Introduction
The Rohingya refugee crisis is one of the most pressing humanitarian crises in the 21st century. Originating from Myanmar’s post-independence nation-building process and internal conflicts, the crisis has been an outcome of decades-long systematic discrimination, marginalization, persecution and violence against the Rohingya – a predominantly Muslim ethnic group primarily residing in Myanmar’s southwestern province of Rakhine (previously called Arakan). Subjected to multiple waves of violence, atrocities, and displacements, especially in the 1990s and 2010s, the plight of the Rohingya intensified after the Myanmar military launched a crackdown, codenamed “clearance operations,” against them in August 2017. The first major influx took place in 1978 after the Myanmar army launched a major military operation to expel the so-called “illegal immigrants,” forcing around 200,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh (Parashar and Alam Reference Parashar and Alam2019). During 1991–1992, a second wave of Rohingya refugees, approximately 250,000 who were stripped of citizenship in 1982, entered Bangladesh to avoid military tactics of harassment, forced labor, and arbitrary arrests (Sahan et al. Reference Sahana, Jahangir and Anisujjaman2019). Assisted by UN programs, most of them were repatriated, but again, many Rohingya fled back due to abuses and lack of citizenship rights (Pugh Reference Pugh2013). The 2017 military crackdown unleashed mass killings, widespread sexual violence, large-scale human rights abuses, and destruction of Rohingya villages, forcing a mass exodus of refugees into neighboring countries, with Bangladesh hosting over one million in the southern Cox’s Bazar district (Bangladesh officially calls the Rohingya refugees “Forcefully Displaced Myanmar Nationals” – FDMN). Significant global concerns and Bangladesh’s intentions to strike out a negotiated deal with Myanmar notwithstanding, the Rohingya refugee crisis continues to remain unresolved, posing serious social, economic, political, demographic, and security challenges to Bangladesh as well as South and Southeast Asia (Hossain et al. Reference Hossain, Ali, Azman, Ahmad and Mehedi2021).
Theory-informed analysis of the threats posed by the Rohingya refugees is rare, however. This paper investigates the security impact of the Rohingya refugee crisis both in the Bangladeshi national context and at the regional level in South and Southeast Asia through the theoretical lens of securitization theory. Securitization theory, introduced by the Copenhagen School in the mid-1990s (Wæver Reference Wæver and Lipschutz1995), holds great potential to explain and offer insights into non-traditional security issues and threats, including refugees, terrorism, cyber threats, climate change, and so on. This theory helps to understand how political and social actors transform certain issues into matters of national, regional, or global security by elevating them to the level of “security threats,” a process elaborated below.
The two primary objectives of this paper are: a) to provide a theory-informed analysis of the Rohingya refugee crisis, bringing to light the interplay between refugee crises and security dynamics through the lens of securitization theory; and b) to explore how the Rohingya refugees look at security and securitize their current plight in Bangladesh. It also examines the possibilities and limitations of securitization theory in the Global South, in light of the research findings. The paper endeavors to achieve its objectives by shedding light on the “lived experiences” of both the Rohingya refugees and their host communities in Bangladesh. “Lived experiences” here means the first-hand information and views the authors obtained through field surveys in Rohingya camps and interviews with residents of the Cox’s Bazar district of southeastern Bangladesh.
The research gap
Scholarly research on the Rohingya refugee crisis abounds, highlighting its political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions, but an in-depth theoretical study on the crisis is missing. Rana and Riaz (Reference Rana and Riaz2023) remain an exception, but their paper narrowly builds on the securitization process that started in the 1990s, while ignoring its ramifications from the national to the regional level. Outside the theoretical domain, Ahmed (Reference Ahmed, Ahmed and Mohiuddin2022) explores how intra-group conflicts among the Rohingya refugee community in Bangladesh have increased in recent years, which threatens Rohingya solidarity. Uddin (Reference Uddin2022) and Ahmed and Mohiuddin (Reference Ahmed and Mohiuddin2022) focus on the vulnerabilities, impact of persecution, and the violations of the rights of the Rohingya as citizens in Myanmar. Ahmed and Mohiuddin (Reference Ahmed and Mohiuddin2022), however, make references to security issues surrounding the Rohingya crisis, arguing for a human-centric security approach. Ahmed and Mohiuddin (Reference Ahmed and Mohiuddin2020) state that Myanmar violated human security by persecuting the Rohingya people, which created national, regional, and global security risks. Siddiqui (Reference Siddiqi and Uddin2022) examines the Rohingya repatriation issue and concludes that repatriation has become a “myth,” as all diplomatic attempts to resolve the crisis have failed.
Akter and Kusakabe (Reference Akter and Kusakabe2014) add a gender-centric perspective to the Rohingya refugee crisis. They explore the prevalence of gender-based violence among Rohingya refugees and the vulnerabilities Rohingya women and girls face in the refugee camps. Human Rights Watch (2018) presents an analysis of systematic abuses of human rights and targeted violence against the Rohingya in general. Yunus and Islam (Reference Yunus, Alam and Islam2018) provide an in-depth study on the socio-economic consequences of the refugee crisis on the host community in Cox’s Bazar. Ibrahim (Reference Ibrahim2016) offers an historical account of the Rohingya people covering the socio-economic context leading to the current crisis. Siddiqui (Reference Siddiqi and Uddin2022) presents a cost-benefit analysis of hosting a large refugee population, taking into consideration the economic, social, and environmental impacts of the Rohingya crisis on Bangladesh. Farzana (Reference Farzana2017) examines the prolonged impact of cross-border displacements in the context of Bangladesh’s security concerns and policy approaches to deal with the Rohingya refugees.
Several authors have investigated the patterns and trends of systematic oppression and persecution of the Rohingya population. Lewa (Reference Lewa2009) discusses how systematic discrimination against the Rohingya in Myanmar gradually created an “open prison” for them as an ethnic group. Walton (Reference Walton2013a) provides an in-depth study on the ethnic hierarchical order in Myanmar that brings to light how Burmese national identity politics has, in the long term, contributed to the marginalization of the Rohingya and other ethnic minority groups in the Buddhist state. Green et al. (Reference Green, MacManus and de la Cour2015) look at the genocide and persecution of the Rohingya population from a different angle. They draw our attention to the early warning signs of genocide against the Rohingya and call for effective international actions.
Writing from a geopolitical perspective, Hussain and Hussain (Reference Hossain and Hossain2019) examine the geopolitical tensions between Myanmar and its neighbors in the context of regional security concerns bred by the Rohingya crisis. Schauble (Reference Schauble2020) evaluates the impact of ASEAN’s limited role in the Rohingya crisis and offers policy options for stronger regional intervention by ASEAN states. Cheung (Reference Cheung2011) similarly examines ASEAN’s limitations in addressing the Rohingya refugee crisis, focusing on challenges to regional cooperation and the protection framework of the association – consensus decision-making.
Numerous practitioner-oriented studies on the Rohingya crisis also exist. Concern Worldwide (2021) provides a review of its Rohingya-related operations in Bangladesh covering the period 2017–2020, offering practitioners lessons on disaster risk reduction, distribution of non-food items, and nutritional issues. UNICEF (2024) focuses on how people with disabilities can adapt to WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene) infrastructure and also presents information about practical design modifications and lessons for inclusive infrastructure in camp settings. Green et al. (Reference Green, Kaljee and Chowdhury2025) explore the main barriers to mental health and psychological support, which inform mental health program design and workforce training. Fetters et al. (Reference Fetters, Rubayet and Sultana2020) investigate sexual and reproductive health in the Rohingya crisis context, highlight policy and regulatory hurdles involving the Bangladesh government and the UN agencies, and offer practical lessons for health service planning in constrained humanitarian settings. A recent but important study is by Hasan et al. (Reference Hasan, Hossain and Atar2024). This study examines how the Rohingya influx has affected the Bangladesh public health system, and offers NGOs and agencies assistance in planning health interventions in keeping with the host system capacities and points of stress.
