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Weaponization of Memory. The Populist Mobilization of the Distant-Past in Romania

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 January 2026

Simona Mitroiu*
Affiliation:
Institute of Interdisciplinary Research, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi , Romania
Camelia Gradinaru
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi , Romania
*
Corresponding author: Simona Mitroiu; Email: simona.mitroiu@uaic.ro
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Abstract

This article explores the strategic (mis)use of historical memory by populist political actors, focusing on George Simion, leader of the Romanian radical-right party Alliance for the Unity of Romanians. Through a detailed case study of the Valea Uzului Cemetery controversy, the research examines how populist movements construct and disseminate exclusionary historical narratives to mobilize affective publics, reinforce nationalistic ideologies, and generate political support. Drawing on qualitative analysis of Facebook comments and posts, the study investigates how memory is weaponized to polarize public opinion and elevate a simplified, antagonistic vision of history. The Valea Uzului case exemplifies how war cemeteries and commemorative practices can be transformed into symbolic battlegrounds for political gain. The digital environment serves as a key vector for radicalization, emotional amplification, and narrative reinforcement. Ultimately, this research highlights the critical role of memory in populist politics and the power of social media in shaping historical perception. It calls for further comparative investigation into how such mnemonic strategies impact democratic processes, interethnic relations, and the broader politics of remembrance in contemporary Europe.

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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Association for the Study of Nationalities

Introduction

The rise of nationalist and populist political parties worldwide intensified scholarly interest in analysing their messaging, particularly in terms of content and rhetorical style (Wodak Reference Wodak2015; Kaya Reference Kaya2015; Bieber Reference Bieber2018; Soffer Reference Soffer2022). This trend has also supported the definition of populism as “a systemic problem with deep structural causes” (De Cesari and Kaya Reference De Cesari, Kaya, De Cesari and Kaya2020b, 11). Special attention was given to the memory and historical narratives in political discourse (Rosenfeld Reference Rosenfeld2021), as well as to the various (mis)uses of recent events, primarily through the references to fascism and communism, aimed at gaining political support (Bull Reference Bull2016; De Cesari and Kaya Reference De Cesari and Kaya2020a). While research demonstrated the importance of new media in disseminating political discourse (Ganesh and Froio Reference Ganesh and Froio2020), scholars continue to highlight the “need for a closer analysis of how historical memory circulates” (Esteve-Del-Valle and Costa López Reference Esteve-Del-Valle and López2022, 1–2), particularly in the context of (mis)uses and weaponization of the distant past by populist political parties. Studies have shown that the electoral success of these parties is influenced by their strategic use of historical narratives, as well as the extent to which their discourse resonates with public opinion (Martín, Paradés and Zagórski Reference Martín, Paradés and Zagórski2022).

This article argues that, within the framework of populism, opinion leaders have increasingly acted as mediators between historical narratives, modes of remembering, mass media, and audiences. A specific case study was chosen for the analysis based on the online presence and discourse of the one of the co-founders and leader of the Romanian party Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (Alianța pentru Uniunea Românilor, henceforth AUR). Founded in the fall of 2019, AUR surprisingly secured fourth place in the 2020 legislative elections and second place in the 2024 parliamentary election. Based on an initial survey of the main themes related to Romanian history employed in AUR and George Simion’s political discourse, several narratives adhering to an antagonistic interpretation of history were identified, chiefly as the opposition between so-called “true” Romanians (defined by traditional values and faith) and the rest of the population (including those perceived as having lost “true” Romanian values, the political elites aligned with the European Union’s interests, etc.).

To analyse how the antagonism is constructed and reinforced through the weaponization of memory, this research examines a specific and contentious event: the dispute surrounding Valea Uzului Cemetery (Cimitirul Eroilor din Valea Uzului), a burial site for World War I heroes that received widespread media attention and was strategically used by George Simion (GS) to bolster both his political support and that of the party he co-founded after these events. In 2019, tensions arose between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority over the nationality of the WWI soldiers buried in the cemetery. Romanian officials erected new crosses exclusively for Romanian soldiers, while the Hungarian minority asserted that the cemetery primarily contained Hungarian heroes. The situation escalated into physical confrontations between citizens. At the same time, AUR’s leader capitalized on this conflict, amplifying an antagonistic memory that framed the events as an attack on “true” Romanians and their national heroes.

Research Design and Methodology

This article examines the (mis)use of the distant past by populist parties by focusing on three interrelated aspects:

  • a) The selection of specific historical memories and interpretations that align with the populist agenda, particularly those reinforcing antagonistic narratives of the past.

  • b) The role of social media in shaping and disseminating these narratives through specific textual and visual representations.

  • c) The reception of the narratives by the online publics, particularly in terms of perceptions and replication of similar modes of remembering.

By exploring these dimensions, the article highlights the role of social platforms in reinforcing antagonistic historical narratives largely used by populist parties, thereby contributing to their political capital.

Methodologically, the article employs populist literature analyses, textual and contextual reading, qualitative analyses, as well as several analyses tools. The analysis adopted a qualitative approach, based on systematic reading of data and comparing the coded themes to identify recurring ideas or patterns.

The research design of this article focuses on exploring the perceptions of a broad and diverse category of people about the events at the Valea Uzului Cemetery, as well as examining the implications and related themes discussed by online users. Facebook was the most used social media platform in Romania (Statista 2023), with over 90 percent of Romanian respondents having an account in 2019, the year the analyzed events took place. Therefore, our research was conducted on this social networking site due to its representativeness. Facebook entries were selected based on their focus on the main topic, Valea Uzului Cemetery, even though posts expressing antagonistic views toward the Hungarian community, its political representatives, or its symbols, as well as in relation to the Romanian majority, were repeatedly published during the analyzed period (April 2019 – July 2023). In 2024, a year marked by active campaigns for Parliament and the Presidency, GS’s anti-Hungarian discourse appeared toned down.

We employed Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software to better manage the amounts of comments. We used the Export Comments tool (https://exportcomments.com) for the tasks of extracting and exporting the Facebook comments to Excel files. With Atlas.ti 25 we conducted both Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) and Interpretive Content Analysis (ICA), to achieve both breadth and depth in understanding our online qualitative data. TCA offered a clear and structured overview of the corpus, by identifying and categorizing the key themes of the comments. Through ICA we deeply understand their meanings and implications in context.

