idem, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989). Odell (fn. 9), 152–55, provides a useful review of the most recent international political economy literature utilizing this institutionalist perspective.

³² March and Olsen (fn. 31, 1984), 739.

³³ On this, see also Goldstein (fn. 26, 1988, 1989). A useful review and critique of cognitive approaches such as Goldstein's is Haggard and Simmons (fn. 15), 509–13.

³⁴ Odell (fn. 9), 153. On the importance of institutional structures in shaping outcomes, also see Steinmo, Sven, “Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain,” World Politics 41 (July 1989).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁵ This was a central theme of the panel “Reflections on the New Institutionalism,” held at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1991.

³⁶ See Downs, Anthony, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 228–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For evidence that selective recruitment occurs in an academic think tank such as IMEMO, see Checkel (fn. 30), chap. 7.

³⁷ Downs (fn. 36), chaps. 6, 12; Thompson, James, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 105–8Google Scholar; and Gagliardi, Pasquale, “The Creation and Change of Organizational Cultures: A Conceptual Framework,” Organization Studies 7 (1986), 119–21, 130–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁸ Kingdon (fn. 24). See also Jack, “The Diffusion of Knowledge, Policy Communities and Agenda Setting,” in Tropman, John, Lind, Robert, and Dluhy, Milan, eds., New Strategic Perspectives on Social Policy (New York: Pergamon, 1981).Google Scholar The arguments about the role of policy entrepreneurs in explicitly institutional settings are taken from Checkel (fn. 30), chap. 1.

³⁹ On the former point, a number of analysts agree that the influence of new ideas is partly a function of their ability to solve key problems faced by political decision makers. See, e.g., Hall (fn. 18), 386–89; Sikkink (fn. 18), 247; Ikenberry (fn. 17), 318–21; and Adler and Haa's(fn. 15), 380.

⁴⁰ On this, see Cohen, Michael, March, James, and Olsen, Johan, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice,” Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (March 1972), 1–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kingdon (fn. 24), 89–94.

⁴¹ Taking a slightly different approach, Evangelista (fn. 22), 275–77, 335–36, has also suggested the importance of policy entrepreneurs and windows for understanding changes in Soviet international behavior under Gorbachev.

⁴² I will return to this point in the article's concluding section. The stages heuristic typically divides the process into a logical sequence, for example, agenda setting, option formulation, decision selection, and implementation.

⁴³ As an anonymous reviewer has correctly noted, I am essentially arguing that ideas as influence are partially “demand-driven,” that is, turned to when structural or other changes in the international system trigger a search. Although such sources may prompt this search, the degree of influence new ideas ultimately have on policy depends on the array of domestic variables discussed above.

⁴⁴ On this, see, especially, Fleron, Frederic, ed., Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969)Google Scholar; Snyder, Jack, “Richness, Rigor and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy,” International Security 9 (Winter 1984–85)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “Science and Sovietology: Bridging in the Methods Gap in Soviet Foreign Policy Studies,” World Politics 40 (January 1988); and Evangelista (fn. 22), 259ndash;60.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Glickham, Charles, “New Directions for Soviet Foreign Policy,” Radio Liberty Research Bulletin Supplement 2/86 (September 6, 1986)Google Scholar; and Evangelista, Matthew, “The New Soviet Approach to Security,” World Policy Journal 3 (Fall 1986).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Lynch (fn. 3); and Zimmerman (fn. 3).

⁴⁷ The distinction between basic assumptions and strategic prescriptions draws on Breslauer, George W., “Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy,” World Politics 39 (April 1987), 430–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁸ For a recent and authoritative overview of the ideology of international relations developed at IMEMO during the 1970s and early 1980s, see Primakov, Yevgeniy, “Uchenyy, ruko-voditel', chelovek (k 70–letiyu akademika N.N. Inozemtseva),” Mirovaya ekonomika i mezh-dunarodnye otnosheniya (hereafter Memo) 4 (April 1991), 104–10.Google Scholar Primakov had served as a deputy director of IMEMO for seven years in the 1970s and returned as its director for several years in the mid-1980s.

⁴⁹ This assessment of IMEMO'S sense of mission is derived from (1) a review of institute literature and programmatic statements by IMEMO'S top leadership concerning its research agenda, both over a sixteen-year period (1964–71, 1980–87); (2) an examination of the training and background of key institute leaders; (3) a quantitative analysis of the subject matter of artides published in IMEMO'S journal, Memo; (4) interviews with institute researchers and leaders; and (5) a review of the various graduate degree programs offered at IMEMO.