The literature review presented above is not exhaustive but covers most relevant scholarly works and policy studies relating to the security implications of the Rohingya refugee crisis. However, this paper, as far as the authors are aware, is the first attempt to theorize the crisis from a securitization perspective.
Research methodology and structure of the paper
The paper primarily employs qualitative research methods, with a field survey being a significant component. The field survey, conducted in May 2024 and March 2025, includes interviews of both local Bangladeshi residents and Rohingya refugee leaders and members, local law enforcement personnel, and representatives of Bangladeshi and international non-governmental organizations working for the benefit of the refugees. It builds on a stratified sampling technique that allows for the selection of participants based on select groups or sub-groups with specific characteristics, such as gender, race, or ethnocultural identities, involving both the refugees and local host communities. This sampling technique was chosen in expectation of getting rich, relevant, and diverse insights from different groups about the complex interplay of factors shaping the security landscape in and beyond Bangladesh.
The purposive sample comprises 60 individuals chosen from four distinct subgroups: 20 Rohingya refugees, 20 local residents from the Cox’s Bazar host community, 10 members of law enforcement agencies, and 10 employees of local and international NGOs. Each subgroup has been selected with the intent to ensure that the research outcomes are reflective of the diverse and intricate realities shaping the security dynamics in Bangladesh and the broader neighboring regions. The sample was defined and shaped by an overriding need to balance representation within the constraints of fieldwork access and safety considerations. While the sample is not statistically representative of over a million Rohingya refugee population, it was designed to reflect diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, ensuring inclusion of perspectives from community leaders, young people, women, and elderly residents. To overcome potential biases of the stratified method (such as over-representing individuals willing to speak with researchers and under-representing those fearful of sharing their views), the research employed triangular techniques by cross-referencing interview data with available NGO reports, news coverage, and policy documents. Enlarging the sample size could add more richness to data and perspectives, but the research faced some logistical constraints (such as getting refugees and local people willing to speak, support from the law enforcement agencies, etc.). The limitations of the fieldwork notwithstanding, the method aims to investigate the most diverse perspectives as possible.
The paper is structured as four interrelated sections. The first section presents a brief discussion on the securitization theory and its relevance for the study of non-traditional security threats like refugee crises and their security implications. The second section elaborately explores the diverse security threats emanating from the Rohingya refugee crisis that Bangladesh has been experiencing. Information obtained through field interviews is extensively reported to enrich the quality of discussions and analysis in this section. Section three briefly focuses on cross-border implications of the refugee crisis involving South and Southeast Asia. Policy responses by regional states like India, Malaysia, and Thailand are investigated in this section. The fourth section takes a critical look at how the Bangladeshi securitizing actors have securitized the Rohingya refugee crisis as a serious security threat to Bangladesh. The concluding section, in addition to highlighting the main points and findings, integrates the discussions and analysis focusing on the securitization theory, while also briefly highlighting the potential and limitations of the theory in refugee studies in the Global South.
Non-traditional security threats and securitization theory
Refugee crises, along with climate change, terrorism, pandemics and public health problems, and environmental disasters, are non-traditional security threats. Such threats are primarily human-centered and human-created security risks that undermine the safety and stability of a state (resource constraints, social tensions, demographic and governance strains) without posing direct military threats – war, invasion, or armed conflicts, threatening territorial integrity and sovereignty (Acharya Reference Acharya2001; Caballero-Anthony Reference Caballero-Anthony2016). It is the enormity of the non-traditional threats that has drawn scholarly attention from different theoretical schools, particularly realism, liberalism, and human security, with securitization theory being the latest entrant. Each theoretical school has its distinct research focus, security referent, and style of interpretation of security issues. All the theoretical schools, while clashing against each other, approach the refugee crises and the national, regional, or global threats they pose from their respective theoretical platforms.
Realism offers a traditional state-centric and military-oriented security perspective (see Buzan Reference Buzan, Smith, Booth and Zaleweski1996; Booth Reference Booth, Kieth and Michael2003; Mearsheimer Reference Mearsheimer1990; Walt Reference Walt1991; Waltz Reference Waltz1988). Security, according to the realist view, is a state’s immunity to external threats – the ability to resist foreign invasion and aggression and thus protect its political independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. All states need to ensure their survival primarily through “self-help” military preparedness, though they are free to choose military alliances to bolster and maintain their power balance against enemies. In this view, refugees, who spill over a state’s national border from a third country, are framed as external threats, as large-scale refugee movements destabilize national borders, social order, and economies of neighboring or distant states (see Rösch and Lebow Reference Rösch, Lebow, Orsi, Avgustin and Nurnus2018). More alarmingly, they can fuel internal strife, create new grounds for malign or terrorist activities, and exacerbate tensions between local populations and the refugees. A recent example is the massive influx of Syrian refugees into the neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, straining state resources and heightening security concerns. The major problem with the realist view is its obsession with state security, and it hardly pays any serious attention to the humanitarian dimension of the refugee crises.
Liberalism views the cross-border refugee movements as security threats but takes an institutionally focused, more cooperative approach to security problems originating from refugee crises (Lamey Reference Lamey2012; Lavenex Reference Lavenex2024). It seeks solutions to refugee crises through multilateral cooperation to financially support the refugees and safeguard their human rights under international law. International institutions like the UN, UNHCR, and other relevant non-governmental organizations are deemed to have enormous responsibilities to manage the refugee crises, facilitate negotiated settlements, and encourage burden-sharing among states. There is, however, a limitation to the liberal approach to refugee crises as international institutions often lack the capacity to address massive displacement of populations, and their interests to support the refugees may dwindle over time if states, especially the host and “perpetrator” states, fail to cooperate.
The human security approach, on the other hand, reinterpreted or revolutionized security studies in the early 1990s by making a shift from state security to individual security. The individuals were declared the primary security referents, rendering state-centric military security to a secondary level, and promoting individual economic, social, political, cultural, and environmental security as more urgent, more prominent security concerns. Naturally, refugees, according to this approach, are not security threats but simply vulnerable populations who need protection from violence, human rights abuses, poverty, and miserable sufferings (Freitas Reference Freitas2002; Ogata Reference Ogata1999). The prime concern of the human security approach is the protection of refugees as dignified individuals, with access to education, employment, and healthcare. The holistic approach of human security, however, becomes less effective in situations of protracted refugee crises, such as the Palestinian refugee crisis dating back to 1948 and 1967.
Securitization theory, in contrast to major IR theories of realism and liberalism, adds new theoretical innovations in security studies by arguing that security threats are framed through discourses and by introducing a shift from material threats (military threats) to the political process of defining what constitutes a threat. It builds on the central idea that security is a speech act, a central concept Wæver (Reference Wæver and Lipschutz1995) elaborates as issues becoming security threats not because they are really threatening, but because they are projected as such by political and social actors – the securitizing actors. Along with the speech act come the concepts of referent object and audience. The referent object refers to the entity (in this case the state, identity, sovereignty) that needs immediate protection, while the audience means the general people who must accept the securitizing move and support the actions of the securitizing actors. This theoretical innovation drew the immediate attention of IR scholars but was soon criticized for its heavy dependence on discourse.