Narratives of Populism

In political studies, populism reflects “the rise and success, across Europe, in Latin America, Asia, and the United States, of parties and movements that appear to form a new breed and share a number of specific traits” (Bull Reference Bull2016, 214). While socio-economic deprivation has traditionally been used to explain populism’s appeal, recent studies have shown that cultural and memory factors also play a crucial role (De Cesari and Kaya Reference De Cesari, Kaya, De Cesari and Kaya2020b, 10–11). Definitions, characteristics, and interpretations of populism revolve around several key elements.

Ben Stanley (Reference Stanley, Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo and Ostiguy2017) argues that populism provides political entrepreneurs with a tool to mobilize support from diverse groups that share a common discontent toward mainstream political elites. However, due to the heterogeneous nature of their supporters, populist movements often struggle to articulate a consistent and coherent political program. Differentiating between left-wing and right-wing populism, Chiara De Cesari and Ayhan Kaya suggest that class serves as the “glue” for the former, whereas right-wing populism focuses on culture and heritage, which entails:

“anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-establishment positions; the celebration of religion and past history; racism, nationalism, nativism, xenophobia, antisemitism, Islamophobia, and anti-immigration ideologies; the promotion of the ideal of a socially, economically, and culturally homogenous organic society; frequent mobilization of conspiracy theories to understand the world we live in; faith in a leader’s extraordinariness and simultaneously in their ordinariness, bringing the leader close to the people” (Reference De Cesari, Kaya, De Cesari and Kaya2020b, 7–8).

Scholars highlight that populism does not present a “coherent, unified vision of the world”, articulate a “set of norms and values”, or offer a “set of policies” (De Cesari and Kaya Reference De Cesari, Kaya, De Cesari and Kaya2020b, 7). Instead, populism is best understood in terms of performance and enactment (Moffitt and Tormey Reference Moffitt and Tormet2014, 388). It is also associated with the reassertion of antagonistic group divisions, framing political confrontation as a battle between “us” and “them”, between the “virtuous and homogenous people” and a “set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice” (Albertazzi and McDonnell Reference Albertazzi, McDonnell, Albertazzi and McDonnell2008, 3).

Several studies shift the focus from populism as a political style to how “the people” and the Other(s) are defined. Using this foundational narrative of “the people”, we examine how populist parties (mis)use historical narratives to construct and reinforce their ideological framework. Representativity will be analyzed as part of how populist political parties define “the people.”

Ernesto Laclau’s definition of populism – which emphasizes its form rather than ideology – highlights its disguised universalism, the claim to represent “the people” when, in reality, populism never encompasses society as a whole. Instead, populist movements adopt empty signifiers, stripping them of concrete meaning to assert representation over the entire nation while only advocating for a particular segment of society (Bull Reference Bull2016, 216). These movements (re)construct powerful myths and founding moments to reinforce divisions between those they consider the rightful inheritors of national identity and the excluded Other(s). Myths, in this sense, “draw on collective memory of an imagined past in order to define who belongs” and who is excluded (Bull Reference Bull2016, 217).

The founding moment creates the illusion of a once-unified society that was disrupted by an external or internal enemy, preventing the nation from achieving its ideal state (Savage Reference Savage2012, 574). The construction of “the people” thus relies on the selective reinterpretation of history, making it imperative to analyze “the use and abuse of memory” in this process (Hoskins Reference Hoskins2013). The strong connection between populism and the past (Chiantera-Stutte Reference Chiantera-Stutte2005) also highlights the role of selective memory, populist movements deliberately highlight certain historical moments while suppressing others to justify their exclusionary narratives. As Anna Cento Bull observes, “populist movements, in constructing a collective ‘we’ out of disunity, often tend to rely on the construction and demonization of a common enemy” (Bull Reference Bull2016, 231).

The overlap between populism and nationalism generates another dominant narrative widely used by populist parties. Benjamin De Cleen (Reference De Cleen, Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo and Ostiguy2017) argues that there are two groups of nationalist demands articulated with populism: one that revolves around exclusion (of specific groups of people) and one that is formulated by supporting the sovereignty of the nation and arguing against a larger structure of supra-national political bodies.

Various studies have explored the essence of nationalism and its global manifestations (Bieber Reference Bieber2018; Vachudova Reference Vachudova2020). The rise of nationalism is identified as country-specific but largely rooted in anti-elite discourse and the crisis of liberal democracy (Bieber Reference Bieber2018, 520). Nationalism relies on the distinction between in-groups and out-groups, and in extreme forms, this radicalization manifests as racism and xenophobia (De Cesari and Kaya Reference De Cesari and Kaya2020a). Bieber suggests that nationalism’s intensity can be measured through exclusionary citizenship policies, socio-economic marginalization, media discourse, and violence against specific groups (Bieber Reference Bieber2018, 521).

Extreme nationalism, in particular, is interlinked with the construction of an Other, against whom the nationalist discourse is legitimized:

“nationalism requires an ‘other’ to define itself against, which might be either minorities within, neighboring nations or states, or global enemies, be they states (often great powers) or trans-national groups or individuals, such as George Soros serving as the other in Hungary and a number of other Central and East European countries.” (Bieber Reference Bieber2018, 528)

Historically, nationalism has been deeply intertwined with collective memory and cultural heritage, with nationalist commemoration centering on origin myths and national heroes. Nostalgia for a lost past is often linked to racism and authoritarianism (Bieber Reference Bieber2018, 530). While the “memory boom” and the development of memory studies, spurred by the “politics of regret” (Olick Reference Olick2007) and the concept of the “present past” (Huyssen Reference Huyssen2000), have reshaped how history is commemorated (De Cesari and Kaya Reference De Cesari, Kaya, De Cesari and Kaya2020b, 3), this study demonstrates that populist parties continue to repurpose nationalist commemorations to reinforce their ideological claims.

Furthermore, populist parties react to the understanding of memory by fostering historical, political, and cultural inclusion and adopt antagonising memory by invoking the “true” heroes and “true” history of specific historical accounts. Political parties act as mnemonic actors, using national myths and symbols to legitimize power and mobilize electoral support, transforming memory into a political tool (Malinova Reference Malinova2021, 2). Counter-memories promoted by populist parties frame historical narratives in antagonistic, exclusionary terms, avoiding critical reflection on past conflicts and reinforcing a simplified, binary version of history by promoting “memories which essentialize, as opposed to problematizing, a collective sense of sameness and we-ness, with accompanying sentiments of they-ness” (Bull and Hansen Reference Bull and Hansen2016, 393). A simplification of the way we remember the past is exacerbated. Turning historical events into “foundational myths of the community of belonging” (Bull and Hansen Reference Bull and Hansen2016, 393), this manipulation of the past is based on a selective remembering, actively promoting some events while forgetting and shadowing others.

