12.1 Introduction
In order to understand Algeria’s position in relation to what is now the European Union (EU), we must consider several factors, especially historical factors.Footnote 1 Algeria became part of ‘France’ in the mid nineteenth century due to colonization. Consequently, a French administrative structure based on an absence of equality was established, reinforced by the presence of European settlers in the Maghreb.
Following the losses in the Indo-Chinese territories in 1954 and the Maghreb (Morocco and Tunisia) in 1956, coupled with the escalation of the Algerian War of Independence in 1954, French officials became increasingly convinced that creating a distinct legal status for Algerians was the only way to justify France’s objection to Algeria’s independence.
Intense European efforts to realize a unifying project in the mid 1950s resulted in the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC). Initially comprising six founding members – France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg – there was no intention to extend this new institution to the colonies. However, the Algerian cause, raised in international forums and notably at the United Nations, altered the course of negotiations. Algeria became the focal point of French–European struggles to ensure the expansion of this new European institution throughout the entire Mediterranean, with the possibility of directing European funds to Algeria.
Another aspect supporting France’s view of Algeria’s legal position was its adherence to the colonial concept of Eurafrica. Despite its gradual loss of relevance after the independence of former colonies, this concept continued in the form of a vision of the establishment of a complementary relationship between Europe and Africa. France supported this notion by legally asserting its keen defence of Algeria’s inclusion in the new European bloc under Article 60 of the 1946 French Constitution, which states that the French Union includes continental France, overseas departments, and territories.
The controversial idea of Eurafrica had widespread acceptance in 1957, the year the Treaty of Rome was signed.Footnote 2 Although European intentions to integrate Africa, including Algeria, were evident under the Treaty of Rome, several decades later it had become clear that a united Europe could not sustain that integration. Instead, and as this chapter will show, the inclusion of Algeria was replaced with various tools that reflected the EU’s institutional system and internal and external policies. Europe has yet to find what it appears to be seeking, namely a ‘special relationship for sustainable rapprochement’.Footnote 3
Against this background, this chapter will raise the following questions. What were the legal foundations that shaped the Euro–Algerian relationship? Did Europe depend on Algeria even after their separation? How has Algeria’s exit from the EEC impacted on the EU of today? Given its relationship with Algeria, has the EU ever truly succeeded in delineating a well-defined regional border law?
12.2 The Law of Extending European Borders: European Integration and Algeria
Algeria, through its European status imposed by France, de facto formulated the border law of the EEC. In other words, belonging and integration were not only a result of the geographical contiguity of regions, but rather could be achieved based on extra-regional extension through colonialism.
In the first decades of the EU, during the post-Second World War era, European leaders insisted on flexible borders. At a time when Europe and Africa did not have common interests, these leaders considered ‘integration’ as a tool to preserve imperialistic interests. France, in particular, promoted integration between the two continents, on the condition that European superiority was maintained within the integrational structure. The French also argued for preferential tariffs under the guise of development aid. This ‘integration’ was finally achieved mainly because four countries of the EEC group had colonies or administered territories under international trusteeship.
The inclusion of Algeria in the EEC was achieved specifically through extensive French efforts led by French minister of the overseas Gaston Defferre. The French insisted that its partners regulate Algeria in Article 227 of the Treaty of Rome.Footnote 4 Article 227 states that some provisions of the EEC are to be applied to Algeria, which means that Algeria was considered as a part of the EEC even though it was not an official Member State like the six founding countries. Megan Brown, in her book The Seventh Member State (in other words, Algeria) points out that although Article 227 mentioned Algeria, the latter’s status was not clearly defined at the time, making the Euro–Algerian relationship complex and ambiguous.
