The flawed premise of cognitive similarity

Hernandez et al. build their argument on the premise that animals deserve I-O psychology’s attention because they possess cognitive and emotional capacities similar to those of humans. They write about animals displaying “job attitudes through emotions/excitement expressed during their labor” and showing “(lack of) commitment to tasks via escape attempts.” This anthropomorphic interpretation assumes that animal behaviors map onto human psychological constructs in meaningful ways.

This foundational assumption is deeply problematic. When we observe a police dog’s enthusiasm during training, can we truly infer job satisfaction in any sense comparable to human work engagement? Or are we merely witnessing a combination of breed-specific prey drive, conditioned responses to reward cues, and the social bonding that dogs naturally form with their handlers? When a laboratory animal attempts to escape, should we interpret this as low organizational commitment or recognize it as a basic survival instinct? The authors’ approach essentially argues that animals matter because they are like us—a premise that is both scientifically questionable and ethically limiting.

But what about justice perceptions? Aren’t there studies that show animals react negatively to unequal distributions of rewards? Yes, there certainly are such studies, but do these reactions genuinely reflect concerns about fairness or something entirely different? McAuliffe and Santos (Reference McAuliffe, Santos, Gray and Graham2018), in their review of fairness research in animals, highlight crucial differences. They found that although animals do react negatively to inequity, these responses likely stem from frustration at receiving less-preferred rewards rather than any abstract understanding of justice. When a capuchin monkey rejects cucumber after seeing another receive grapes, is it protesting against distributive injustice, or is it expressing emotional frustration at not receiving rewards that have become salient because of the immediate context? Furthermore, there is no strong evidence that monkeys act to ensure fairness for others or protest when they themselves benefit unfairly. Nor do monkeys exhibit behaviors aligned with procedural justice.

The suffering-centered alternative

The philosophical foundation underlying Hernandez et al.’s approach appears to extend a Kantian universalization framework to animals by attempting to demonstrate that they possess rational capacities and abilities similar to humans. On the surface, this extension of Kantian deontological ethics to animals seems admirable—after all, Kant’s emphasis on universal moral principles and treating beings as ends in themselves commands deep respect in moral philosophy.

However, this approach paradoxically does a disservice to working animals. By arguing that animals display rational capacities such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and justice perceptions, we set up a test that animals are bound to fail. The equivalency of such capacities between humans and animals can easily be refuted, as indeed it has been by decades of comparative cognition research (e.g., Dehaene et al., Reference Dehaene, Al Roumi, Lakretz, Planton and Sablé-Meyer2022; Penn et al., Reference Penn, Holyoak and Povinelli2008; Premack, Reference Premack2007). When we inevitably discover that animals don’t experience organizational justice or career aspirations in ways comparable to humans, does this mean they deserve no moral consideration? This is the trap of the Kantian framework when applied to animals: It makes moral worth contingent upon meeting some cognitive threshold that most animals cannot attain.

This is precisely why Peter Singer and other bioethicists argue that it doesn’t matter whether animals have human-like cognitive abilities. Kant’s moral philosophy holds that beings deserve consideration based on their capacity for rational will and autonomy, specifically, the ability to act according to the moral laws one gives to oneself. Singer critiques this rationality criterion as arbitrary and speciesist, as it unjustly denies moral status based on cognitive traits rather than morally relevant characteristics. Thus, paradoxically, while trying to reduce speciesism, Hernandez et al. have inadvertently promoted a premise that is likely to encourage speciesism.

In other words, the relevant question is not whether animals can reason at the levels required for I-O constructs. Instead, as the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham famously argued, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (Singer, Reference Singer1975), the capacity to experience pain and suffer is what makes a being morally considerable. Animals are clearly sentient; they feel pain, fear, and distress. Excluding them from moral consideration because they lack human-like rationality or cannot comprehend organizational justice is ethically unjustifiable.

This shift from anthropomorphism to suffering has profound implications for how I-O psychology should approach animal welfare. Instead of asking whether animals experience job satisfaction or organizational commitment, we should ask: Do current work arrangements cause unnecessary suffering? How can we minimize pain, distress, and deprivation while maximizing well-being? If we universalize the principle “We ought to reduce suffering where we can,” it applies equally to humans and animals—but without requiring us to pretend animals are furry humans with career aspirations.

Focusing on suffering also provides clearer metrics for assessment. Although we cannot meaningfully measure a horse’s career aspirations or a dog’s organizational identification, we can assess indicators of physical and psychological distress through behavioral observations, physiological markers, and environmental conditions. This approach maintains scientific rigor while addressing the core ethical concern: preventing unnecessary suffering.

A critic might rightly ask whether abandoning deontology is necessary. Could we not simply extend a Kantian-style respect for animals as “ends in themselves” without the burden of proving cognitive similarity? Indeed, Kantian ethicists like Tom Regan (Reference Regan2004) have argued for animal rights based on their inherent value as “subjects-of-a-life.” However, for a practitioner-focused field like industrial-organizational psychology, a utilitarian framework centered on the tangible, measurable, and reducible outcome of suffering offers a more direct path to intervention. Instead of debating the abstract nature of “inherent worth,” I-O psychology can leverage its expertise in measurement, work design, and organizational systems to directly address and mitigate the behavioral and physiological indicators of distress in work animals.