Summarizing, this article closely follows these two main interconnected narratives (populist narratives, here PN) used by populist movements and parties. For each of them, two other conceptualizations and ramifications were identified: (PN1) The foundational narrative that is correlated with the definition of people and representativity, which bases itself on the founding moment that ensured unity and is reinforced by national myths, followed by exclusion and vilification of Other(s) who were not part of the founding moment; (PN2) The sovereignty of the nation, which opposes the supranational structure and is articulated through the commemorations of collective memory and heritage and the emphasis on national heroes (the “true” ones).

Social Media, Opinion Leaders and the “Affective Publics”

Many people engage with politics in the twenty-first century through a combination of online and offline activities. The increasing role of social media in politics has been linked to the rising popularity of extremist populist movements (van den Hemel Reference van den Hemel, De Cesari and Kaya2020). Social media emancipated citizens by increasing their knowledge and participation and opened a fast communication channel through which political parties can attract supporters. Social media has empowered citizens by expanding their access to political knowledge and participation while also providing a fast communication channel for political parties to attract supporters. It has become the preferred medium for populists (Ganesh and Froio Reference Ganesh and Froio2020; Engesser et al. Reference Engesser, Ernst, Esser and Büchel2016). Almost all populist parties and movements use social media “to communicate their messages to large segments of society, who no longer seem to rely on the mainstream media” (De Cesari and Kaya Reference De Cesari, Kaya, De Cesari and Kaya2020b, 14).

Social media facilitates direct engagement with followers, often framed as engagement with “the people”, by creating an online space of close proximity. This characteristic allows populist parties to bypass traditional media channels in their communication with supporters (Bene et al. Reference Bene, Magin, Haßler, Russmann, Lilleker, Kruschinski, Jackson, Fenoll, Farkas, Baranowski and Balaban2023). The form of the messages shared, along with their repeated performance online, shapes both their reception and the political support they generate. Populism benefits from social media’s emphasis on personal narratives over policy discussions and its preference for short, simplistic messaging. This fragmentation fosters an “ideological incoherence” (De Cesari and Kaya Reference De Cesari, Kaya, De Cesari and Kaya2020b, 14–15), especially in the absence of real debate and argumentation (Manucci Reference Manucci, Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo and Ostiguy2017).

Two major risks accompany the rise of social media in populist discourse. First, the phenomenon of “echo chambers” (Nguyen Reference Nguyen2020) ensures that populist messages are repeatedly reinforced within closed online spaces, with little opposition or alternative interpretations. Second, search algorithms play a key role in shaping an antagonistic and unidimensional online environment. By prioritizing content aligned with users’ previous searches and interactions, these algorithms can be easily exploited by populist movements (van den Hemel Reference van den Hemel, De Cesari and Kaya2020).

Social media also provides a platform for the affective dimension of politics, which is constructed around fear and fantasy, creating “affective publics” (van den Hemel Reference van den Hemel, De Cesari and Kaya2020), a dynamic heavily exploited by populist leaders. Scholars have identified a strong association between emotions such as fear and shame and the rise of populism, outlining two key emotional mechanisms (Salmela and von Scheve Reference Salmela and von Scheve2017). The first mechanism involves resentment and fear, which fuel negative emotions directed toward perceived Other(s), such as immigrants, refugees, and elites. The second mechanism involves emotional distancing from a social identity that evokes shame, leading individuals to seek stable references in nationalism, religion, or traditional gender roles (Salmela and von Scheve Reference Salmela and von Scheve2017).

Affective responses triggered through social media are linked to “the demise of consensus-politics and the rise of emotional polarisation” (van den Hemel Reference van den Hemel, De Cesari and Kaya2020, 167). Reworking the past through selective memory and commemoration is one way to construct affective publics in the present. Populists use an antagonistic mode of remembering history, selectively emphasizing past suffering experienced by their group while demonizing the perceived Other(s). The (mis)use and manipulation of historical narratives (Wodak Reference Wodak2015) often involve claims of victimhood and assertions of historical truth (Mitroiu and Gradinaru Reference Mitroiu and Gradinaru2024; Lipiński and Szabo Reference Lipiński and Szabo2022). The past is thus instrumentalized by populist movements to define “the people” and establish a clear boundary between “us” and “them.”

Nativism shapes the perception of external threats, whether they be people, ideologies, or policies, seen as endangering the native group’s continuity. The reinterpretation of historical events to support this narrative reinforces an antagonistic worldview. Past victimhood is mobilized to generate electoral support by fueling resentment and assigning blame for historical conflicts (Martín, Paradés, and Zagórski Reference Martín, Paradés and Zagórski2022). This tactic is used to legitimize political agendas aimed at restoring “a privileged position and renewing a deserved greatness lost in the past and still threatened by internal and external enemies” (Lipiński and Szabo Reference Lipiński and Szabo2022, 347). Acting as “mnemonic warriors”, populist political actors manipulate history to construct a meta-narrative of the past that supports their claims to truthfulness, positioning themselves against those “who cultivate ‘wrong’ or ‘false’ versions of history” (Kubik and Bernhard Reference Kubik, Bernhard, Bernhard and Kubik2014, 17).

The two-step flow of communication theory (Katz and Lazarsfeld Reference Katz and Lazarsfeld1955) posits that mass communication influences the public indirectly, relying on opinion leaders to interpret, contextualize, and disseminate information. The emergence of new media, which enables direct communication with audiences, has impacted traditional communication models, leading some scholars to suggest that opinion leaders have diminished in importance (Bennett and Manheim Reference Bennett and Manheim2006).

AUR and the Mobilization of Past

AUR employs nationalist radical-right rhetoric rooted in Euroscepticism, which manifests as opposition to European integration, denial of EU institutions’ legitimacy, and strong conservative values. The party capitalized on declining public trust in both the state and the EU during the COVID-19 pandemic (Doiciar and Crețan Reference Doiciar and Crețan2021).

George Simion (GS), the party leader, frequently refers to the unification of Romanians from both the current national territory and historical regions that once belonged to Romania (Gherghina and Mișcoiu Reference Gherghina and Mișcoiu2022). The party’s electoral success is attributed to its emphasis on protecting national values and its self-portrayal as a Christian party loyal to the Orthodox Church and traditional values (Soare and Tufis Reference Soare and Tufiș2023, 114). It received support from Orthodox priests during the elections (Crăciun and Țăranu Reference Crăciun and Țăranu2023). Its ideology is considered illiberal populism due to its anti-gender and anti-LGBT positions (Dragolea Reference Dragolea2022) and its use of hate speech targeting ethnic minorities (Roma and Hungarians) as well as gender minorities (the LGBTQ+ community and women) (Gheorgiu and Praisler Reference Gheorghiu and Praisler2022).