⁵⁰ Yakovlev was essentially in “exile” at this time. He had been posted to Canada in 1973, after losing a battle with conservative Russian nationalist elements within the Communist Party. Prior to 1973 he had spent most of his adult life working in the central apparatus of the cpsu, mainly in its propaganda, science, and culture sections. In notable contrast to most apparatchiks, Yakovlev was well educated. He held a doctorate (in historical sciences) along with the academic rank of professor and had spent a year as an exchange student at Columbia University in the late 1950s.

⁵¹ On this, see also Vaksberg, Arkadiy, “Priglasheniye k sporu: Zametki na polyakh knigi A.N. Yakovleva ‘Kakim my khotim videt’ Sovetskiy Soyuz',” Literaturnaya gazeta, May 15, 1991, p. 3.Google Scholar The directorship of IMEMO was open because Vladlen Martynov, who had taken over as the institute's leader in the wake of Inozemtsev's death, was officially only its acting director.

⁵² Those familiar with Yakovlev's publications during the years 1983—85 may well ques tion this observation. Many of these writings were vitriolic, propagandists, and extremely anti-American. Institute researchers assert, however, that Yakovlev's tone and approach within the institute were completely different. Moreover, a careful review of his writing during this period reveals several instances where he adopted a very unorthodox approach on matters of foreign (and domestic) policy. See, e.g., Yakovlev, , “Dinamizm i konservatizm—ikh adepty” (Dynamism and conservatism—their adherents), in Yakovlev, , Realizm—zemlya perestroyk: lzbrannye vystupleniya i stat'i (Realism—land of perestroika: Selected appearances and articles) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990).Google Scholar This essay, first published in 1990, was in fact written by Yakovlev at the time he assumed the leadership of IMEMO in 1983. For further evidence of his unorthodox views during these years, see Yakovlev, , “Demokratiya, toropyas', ne proizvodit nravstvennoy selektsiy,” Literaturnaya gazeta, December 25, 1991, p. 3.Google Scholar Yakovlev reveals in that article that as far back as late 1985 he had proposed splitting the CPSU into two parties, thus fostering the development of multiparty politics in the Soviet Union.

⁵³ On this last point, also see “Vystupleniye M.S. Gorbacheva v Britanskom parlamente,” Pravda, December 19, 1984, pp. 4–5; and Arbatov, Georgiy, “Memuary. Arkhivy. Svidetel'stva: Iz nedavnego proshlogo,” Znamya, no. 10 (October 1990), 221.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Yakovlev, Aleksandr, “Obshchestvennye nauki na novom etape,” Pravda, November 28, 1987, p. 3.Google Scholar The one exception to this pragmatic approach is Yakovlev's image of American capitalism. See fn. 69.

⁵⁵ See, e.g., Lukov, V. and Tomashevskiy, Dmitriy, “Radi zhizni na zemle (Uroki velikoy pobedy i mirovaya politika nashikh dney),” Memo 2 (February 1983), 3–13Google Scholar; idem, “Interesy chelovechestva i mirovaya politika,” Memo 4 (April 1985), 17–32; and Bykov, Oleg, “Leninskaya politika mira i ee voploshcheniye v deyatel'nosti KPSS” Memo 3 (March 1984), 23–29.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See, e.g., “Vsesoyuznaya nauchnaya konferentsiya: Delo Marksa zhivet i pobezhdayet,” Memo 7 (July 1983), 72–95; and Shishkov, Yuriy, “Tribuna ekonomista i mezhdunarodnika: K voprosu o edinstve sovremennogo vsemirnogo khozyaystva,” Memo 8 (August 1984), 72n‐83.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Valkenier (fn. 3), chap. 2, provides a good overview of Soviet specialist writing during the 1970s on these concepts.

⁵⁸ The Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada (ISKAN), the other main international affairs think tank, had virtually nothing to say on the issues IMEMO was most aggressively promoting during these years.

