Hostname: page-component-6766d58669-kl59c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-23T01:23:01.967Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Coordination with communication under oath

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Nicolas Jacquemet ,
Stéphane Luchini ,
Jason F. Shogren  and
Adam Zylbersztejn
Nicolas Jacquemet*
Affiliation:
Paris School of Economics, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, MSE, 106 Bd de l’hopital, 75013 Paris, France
Stéphane Luchini*
Affiliation:
Centre de la Vieille Charité, GREQAM-CNRS, 13236 Marseille Cedex 02, France
Jason F. Shogren*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071-3985, USA
Adam Zylbersztejn*
Affiliation:
GATE L-SE UMR 5824, Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, 69131 Ecully, France
*
nicolas.jacquemet@univ-paris1.fr
stephane.luchini@univmed.fr
JRamses@uwyo.edu
zylbersztejn@gate.cnrs.fr
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50%; (2) senders’ messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers’ trust of messages increased.

Keywords

Coordination gameCheap talk communicationOath

JEL classification

D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness C72: Noncooperative Games

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 21 , Issue 3: Special Issue in Honor of John Van Huyck , September 2018 , pp. 627 - 649
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

References

Abadie, A (2002). Bootstrap tests for distributional treatment effects in instrumental variable model. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 97(457), 284–292. 10.1198/016214502753479419CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aumann, R Gabszewic, JJ, Richard, JF, & Wolsey, LA (1990). Nash equilibria are not self-enforcing. Economic decision-making: Games, econometrics, and optimization: Contributions in honor of Jacques H. Dreze, Amsterdam: North-Holland 201–206.Google Scholar
Battalio, R, Samuelson, L, & Van Huyck, J (2001). Optimization incentives and coordination failure in laboratory stag hunt games. Econometrica, 69(3), 749–764. 10.1111/1468-0262.0021210.1111/1468-0262.00212CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beard, TR, & Beil, RO Jr (1994). Do people rely on the self-interested maximization of others? An experimental test. Management Science, 40(2), 252–262. 10.1287/mnsc.40.2.25210.1287/mnsc.40.2.252CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beard, TR, Beil, ROJ, & Mataga, Y (2001). Reliant behavior in the United States and Japan. Economic Inquiry, 39(2), 270–279. 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00065.x10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00065.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blume, A, & Ortmann, A (2007). The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 132(1), 274–290. 10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bochet, O, & Putterman, L (2009). Not just babble: Opening the black box of communication in a voluntary contribution experiment. European Economic Review, 53(3), 309–326. 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.09.005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burger, JM (1999). The foot-in-the-door compliance procedure: A multiple-process analysis and review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(4), 303–325. 10.1207/s15327957pspr0304_210.1207/s15327957pspr0304_2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charness, G (2000). Self-serving cheap talk: A test of Aumann’s conjecture. Games and Economic Behavior, 33(2), 177–194. 10.1006/game.1999.077610.1006/game.1999.0776CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cialdini, C, Bassett, J, Miller, R, & Miller, J (1978). Low-ball procedure for producing compliance: Commitment, then cost. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(5), 463–476. 10.1037/0022-3514.36.5.46310.1037/0022-3514.36.5.463CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cialdini, R, Sagarin, B Brock, T, & Green, M (2005). Interpersonal influence. Persuasion: Psychological insights and perspectives, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Press 143–169.Google Scholar
Cooper, DJ, & Van Huyck, JB (2003). Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and extensive form representation of games. Journal of Economic Theory, 110(2), 290–308.Google Scholar
Cooper, R, DeJong, DV, Forsythe, R, & Ross, TW (1992). Communication in coordination games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 739–771. 10.2307/2118488CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, RW, DeJong, DV, Forsythe, R, & Ross, TW (1990). Selection criteria in coordination games: Some experimental results. American Economic Review, 80(1), 218–233.Google Scholar
Crawford, V (1998). A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk. Journal of Economic Theory, 78(2), 286–298. 10.1006/jeth.1997.235910.1006/jeth.1997.2359CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crawford, VP, & Sobel, J (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, 50(6), 1431–1451. 10.2307/191339010.2307/1913390CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Demichelis, S, & Weibull, JW (2008). Language, meaning, and games: A model of communication, coordination, and evolution. American Economic Review, 98(4), 1292–1311. 10.1257/aer.98.4.129210.1257/aer.98.4.1292CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Devetag, G, & Ortmann, A (2007). When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory. Experimental Economics, 10(3), 331–344. 10.1007/s10683-007-9178-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Doyen, S., Klein, O., Simmons, D., & Cleeremans, A. (2014). On the other side of the mirror: Priming in social and cognitive psychology. In Molden, D. C. (Eds.), Understanding priming effects & in social psychology. New York: The Guilford Press.Google Scholar