Existing literature on AUR and its leaders’ discourse was used to summarize the main interlinked narratives circulated by the party, focusing on foundational (PN1) and sovereignty (PN2) narratives. Social media platforms, such as Facebook and Telegram, are AUR’s primary communication channels for disseminating these narratives. Therefore, in addition to analyzing the discourse of AUR leaders, various studies have examined the role of social media in spreading their messages.

Researchers have identified a “hyper-nationalist, Orthodox geographical imaginary” within the party’s rhetoric, which emphasizes Romanian natural resources in terms of food sovereignty, the Romanian peasant as an exemplar of sustainable agriculture, and the protection of “the last virgin forests in Europe” as central to Romanian national identity (Mihai and Ungureanu Reference Mihai and Ungureanu2024). AUR frames Romania as a “colony” exploited for human and natural resources by Western Europe through emigration and extraction (Mihai and Ungureanu Reference Mihai and Ungureanu2024, 2). The themes of territorial integrity and historical injustice converge into a broader narrative of national pride restoration. Scholars have noted that political actors successfully mobilize support by appealing to territory in countries where there is a mismatch between actual and imagined boundaries, leveraging “emotionally resonant narratives of national victimization and nostalgia for better times” (Carter and Pop-Eleches Reference Carter and Pop-Eleches2024, 4). AUR’s discursive strategy aligns closely with this model, exploiting existing attitudes to reinforce its nationalist agenda.

The fraught historical relationship between Romania and Ukraine, particularly the Soviet occupation of Romanian territories after World War II, which later became part of Ukraine (Southern Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina), as well as the rights of Romanian minorities in Ukraine, have been used by AUR to justify anti-Ukrainian and pro-Putin rhetoric. Additionally, the party frames Romania’s support for Ukraine as fueling the war and claims it is the primary reason for “Ukraine’s unwillingness to let go or negotiate peace with Russia” (Stoica and Voina Reference Stoica and Voina2023, 35). This anti-Ukrainian stance is coupled with AUR’s declared concern for Romanian communities abroad, its transnational politics gain electoral support from the Romanian diaspora, particularly in Italy and Spain. In publicly claiming to defend national identity, AUR defines “the people” in a transnational way, warns of the perils of “discrimination and cultural assimilation”, and argues that Romanian communities “embody pieces of Romanian-ness in need of political representation and demographic preservation” (Soare and Tufis Reference Soare and Tufiș2023, 102).

GS is known for addressing highly polarizing topics, such as the “unification of Romanian-speaking territories” (Grapă and Mogoș Reference Grapă and Mogoș2023, 148). AUR’s growing media presence is attributed to GS’s populist style, characterized by physical and verbal aggression under the guise of “patriotic violence” (Grapă and Mogoș Reference Grapă and Mogoș2023). Several studies have examined GS and AUR’s campaigning tactics, which rely on controversy and spectacle, particularly on social media (Doiciar and Crețan Reference Doiciar and Crețan2021). In modern populist politics, leaders often become more influential than policies in attracting electoral support (Moffit and Tormet 2014), while scandalization, dramatization, and the politicization of divisive topics (Wodak Reference Wodak2015) are amplified through mass media, which follows the viral dynamics of social platforms.

AUR’s leader frequently employs mythopoesis, a rhetorical appeal to historical narratives and figures, by invoking national flags, monuments, and tombs of historical figures (Grapă and Mogoș Reference Grapă and Mogoș2023, 157). The party leader’s verbal aggression, as well as AUR’s promotion of hate speech, raises concerns about whether the party should be classified as a non-violent extremist group (Coțofană Reference Coțofană, Orofino and Allchorn2023).

Contested Histories and the Mnemonic Places

Romanian-Hungarian interethnic relations within Romania have long been a sensitive topic for both communities, frequently politicized and transformed into a contested history that continues to fuel tensions. At the core of this antagonistic historical narrative, pitting “their” version of events against “ours”, lies the contested region of Transylvania, which both Romanians and Hungarians consider the cradle of their respective nations (Petrescu Reference Petrescu2009, 532).

Hungarian and Romanian historiographies construct differing narratives about Transylvania’s past, each seeking to establish historical continuity in the region. Romanian historiography emphasizes Dacian-Roman continuity, while Hungarian narratives argue that Romanians migrated to Transylvania later from south of the Danube. After the Treaty of Trianon, Romania was awarded Transylvania, and approximately 1.7 million Hungarians became a minority. Under the new rule, their political, economic, and social standing deteriorated, and policies aimed at “re-Romanianizing” the Transylvanian population further marginalized them (Culic Reference Culic2006, 176). The Romanian government made higher education in Transylvania exclusively Romanian, and the situation of national minorities worsened during World War II as authoritarian regimes came to power (Culic Reference Culic2006, 177).

During the communist period, Hungarian minorities faced various policies of repression, as Romanians dominated political and institutional structures and national homogenization was imposed. While some argue these policies were part of the communist regime’s broader control over the entire Romanian population, the Hungarian minority perceived them as disproportionately harmful, leading to the loss of collective rights crucial to their community (Culic Reference Culic2006, 184).

In the first post-communist decade, interethnic conflicts erupted over allegations of Hungarian minority rights violations, concerning language, education, and autonomy, while many Romanians feared territorial fragmentation and separatism (Bell Reference Bell1996). The longstanding fear of territorial division has fueled negative stereotypes of the Hungarian community and shaped current narratives: “Negative attitudes are based on the fear that Hungarians would like to split the country and either join Hungary or create an autonomous area.” (Aluas and Matei Reference Aluas, Matei and Joly1998, 108).

The populist parties’ use of the myth of purity and homogeneously defining nation-state (Bull and Hansen Reference Bull and Hansen2016; Wodak Reference Wodak2015) reinforces the continuity of the “we” in time and mobilizes affective publics against the dangerous Other(s), whose presence and claims introduce tensions and divisions into this envisioned unity.