Historical patterns of regulatory ineffectiveness

Hernandez et al. propose I-O psychologists should advocate for legal protections for animal workers, oppose “ag-gag” laws, and support “equal pay for equal work” for animals. Although these suggestions reflect admirable intentions, they overlook the consistent failure of regulatory approaches to protect vulnerable populations, whether human or animal.

Consider the persistence of ag-gag laws despite decades of advocacy. These laws, which criminalize undercover documentation of conditions in animal agriculture, continue to be enforced in six major agriculture-dominant U.S. states despite constitutional challenges and public opposition. Even when courts strike down these laws, legislatures often pass revised versions that achieve similar censorship through different mechanisms. The regulatory capture evident in these cases demonstrates how industries with economic power can shape laws to protect their interests rather than animal welfare.

The historical treatment of human workers provides additional context. In his book, Sapiens Reinvented: Saving the Species from a Deadly Evolutionary Flaw, Jim Loehr (Reference Loehr2023) describes humanity’s dark side and cruel treatment of other humans throughout history. From wars and genocide to chattel slavery, sex trafficking, and modern sweatshops, humans have engaged in the cruelest of acts. If regulatory frameworks have struggled to protect humans who can speak, vote, and organize, what hope exists for protecting animals who lack these capacities? Child labor laws took centuries to establish and still face enforcement challenges globally. Minimum wage laws exist but often fail to provide living wages. Workplace safety regulations are routinely violated with minimal consequences.

The enforcement problem

Even well-intentioned animal welfare regulations face insurmountable enforcement challenges. Unlike human workers who can report violations, animals cannot file complaints or testify about their treatment. Inspection systems are chronically underfunded and easily circumvented. When violations are discovered, penalties are often too minimal to deter future misconduct.

The European Union’s (EU) animal welfare directives, often cited as model legislation, illustrate these limitations. Despite comprehensive regulations on the treatment of farm animals, investigations consistently reveal widespread noncompliance. A 2019 European Court of Auditors report identified weaknesses in the implementation of rules by member states and noted that the commission has limited assurance that EU animal welfare standards are being applied consistently. If the EU, with its relatively strong regulatory infrastructure and cultural support for animal welfare, struggles with enforcement (Leone, Reference Leone2020), what hope exists for effective regulation in regions with weaker governance or different cultural values?

The libertarian-utilitarian synthesis

Although regulatory frameworks provide an essential foundation for animal welfare, their history of inconsistent enforcement and susceptibility to industry influence suggests they are not enough on their own. A more effective driver for change occurs when we supplement these regulations with market-based solutions rooted in libertarian principles and utilitarian philosophy. This is not to suggest a false dichotomy; rather, it is to advocate for a symbiotic relationship where regulation establishes a necessary baseline, but consumer choice and corporate innovation push standards far beyond that minimum. This approach recognizes that lasting change comes not from top-down mandates but from aligning ethical outcomes with economic incentives.

The libertarian dimension emphasizes voluntary choices by consumers and producers rather than government coercion. When consumers choose products from companies with superior animal welfare practices, they create powerful market incentives for improvement. When companies voluntarily adopt higher standards to satisfy consumer demand, they do so with greater enthusiasm and creativity than when simply complying with minimal legal requirements.

The utilitarian dimension directs these market forces toward the goal of reducing suffering. By making animal welfare economically valuable, markets can stimulate innovations that reduce suffering more effectively than regulations. Companies competing on animal welfare standards have incentives to develop novel approaches—from Temple Grandin’s livestock handling systems that reduce stress to emerging cellular agriculture technologies that could eliminate animal suffering entirely.

Evidence of market effectiveness

Market-driven improvements in animal welfare are already demonstrating superiority over regulatory approaches. Consider the rapid expansion of pasture-raised and cage-free egg production in response to consumer demand and corporate commitments. Major food companies pledged to source only such eggs, not because of legal requirements but because consumers demanded them. This market pressure achieved in years what decades of regulatory advocacy had failed to accomplish.

The development of plant-based and cultivated meat alternatives provides another compelling example. Companies like Beyond Meat and Impossible Foods have attracted billions in investment not through regulatory mandates but by creating products that compete on taste, price, and convenience while eliminating animal suffering. These market innovations promise to reduce animal suffering on a scale that regulation could never achieve.

Expanding the argument to include domains where animals work instead of being food, we see that market forces have driven change more quickly than regulation. Ringling Brothers Circus ended its elephant acts in response to declining ticket sales rather than legal prohibition. SeaWorld phased out orca breeding programs after public sentiment turned against marine mammal captivity, as reflected in plummeting attendance and stock prices. These market-driven changes occurred while regulatory frameworks largely remained unchanged. Similarly, in the realm of service animals, the ‘brand reputation’ of organizations that use positive-reinforcement training and provide excellent lifelong care for their dogs becomes a marketable asset, attracting more donors and applicants.

The role of I-O psychology in market solutions

I-O psychology can contribute significantly to these market-based approaches without forcing animal experiences into human psychological frameworks. We can study how employees in animal industries cope with ethical concerns about their work, developing interventions that support workers while promoting higher welfare standards. We can investigate what drives consumer choices regarding animal welfare, helping companies authentically communicate their practices. We can examine how organizational cultures that prioritize animal welfare affect employee engagement and retention. We can develop leadership training that assists executives in navigating the business case for animal welfare.

This approach leverages I-O psychology’s genuine expertise while respecting the fundamental differences between human and animal psychology. It acknowledges that I-O psychologists can contribute to animal welfare through our understanding of human behavior in organizational contexts rather than through misguided attempts to apply human constructs to animal minds.