Duffy, J, & Feltovich, N (2002). Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk. Games and Economic Behavior, 39(1), 1–27. 10.1006/game.2001.089210.1006/game.2001.0892CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duffy, J, & Feltovich, N (2006). Words, deeds, and lies: Strategic behaviour in games with multiple signals. Review of Economic Studies, 73(3), 669–688. 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00391.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellingsen, T, & Östling, R (2010). When does communication improve coordination?. American Economic Review, 100(4), 1695–1724. 10.1257/aer.100.4.169510.1257/aer.100.4.1695CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Erat, S, & Gneezy, U (2012). White lies. Management Science, 58(4), 723–733. 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1449CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farrell, J (1988). Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium. Economics Letters, 27(3), 209–214. 10.1016/0165-1765(88)90172-310.1016/0165-1765(88)90172-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farrell, J, & Rabin, M (1996). Cheap talk. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(3), 103–118. 10.1257/jep.10.3.10310.1257/jep.10.3.103CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E, & Schmidt, KM (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868. 10.1162/003355399556151CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibson, R, Tanner, C, & Wagner, AF (2013). Preferences for truthfulness: Heterogeneity among and within individuals. American Economic Review, 103(1), 532–548. 10.1257/aer.103.1.53210.1257/aer.103.1.532CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gneezy, U (2005). Deception: The role of consequences. American Economic Review, 95(1), 384–394. 10.1257/0002828053828662CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goeree, JK, & Holt, CA (2001). Ten Little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions. American Economic Review, 91(5), 1402–1422. 10.1257/aer.91.5.1402CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greiner, B (2015). Subject pool recruitment procedures: Organizing experiments with ORSEE. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1(1), 114–125. 10.1007/s40881-015-0004-410.1007/s40881-015-0004-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guéguen, N, Joule, R-V, Halimi-Falkowicz, S, Pascual, A, Fischer-Lokou, J, & Dufourcq-Brana, M (2013). I’m free but i’ll comply with your request: Generalization and multidimensional effects of “evoking freedoom” technique. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 43(1), 116–137. 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2012.00986.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hanaki, N, Jacquemet, N, Luchini, S, & Zylbersztejn, A (2016). Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty. Theory and Decision, 81(1), 101–121. 10.1007/s11238-015-9525-910.1007/s11238-015-9525-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hurkens, S, & Kartik, N (2009). Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion. Experimental Economics, 12(2), 180–192. 10.1007/s10683-008-9208-210.1007/s10683-008-9208-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacquemet, N., James, A., Luchini, S., & Shogren, J. (2016). Referenda under oath. Environmental and Resource Economics (on-line).Google Scholar
Jacquemet, N, Joule, R-V, Luchini, S, & Shogren, JF (2013). Preference elicitation under oath. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 65(1), 110–132. 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.05.00410.1016/j.jeem.2012.05.004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacquemet, N, & Zylbersztejn, A (2013). Learning, words and actions: Experimental evidence on coordination-improving information. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 13(1), 215–247. 10.1515/bejte-2012-001810.1515/bejte-2012-0018CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacquemet, N, & Zylbersztejn, A (2014). What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis?. Review of Economic Design, 18(4), 243–264. 10.1007/s10058-014-0162-510.1007/s10058-014-0162-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Joule, R, & Beauvois, J (1998). La soumission librement consentie, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.Google Scholar