The commemoration of the past is often linked to physical monuments that serve as focal points for collective memory. Cemeteries of fallen soldiers and national heroes play a key role in these remembrance practices, as they provide a tangible connection to past events, create a community of memory, and drive public recollection. War cemeteries “hold the tangible evidence of the human cost of conflict”, represent “the remaining link between the living and the dead” and provide “a dedicated space for engagement with the emotive aspects of mourning and remembering” (Starr, Reference Starr2022, 2). War cemeteries “anchor memories about past events and present societal (though contested) remembrances about these events and the nation” (Beckstead et al. Reference Beckstead, Twose, Levesque-Gottlieb and Rizzo2011, 194). Due to their appeal to shared memories and their connection between past, present, and future, they offer a tangible source of association with narratives of heroization and national unity. As places commemorating national heroism and sacrifice, they are also susceptible to instrumentalization by political actors seeking to enhance their electoral appeal. Politics of commemoration associated with “dead bodies” as “symbolic vehicles” of political meaning (Verdery, Reference Verdery1999) in post-socialist period and afterwards (Rusu, Reference Rusu2018) are also connected to the various changes of (re)construction of past narratives.

In April 2019, the local administration of the town of Dărmănești (Bacău County) decided to take ownership of the Valea Uzului military cemetery, which had previously been under the care of Sânmartin/Csíkszentmárton village (Harghita County, home to a significant Hungarian community). The administration installed approximately fifty concrete crosses next to the existing wooden ones and erected a monument in memory of the Romanian soldiers who fought in World War II. The cemetery was the site of significant battles during both World Wars. However, it is worth noting that most soldiers buried there are from World War I and belong to various nationalities, including German, Hungarian, Austrian, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, and Italian. The site holds particular significance for the Hungarian community, who consider it a place of pilgrimage and an essential part of their collective remembrance.

András Gergely, mayor of Sânmartin/Csíkszentmárton in 2019, told the press that the cemetery was founded in 1917 for Austro-Hungarian troops who died there, with most of those buried belonging to the 10th Regiment from Miskolc (Hungary). Accusations emerged that the “refurbishment” of the cemetery was intended to serve Romanian nationalist interests, and the lack of an official permit for the construction work further exacerbated tensions. The juxtaposition of different types of crosses challenged what is generally considered the “principle of egalitarian treatment” in war cemeteries (Vanderstraeten, Reference Vanderstraeten2014). In British military cemeteries from the Great War, uniform headstones were used for all the deceased, regardless of financial status, race, or religion, to reflect the idea that “the victims fought and fell side by side” (Vanderstraeten, Reference Vanderstraeten2014, 458).

In May 2019, an unknown group covered the newly installed concrete crosses with black bags, which members of the Hungarian community later removed. However, the incident was used to fuel a hate campaign against the Hungarian population and intensify extremist rhetoric. This was done through an antagonistic remembrance of national heroes and the exploitation of past fears of separatist movements. GS emerged as a leading promoter of this antagonistic narrative, using posts on his Facebook page to denounce the situation, personally visiting the cemetery, and repeatedly calling for action.

Tensions culminated in June 2019 when several thousand Romanian commemorators forcefully broke into the cemetery and attacked a group of ethnic Hungarians who had formed a human chain around the site in protest. Chants of “Out with the Hungarians from the country!” were heard, and violence was used against the Hungarian demonstrators. Official data from the National Office for the Cult of Heroes later confirmed that the number of Romanian soldiers buried at the site was very low—fewer than ten out of more than 1,300 graves, as most Romanian soldiers had been relocated to a different cemetery years prior. However, this historical evidence had no effect in reducing interethnic tensions. Instead, GS’s extremist discourse, centered around “true” Romanians, national heroes, and “national dignity”, continued to shape public perception.

Although the concrete crosses were removed in 2023 following a judicial decision, Romanian extremist organizations subsequently placed new wooden crosses, demonstrating the site’s continued political and symbolic significance, while the 2025 results of the Presidential election showed the impact of the events at the citizens’ level.

Mnemonic Warrior and Patriotic Violence

GS extensively leveraged the controversy surrounding the Valea Uzului Cemetery through his social media activity. He repeatedly revisited the topic to keep the memory of the event alive (the entries are related to the religious commemoration of the national heroes celebrated yearly during the first summer months) and to bolster his political support by associating himself with the heroism and sacrifice of the fallen soldiers buried there. His Facebook entries on the topic (from May 2019 until July 2023) generated significant engagement, measured in likes, comments, and shares. In May 2019, the European Parliament elections were held (Bene et al. Reference Bene, Magin, Haßler, Russmann, Lilleker, Kruschinski, Jackson, Fenoll, Farkas, Baranowski and Balaban2023), and GS was elected as an independent candidate. On the eve of the election, the events at the Valea Uzului Cemetery provided him with a hot-button issue around which he rallied electoral support. He quickly capitalized on the controversy, presenting himself as a defender of Romanian rights by traveling to the site. His association with the events stemmed from this visit, during which he attracted media attention by claiming that extremist members of the Hungarian community had physically assaulted him solely because he is Romanian. He promptly posted about the incident on his Facebook page and streamed live from the scene, filming those present and the surroundings. He made ten posts on May 17 and 18, 2019, the first entries he published on the topic.

In his posts, he spoke about the Hungarian extremists and the violence inflicted upon him, repeatedly asserting that it was solely due to his Romanian identity. A divisive line is reinforced between those present: members of the Hungarian community and Romanian citizens who came with the Romanian flag to mark the cemetery and honor the Romanian soldiers.

The live streams were followed by photos of GS’s return to the cemetery, where he placed bands in the colors of the Romanian flag on each concrete cross erected for Romanian heroes, not on the older wooden crosses, which were clearly associated with fallen Hungarian soldiers. In a subsequent Facebook post, GS commented on this action: “Everything returned to normality now: our heroes can rest in peace.”

GS’s involvement led to events on June 6, 2019, when he and supporters from different parts of the country gathered to celebrate National Heroes Day. The accumulated tension escalated into violence, with the Romanians being the main aggressors. GS’s Facebook posts do not acknowledge this violence; instead, he praises the Romanians present there, standing together with him, whom he describes as “true patriots.”

In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, no posts related to National Heroes Day or the Valea Uzului Cemetery were made, as the main narratives focused on other issues, such as condemning government-imposed restrictions. In May 2022, the topic resurfaced when GS posted a call for Romanians to gather at the Valea Uzului Cemetery to celebrate National Heroes Day. The post received significant engagement, 1.3K comments, 512 shares, and 10K positive reactions. The following post described the planned celebration, referred to “true Romanians”, and included a video of GS laying flowers at the monument in the cemetery, where he took part in the public commemoration as the central figure. He was surrounded by Orthodox priests, people in national costumes, and a large display of Romanian flags.