In sum, the Treaty of Rome was intentionally formulated to maintain Algeria’s administrative status within France.Footnote 5 The rights of Algerians were not, however, clearly defined within the EEC. Brown reached an important conclusion in this regard, namely that the ‘seventh Member State’, Algeria, challenged the concept of Europe’s natural borders by highlighting the extra-continental nature of the EEC at the time of its creation. In other words, she says, the integration process was never spatially restricted.Footnote 6
The ambiguity inherent in the Euro–Algerian relationship concerns Algeria’s status and the fact that the local population never benefitted from the same rights as Europeans. Moreover, requests made to the EEC to provide technical and professional assistance for Algerian workers were rejected.
After Algerian independence, the relationship mutated into cooperation agreements between the EEC and Algeria and several other Mediterranean countries. These agreements governed economic exchanges and technical and financial aid. Algeria was the first to express its desire to cooperate with the Community on an international scale in a letter of 24 December 1962, followed by a request to start exploratory conversations on 27 June 1963. Tunisia and Morocco expressed the same desire on 8 October and 14 December 1963 respectively.Footnote 7 The aim of the cooperation agreements was to facilitate trade and the movement of workers between Algeria and the countries of the EU. However, the preferential privileges granted under the agreements were limited, because these provisions were incompatible with the economic policy of a country that had until very recently been under colonial rule.Footnote 8 Algeria’s exhaustion from having been a colony for so long made it falter and stumble in its attempts to improve its economy. The Algerian authorities therefore accepted support and assistance agreements, but encountered technical, political, and material difficulties. As a newly decolonized state, Algeria was unable to perceive its relationship with the Europeans as anything other than a different form of colonialism, especially in the realm of workers’ rights. It must be remembered that under colonial rule, Algerian workers did not enjoy genuine equal rights alongside the Europeans.
Maintaining ties with the former colony was nevertheless still considered in the mainstream French discourse to be the most rational solution; consequently, the nature of the relationship between Algeria and the EU acquired a sense of inevitability.
Today the border problem continues to be an important topic in European politics, but it has changed shape. The centrality of borders in the relationship between Algeria (albeit not only) and the EU is illustrated in the ongoing debate concerning migration. Under the pretext of protecting their borders from the arrival of ‘unnecessary’ immigrant populations who do not ‘deserve’ to belong to their countries, or who are even considered a threat to their nations and to Europe as a whole, some politicians have sought to tighten these borders by various means including the creation of detention centres.Footnote 9
It will not then be difficult to understand the impact of Brexit in 2020. This was not just Britain’s exit from the EU and the contraction of the latter’s borders, but also an affirmation of the European illusion of establishing a system of borders between European and non-European regions. European countries were, and de facto are still, in need of what is non-European.
The vulnerability of European borders can be seen internally too. During the Covid-19 pandemic all Member States of the EU became isolated, which deepened the crisis in the legal system of integration established by the Treaty of Rome of 1957.
If we acknowledge that before the contemporary vulnerability and movement of European borders, the European integration of Algeria was in fact the first example of such a movement of the European border, many questions arise.Footnote 10 Most importantly, how was it possible for Algeria, a Muslim country in the southern Mediterranean, to join the EEC under the Treaty of Rome and remain a ‘member’ until 1976, when its withdrawal was formalized, even though it had gained independence in 1962? The answer to this question is best understood as a matter related to European needs and interests, especially those of the French.
Recalling Algeria’s role in European integration and the way in which Algeria moved the European border, the subsequent part of this study will highlight how the EU Member States, including France, have constructed multiple concepts of Euro–Algerian relations. First, a relatively brief period of ‘cooperation’. Second, and spanning several decades, ‘partnership’. Most recently, grafted onto the concept of partnership, ‘Neighbourhood Policy’ and ‘Union for the Mediterranean’.
12.3 Expansion of European Influence: The Euro–Mediterranean Cooperative Proposal
After the declaration of Algerian independence, some European countries did not want to continue granting a specific preference to certain African countries and advocated that preferential treatment should rather be kept within the EEC institutional framework. This prompted the opening of negotiations between Algeria and the EEC. However, the legal basis for interaction between Algeria and Europe had changed. Instead of coming under Article 227, which recognized the inclusion of Algeria into the EEC, Algeria’s relationship with the EEC now came under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, which states in part: ‘The Community may conclude with a third State, a union of States or an international organization, agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures.’