In order to expand the theoretical range and explanatory power of securitization theory, Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde (Reference Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde1998) dilated its framework to explain sectoral security (political, economic, societal, environmental), and included a host of referent objects other than the state, such as identity, environment, migration, and terrorism. A bevy of scholars have, respectively, studied how terrorism, climate change, and migration have been often framed as direct and immediate existential threats to state or regional security. Huysmans (Reference Huysmans2006) has examined how securitizing actors have often framed migration as a threat to national social cohesion as well as national security, which, in effect, justified restrictive immigration policies. Buzan and Hansen (Reference Buzan and Hansen2009) studied how terrorism was securitized in the post-9/11 context. Their study shows how the framing of terrorism as an immediate existential threat across different world regions, especially in North America and Western Europe, led to unprecedented expansion of executive powers with a corresponding decrease in civil rights and political freedoms. Floyd (Reference Floyd2011) explored the securitization of climate change by states and international organizations, prompting urgent calls for global cooperation.
Securitization theory has no doubt considerable explanatory power to cover a wide range of non-traditional security issues, which are plaguing the contemporary world. The two main criticisms leveled against this theory are that the theory, like other dominant IR theories, is Eurocentric and that it is narrowly focused on discourses. Bilgin (Reference Bilgin2011) argues that the Eurocentric focus of the theory limits its application to non-Western and non-democratic contexts. In non-democratic or authoritarian contexts, speech acts, which are central to securitization theory, cannot play any significant role to securitize issues as existential threats, because of the lack of political freedoms and civil rights. Balzacq (Reference Balzacq2011) critiques that securitization theory emphasizes rhetoric but overlooks the sociopolitical process of practices, institutions, and material conditions under which securitization can take place.
This paper departs from Bilgin’s critique of the Eurocentric focus of the securitization theory that questions its applicability to authoritarian or non-democratic contexts in the non-Western world. Authoritarian regimes definitely curb the civil rights of citizens, particularly the media, limiting the play of speech acts but the widespread use of social media, the availability of internet-based sources of news, and the instant dissemination of information have largely overcome authoritarian barriers to discursive practices. Additionally, securitizing actors, authoritarian or democratic, enjoy a high degree of freedom, thanks to amazing IT advances in the contemporary context, to securitize issues like cross-border migration, environmental degradation, or refugee crises. Balzacq’s interpretation of the sociopolitical process involving practices, institutions, and material conditions remains important in securitizing sociopolitical phenomena as security threats as well. In line with this position, this paper first maps out the threats and then explores how the threats posed by the Rohingya refugees are framed as national and regional security threats by Bangladesh and other South and Southeast Asian states.
Rohingya refugees, security threats, and securitization
Refugee-hosting countries generally face a list of daunting tasks to manage a large refugee population, provide security for the refugee camps, and manage social tensions between the refugees and the local population. The massive influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, for example, created serious social and economic tensions. The governments of the two Arab states literally struggled to provide food, accommodation, education, healthcare, and employment opportunities for the refugees and their citizens. This situation exacerbated social tensions between the refugees and the host communities (Anouti and Enna Reference Anouti and Enna2023; Dahi Reference Dahi2014; Khawaldah and Alzboun Reference Khawaldah and Alzboun2022). The militarization of the refugees by militant and rebel groups is another big security concern. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a poor African state that hosts a large refugee population from Rwanda and Burundi, armed rebel groups have recruited young refugees, exploiting their vulnerabilities. Muggah (Reference Muggah2006) points out that the lack of adequate security protection for the refugee camps could result in cycles of violence leading to threats and instability for the host countries and their neighbors. Bangladesh has been facing a similar situation since 2017. Below, the paper details the diverse threats and challenges the Rohingya refugees pose to Bangladesh and the regional states.
Threats to Bangladesh’s national security
The multifaceted security challenges and their implications for Bangladesh can be broadly examined under five categories – impact on economy and resources, drug trafficking and radicalization concerns, challenges to law enforcement and military resources, border security and national stability challenges, and public debates and political tensions. Each of the five categories is discussed below with reflections on and references to data and information we obtained through field surveys conducted in the refugee camps located in the Ukhia sub-district of Cox’s Bazar.
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a) Impact on Economy, Demography, and Resources
The exodus of a vast number of refugees has created strains on local resources and public services. Maintaining the refugees has hugely increased the demand for food, water, and shelter, making such basic necessities more expensive in the local markets and for the host communities. With international aid and assistance pouring into the refugee camps, the poor local communities saw no change in their economic fortunes but struggled to cope with the skyrocketing prices of daily necessities. A local teacher (aged around 55 years) from the host community told the authors, “The refugees are here for a long time, producing endless negative impacts. Their demand for food and housing has pushed up prices for the same items for the local people. Hundreds of government employees and aid workers have arrived in Cox’s Bazar area to support the refugees, forcing house rents go up” (interview, 18 May 2024). Another local resident (a young person around 35 years old, involved in local business) reported: “We are low-income group people. Prices of commodities and daily necessities have shot up by 20% to 30% making our life more miserable” (interview, 18 May 2024).
The local host communities often portray dismal scenarios about the demographic imbalance affected by the Rohingya refugees. They project the size of the local population in Ukhia (Ukhia hosts Kutupalong, the largest refugee settlement in the world) in the range of three to four hundred thousand people (actual number was 263,158 in 2022, according to the Bangladesh national census). The massive size of the refugee population exceeds one million, which speaks of a 1:3 ratio, a scenario where local people are not only outnumbered but also predicts a permanent demographic shift in favor of the refugees, if the refugees remain in Bangladesh and seek integration into the Bangladeshi society. A local Union Council (a rural-level representation unit in Bangladesh) member (aged around 48 years, involved in local politics for a long time and linked to national politics as well) in the Ukhia sub-district expressed his frustration this way: “The Rohingya are a large refugee population, their number has reached 1.5 million by this time. We are concerned about the future of local Bangladeshi people. The refugees should be repatriated as soon as possible” (interview, 19 May 2024). This fear is not necessarily an individual’s discrete fear. A similar view was echoed by other local individuals we interviewed. For example, another local Union Council member (around 40 years old, who is involved in the local education sector as he teaches at an elementary school) expressed the fear that “The Rohingya refugees will capture the Cox’s Bazar district in the next 10 years. There are hundreds of Rohingya armed groups who operate here, and they are becoming intimidating” (interview, 19 May 2024).
The local people equally decry the loss of employment opportunities and income-generating activities to the Rohingya refugees. They are outbid by the refugee workers who are willing to work for half the daily or monthly wage that local workers get. Whereas a local worker demands BDT 600 (US $5 approx.) as a daily wage, a Rohingya worker is willing to work for BDT 300 (US $2.5) a day. It is pushing local people further into poverty, increasing their suffering, and also making them hostile towards other refugees who enjoy international financial aid and relief support. As per the rules of the Bangladesh government, the refugees are prohibited from taking up local employment opportunities, but they frequently violate local rules and regulations (The Daily Star, 2025). A local female resident (around 55 years old who works for a local NGO) corroborated this point: “The Rohingya workers have infiltrated into the local labor markets. They can be found in every shop and work place. They sell their labor at a much cheaper rate, as they get financial support from UNHCR and other NGOs” (interview, 20 May 2024). This resident also reported: “The Rohingya refugees are by law bound to stay inside their camps but many of them rent houses and stay outside the camps. Some of them are also getting married to local girls.” A contrasting view was presented by a Rohingya refugee worker (aged around 35). He said: “The financial support and relief distributions we receive are not enough to run the whole month. So, we have to take up jobs, to do different types of farming. We have to earn money by doing that” (interview, 27 May 2024).