In May 2023, he posted a photo of the cemetery adorned with Romanian flags, reminding followers about the commemoration. Then, in July, following a judicial decision to remove the concrete crosses, GS made another post documenting his presence at the cemetery. He declared the Valea Uzului Cemetery “an issue of national pride” and expressed support for Romanian extremist organizations that had placed new wooden crosses. Members of these organizations were praised as “brave”, while GS criticized the political representatives of the Hungarian community and lamented the “slave status” to which Romanians were allegedly reduced. He also condemned what he described as the victimization of Romanians by the ruling political class, accusing them of using legal force against their citizens, understood as the Romanian majority. Since there is abundant evidence of the low presence of Romanian soldiers in the cemetery, GS reduces the issue in his discourse to the fact that Romanian soldiers fought and died in that territory and should be commemorated in that cemetery, even if they are buried elsewhere.

Affective Publics

To analyze online reception and reactions, we selected a corpus composed of comments on three key Facebook posts published by GS during the cemetery disputes. The dataset includes a total of 1,909 comments: 745 on the first post, 624 on the second, and 540 on the third. The first post, dated May 18, 2019, features three photos of GS in the cemetery, capturing the moment he placed tricolor ribbons on the crosses of Romanian heroes. The accompanying text reads: “DONE, the cemetery is brought up to the standards of NORMALITY! We need to do this all over of GREATER Romania. If I count on you on May 26th to vote, send me a private message.”. This post received 4.200 reactions and 978 shares. The second post, published on May 22, 2019, is also multimodal. It includes a brief text: “The Truth about the Extremists at Valea Uzului Cemetery” and a 10-minute, 14-second video viewed by 90.000 users. This post garnered 2,600 reactions. The third post, from June 6, 2019, features a 1-minute, 28-second video and the caption: “Heroes of the Romanian Army – Present! If two weeks ago I came here alone, this time I was with two thousand true patriots. Thanks, brothers!”. The post accumulated 5,800 likes and 122,000 views.

The comments bring to the surface, through the specific case of Valea Uzului, deep-seated interethnic tensions and significant polarization of both opinions and emotions. The events became a catalyst for broader, often sensitive discussions, functioning as a node in a larger network of interconnected issues. Frequently, the cemetery itself was not the focal point of the comments. Instead, it served as a trigger that brought other, more latent topics to the fore. The most salient themes, both in terms of volume and emotional engagement, include: the perceptions and discourse surrounding the incidents at the Valea Uzului cemetery, the ways in which users relate to George Simion and his actions, the connection of events with the vote, the perception of Romanians on Hungarians, as well as the perception of Hungarians on Romanians (PN1), the perception of Romania, of the heroes (PN2), but also of political parties. In affective terms, two major categories were openly and directly expressed by users: respect and shame. In addition to these, a mix of emotions emerges from the comments, ranging from hatred and indignation to hope and trust. Ideological and affective positions are structured around dichotomies such as: we vs. you, “our heroes” vs. “your heroes”, majority vs. minority, patriots/citizens/“true” Romanians vs. Other(s) (PN1). Although less prominent, appeals for coexistence, for avoiding extremism and political manipulation form another crucial thematic strand within the comments.

The perceptions and discourse surrounding the incidents at the Valea Uzului cemetery are highly polarized. The situation served as a backdrop for a broad thematic cluster, with comments focusing on two main subthemes: cemetery and crosses. The former involves debates over whether the cemetery is international or national (Hungarian vs. Romanian), alongside territorial disputes between Dărmănești and Sânmartin (PN1). One user proposed renaming it: “The Valea Uzului cemetery must be called the Military Cemetery and that’s it. It cannot be called the Heroes’ Cemetery. Those who fought against the Romanians cannot be heroes.” (PN1) Comparisons were also made between the care shown for this cemetery and the neglect of the Heroes’ Cemetery in Bacău, subtly reinforcing polarizing narratives. The concrete crosses erected as part of a centennial project undertaken by the Dărmănești City Hall, with the support from the Ministry of Culture, became a key discursive trigger. Their later covering with plastic bags sparked intense debate, rife with accusations and mutual distrust. In terms of emotional content, many users expressed offense or outrage, and interpretations vary widely. Some framing the events debated them within the same dichotomous regime of assigning guilt and responsibility (“if the Hungarians were minding their own business, nothing would happen there. You provoked this.” vs. “in Valea Uzului the Romanians provoked!”). The situation is described as “profanation” (even if its authors are sometimes Romanians, sometimes Hungarians), a provocation, or a politically orchestrated interethnic conflict (“A group of extremists provokes, another group of extremists reacts, and some politicians (from both camps) instigate or take advantage. Sputnik applauds the event…”; “That’s what the extremists wanted, on both sides. An open ethnic conflict. We should be smarter than that. We’re actors in a play written in Moscow.”). Some users reflected on GS’ public image (“Dear George Simion, reading the comments, I realize you are surrounded by a small group of Romanian extremists! Is this the image you want to project? Is this the Romania you want to make great? You have your own path, but you need to clean up your image, which is starting to be associated with extremism.”). Others interpreted the situation as diversionary or manipulative, fabricated to serve electoral purposes (“George Simion, the challenge lies in the fact that you want to introduce a false theme before the elections”, “The whole thing seems staged!”, “Those who put the garbage bags on the crosses must be punished/fined, but let’s not campaign on the basis of an isolated incident and on the memory of the dead soldiers.”). One user offered a poignant observation on perception of such an event, to the detriment of rational arguments: “I don’t know the details, and I think many who comment don’t, it’s all about perception, about what stays in the minds of those who saw the message…”.

The theme of heroes (PN2) reveals a symbolic schism: “our heroes” vs. “your heroes”, Romanian vs. Hungarian heroes, “heroes of the Nation” vs. “other heroes” (PN1). The subtheme of justice for heroes follows the same dichotomous thread, with calls for respect: “Respect your heroes, but we demand respect for our heroes.” References to iconic figures, Decebal, Tudor Vladimirescu, Mihai Viteazul, Horia, Cloșca and Crișan, Ștefan cel Mare, reinforce this cultural cleavage. These binaries align with Bull and Hansen’s (Reference Bull and Hansen2016) conception of populism as reliant on oppositional historical narratives.

Regarding GS’s reception, responses are polarized. He is evaluated through a lens of competing traits, indicating a complex engagement with GS’s self-presentation as a mnemonic warrior, while also acknowledging his discourse violence in terms of scandalization and politicization of divisive topics (Wodak Reference Wodak2015). Regarding the category of positive traits, GS is portrayed as a hero, patriot, savior, and true Romanian: “he is a true hero,” “Our Hero from Valea Uzului,” “Bravo, our tireless patriot!,” “Vote for a true PATRIOT! Save Romania from the hordes of criminals and traitors – be they Romanians or Hungarians,” “You are a true Romanian! I vote for you.” The subtheme of the manifest support shown to GS focuses on the following major discursive layers: “bravo”, “congratulations” and “success.” In addition, unwavering trust, including endorsements from members of the diaspora, is expressed, while some commentators consider GS to be a “future GREAT STATESMAN” or “the future President of Romania.”