Article 238 uses an equitable formula to describe the relationship between the EEC and others by establishing agreements that guarantee equal rights and obligations to all states; creating joint initiatives and actions; and providing for special procedures. Cooperation implies interaction based on equality without discrimination or distinction between the states. Algeria, through its new position, formulated a proposal that differed from everything that had preceded it, by ensuring the expansion of the EEC’s intervention in spheres of influence in exchange for support and assistance. This can be understood as an attempt at replacing integration through colonization with integration through cooperation.
The EEC-Algerian Cooperation Agreement was signed in April 1976. This agreement defined a new relationship between the EC and Algeria in addition to the existing trade relationship. Moreover, the agreement was comprehensive and without any specific condition attached (this, as we will see, has since changed), opening the door to further bilateral agreements.Footnote 11
While the cooperation agreements were soon replaced with new forms of policy documents and agreements, as we will see later, the idea of cooperation has remained in the area of migration. Through an intersection of common interests between what is now the EU and Algeria, the management of borders and human mobility has historically been and still is entrenched in the EU–Algerian relationship. The ‘migration problem’ and its associated security challenges has remained a topic of cooperative policy. The issue of migration, connected to security and social challenges beyond borders, has always been the subject of complex and challenging negotiations between Algeria and European countries. On this issue there exist what could be described as genuine and continuous diplomatic efforts of cooperation.
12.4 Partnership with Algeria
12.4.1 The New Euro–Mediterranean Policy of the 1990s.
The European approval of a new Euro–Mediterranean policy was influenced by a combination of regional and international factors, which cooperation agreements alone could not accommodate.Footnote 12
The first tangible sign of this transformation within the EU was the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which aimed to enhance the democratic legitimacy of European institutions and improve their efficiency. More importantly, the Treaty linked economic unity to the progress of the common foreign policy, as well as the common security policy, complemented by a common defence policy. The Maastricht Treaty turned the EU towards a ‘partnership framework’.Footnote 13 The European Commission proposed the idea of the Euro–Mediterranean partnership (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), extending the financial protocol with these countries and reviving the project of a ‘free exchange’ area. It became clear that the European conviction and view was that a Euro–Mediterranean relationship was the best basis for regional stability.Footnote 14 For Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, the opportunity presented in the context of this ‘partnership framework’ was to rely on European assistance and paternalistic policies.
The Algerian crisis, which began in 1992, together with the political climate prevailing then in France, led the latter to reconsider once again the relations between the two countries. In this context, the paternalistic nature of what the European countries were trying to practise and impose became clear. For instance, we may recall the remarks of the French minister of foreign affairs Allain Jupé, according to which ‘France must help the Algerian government in the fight against terrorism’. In the same vein, the former president François Mitterrand proposed holding a European conference on Algeria; in other words, Europe determining the fate of Algeria from the outside as was done during the colonial period.Footnote 15
Europe’s shift towards diversifying partnership policies served as an alternative to cooperation. The EU directed its foreign policy towards new forms and areas. One example is the French proposal presented by former president François Mitterrand to establish a Council for Security and Cooperation in the Western Mediterranean, consisting of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Italy, Spain, and France. However, the Maghreb countries, including Algeria, opposed the exclusion of some countries (such as Malta, Yugoslavia, and Libya); they also insisted that the conflict in the Middle East should not be ignored. The initiative was revived in 1990, resulting in the formation of the 5+5 Group. During a second meeting of the group in 1991 the ‘Algiers Declaration’ was issued. However, the group was short-lived, due to several security and political circumstances, most notably the Lockerbie crisis.
