In this article, I delve into the religious thought of Robert Greene (1678–1730) within the institutional context of the University of Cambridge. Despite being under-investigated, Greene was a thought-provoking figure who made significant contributions to debates on the relationship between reason, faith and natural philosophy. While his natural philosophy has garnered some attention, his religious thought has been largely overlooked.Footnote 1 I argue that situating Greene within the religious controversies at the turn of the eighteenth century enhances our understanding of the reception of John Locke’s (1632–1704) views on reason and faith at the University of Cambridge. Greene criticised Locke’s views on the epistemology of faith and those who radicalised Locke’s views, such as John Toland (1670–1722). While he shared similar concerns with other Cambridge-based or Cambridge-trained scholars who critiqued the religious views of Locke and Toland, Greene differed by explicitly providing an epistemology that prioritised reliable testimony over propositional deductions. This distinction makes Greene’s response to Locke’s view on the relationship between reason and faith perhaps the most elaborate among Cambridge-based or Cambridge-trained critics of Locke’s religious views.
Today, Greene is primarily remembered as a critic of the so-called ‘new science’, particularly of Isaac Newton’s (1642–1727) natural philosophy. Proponents of Newton’s natural philosophy and mathematics, including Roger Cotes (1682–1716), Plumian Professor and editor of the second edition of Newton’s Principia (1713), and Nicholas Saunderson (1682–1739), William Whiston’s (1667–1752) successor as Lucasian Professor at Cambridge), ridiculed Greene’s 1712 book The principles of natural philosophy. Footnote 2 Saunderson, for instance, described Greene’s work as ‘elaborate nonsense’.Footnote 3 Alternatively, Greene might be noted for developing an eccentric natural philosophy that attracted few, if any, followers.Footnote 4 As I shall argue throughout this essay, Greene was equally – if not more – concerned with Locke’s epistemology and his view on the relationship between reason and faith. Greene’s criticism of Locke’s An essay concerning human understanding has not been previously examined. Recently, a scholar has described Greene as a disciple of Locke, highlighting the need for a better understanding of Greene’s position.Footnote 5
This article is structured as follows. In the second section, I provide biographical information on Greene that is relevant for understanding the milieu he was part of; in the third, I discuss Locke’s and Toland’s views on reason and faith; in the fourth section, I explore the criticisms from several Cambridge-based or Cambridge-trained scholars who critiqued Locke’s and Toland’s views on the relationship between reason and faith.Footnote 6 This section will allow us to gauge the uniqueness of Greene’s views on the relationship between reason and faith. In the fifth I turn to Greene, focusing on his views regarding the truth and divinity of the Scriptures as developed in his 1711 A demonstration of the truth and divinity of the Christian religion; finally, in in the sixth section, I explore the epistemological framework that Greene used to challenge Locke.
Robert Greene, a Fellow of Clare Hall, Cambridge
Greene was born on 27 February 1678 in Tamworth, Staffordshire, fourteen miles north-east of Birmingham. He was the son of Robert Greene Sr, a mercer, and Mary Pretty of Fazeley.Footnote 7 Upon his father’s passing, Greene inherited his possessions, estate and some money.Footnote 8 In October 1694 Greene was admitted to Clare Hall, Cambridge, as a sizar – an undergraduate who received an allowance in exchange for performing certain duties. He matriculated in 1696, graduated with a BA in 1699–1700, and earned an MA in 1703. During his studies, he was encouraged by his ‘Tutor and … Friend’, Richard Laughton (bap. 1670–1723), to study sciences and mathematics, which exposed him to the natural philosophies of René Descartes (1596–1650) and Isaac Newton (1642–1727).Footnote 9 Greene was ordained into the Church of England in September 1705, fulfilling the requirements for a Fellowship at Clare Hall. As a tutor at Clare Hall, where he also served as dean, he wrote a student instruction manual in 1707.Footnote 10 From 1723 until his death, he served as the vicar of Everton in Bedfordshire and Tetworth in Huntingdonshire,Footnote 11 and as minister at Great St Mary’s.Footnote 12 Between 1727 and 1728, he was senior proctor of the university, and in 1728 he was awarded the title Doctor Divinitatis.