Recently, a new concern has surfaced regarding a gradual decline in international aid and assistance for the refugees. Due to funding shortfalls, the World Food Program is slashing monthly food vouchers from $12.5 to $6 per refugee, taking effect from 01 April 2025 (Al Jazeera 2025b). The US, the largest donor of the Rohingya refugees, has announced massive humanitarian aid cuts worldwide. The Trump administration’s executive order, suspending US-funded projects globally, has rung an alarm bell for the Rohingya refugees. In 2024, the total financial requirement for supporting the refugees and managing their camps was $852.4 million. Out of a total international donation of $548.9 million received, the US alone provided $301 million, amounting to 55% of the total foreign donation (The Daily Star 2025b). The aid cuts by the US sends out the message that resources are finite and that refugees cannot be supported indefinitely, unless alternative funding sources are available. The Bangladesh government, already beset with mounting socio-economic and developmental challenges, currently spends $1.22 billion a year for the Rohingya refugees (The Daily Star 2022). Bangladesh’s national budgets in the coming years are likely to face more constraints, if the decline in international aid and assistance for the refugees cannot be arrested.
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b) Drug Trafficking, Crimes, and Radicalization
Criminal networks, run by refugee gangs and local miscreants, are involved in drug smuggling, illegal arms trade, and human trafficking. Drug smuggling has, in particular, become an endemic national problem. Cross-border smuggling of yaba (methamphetamine) pills, produced in Myanmar, is largely facilitated by the porous Bangladesh-Myanmar borders stretching 271 kilometers. The gangs and miscreants use the refugee camps as transit points by capitalizing on the depressions and frustrations of the Rohingya youths who are either victims of or witnesses to atrocities by the Myanmar government. The surrounding local Bangladeshi communities are also affected, as drug addiction has been on the rise along with a corresponding uptick in criminal activities. A Rohingya refugee leader (aged around 50, wearing a religious cap) living in camp number 5 in Ukhia admitted: “When these narcotics are imported from Myanmar, Myanmar people or Rohingya people may be involved. There is certainly a connection to the local people of Bangladesh” (interview, 16 May 2024).
Similar confessions were made by a good number of other refugees. Referring to the Myanmar military, an older refugee (aged around 65) said: “The Myanmar military is directly behind all these drugs. They transport drugs from across the borders with the help of local Bangladeshis and the involvement of Rohingya refugees” (interview, 16 May 2024). Another older refugee (aged around 70) validated this point: “I know about all these drugs. They usually come from the Myanmar border, and local Bangladeshis as well as refugees work together to run the cross-border drug business” (interview, 22 May 2024). Generating illegal incomes and amassing money drive the yaba business. A young refugee (who is in his 20s, living in camp number 5 for more than five years) confessed to the authors: “Yaba business is behind many quarrels and fighting. And this business is controlled by many armed groups. They are in a race to generate money with this illegal business” (interview, 16 May 2024).
Most of the local Union Council members and other local residents we interviewed put the blame on the Rohingya refugees for the cross-border narcotics business, while remaining oblivious to the involvement of the local people. The Bangladesh Police officers, stationed in the Ukhia and Teknaf sub-districts, came up with similar information. The OCs (Officers-in-Charge) of Ukhia and Teknaf police stations reported to the authors that yaba business was a part of their (refugees’) daily life, a socially and culturally acceptable practice. Many refugees, with links to their relatives and other people in Myanmar, take sugar and oil from Bangladesh and exchange these goods for yaba in Myanmar (interview, 07 March 2025). A Teknaf-based regional commander of Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), a paramilitary force, disclosed that the fishermen in the Naf River (a river flowing across the Bangladesh-Myanmar border in the Cox’s Bazar district) act as intermediaries in the exchange of sugar and oil, goods that are in shortages in Myanmar, for yaba, earning BDT 5,000 per exchange. The exchanges take place in the mid-river point, mostly at night time to evade security surveillance (interview, 07 March 2025).
Alongside the illegal drug business, the radicalization of the Rohingya refugees has remained a serious issue. The fear of radicalization originates from two real factors: a) the refugees’ long experience of extreme violence, repression, and marginalization by the Myanmar military; and b) the unfriendly treatment by the host communities. The two factors collectively may have motivated the young refugees to get in touch with radical or religious fundamentalist forces, such as Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS), creating a new spectrum of insecurity for Bangladesh. Reportedly, the AQIS leadership was instructed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to support the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar by executing revenge attacks to punish the Myanmar government (Reuters 2017). Some Bangladeshi militant groups, most notably Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Harkat ul Jihad al Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B), groups that are now mostly suppressed by the government, responded positively in the name of their religious duty to protect the Rohingya (Bashar Reference Bashar2017, 6).
A major Rohingya armed group –the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) was accused of entering into partnerships with al-Qaeda. Additionally, some Rohingya refugees, who sympathized with an Islamic fundamentalist worldview, were reportedly in touch with JMB and HUJI-B (Wolf Reference Wolf2014, 4). Other militant Rohingya groups, such as Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Nabi Hossain Group, were and are exploiting the feelings of the young Rohingya and their miserable plight to recruit, train and finally send them to the frontlines to face off the Myanmar armed forces. They are also reportedly involved in attacking local refugee camps, shooting and burning houses (interview with a young refugee aged around 30, living in the Kutupalong Refugee Camp, 21 May 2024).
A good number of refugee interviewees admitted that militant organizations like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and RSO abduct Rohingya youths from the camps. The Rohingya brokers from within the camps are supporting the militants. A Rohingya camp leader, who we quoted earlier, explained this issue as a double-edged sword. He said, “Just as our groups are abducting people from here, the Myanmar military is abducting the Rohingya in Myanmar for war. The abductees are forced to go to the battle fronts; if they don’t go, then they are killed” (interview, 22 May 2024). A female refugee (aged around 50) gave the authors similar information. She reported: “Rohingya youths are abducted from new refugee camps (established in and after 2017) because of the ongoing war in Myanmar. The militant groups are also abducting young Rohingya men from registered refugee camps (pre-2017 camps established in the wake of the 1991-92 refugee influx). We are afraid” (interview, 22 May 2024).
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c) Strains on Law Enforcement and Military Resources
Bangladesh’s armed forces and law enforcement agency personnel were stretched too thin to respond to multiple pressures unleashed by the large-scale influx of the refugees. Three pressing issues were, and still are, the management of refugee camps, monitoring and defending the border with Myanmar, and prevent drug smuggling and human trafficking, what required an increasing security presence in the Cox’s Bazar district.
Following the 2017 exodus, the armed forces and the police struggled to meet immediate security needs in the Cox’s Bazar district. Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies, found it difficult to deal with the rising rate of crimes due to a shortage of police manpower. The OC of Teknaf police station told the authors that he had only 60 police personnel to manage over 200,000 Rohingya refugees sheltered in Teknaf, giving rise to unmanageable pressures on the police force to look after the security of the local residents (interview, 07 March 2025). On the other hand, large-scale concentrations of military resources followed suit in this area after the 2017 refugee influx, leaving other areas of the country less protected or vulnerable to extremist or terrorist attacks. It is important to note that Bangladesh is currently the second-largest troop-contributing country to UN peacekeeping missions. The Rohingya refugee crisis at least partially threatened to affect the country’s peacekeeping commitments, since the crisis forced redirection of military personnel and resources to the Cox’s Bazar area and across the Bangladesh-Myanmar border for refugee registration and aid operation (Business Standard 2017). However, the deployment of armed forces in the refugee camps created some tensions between the authorities and the refugees, as human rights abuses were reported by the press (The Guardian 2018).
