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Public reason, non-public reasons, and the accessibility requirement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jason Tyndal
Jason Tyndal*
Affiliation:
The Department of Social Sciences, College of Southern Nevada, Las Vegas, NV, USA
*
Jason Tyndal jason.tyndal@csn.edu College of Southern Nevada, 700 College Dr.Bldg B, #241, Henderson, NV 89002, USA
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Abstract

In Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong develops what is perhaps the most comprehensive defense of the consensus model of public reason – a model which incorporates both a public-reasons-only requirement and an accessibility requirement framed in terms of shared evaluative standards. While the consensus model arguably predominates amongst public reason liberals, it is criticized by convergence theorists who reject both the public-reasons-only requirement and the accessibility requirement. In this paper, I argue that while we have good reason to reject Quong’s call for a public-reasons-only requirement, all public reason liberals should endorse at least some shared evaluative standards and, hence, an accessibility requirement.

Keywords

Public justificationpublic reasonsconsensusconvergenceQuong

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Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 8 , December 2019 , pp. 1062 - 1082
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2019

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