⁵⁹ Gorbachev, Mikhail, “Oktyabr' i perestroyka: Revolyutsiya prodolzhayetsya,” Kommunist 17 (November 1987), 31–36.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See Legvold, Robert, “The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 68 (America and the World 1988–89), 82–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶¹ Primakov had been appointed head of the institute in December 1985, succeeding Yakovlev, who moved on to a much more important position in the Central Committee apparatus. This “promotion” may seem odd given Yakovlev's apparent success at IMEMO. Gorbachev, however, clearly wanted his close ally in a stronger bureaucratic position so that Yakovlev could help him overcome opposition to his policies in the Central Committee (which at that point was still a key actor in the political process).

⁶² From 1977 to 1985 Primakov served as director of the Academy's Institute of Oriental Studies.

⁶³ See, e.g., Primakov, Yevgeniy, “Leninskiy analiz imperializma i sovremennos?,” Kommunist 9 (June 1986), 102–13Google Scholar; and idem, “Kapitalizm vo vzaimosvyazannom mire,” Kommunist 13 (September 1987), 101–10.

⁶⁴ These ties first became evident in November 1985, when Primakov accompanied Gorbachev to the Geneva summit meeting. Two deputy directors of IMEMO confirm in separate interviews that by late 1986 Primakov had become a key Gorbachev adviser.

⁶⁵ See Primakov, Yevgeniy, “XXVII s'ezd KPSS i issledovaniye problem mirovoy ekonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy,” Memo 5 (May 1986), 6–8.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ On this, see also Primakov (fn. 48), 106–7.

⁶⁷ For an excellent overview of the essays on state-monopoly capitalism (and their radical content), see Taylor, Brian, “Perestroika and Soviet Foreign Policy Research: Rethinking the Theory of State-Monopoly Capitalism,” Millennium 19 (Spring 1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar On the conference, see “Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya: Sovremennye osobennosti obshchego krizisa kapitalizma,” Memo 6–8 (June-July-August 1987).

⁶⁸ ISKAN contributed virtually nothing to the capitalism/militarism debate in 1986–87.

⁶⁹ Aleksandr Yakovlev was an obvious source for Gorbachev's skepticism about capitalism. Yakovlev, who at this point was already one of Gorbachev's most trusted advisers, had consistently promoted an image of capitalism that was virtually identical to the one articulated by Gorbachev through early 1987. Even after Gorbachev's commentary on capitalism changed, Yakovlev continued to speak on the topic in a distinctly more pessimistic manner.

⁷⁰ See, especially, Karaganov, Sergey et al., “Vyzovy bezopasnosti—starye i novye,” Kommunist 1 (January 1988).Google Scholar

⁷¹ These were the natural scientists who worked for the Academy of Sciences technical divisions and, in particular, the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, against the Nuclear Threat.

⁷² March and Olsen (fn. 31, 1989), 16–19 and chap. 2; and Goldstein (fn. 26, 1988), 181–86 and passim.

⁷³ This observation is based on an analysis of numerous IMEMO publications, as well as on interviews with three deputy directors of the institute. The institutional constraints facing Arbatov included a weakly developed scientific/technical culture within IMEMO and the institute's long-standing unwillingness to seek contacts with groups within and outside the USSR that studied issues of international security.

⁷⁴ See, especially, the debate between Arbatov and Elgiz Pozdnyakov, a senior scholar in IMEMO'S Department of International Relations, over the proper way to study issues of international security. Arbatov, , “Deystvitel‘no, yest’ li povod dlya spora?’ Memo 10 (October 1988), 130–34Google Scholar; and Pozdnyakov, Elgiz, ‘S kern, kak i po kakomu povodu spor it A. Arbatov?” Memo 10 (October 1988), 125–30.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Arbatov had made quite clear on more than one occasion his desire to bring such expertise to iMEMo. See, e.g., Arbatov, , “Glubokoye sokrashcheniye strategicheskikh vooruzheniy,” Memo 4 (April 1988), 10–22.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ For details on the role of ISKAN and Kokoshin in these security debates, see Checkel (fn.30), chaps. 8–10. In the spring of 1992 Kokoshin was named a deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation.

⁷⁷ March and Olsen (fn. 31, 1984), 739.

⁷⁸ See, e.g., Shevardnadze, Eduard, Moy vybor: v zashchitu demoKratii i svobody (My choice: In defense of democracy and freedom) (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), 62–63.Google Scholar The former foreign minister argues that during the early 1980s Gorbachev knew the kind of foreign policy he did not want—the one followed by the Brezhnev leadership—but seemed much less clear on what should replace it.