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d) Border Security and National Stability Challenges
As mentioned earlier, Bangladesh shares a 271km-long border with Myanmar. This long border lacks an effective monitoring system, and cross-border observation check posts are not that many in number. Insurgent groups and organized criminal gangs can easily exploit Bangladesh’s weak border control systems. Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) is charged with maintaining border security, stop the cross-border infiltrations of criminals, and illegal movements of people. The more challenging task is to prevent drug smuggling and human trafficking, a task the BGB can hardly perform efficiently. A regional Teknaf-based BGB commander admitted that Bangladesh has discernible shortages in border security technology and equipment to effectively monitor day-to-day developments across the Bangladesh-Myanmar borders (interview, 08 March 2025). The massive influx of Rohingya refugees has apparently exposed the BGB’s technological weaknesses to maintain a tight and secure border.
The recent rise of the Arakan Army (AA) has caused a further decline in the security situation. The AA has captured almost the whole of the Rakhine state of Myanmar, including big cities like Maungdaw, and established control over large stretches of the 271km long Bangladesh-Myanmar border (Geopolitical Monitor 2025). Now, Bangladesh faces a big dilemma of contacting and negotiating with which actor – the military junta or the AA, which has become a de facto key actor for any repatriation process (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 2025). It emerges that Bangladesh cannot solely depend on the military junta for cross-border coordination and diplomatic engagements; it also realizes the need to engage with the AA in certain situations, while being cognizant of the fact that the AA enjoys no diplomatic recognition accorded by any independent state. It should be, however, noted that the AA pursues an equally harsh policy towards the Rohingya – restricted movements, discriminatory policies, arrests, and arbitrary detentions, and forced labor (Amnesty International 2025). This raises concerns about security guarantees for repatriation, ensuring citizenship rights for and access to aid and economic provisions for the refugees. All these make conditions for the safe return of the refugees to Myanmar much worse.
The way the Rohingya crisis is unfolding undoubtedly signals a long-term presence of the refugees in Bangladesh (International Crisis Group 2023). The government finds it increasingly difficult to make a balance between the humanitarian needs of the refugees and the need for faster economic development to improve the life-quality of its own citizens. The Rohingya refugees are undercutting the capacity of the government for national development by refusing to go back to Myanmar in the absence of adequate security guarantees or rejecting resettlements in Bhasan Char, a Bangladeshi island in the Bay of Bengal, where the government has built houses and provided livelihood provisions for the refugees. This was the expression of a young refugee (aged around 40) from the Kutupalong Refugee Camp: “If we are taken back to our country with citizenship and honor and the same rights enjoyed by other races, then we will return to our homeland Myanmar but have no plan to resettle in Bhasan Char” (interview, 27 May 2024).
In the absence of a settlement of the refugee crisis, some local residents in Ukhia are helping the refugees integrate into the local society. An older local resident (who is in his 60s and works in a local grocery shop) reported: “There is an area called ‘Shaplapur’ in the southern part of Ukhia. Local people are helping the refugees in exchange for benefits. They are building houses on their own lands for the Rohingya refugees” (interview, 27 May 2024). A female Bangladeshi psychologist (in the age bracket of 40s), who works for an international organization as a counsellor in a refugee camp, aptly reflected on the reality: “Bangladesh cannot socially integrate one million refugees. Our own health and education systems are of poor quality. How can we allow the refugees to permanently settle here? I think some people are making a benefit out of this situation. Otherwise, how could the refugees manage to get NIDs (National ID cards) and passports” (interview, 27 May 2024), pointing to news reports that scores of refugees managed to get Bangladeshi citizenship documents (The Daily Star 2019). This view resonates with the thinking of local residents we met in Ukhia and Teknaf.
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e) Domestic Social and Political Tensions
Domestic public opinion on the Rohingya refugee crisis is divided but increasingly swinging against the refugees. So has been the case with Bangladeshi political parties. Initially, the Bangladeshis welcomed and extended warm hospitality to the oppressed and displaced Rohingya. This hospitality was admitted by an older Rohingya refugee (aged around 55) who said: “They [Bangladeshis] did everything for all of us from every side, including supplies of food, rice, snacks, clothes, and even they received us from the border areas” (interview, 16 May 2024). But the sympathy and positive impressions did not last long. This was quite evident from the expressions of many local residents we interviewed in Ukhia. A local middle-aged female resident expressed bitterness and said: “It was a mistake to welcome the Rohingya refugees. At first, we welcomed them on humanitarian grounds. Now they are involved in bad activities – entering into local job markets, committing crimes, and working against our interests” (interview, 19 May 2024). This point was seconded by a young male student refugee (aged around 25) who said: “Local Bangladeshis are aware of the fact that there are various groupings, shootings and fighting within the refugee camps. For this reason, if a Rohingya goes outside the camp to work in the markets, and if he reveals in any way that he is a Rohingya, then the local Bangladeshis look at him indignantly and condemn him” (interview, 19 May 2025).
On the domestic political front, the persisting refugee crisis has become a point of contention between the major political parties of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Awami League, the party in power from 2009 to early August 2024 when its government collapsed in the face of nationwide student-led uprising, bolstered its image as a humanitarian party by providing food, shelter, and medical services for the refugees. The League government also received international acclaim for sheltering the oppressed Rohingya in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), then the dominant opposition party, criticized the government on various counts – failure to successfully negotiate and repatriate the refugees, failure to mobilize global support to put effective pressures on the Myanmar government and military junta to take back the refugees, and the prolongation of the refugee crisis to morph into a long-term social and economic burden on the country. The BNP Secretary-General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, terming the refugee crisis as a serious national issue, said that the Awami League government was incapable of resolving the Rohingya crisis as it lacked “people’s mandate,” and he linked the solution to the crisis to the removal of the Awami League government (The Daily Star 2023).
The Interim Government, formed after the July 2024 student-led uprising and led by Nobel laureate Prof. Muhammad Yunus, has revamped diplomatic efforts to solve the Rohingya crisis, but no concrete results emerged. However, in terms of attitudes and positions on the Rohingya refugee crisis, the interim government maintained policy continuity, just with a more robust emphasis on the refugees’ repatriation with safety and dignity. Comparative reflections on the attitudes and policies of the Hasina and the interim governments make this point clear. The Hasina government held that the Rohingya were Myanmar citizens and repeatedly urged a safe, dignified, and sustainable return of the refugees to Myanmar (Prothom Alo English 2022). Diplomatically, her government banked on regional and global support to pressure Myanmar to create the appropriate conditions for the safe return of the Rohingya. The Hasina government also highlighted the economic, socio-political, security, and environmental costs of sheltering over a million refugees and how their long-term presence was straining the resources of Bangladesh (ecology, public services, security enforcement, etc.) (Hindustan Times 2022). Following unsuccessful diplomatic engagements to send back the refugees, the former prime minister criticized Myanmar’s political instability and weak guarantees of safety and security to initiate the repatriation process, and finally framed the Rohingya crisis as a national and regional security issue (bdnews24.com 2021).
Prof. Yunus’s interim government has pledged continued support for the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar but made it clear that Bangladesh could no longer shoulder the burden alone, calling for sustained international efforts to support the refugees and resolve the problem permanently (BSS 2025). Like the Hasina government, Prof. Yunus emphasized full rights of the refugees in Myanmar and that they must be repatriated based on a safe, dignified, and voluntary policy (Al Jazeera, 2025). He also warned that Bangladesh was seriously facing resource constraints and that continued support for the refugees would be impossible without new funding from the international community (The Straits Times 2025). The Chief Advisor of the Interim Government, while speaking at the 77th UNGA Session on 25 August 2025, placed a 7-point roadmap to resolve the refugee crisis, with an emphatic statement: “We must not be held hostage to mere rhetoric. Time for action is now” (Dhaka Tribune 2025).
