This paper deals with two issues. On the one hand, it shows that structural changes in financial markets and in the hedge funds industry make the “light-touch” arguments for regulating hedge funds no longer relevant. On the other hand, pleas for stronger regulation of hedge funds are getting more attention. In the first part of the paper the huge expansion of the industry is outlined and the state of current regulation is highlighted. In the second part an in-depth analysis of risks associated with hedge funds is carried out. It is shown that systemic risk can arise from leverage and from concentration of exposures amongst hedge funds. The part played by hedge funds in the spread of the crisis of structured credit is portrayed. In the third section, the recommendations of professional organisations, regulatory authorities and international institutions are summed up within the framework of risk mapping. This oversight shows the ways to reform: the need for direct regulation, the enhancement of indirect regulation and the overhaul of securitization. The prospective pattern of regulation encompasses macro- and micro-issues, and impinges upon factors of demand and supply. It emphasizes the enhanced role of public regulators and displays the conditions for an effective market discipline performed by long run institutional investors.

When do exports lead to rents? And when are they shared with employees? This paper proposes a double empirical test that deals with this question, based on a mix of rent sharing theories and Cournot Oligopoly. We find that most of the OECD exporting activities are associated with some rents that are shared with employees. However, we also show that the destination of sales matter, as rents seem to originate mostly from exporting to other OECD economies or, to a lesser extent, selling to own markets. Exports to developing countries' however, seem to be associated with positive rents only in a small minority of industries.

Cet article revient sur l'interprétation théorique de l'élasticité du nombre d'heures travaillées aux salaires en tenant compte de la demande de travail à temps partiel dans le cadre d'un modèle d'équilibre de recherche en emploi. Une entreprise propose des emplois à temps partiel ou complet en fonction de la variabilité de sa demande, de ses coûts salariaux et de ses coûts d'embauché. Les travailleurs les acceptent ou non selon leur utilité, qui dépend du salaire et des heures. Cette économie admet un équilibre de Nash pour lequel toutes les entreprises emploient des salariés à temps partiel et à temps complet. Des simulations montrent que la relation entre heures et salaires dépend principalement de la demande des entreprise et non de la préférence pour le loisir des individus.

The formulation of legal rules is a challenging issue for lawmakers. Tradeoffs are inevitable between providing more guidance by specific rules and enlarging the scope by general rules. Using real options theory we show that the degree of precision should be considered as a degree of flexibility which increases the value of the text. Thus, we derive a normative principle for a draftsman to choose between rules versus standards and to decide when the law should be enacted. In highly innovating environments, delaying the enactment allows lawmakers to obtain more information. Therefore, the lower the degree of precision of the law, the shorter the delay.