12.4.2 From the Barcelona Process to the Association Agreement: Shaping A European Foreign Policy.
Partnership has become the cornerstone of the EU’s common foreign policy.Footnote 16 In this context, the relationship with Algeria has shifted from revolving around commerce and trade to become a ‘strategic’ one with a greater focus on security challenges. Partnership is also the umbrella term used to delineate the legal framework for European migration.
The Barcelona Process, initiated in 1995 and involving the EU and twelve southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, addressed the ‘urgent need’ to connect the countries south of the Mediterranean Sea with the EU. However, the Barcelona Process had vulnerabilities and shortcomings. It excluded, for example, two key issues – agriculture and population flows – and established what many have described as an ‘unequal reciprocal relationship’. With its flexibility and limited commitment, it did not prove to be very effective. It is noteworthy that the Barcelona Declaration, while not legally binding or of contractual nature, is nevertheless considered a condition for joining the partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean countries.
In the year 2000, when France chaired the follow-up meeting of the Barcelona Process at the fourth Euro–Mediterranean Conference in Marseille, the goal was to continue the official discussion on the project ‘Charter of Stability in the Mediterranean’. This project revolved around peaceful resolutions to end conflicts, respect for human rights and democracy, and combating the root causes of terrorism. Due to the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, however, the drafting of an agreement was abandoned. The outcome of this conference highlighted concerns about European attempts to revive colonial efforts and to ensure the longevity of projects related to European interests and thus European influence. The Marseille conference in fact revealed that the Barcelona Process had not achieved its intended goal of creating a region of prosperity, stability, and security.Footnote 17
A key component of the partnership as conceptualized by the Barcelona Process was the signing of an Association Agreement between the EU and Algeria on 22 April 2002, which came into effect on 1 September 2005. The following question arises: what has changed and what is new?
The agreement was signed by the EU and Algeria to strengthen historical and cultural ties, considering their ‘proximity and interdependence [with] historic links and common values’.Footnote 18 The Association Agreement commits both parties to a more substantial liberalization of bilateral trade and is meant to ensure that Algerian companies and consumers benefit from the development of international trade and investment. The agreement includes a gradual elimination of customs duties on European industrial products over a twelve-year period (Algeria already enjoys tariff-free access and a share in the European market for its industrial exports). The EU has chosen a policy of immediate liberalization (without duties or quotas) for a large number of Algerian agricultural products since the agreement became valid, except for a limited list of sensitive categories where quotas are established. Algeria must respond with significant tariff reductions on agricultural exports from the EU. Substantial tariff reductions have been agreed upon by both parties for manufactured agricultural products and fish products.
Algeria has benefitted from the customs exemption agreements, but these benefits have remained very limited due to several long-term obstacles of a political and legal nature. The Association Agreement lays a significant foundation for economic liberalization in Algeria. It obliges Algeria to enact what in Algerian legal scholarship could be termed modern legislation regarding competition and intellectual property protection to make it compatible with European standards.Footnote 19 The internationalization and the diffusion of exchanges under pressure from the European and international community have also led to the unification of the rules of international trade, whether in the form of general conditions, model contracts, or international agreements, and the adoption of alternative dispute resolution methods, such as international trade arbitration to resolve international trade disputes.
The Association Agreement covers more than just trade and the economy. It establishes new institutional structures to intensify ‘political dialogue’ across a wide range of areas, from education and culture to combating crime, money laundering, drugs, and terrorism. Both states are committed to upholding human rights and democratic principles. This initiative coincides with the development of an ambitious new programme for economic cooperation between Algeria and the EU with the view to help the Algerian economy adapt to the global market. Assistance will be provided to implement the Association Agreement in areas such as updating customs and tax administrations, supporting standards and technical regulation bodies, and enhancing the statistical system.
From a legal perspective, association agreements represent a regulatory and methodological shift compared to previous models, because their reach depends on the economic development of Mediterranean countries and the depth or intensity of the political, social, and economic relationships they share with the EU, which explains the commitment to negotiate between the ‘Partnership Council’ and the government of the concerned state within the framework of an annual meeting.