⁷⁹ Compare, for example, the discussion of domestic and foreign policy in Gorbachev, , Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda (Vital creativity of the people) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984)Google Scholar, a speech of December 1984 before a conference on ideology.

⁸⁰ Tetlock (fn. 4) is an excellent overview of the definitional problems.

⁸¹ Legvol's (fn. 10) important account of Soviet learning in the 1980s exhibits this analytic bias.

⁸² That is, through “cognitive content” learning. For a discussion of this concept, see Tetlock(fn.4), 27–31.

⁸³ Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this issue.

⁸⁴ On the importance of integrating political factors into psychological theories of decision making, see also Mendelson, Sarah, “Explaining Change in Soviet Foreign Policy: Learning, Motivated Bias and Epistemic Communities” (Paper delivered at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1991), 1–10.Google Scholar For an excellentoverview and critique of learning theories as applied to the Soviet case, see Evangelista (fn. 22), 266–79, 323–28.

⁸⁵ Deudney and Ikenberry (fn. 7).

⁸⁶ For a recent treatment of this issue, see McKeown (fn. 15, 1991), 259–78.

⁸⁷ Realist theories (which focus on a particular subset of international stimuli to explain state behavior) insist—wrongly I think—that a state's interests can be taken as a given. Even recent and quite sophisticated realist theories exhibit this analytic bias. See Ikenberry, G. John, Lake, David, and Mastanduno, Michael, “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (December 1989).Google Scholar The authors attempt to develop a realist theory that incorporates both domestic and international variables.

⁸⁸ Colton, Timothy, “Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union,” in Colton and Gustafson (fn. 1), 34–37.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Thanks to Dave Cameron of Yale University for alerting me to this issue.

⁹⁰ See, especially, Primakov (fn. 48). Recall that Primakov had a prior association with IMEMO, as a deputy head of the institute for seven years beginning in 1970.

⁹¹ Two books written by Arbatov in the early 1980s clearly demonstrate his knowledge of Western strategic concepts and thinking. See Arbatov, , Bezopasnos' v yadernyy vek (Security in the nuclear age) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1980)Google Scholar; and idem, Voyenno-strategichesikiy paritet i politika SShA (Military-strategic parity and the policy of the U.S.A.) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984). On Arbatov, also see Cobb, Tyrus, “National Security Perspectives of Soviet ‘Think Tanks,’” Problems of Communism 30 (November-December 1981), 54–55, 57.Google Scholar

⁹² In the comparative politics literature, David Laitin has made a similar point with respect to the revolutions in Eastern Europe. Laitin, See, “The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union,” World Politics 44 (October 1991), 141–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹³ There is interesting if preliminary evidence that this is the case in Ukraine. See Mihalisko, Kathleen, “Defense and Security Planning in Ukraine,” Report on the USSR 3 (December 6, 1991), 15–19.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ See the recent symposium “Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process,” PS: Political Science and Politics 24 (June 1991), 144“Political Science and Public Policy,” PS: Political Science and Politics 24 (June 1991), 145.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Kingdon (fn. 24).

⁹⁷ Risse-Kappen (fn. 10), 187–88; and idem, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” World Politics 43 (July 1991). See also Haggard (fn. 16), 432–33.

⁹⁸ As noted earlier, Evangelista (fn. 22) argues in favor of a similar approach.

⁹⁹ See, especially, Haas (fn. 6). See also idem, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control,” International Organization 43 (Summer 1989); Haas, Ernst, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)Google Scholar, chaps. 1–2; and Mendelson (fn. 84).

¹⁰⁰ These are central themes of virtually all the essays in the ecent special issue of International Organization dedicated to epistemic policy coordination. See Haas (fn. 6).

¹⁰¹ For an excellent overview of the causal logic behind the epistemic-communities approach, see Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” in Haas (fn. 6).

¹⁰² Matthew Evangelista and Stephan Kux have suggested, in a more general sense, the importance of such contacts for the evolution of Soviet views on security. See Risse-Kappen (fn. 10), 183.

¹⁰³ Haas (fn. 101), 3–4, 33–34.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 4. The first two elements in the causal logic are uncertainties faced by political decision makers and interpretation of these uncertainties by experts. That is, uncertainties give rise to demands for information and advice that is provided by the epistemic community.

¹⁰⁵ Adler, , “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” in Haas (fn. 6), 101–45.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ See Checkel (fn. 30), chaps. 5–6.