Threats to Regional Security
The security impact of the Rohingya crisis did not remain confined within the national borders of Bangladesh; its spillover effects quickly spread to South and Southeast Asian neighborhoods, affecting India, Thailand, and Malaysia in varying degrees. Of the three neighboring states, India and Malaysia were more affected, as the Rohingya refugees made their ways through land and sea routes. There are some 22,500 registered Rohingya refugees in India (the number shot up to 40,000 after the August 2017 violence); Malaysia took 200,000 refugees, while several thousand live in Thailand (Refugees International 2024). Three types of threats emerged – regional instability, human trafficking, and geopolitical realignments. Naturally, the large number of displaced Rohingya strained diplomatic relations between Myanmar and the neighboring states, put extra pressure on the neighbors’ socio-economic order and resources, and sparked debates over border insecurity caused by human trafficking.
India, an immediate neighbor of Bangladesh, adopted a completely unwelcome policy toward the Rohingya refugees. Though the number of refugees was small, India suffered from policy exigency about how to deal with the refugees. India’s domestic public opinion on the refugee question was divided, giving rise to concerns for national security, and communal tensions since the Rohingya are predominantly Muslims. Except for humanitarian organizations and human rights activists, the general public was driven by religious and nationalistic feelings that fueled anti-Rohingya attitudes (Al Jazeera 2019). In mid-2017, before the latest exodus started in late August of the same year, the Indian government branded the Rohingya living in India “illegal immigrants,” and announced a plan to deport them (Yhome Reference Yhome2023). Soon after the August 2017 refugee overflow to Bangladesh, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Myanmar and “condemned the recent terrorist attacks,” conducted by the insurgent group ARSA, but ignored the cause of the oppressed Rohingya (Government of India 2017). The Modi government already adopted the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019, which allows fast-track citizenship for persecuted minorities from neighboring states, excluding Muslims. This Act was widely seen as a communal policy to promote Hindu, Buddhist, and other religious minority interests at the cost of India’s democratic principles (Ananda Reference Ananda2024).
The Rohingya refugees in India, registered or not, often face arbitrary detention, pervasive restrictions and violent attacks, often incited by political leaders and extreme Hindu communal organizations (Human Rights Watch 2022). The government’s 2017 decision to deport the Rohingya refugees was challenged by civil society and rights groups who took the case to the Indian Supreme Court. The apex court, however, to the dismay of rights bodies, handed down a verdict in favor of the government’s decision to deport 170 refugees detained in India-controlled Kashmir (Al Jazeera 2021). The government justified the deportation policy by citing concerns about radicalization and terrorism. Strains on national resources were cited as an additional reason behind deportation (South China Morning Post 2024).
The refugee crisis also impacted Malaysia and Thailand. Thousands of Rohingya refugees, under the deceptive promises of human traffickers, took the dangerous sea routes to reach these two countries. Malaysia, a Muslim-majority state, initially treated the Rohingya refugees as criminals and prosecuted them on charges of illegal entry (Human Rights Watch 2020). Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its associated 1967 Protocol and thus had no legal obligations to treat the refugees favorably. Although the government subsequently adopted a favorable policy towards the Rohingya under the Immigration Act 1959/53, the refugees still had no legal right to employment, social and medical services, or education at public schools. It is reported that 60% of the adult Rohingya refugees in Malaysia work in the informal sector, contributing to the country’s labor shortages (ADSP 2023).
Malaysian public opinion on the Rohingya refugees, as it has been the case in India, is largely negative. The general citizens view the refugees as a national burden, creating strains on resources and threatening Malaysian national identity. Social media was rolling out anti-Rohingya rhetoric and launched a campaign of xenophobia, aided by fake news. Shockingly, they were blamed for spreading the virus during the COVID-19 pandemic period (Enzmann Reference Enzmann2020). The Malaysians are, in general, unfriendly towards the undocumented immigrants, yet their hostile attitudes against the Rohingya refugees set a new example.
Thailand, in contrast, abused and mistreated the refugees, raising serious international concerns. Reports of refugee trafficking by Thai authorities and smugglers became news headlines. A 2015 report by Human Rights Watch referred to mass graves of Rohingya in a human trafficking camp where more than 30 bodies were discovered. This was a horrific development wherein the complicity of the Thai authorities was not out of question (Human Rights Watch 2015). Like Malaysia, Thailand is a non-signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. The Rohingya refugees, who managed to cross into the country, are considered “illegal immigrants” under the Immigration Act 1979. However, the government differentiated between Rohingya and non-Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. The non-Rohingya refugees are temporarily placed in border camps, and the Rohingya refugees who clandestinely made their ways into urban areas were subject to arrest and detention (Mixed Migration Center 2023, 6). As in India, Thailand’s Rohingya refugee policy was apparently influenced by the need to keep the Rohingya away from its soil, and not to let them use Thailand as a transit point to move into other Southeast Asian countries.
In tandem with their counterparts in India and Malaysia, the Thai citizens, in general, have negative attitudes towards refugees, the Rohingya refugees in particular. An International Labor Organization (ILO) survey, conducted in 2019, reports that 70% of the Thai interviewees associated migrants with high crime rates in the country, and they believed that the refugees were threatening Thai culture and heritage (ILO 2019). Most Thai citizens, living in urban centers, have a widespread perception that the Rohingya are a threat to their society, a challenge to public safety, and who illegally wrench the Thai labor markets (IOM 2023). In brief, Thailand, India, and Malaysia proved very unsafe destinations for the Rohingya refugees who were securitized on the grounds of social, economic, and national security concerns.
Securitization of the Rohingya refugee crisis
The process of securitization, as explained in section one of this paper, took place through three stages – the securitizing actors (government leaders, media), a sellable narrative of threats to the referent objects (Bangladesh, state security, identity, sovereignty), and an audience (general public, parliament) supportive of the policy responses occurring throughout the securitization process. Below, the paper elaborates on how the Rohingya refugee crisis has been securitized through the three stages. The paper specifically focuses on Bangladesh since this country bears the brunt of refugee incursions (90% to 95%) and is much more seriously affected, compared to India, Malaysia, or Thailand.
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a) Bangladeshi Securitizing Actors and Framing of the Rohingya Crisis
Bangladeshi securitizing actors were successful in framing the Rohingya refugees as serious national security threats. Official statements of the former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (in office from 6 January 2009 to 5 August 2024) and her cabinet ministers are noteworthy here. In 2019 Hasina said, “I already have 160 million people in my country…. I can’t take any other burden. I can’t take it. My country cannot bear” (quoted in Kipgen Reference Kipgen2019, 71). A former Foreign Ministry Secretary of Bangladesh made a similar statement the same year: “Bangladesh would no longer be in a position to accommodate more people (the Rohingya) from Myanmar” (The Guardian 2019). Former Foreign Minister AH Mahmood Ali (in office from November 2013 to January 2019) made a statement in the national parliament in June 2017, raising security concerns. He said, “Among the Cox’s Bazar population 20-25 percent are now ‘Rohingya Muslims’. Such huge ‘Rakhine Muslims’ may become a threat to national security…. ‘Myanmar intruders’ are harming Bangladesh in terms of social, economic, political, and environmental aspects” (The Daily Star 2017).