It must be emphasized that the EU is adopting an ‘assistance approach’. Through this approach, it seeks to ensure the sustainability of contractual relations and enhance them in local affairs across various sectors, thereby reinforcing the European presence and influence in Maghreb countries, including Algeria.
The Association Agreement employs the principle of political conditionality, similar to what is found in international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and relies on the preparation of structural reform programmes.Footnote 20 For instance, the absence of good governance was noted to have an impact on poverty, developmental setbacks, and social conditions.Footnote 21 Consequently, the agreement made the provision of loans and aid conditional on the establishment of the principles of good governance. Further, as reflected in Article 2 of the Association Agreement, the EU’s approach to external relations with African countries is characterized by yet another form of conditionality, whereby it purports to condition all of its provisions on the respect for human rights and democracy, under the threat of suspending or terminating the partnership or ending support.
12.4.3 The European Neighbourhood Policy.
Both Algeria and Libya approached the European Neighbourhood Policy with considerable hesitation. From Libya’s perspective, the ongoing problems of its ‘political dialogue’ with European countries have dominated bilateral relations for years, primarily due to its exclusion from the Barcelona Process of 1995. Unlike agreements reached in the past with other Mediterranean Arab countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria), Libya has secured concessions from the Europeans with a lower political conditionality threshold. The EU turned a blind eye to the demand for political reforms in Libya, including commitments to ensure pluralism, freedom of the press, and judicial independence.
Moreover, France’s rush to strengthen ties with what the former president, Nicolas Sarkozy, termed the ‘Gateway to Africa’, and its preparation for building a nuclear reactor in Libya at that time, led to Libyan scepticism about the true European objectives regarding Libya and Algeria. The uncertainties surrounding European goals created an imbalance among Mediterranean counterparts.Footnote 22
When the EU Commission first introduced its ‘Neighbourhood Policy’, it was presented as a fresh framework for relations with countries not involved in integration into the EU. Although it stemmed from the Barcelona Process, this ‘new’ policy was sold as ‘Building Peace in the Neighbourhood’. For the countries of the southern Mediterranean, the partnership was described as being based on a mutual commitment to common values (democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, principles of the market economy, and sustainable development). Hence, the European Neighbourhood Policy went beyond existing relations to provide a deeper political relationship and economic integration.
The European Neighbourhood Policy is considered one of the most problematic policies, especially as it is based on a specific form of bilateral relations, namely ‘the European Union – partner country’. It is distant from regionalism or localism and keeps the door firmly closed on any possibility of accession to the EU. It favours the interests of the European countries over those of their partners and promotes some partner countries over others.Footnote 23
What first catches the attention is the diversity of forms of legal and non-legal instruments associated with the Neighbourhood Policy. There are initiatives such as ‘Expanded Europe’ and the ‘Geographical Neighbourhood Policy’, which were adopted in 2003. This was followed by the issuance of the Europe and Neighbourhood Policy document in May 2004, along with the strategic paper that determined this policy. It was then reinforced with action plans in December of 2004, culminating in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instruments,Footnote 24 a financial instrument considered a simplified political tool compared to the preceding MEDA or TACIS instruments.Footnote 25
12.4.4 The Union for the Mediterranean: From a French Initiative to a European Project.
The development of the Mediterranean Project for Contemporary Partnership is the crystallization of a French strategy that has existed since the seventies. It materialized as a political agreement with economic, social, cultural, and security content, laying the groundwork for the establishment of a new regional organizational structure. It began with a partnership, evolved into a Neighbourhood Policy, and ultimately took its final form as the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008.
In 2007, the then French presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy announced that the French recognized the importance of the common heritage between Europe and the Mediterranean region. He expressed regret that France and Europe had turned their backs on the Mediterranean. The idea was to build institutions with various missions and powers in order to reorganize selective migration, meet environmental challenges, develop education, as well as invest in renewable and nuclear energy. Gradually, in response to the EU’s call, the emphasis moved from an initiative based solely on French interests to a broader European proposal.