Joule, R-V, Girandola, F, & Bernard, F (2007). How can people be induced to willingly change their behavior? The path from persuasive communication to binding communication. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 1(1), 493–505. 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00018.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kamecke, U (1997). Note: Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game. International Journal of Game Theory, 26(3), 409–417. 10.1007/BF0126328110.1007/BF01263281CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kartik, N (2009). Strategic signaling with lying costs. Review of Economic Studies, 76(4), 1359–1395. 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00559.x10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00559.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kartik, N, Ottaviani, M, & Squintani, F (2007). Credulity, lies, and costly talk. Journal of Economic Theory, 134(1), 93–116. 10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.00310.1016/j.jet.2006.04.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Katzev, R, & Wang, T (1994). Can commitment change behavior ? A case study of environmental actions. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 9(1), 13–26.Google Scholar
Kiesler, C (1971). The psychology of commitment. Experiments liking behavior to belief, New York: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Kolb, B, & Whishaw, I (2009). Fundamentals of human neuropsychology, New York: Worth.Google Scholar
López-Pérez, R (2012). The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness. Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(3), 642–658. 10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.00410.1016/j.joep.2011.12.004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lundquist, T, Ellingsen, T, Gribbe, E, & Johannesson, M (2009). The aversion to lying. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70(1–2), 81–92. 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.01010.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.010CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miettinen, T (2013). Promises and conventions—An approach to pre-play agreements. Games and Economic Behavior, 80, 68–84. 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.00210.1016/j.geb.2013.03.002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pallack, M, Cook, D, Sullivan, J, & Bickman, L (1980). Commitment and energy conservation. Applied social psychology annual, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 235–253.Google Scholar
Parkhurst, GM, Shogren, JF, & Bastian, C (2004). Repetition, communication, and coordination failure. Experimental Economics, 7(2), 141–152. 10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026976.44467.6610.1023/B:EXEC.0000026976.44467.66CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosenthal, RW (1981). Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox. Journal of Economic Theory, 25(1), 92–100. 10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-110.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schelling, T (1960). The strategy of conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Sekhon, J (2011). Multivariate and propensity score matching software with automated balance optimization. Journal of Statistical Software, 42(7), 1–52. 10.18637/jss.v042.i07CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Selten, R (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4(1), 25–55. 10.1007/BF01766400CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Serra-Garcia, M, van Damme, E, & Potters, J (2013). Lying about what you know or about what you do?. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(5), 1204–1229. 10.1111/jeea.12034CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sobel, J. (2013). Giving and receiving advice. In Acemoglu, D., Arellano, M. Dekel, E. (Eds.), Advances in economics and econometrics. Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society.10.1017/CBO9781139060011.011CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sutter, M (2009). Deception through telling the truth? Experimental evidence from individuals and teams. Economic Journal, 119(534), 47–60. 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02205.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Huyck, JB, Battalio, RC, & Beil, RO (1990). Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. American Economic Review, 80(1), 234–248.Google Scholar
Van Huyck, JB, Battalio, RC, & Beil, RO (1991). Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(3), 885–910. 10.2307/293793210.2307/2937932CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Huyck, JB, Battalio, RC, & Beil, RO (1993). Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication. Games and Economic Behavior, 5(3), 485–504. 10.1006/game.1993.1026CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vanberg, C (2008). Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations. Econometrica, 76(6), 1467–1480. 10.3982/ECTA7673Google Scholar
Wang, T, & Katsev, R (1990). Groupe commitment and resource conservation: Two field experiments on promoting recycling. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 20(4), 265–275. 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1990.tb00411.x10.1111/j.1559-1816.1990.tb00411.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weibull, J. W. (2004). Testing game theory. In Huck, S. (Ed.), Advances in understanding strategic behaviour—Game theory, experiments and bounded rationality. London: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zeiliger, R. (2000). A presentation of Regate, Internet based software for experimental economics. http://regate-ng.gate.cnrs.fr/~sferriol/.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Jacquemet et al. supplementary material

Online Supplementary Material
Download Jacquemet et al. supplementary material(File)
File 130.1 KB