Linking the security implications of the Rohingya crisis to Myanmar, former Prime Minister Hasina, in an interview with The Washington Post in September 2019, said: “The problem with Myanmar is that they don’t listen to anybody. I don’t want to fight with anybody. I want a peaceful solution because they are my next-door neighbor” (Tharoor Reference Tharoor2019). A former Bangladesh State Minister for Foreign Affairs, referring to Cox’s Bazar district’s local people’s fear of insecurity against the Rohingya refugees, asserted in September 2019: “Bangladesh is an independent and sovereign country, but we have challenges in maintaining our own law and order. If we have any issues arising from them (the Rohingya), we must take a tougher stance” (quoted in Kamruzzaman Reference Kamruzzaman2019).
The Bangladeshi media also played a critical role in securitizing the Rohingya crisis. Media reports, in general, framed the crisis as a threat to national security and stability. The range and scope of the framing are diverse, portraying the refugees as victims of oppressions by Myanmar, an economic burden for Bangladesh, spreaders of diseases, threats to the national identity of the host country, and, more significantly, as threats to Bangladesh’s national security (see Rahman Reference Rahman2022, 8–9). Media’s projection of the last point – threat to Bangladesh’s national security has promoted a two-dimensional framing (Wadud Reference Wadud2020): first, the media sought to find a link between the Rohingya refugees and global terrorism; and second, a good percentage of refugees are involved in illegal drug business and other criminal activities like killings, hijackings, beatings and so forth. Reports by the newspaper outlets, in fact, affected and negatively reshaped the mindsets of the Bangladeshi public who were originally sympathetic to the refugees.
The speech acts of former Prime Minister and other high-ranking government officials bring to light at least a few significant points: a) they successfully framed the Rohingya refugee crisis as a serious security issue for Bangladesh. The Prime Minister’s statements unambiguously pointed to real and potential insecurities originating from the refugee crisis; b) the general public and the parliament accepted the securitization moves openly or tacitly, since they did not oppose the statements; and c) the securitization moves prepared the general context for policy actions to deal with the threats, a point elaborated below.
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b) Referent Objects and Security Narrative
The referent objects in the securitization process have been Bangladesh’s national security, economic stability, social cohesion, and identity. The local narrative about the refugees has unfolded in relation to the referent objects, which are facing threats due to the presence of over a million Rohingya refugees who threaten the demographic balance of the Cox’s Bazar region, challenge the region’s social fabrics, and dilute national identity. The refugees are viewed as outsiders coming from Myanmar, according to the local narrative. They are involved in cross-border militancy, illegal drug trade, mugging, and human trafficking (our interviews with local people, reported above, corroborate this point). The more the crisis is prolonged, the greater the magnitude of threats to Bangladesh’s security, social cohesion, economic stability, and identity (Wadud Reference Wadud2020).
This narrative proved helpful in securitizing the refugee crisis. A “Rohingya refugees versus local residents” binary developed over the years since 2017, as local people have voiced their concerns and expressed anxieties about the multifaceted adverse impacts of the refugee crisis (Hoekstra Reference Hoekstra2017). Some local media outlets advised the citizens not to be sympathetic to the refugees if the crisis continues (Rahman Reference Rahman2022, 9). The policymakers and the media reflected on the narrative to get the public on their side.
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c) Public Support and Policy Responses
The shift in public perceptions in Bangladesh from initial sympathy to negative attitudes facilitated or even emboldened the government’s securitization drive. The national parliament, dominated by members of the Awami League party, provided political backing, moral support, and stood by the securitizing actions of the government. Public opinion surveys conducted by the Xchange Foundation in 2018 in the Cox’s Bazar district and the UNDP in the Teknaf and Ukhia sub-districts of Cox’s Bazar in 2018 reported similar negative outlooks against the refugees. The Xchange Foundation interviewed a total of 1,700 local citizens across Cox’s Bazar district and found that 85% of the interviewees did not feel safe with the refugees living in and around their neighborhoods (Xchange Foundation 2018, 38). The UNDP survey reported that 80% of the interviewees in Teknaf and 50% in Ukhia were suffering from insecurity due to the Rohingya refugee presence (UNDP 2019, 127). The survey results were very much supportive of the anti-refugee actions and restrictive policies pursued by the securitizing actors.
The restrictive policies range from encampment of the refugees to deployment of armed forces around the refugee camps, increasing military presence across the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, and increasing vigilance by police forces. The government outlined and enforced a set of restrictions on the movements of the refugees, requiring approval from security officials to leave the camps. Thousands of police and army personnel were deployed to put a check on beatings and killings in the camps, following the murder of 19 refugees in 2018 (Reuters 2018). To enhance surveillance and monitoring of the camps, the government, with support from UNHCR, introduced biometric registration of the refugees in 2019 (Reliefweb 2019). Additionally, the government set up 27 army and police check points on the roads of Cox’s Bazar district to stop the refugees moving from one area to another area or from leaving the camps to enter into towns (Human Rights Watch 2018, 43), curtailing their freedom of movement. Government security forces and law enforcement agencies were put on alert along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border with the order to step up patrolling and remain vigilant to curb anti-security activities. The Bangladeshi public overtly or covertly supported all such actions of the government.
Interestingly, behind the securitization narrative and process, a historical triangular relationship has been at play. Three intertwined factors – ethnicity, religion, and identity politics, which are shaped by post-independence politics in Myanmar, have an undeniable impact on the securitization process. Myanmar’s Rakhine State has historically maintained cultural and trade connections with Bengal (present-day Bangladesh and the West Bengal Province of India), particularly the southeastern Chittagong region of Bangladesh (Leider Reference Leider, Ibrahim and Farzana2018). Historical evidence suggests that Arab traders, Muslim settlers from Bengal, and local converts co-existed in Rakhine for centuries, forming a mixed population. Today’s Rohingya people draw their origins to this mixed population (Yegar Reference Yegar1972). The cultural and historical connections between Rakhine and the Chittagong region further expanded during British colonial intervention (1824–1948), allowing cross-border movements of people. After Myanmar’s independence in 1948, the Burmese nationalist started politicizing and framing the Rohingya as “Bengali immigrants,” threatening their historic roots and cultural identity in Myanmar (Pugh Reference Pugh2013). Different post-independence governments gradually revoked the legal recognition of the Rohingya, with the 1982 Citizenship Law excluding them from the list of “national races” and depriving them of citizenship rights (Parashar and Alam Reference Parashar and Alam2019). The Rohingya people were thus rendered stateless, denying them political rights, property ownership, and access to education and employment opportunities (Alam Reference Alam2019; Gehlot Reference Gehlot2021). This outright denial of identity was reinforced by nationalist Buddhist movements that portrayed the so-called “outsiders,” the Rohingya as a demographic threat to Buddhist-majority Myanmar (Alam Reference Alam2018). Nationalist and religious leaders have used narratives of identity politics to define Myanmar’s national identity as exclusively Buddhist and ethnically Burman (Walton Reference Walton2013a). Myanmar’s military leaders have employed the narratives of national identity to fuel public hostility and legitimize violence against the Rohingya, creating security challenges for Bangladesh and other regional states.