However, making this idea European rather than French is neither simple nor superficial, as the project was built on a very solid French foundation. One of its most important pillars was the Avicenne Report from 2007, which formulated French interests in the form of projects for developmental, security, and political reforms. This approach was meant to guarantee the effective implementation of policy, which differed from what was considered the disappointment of the Barcelona path. Additionally, a report from the French National Assembly laid the groundwork for how to build on existing institutions and how to involve the EU in the Mediterranean Union.Footnote 26 This report emphasized respecting the gains of Barcelona, while confirming that belonging to the Mediterranean Union is not a substitute for joining the EU. In December 2007, this stance was supported by the ‘Call from Rome for the Mediterranean’, a French, Italian, and Spanish political initiative.
The proposal was not presented to Algeria, perhaps with the aim of excluding any link between the interests of the French project and its former colony. Instead, Algeria demonstrated its position by joining what at that point was named the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’, in order to avoid being marginalized in the region.Footnote 27
All of this is aimed at elevating the political level of relations with Europe. The noticeable expansion of partnership areas characterized the new direction, now including political and security dialogue, urban development, water, energy, tourism, justice and law, women’s issues, civil society cooperation, migration, health, intercultural dialogue, industry, statistics, and more. However, over the first two years, amid many internal problems for countries (financial crises) and security setbacks in the Middle East, among other issues, the achievements were limited. These achievements focused on specific sectors, such as funds dedicated to alternative energy projects, civil protection, higher education and scientific research, and justice.Footnote 28
In this project, Algeria has proven to be an indispensable partner. There are, however, several challenges, such as the absence of clear positive indicators regarding the achievements and future goals of the partnership. In an era where China is emerging as a global power challenging the West it appears crucial that Europe reconsider its relations with former colonies. Pursuing independence and isolation poses a risk to the global influence of the EU.
For a long time, the EU has relied on specific policies tailored to the nature of its relationships with colonies in various regions worldwide.Footnote 29 However, these policies are primarily built upon a common factor: trade and aid connections. Nevertheless, in the face of new global transformations and the emergence of new international actors, the unified European entity that is the EU has struggled to maintain its position. The challenge for the Union is no longer merely that of sustaining existing relationships with former colonies but rather taking a leadership role and asserting global influence.
12.4.5 Evaluating the Partnership.
The slow pace of reforms and protectionist policies on both sides are the main factors hindering the partnership. The Mediterranean perspective, often non-European, considers development and reforms as projects, and projects require a significant amount of time. Regarding customs duties, Algeria is among the first group of South Mediterranean countries experiencing a very high rate, ranging between 18 per cent and 30 per cent. While the customs dismantling process varies by country, the region as a whole relies on reducing customs tariffs on imports and maintaining them for consumer goods. This protectionist policy, considered an advantage for developing countries, is not necessarily favoured by the EU. The EU, in turn, sought self-protection through other means such as data protection laws, designation of sensitive sectors, standardization, anti-dumping laws, and so forth.
On the other hand, regional integration failures and a lack of investment attraction contributed to undermining the role that the EU was expected to play in the region. For instance, the EU’s share as the primary source of foreign investment had already fallen to less than 50 per cent in 2002. Instead, the EU became not just an economic actor and partner but a player addressing security, stability, and prosperity challenges.