From the perspective of negative traits, GS is characterized as “a provocateur”, “suspect”, “another sycophant”, “a charlatan”: “Unfortunately I know who he is, and I think he is a provocateur above all who seeks votes by manipulating noble feelings and inciting hatred.” False, facade patriotism is ridiculed and seen as the opportunistic way to capitalize on votes and image before the elections for the European Parliament: “Nationalism is not patriotism. And today, George Simion, you disappointed some people. There is nothing constructive here, only extremism.” The anti-Simion subtheme reveals the opinions expressed by people who consider his actions to be unethical (“Are you campaigning by stepping over dead bodies?”) and, in addition, they contribute to the acute polarization in society: “you know how to polarize public opinion (you stir up controversy right before elections). The problem is, in most cases, those who get into office through these tactics end up accomplishing nothing!” Accusations extend to propaganda, repressive tactics reminiscent of the Securitate, extremism, manipulation and lying, disinformation and division. Few commentators use harsh language to highlight these issues and their opposition to these tactics.

Figure 1. George Simion Network (generated with Atlas.ti 25).

The topic of voting is closely tied to perceptions of GS and Valea Uzului events, with some users directly and convincingly stating their choice to vote for him, some contesting the political interference in the events at Valea Uzului cemetery and their use for electoral purposes, therefore not voting for GS, as well as a very small number of comments that, although stating their vote for GS, do so under the specter of doubts and hopes that require confirmation in the future. The first category, in addition to comments such as “I vote for GS”, “Do you want us to reign, on our own Mioritic lands, in our own homeland…?? Simple. Vote for George Simion, number 15.”, contains the link between Valea Uzului events and the decision to vote: “Thank you to the Hungarian extremists for causing all this scandal! So, now I know that I must go to the vote, and I know exactly who I’m voting for! George, you have a well-deserved vote!”. The second category of commentators announces that they will not vote for GS for various reasons: nationalism (“I considered you a voting option until recently… I’ll give it to someone else. Nationalism from Bucharest has no place in Transylvania.”), lack of integrity (“to cast votes on the behalf of martyrs who also died because of extremist dictators like you”, “Before the elections you woke up making a big circus in a cemetery to get some votes in the European Parliament.”), emotional interference or manipulation (“because there are elections all over Europe and every scandal of this kind goes very well for extremist parties, it’s a big battle for votes, for positions and an attempt was made to provoke strong emotions”). A third group supports GS cautiously, awaiting confirmation of his sincerity: “George, if you are truly driven by love for Greater Romania, for the Orthodox Christian faith, and for the Romanian people, you can count on my family’s vote. Please, do not betray our feelings as well”, or “You must keep your promises, because we are disappointed after so many years of lies, mockery, and deceit, and we no longer trust anyone.”).

These perspectives are shaped not only by the immediate context, but by deep disillusionment with the Romanian political parties. Online users considered their actions over time to be an extremely important factor in their voting decision. GS emerged for some as a symbol of needed change. Political parties are criticized and blamed for systemic failure. Among the political parties, UDMR (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania) faced the highest number of accusations, many considerations being related to its supposed lack of constitutionality. Both recent and distant histories are invoked to fuel this discourse (e.g. references to Dacia, Decebal, or Ștefan cel Mare), reinforcing emotional resonance and virality (van den Hemel Reference van den Hemel, De Cesari and Kaya2020).

The corpus also reveals a broader theme related to the perceptions of Romania itself. They contain thematic clusters referencing historical regions, such as Ardeal, the Szekler Land, and Transylvania, as well as concepts associated with what is regarded as “Romanian land.” Additionally, users invoke national symbols like the coat of arms, flag, and language. Debates over historical borders, citizenship, and ethnicity surface regularly (e.g. “Ardeal is Romanian land” vs “It’s a lie that Ardeal was ever Romanian land, and as long as the last Hungarian lives, it will remain Hungarian land!”). The polarization between “this is our home” and “you are guests” underscores unresolved interethnic tensions (PN1).

Identity remains a focal point: “Wrong, I am ROMANIAN, what are you?”. This encapsulates the interplay between self-presentation and perceived identity. Accusations of lacking historical or geographical knowledge, as well as disinformation, are mutual. Romanians described themselves as patriotic, tolerant, united, and sovereign, while they are perceived by Hungarians as “thieves of culture”, as those who “destroy”, “steal”, or “incite.” Conversely, Romanians perceive Hungarians through the lens of otherness: as “guests in Europe”, “migrants” or “minorities.” A small fraction of users calls for moderation and nuance, particularly around the Valea Uzului Cemetery case, advocating for proportionality and against inappropriate generalizations. The “us” vs. “them” axis dominates this segment, with the degree of flaming and opinion radicalization reflected in a substantial number of comments that employ offensive language, including threats and insults, most of which are directed at Hungarian users (PN1). This finding is consistent with the theoretical framework presented by Albertazzi and McDonnell (Reference Albertazzi, McDonnell, Albertazzi and McDonnell2008) and also emphasizes the “emotional polarisation” (van den Hemel Reference van den Hemel, De Cesari and Kaya2020) that underlines the entire corpus. Our finding also reinforces past results regarding the connection between electoral success and the discourse that resonates with and reproduces electoral preferences (Martín, Paradés and Zagórski Reference Martín, Paradés and Zagórski2022).

Figure 2. General Vizualization Network (generated with Atlas.ti 25).

Beyond the intense emotional and discursive polarization, the most frequently expressed sentiment explicitly named is respect. Unlike other emotional tones that can be inferred from the content of comments, respect is directly articulated. The vast majority of comments convey respect toward GS, while a significantly smaller number call for mutual respect, among people, between minorities, for the Romanian people, or for national heroes. The second most frequent is shame, expressed in connection with the cemetery events, political parties, the action led by GS, and more broadly, to Romania as a whole. The explicit evocation of shame requires, as a regulatory mechanism, an appeal to stable elements, which may originate from the core components of national identity, as emphasized by Salmela and von Scheve (Reference Salmela and von Scheve2017). Finally calls for coexistence appear sporadically, backed by examples of mixed marriages and communities and by warnings against political manipulation.