For Bangladesh, the successive influxes of the Rohingya refugees, especially the 2017 inflows, have been the principal catalyst for shaping relations with Myanmar. Bangladesh’s response to the latest 2017 influx has been a humanitarian response and the Hasina government consistently underscored that the Rohingya are Myanmar’s citizens, and Myanmar must take them back with guarantees of safety and security (Minar Reference Minar2021). So, in the evolving triangular relationship, in Myanmar’s post-independence nation-building process, the Rohingya have been treated as outsiders, making them stateless. Bangladesh, though initially let the Rohingya cross the border on humanitarian grounds, gradually grew impatient as the refugees were straining its limited resources and creating huge security challenges. Bilateral relations between Bangladesh and Myanmar are getting tense over the Rohingya, an ethnic and cultural group that both Bangladesh and Myanmar disown. Being driven out of Myanmar and unacceptable to Bangladesh, the Rohingya refugees are now feeding the security narratives of both countries. Bangladesh has resisted integrating the Rohingya refugees partly to avoid domestic political tensions and partly to fears of disrupting national identity narrative.
How the Refugees view the securitization process
Still, the above discussion on the securitization of the refugees warrants further analysis on how it affects the daily lives of the refugees and how the refugees view the securitization process itself. In other words, how refugee perspectives challenge or complicate the securitization process, a top-down process effected by the Bangladesh government and media, merits some discussion here. More interview data are reproduced and analyzed to find out the connections between the top-down securitization process and refugee reactions. A 50-year-old Rohingya community leader (from Camp 5) told the authors: “I, along with my family, am living in captivity, surrounded by our Camp-in-Charge (CIC), and many of us cannot go out and do work. They do not let us pass through the check posts, because we do not have a Bangladeshi ID card or any permit to go out. We are Rohingya, so we cannot do any work” (interview, 21 May 2024). This statement exposes how this community leader interprets the impact of the restrictions on Rohingya work rights, movement, and economic freedom. Another Rohingya community leader (from Camp 7), who was scared of the militant groups’ violent recruitment processes, said: “Because it is hard that people are being taken from the camp for the Burma war, I somehow explained and kept my son in the camp” (interview, 16 May 2024). This statement reflects how this community leader securitized recruitments by militant groups as a direct threat to Rohingya refugee families. He also added: “Militant groups are using young boys as cannon fodder on the battlefield. They are being taken there only to be killed by the Myanmar army and their local allies,” depicting as well as securitizing how battlefield Rohingya casualties are threatening their survival as an ethnic group.
Validating the threats posed by armed groups, an adult refugee from Kutupalong Refugee Camp (KRC) said that “[They] are attacking our camp, shooting, burning houses… since 2017. Our security is no longer visible” (interview, 21 May 2024), revealing the security vulnerability of the refugees. An older refugee from the KRC referred to how political dissents are framed and punished by the Bangladeshi security forces, suggesting securitization of speech. He said: “If you are too vocal, you will be put in jail under charges of keeping guns, drugs or something else” (interview, 22 May 2024). Another older refugee (from Camp 5) framed religious identity as the reason for their prolonged refugee status, turning identity into a securitized category. He asserted: “Since we are Muslims, we are living as refugees for so long” (interview, 22 May 2024).
A few interviewees also looked at Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies, such as the Armed Police Battalion (APBN), as posing security threats to their existence in Bangladesh. An adult refugee (from Camp 7) said: “APBN are arresting Rohingya youths using their complicity with RSO as excuses but handing them over to ARSA that takes them to the Myanmar battlefield directly” (interview, 23 May 2024). A female refugee from KRC securitized adult abductions (of both male and female refugees) as a persistent existential threat to the community’s survival. She said: “We cannot stay well here. Our children are being taken away everywhere, so we fear for our lives” (interview, 22 May 2024). The above statements from the refugees confirm that there is also a Rohingya dimension to the securitization process. Their perspectives on securitization develop along two dimensions – threats to their existence both from Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Conclusion
This paper has pursued two principal objectives – a theory-informed analysis of the Rohingya crisis and an analysis of the spectrum of diverse threats the crisis has posed for Bangladesh and the regional states of India, Malaysia, and Thailand. Additionally, it has shown how the threats have been securitized, especially by the Bangladeshi government and the media, making the point clear that the parameters and explanatory power of the securitization theory can be comfortably applied to examine non-traditional security threats like the refugee crisis that can destabilize the national and regional security order in the Global South. Along the way, the paper has highlighted how the refugees interpret the securitization process, making the point that even victims of securitization also have a voice in reinterpreting how they are securitized. The paper also brings to focus another important point – a shift from how persecution and insecurity drive oppressed people to become refugees to how the refugees themselves create a specter of insecurities for the host as well as regional states.
Undeniably, the different categories of threats challenge Bangladesh’s national security, and the security of regional states at a lower level, but it is disputable whether they pose any existential threats. Existential threats primarily emanate from outside the national borders – foreign military aggressions cum territorial aggrandizements (as Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories) that require immediate actions either to defeat or neutralize the threats.
Non-military threats, like the Rohingya refugee crisis, are severe in nature and probably more dangerous in the long term, but they allow the governments time and diplomatic maneuverability to get around the threats without losing territories or national sovereignty. The Bangladeshi government at first allowed the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar to cross into the country and helped settle them with international aid and assistance. It is the failure of negotiations with Myanmar to send the Rohingya back to their homeland that paved the way for securitizing the crisis. As in the securitization of Syrian refugees in Europe and terrorism in North America, the Bangladeshi government leaders and the press have securitized the Rohingya crisis through speech acts that effectively produced an anti-Rohingya narrative, which the general public and members of parliament accepted or acquiesced to and allowed policies and restrictive actions against the refugees. This paper thus adds a new theoretical dimension and fills in empirical gaps to widen understanding of the securitization of the crisis.
The analysis on the securitization of the Rohingya crisis still poses a big question: What potential does the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory have for explaining complex non-traditional security issues from the non-Western, Global South perspectives? The securitization theory is a powerful analytical tool to unpack and explain why and how non-security issues become or turn into security issues. It commands a broad analytical reach (issues gain security status through discourse and political framing), draws attention to a critical lens on power (how elites use security language to mobilize support and justify exceptional policies), and provides policy insights (when issues can be de-securitized, treating them as usual governance problems) (Buzan and Wæver Reference Buzan and Wæver2003). Nevertheless, the theory is less receptive, but not squarely inapplicable, to realities in the non-Western or Global South context.
In the Global South, security dynamics are shaped by a combination of factors – historical developments or legacies, culture, resource constraints, and post-colonial power structures (Acharya Reference Acharya2001; Huysmans Reference Huysmans2006). Forced migration in the Global South, as in the case of the Rohingya refugees, is driven more or less by these factors. The securitization theory underplays such factors, so its theoretical framework and explanatory power remain limited to cover Global South non-military security issues. Like realism, liberalism, and other dominant theories of international relations, securitization theory is also state-centric and suffers from elite biases. Elite speech acts drive the process and thrust of this theory in a top-down way; it is hardly prepared to deal with bottom-up securitization (for example, how the victims of securitization view securitization through their own lenses). Additionally, this theory explains how issues are securitized but says very little about how to manage the issues humanely or effectively. So, the securitization theory has the potential to cover non-traditional security threats with distinct Global South origins, though its interpretation may not be that perfect. Our study of the Rohingya refugee crisis opens up new avenues to more critical discussions and scrutiny of the securitization theory in the Global South context.
Acknowledgments
The authors sincerely thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive and insightful comments, which sharpened the arguments and refined the theoretical framework of the article.
Financial support
The authors received generous financial support from the Center for Peace Studies, North South University, to conduct field research for this article.
Competing interests
The authors declare none.
Ethics statement
The authors obtained approval from the Office of Research, North South University.
Statement on AI contributions to research content
The authors declare no use of AI tools to generate images and text, analyze or extract insights from data or other materials.
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