The Joint Assessment Document of the Partnership Agreement for the year 2017 stated that the trade budget’s imbalance and the significant deficit have imposed a new commitment on the EU to build an effective ‘win-win’ partnership. That was following the failure of many precedent joint meetings, in addition to the report of the French Senate (2016–2017), which described this kind of agreement as simply a means to secure short-term political and diplomatic interests.Footnote 30
The evaluation also revealed obstacles that hindered the partnership from progressing as envisioned by its founders. The most significant impediments included the absence of any role for non-governmental organizations and the high indebtedness of South Mediterranean countries due to the policies pursued by donor countries through international financial institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). The donor countries seemed to be using the economic situations of the South Mediterranean countries as collateral. Pressure from the WTO resulted in the EU’s practice of using political conditionality with a focus on security. There was also a tightening of selective migration programmes due to insufficient management mechanisms, amidst the disparity between a series of joint agreements and treaties and the increasing contradictions in migration legislation. Moreover, the demographic decline in EU countries, and the resulting encouragement of skilled migration, further complicated the situation. All these factors hindered the securing of a sustainable partnership.
The problems of terrorism and cross-border crime, the growing tide of illegal migration, and the crisis of refugees and minorities on both shores of the Mediterranean are among the most important factors shaping European ‘partnerships’. For example, in the field of migration and border entry regulation, we see a difference between the 1960s when Mediterranean governments encouraged the migration of their citizens to Europe, and the 1970s and 1980s when they shifted towards discouraging migration and reclaiming skilled workers. Finally, in the 2000s, we witnessed an increase in the number of laws aimed at regulating migration from within, by, to give one example, rejecting or accepting dual nationality. The Algerian government, for example, initially rejected dual nationality but later recognized it through an amendment to the nationality law. Other issues include the matter of family reunification, or the right of foreigners to benefit from social security and social grants for students, all of which result from the varying views of European countries (such as France, Germany, and Spain) on the Mediterranean migrants. Some see them as a factor to ensure the vitality of the European economy, while others do not.
12.5 Conclusion
The Rome Treaty of 1957 was a pivotal moment in the establishment of the EU. Despite its primary goal being the creation of a common market, its historical connection to former colonies influenced the structure, approach, and system of the Union itself. During the post-Second World War decolonization period, the treaty impacted relations between European countries and their former colonies. Once the economic integration was completed, and once former colonies had gained independence, Europe shifted towards enforcing cooperation, leading to ongoing economic and political interactions in the development of a highly dynamic regional system. It cannot be denied that the EU has indissoluble historical ties, interests, and political considerations that bind it to Algeria.
It would appear that the EU’s overall approach to Algeria does not change whether Algeria is part of the EEC, by an extension of the integration project outside the continent, or whether the EU is assuming the role of influencer in Euro–Maghreb, Euro–Mediterranean, and Euro–Arab relations, or whether the EU acts strategically to secure its interests in the framework of projects like the Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Association Agreement.
Different generations of agreements have embodied the Europeans’ perspective towards non-Europeans. The transition of purely economic agreements to agreements with a variety of social, political, security, and cultural aspects means that internal and external dynamics have played a significant role in shaping and redirecting the EU’s policy towards Algeria and its neighbours. These transformations indicate the level of adaptation of the relationship between the EU and Algeria.
The early phase of Algeria’s independence provided an opportunity to acknowledge the dynamic expansive movement of European borders. The Member States of the EU, however, needed to instil confidence in regional integration. Once achieved, the sole guiding principles from within towards those outside its borders became those that impact and shape not only the internal structure of the Union but also its common foreign policy centred on security, defence, migration, and development. Algeria did not completely detach from interacting in these policy areas as they remain fundamental for its own internal affairs. And since independence ended the colonial era, Euro–Algerian relations have shifted to a new form of partnership, which is not best described as cooperation. This new paradigm of partnership replaced the initial integration that characterized Algeria’s relationship with Europe.
It is true that France initially compelled Europe to accept Algeria within the framework of regional integration. France also sought, in one way or another, to ensure the continued importance and permanence of Algeria’s role within the EU for many years solely to achieve its own political and economic objectives. Nevertheless, one should not deny the European will to engage with Algeria in a mutually beneficial manner, based on common interests. Issues such as migration, border control, security, and the project of the Union for the Mediterranean are components of such a connection with Algeria.
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