The online space is widely recognized as conducive to flaming and discursive polarization. Moreover, the major topics present in the comments themselves tend to foster opinion radicalization. Although we cannot assume that this qualitative research, conducted exclusively in the online environment, is statistically representative of the various potential respondent samples, we argue that the overlap between potentially inflammatory topics and the current patterns of communication on social media does not necessarily constitute a limitation. Instead, it functions as a litmus test that exposes key narrative themes and discursive patterns. Since we only investigated Facebook, because in Romania and Europe it represents the dominant social media platform used for general and electoral purposes, it remains unclear how far the directions we found in our corpus are similar for X or Instagram. Future research, qualitative, quantitative, or mixed-method, may deepen insights into the events at Valea Uzului and their instrumentalization in various contexts and social networking sites.

Conclusions

Acting as an opinion leader, GS mediated public remembrance by commemorating heroes and shaping historical narratives, leveraging electoral support through antagonistic interpretations of history that reinforced the party’s ideology. In this context, exclusionary citizenship policies (Bieber Reference Bieber2018) are closely tied to the construction of the Other(s), rooted in fear, shame, and resentment (Salmela and von Scheve Reference Salmela and von Scheve2017). Antagonism was both created and sustained through the weaponization of memory, promoting a narrative of “true heroes” whose commemoration was framed as the only acceptable form within the logic of extreme nationalism. Within this adversarial mode of historical remembrance, affective publics emerged through online communication. Manufactured controversy and spectacle on social media platforms helped arouse explicit electoral support. This is most clearly seen in the manipulation of the Valea Uzului Cemetery episode, which became a performative stage for the enactment of nationalist myth-making and symbolic violence, reinforcing binary distinctions between “us” and “them.”

Through emotional appeals and simplified historical framing, GS has capitalized on longstanding interethnic tensions to reinforce a narrative of victimhood, sovereignty, and ethnic purity. These dynamics are not limited to ideological rhetoric but are operationalized through concrete actions: the staging of commemorative events, symbolic gestures like placing Romanian flags and crosses, and the use of social media to mobilize public sentiment. Moreover, the research underscores the central role of social media as both a platform and a performative space for populist engagement. The interplay of history, memory, and identity in the two narratives identified (PN1 and PN2) reveals a deliberate process of exclusion and ideological closure, one that simplifies complex histories into accessible, emotionally charged stories.

Contrary to claims that the rise of new media has diminished the role of opinion leaders (Bennett and Manheim Reference Bennett and Manheim2006), this study shows that such figures have not only maintained but expanded their influence as communicators and mediators in a politically charged landscape of historical memory. They do not merely reinforce latent beliefs (Bennett and Manheim Reference Bennett and Manheim2006); rather, they actively reframe them to serve their political objectives. Through social media, populist opinion leaders mobilize “ordinary people to spread and circulate” the narratives they champion (Esteve-Del-Valle and Costa López 2022, 1). The case of Valea Uzului exemplifies how populist movements appropriate memory to assert dominance over public discourse, marginalize minority perspectives, and gain electoral advantage. Yet, the long-term effects of how these narratives are remediated, recirculated, and shape public opinion warrant further investigation.

The recent Romanian presidential elections, held on May 18, 2025, in a decisive second round, saw GS, who had comfortably led in the first round, face off against independent candidate Nicușor Dan. Dan secured victory with 53.60% of the vote. Alongside a record-high turnout (64.72% of eligible voters), the events in Valea Uzului reemerged in public discourse, particularly in light of the Hungarian community’s support for the independent candidate. Kelemen Hunor, leader of the UDMR party, referenced these events across social media and mainstream platforms, stating: “Simion is neither a sovereigntist nor a Christian – he is anti-Magyar! We will not forget that he danced on the graves of our grandparents in Valea Uzului, and we will not forget that, through hundreds of lawsuits, he attacked our language, flags, and symbols” (Hunor, May 10, Reference Hunor2025, 12:27, Facebook post; Mazilu Reference Mazilu2025).

Many Facebook users, regardless of ethnicity, identified the events in Valea Uzului as a defining moment with lasting political consequences. Some characterized it as “The violence in Valea Uzului – the birth of George Simion’s political career”, while also remarking, “Paradoxically, that same act marked his political downfall. The mobilization of the Szeklers and their intense opposition to him was not orchestrated by UDMR politicians or fueled by Nicușor Dan’s campaign. Simion’s absence from the debates didn’t even matter. It all came down to one event: the desecration of the graves of Szekler ancestors. And the Szeklers remained silent, waiting patiently for the right moment to strike back…”. The idea of a political boomerang echoed widely among Facebook users: “The new synonym for ‘Valea Uzului’ is ‘boomerang’”, and, consequently, “Riding the crosses/desecrating cemeteries – paid.”

The analysis of online reactions to GS’s Facebook posts during the Valea Uzului cemetery dispute reveals the deep entanglement of historical memory, identity politics, and digital communication within Romania’s current socio-political landscape. A seemingly localized event, centered on a contested cemetery, evolved into a potent national and interethnic flashpoint, triggering wide-ranging debates that extend far beyond the initial incident. The intensity and structure of the reactions underline not only the persistence of unresolved historical tensions but also the instrumentalization of memory and emotion in populist political discourse. GS’s posts, through their visual and rhetorical construction, served as a catalyst for activating affective publics. While GS’s framing of the event resonated positively with a significant portion of his followers, who saw him as a patriotic figure defending national dignity, it also provoked strong criticism, especially from those who viewed his actions as opportunistic, extremist, or divisive. Multiple divisive and highly polarized narratives were part of GS’s discourse during the political campaign while their success or failure in gaining political support and votes require further research.

The centrality of some emotions, such as shame and respect, as explicitly named and repeatedly invoked, reflects the emotionally charged nature of historical remembrance in the Romanian public sphere. Memory here is not merely recalled but activated, contested, and weaponized in service of both affirmation and repudiation.

The Valea Uzului case reveals how historical memory and social media intersect to shape political behavior and identity claims in contemporary Romania. It also underscores the vulnerability of digital publics to manipulation, oversimplification, and emotional escalation. Understanding the mechanisms through which memory, media, and politics converge is essential for analyzing current tensions and imagining critically reflective forms of collective remembrance. Future research should expand on the comparative dimensions of such mnemonic strategies and investigate their impact on the broader politics of memory in Central and Eastern Europe.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank their anonymous reviewers for their suggestions.

Disclosure

None.

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Figure 1. George Simion Network (generated with Atlas.ti 25).

Figure 1

Figure 2. General Vizualization Network (generated with Atlas.ti 25).