Greene died on 16 August 1730 while visiting his birthplace. He was buried in All Saints, Cambridge, and left an elaborate will, described as ‘whimsical’Footnote 13 by one of his contemporaries. Greene bequeathed his estate in Tamworth and £200 in bank stock to Clare Hall, subject to certain stipulations.Footnote 14 Among his unusual requests, Greene specified that his body was to be dissected in his own room, with his internal organs collected and placed near the communion table in All Saints, where he had officiated for three years for William Grigg (?–1726).Footnote 15 His organs were to be accompanied by a sober marble stone with a lengthy epitaph. His skeleton was to be displayed in the library of Clare Hall, alongside the books he had published during his lifetime and a transcript of his will. Additionally, Greene instructed that on the third Sunday after his burial, a sermon should be preached on 1 Corinthians i.19–21 addressing the foolishness of worldly wisdom. This sermon was to be preached by either George Stanhope (1660–1728), who had argued in his Boyle Lectures that it is disastrous to reject the mysteries of faith because they are incomprehensible;Footnote 16 Robert Moss (1666–1729), whose sermons in St Mary’s were much frequented;Footnote 17 Robert Jenkin (c.1656–1727), a non-juror who later took oaths to Queen Anne and served as Master of St John’s College between 1711 and 1727 and as Lady Margaret’s Professor of Divinity;Footnote 18 or Daniel Waterland (1683–1740),Footnote 19 the Master of Magdalene College from 1713 to 1740, who was a fierce critic of Samuel Clarke’s (1675–1729) theological writings.Footnote 20 In the event that Clare Hall refused the bequest, Greene instructed that it should be offered to St John’s College, Trinity College, Jesus College or Sidney Sussex College, in that order. Clare Hall accepted some conditions of the will in December 1742, after Greene’s relatives permitted the use of another skeleton in place of Greene’s.Footnote 21 In accordance with his will, part of Greene’s estate was also used to fund scholarships for sizars and poor scholars at Clare Hall.Footnote 22 Among his executors, Greene mentioned his ‘Dear ffriends’, all of whom were Fellows of Clare Hall, including Edward Clarke (?–?) who graduated with a BA in 1680 and an MA in 1684 and served as bedell;Footnote 23 Henry Hopkinson (?–?) who graduated with a BA in 1717 and an MA in 1721;Footnote 24 Charles Morgan (1678–1736), who had served as Master of Clare Hall between 1726 and 1736; and John Wilcox (1692–1762),Footnote 25 Morgan’s successor as Master of Clare Hall.Footnote 26
Locke and Toland on reason and faith
Locke laid the groundwork for subsequent discussions on the authority of reason and revelation.Footnote 27 He asserted an epistemological distinction between reason and faith. Reason, he argued, is ‘the discovery of the Certainty or Probability of such Propositions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at by Deductions made from such Ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties, viz. by Sensation or Reflection’. In contrast, faith is ‘the Assent to any Proposition, not thus made out by the Deductions of Reason; but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming from God’.Footnote 28 This assent pertains to probable matters of fact, such as biblical miracles reported by others.Footnote 29 In An essay concerning human understanding (1689), Locke wrote,
[In] those [propositions], concerning which it [i.e. reason] has but an uncertain Evidence, and so is perswaded of their Truth, only upon probable Grounds, which still admit a Possibility of the contrary to be true, … in such probable Propositions, I say, an evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent even against Probability. For where the principles of Reason have not evidenced a Proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear Revelation, as another Principle of Truth, and Ground of Assent, may determine; and so it may be a Matter of Faith, and be also above Reason. Because Reason, in that particular Matter, being able to reach no higher than Probability, Faith gave the Determination, where Reason came short; and Revelation discovered on which side the Truth lay … Whatever GOD hath revealed, is certainly true; no Doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of Faith: But whether it be a divine Revelation, or no, Reason must judge.Footnote 30
A discussion is warranted here. According to Locke, the realm of faith includes propositions that humans cannot infer through reason alone, but instead require ‘the assistance of Revelation, as necessary to gain out Assent’.Footnote 31 Matters of faith deal with divinely revealed propositions: things ‘above Reason, are, when revealed, the proper Matter of Faith’,Footnote 32 according to Locke. However, Locke immediately asserted that no proposition can be accepted as a revelation if it contradicts ‘the clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas’, as this would mean that God would ‘overturn all the Principles and Foundations of Knowledge he has given to us’.Footnote 33 Matters of faith can have no authority against the ‘plain and clear Dictates of Reason’, he underscored.Footnote 34 Locke thus urged that humans need not suspend their rational powers when receiving matters of faith, that is, revelation, since reason evaluates and interprets revelation.Footnote 35 Correspondingly, Locke made a distinction between propositions according to reason, propositions above reason and propositions contrary to reason, urging that the latter two cannot collapse.Footnote 36 Locke provided examples of things above reason: the rebellion of part of the angels against God and an afterlife with reward and punishment.Footnote 37 The notion of ‘things above reason’ has an significant pedigree in scholastic debates, and was also adopted and employed by the magisterial Reformers and a number of important Protestant thinkers in seventeenth-century England, including John Owen (1616–84) and Robert Boyle (1627–91).Footnote 38
Several paragraphs earlier, Locke asserted that revelation can never be as certain ‘as the Knowledge we have from the clear and distinct Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our own Ideas’.Footnote 39 In ‘Of our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things’ (An essay concerning human understanding, bk iv, ch. xi), Locke elaborated,
And therefore concerning the Existence of finite Spirits, as well as several other Things, we must content ourselves with the Evidence of Faith; but universal, certain Propositions concerning this matter are beyond our reach. For however true it may be, v.g., that all the intelligent Spirits that GOD ever created, do still exist; yet it can never make part of our certain Knowledge. These and the like Propositions, we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in this state, capable of knowing.Footnote 40
For Locke, those who do not permit reason to evaluate the divine origin of revelations fall prey to ‘enthusiasm’, entertaining propositions with ‘greater assurance than the Proofs it is built upon will warrant’.Footnote 41 Locke concluded that, from a rational perspective, revelations should be evaluated as cases of testimony, which is why revelations can, at best, be only highly probable.Footnote 42 However, it should be stressed that, unlike Toland, Locke still upheld the view that God has revealed truths that are ‘beyond the Discovery of Reason’. These truths are ‘Matters of Faith; with which Reason has, directly, nothing to do’.Footnote 43 According to Locke, human reason must yield to divine revelation.Footnote 44 By introducing probability into religious discourse to counter enthusiasm,Footnote 45 Locke contributed to a reading of his work according to which revelation is less certain than other forms of knowledge.Footnote 46
For the Irish-born enfant terrible Toland, it was unacceptable that reason should yield to revelation. Instead, Toland, who aimed to provide ‘a rational Account’ of the doctrines of Jesus Christ and his Apostles, argued that reason is the ‘only Foundation of all Certitude’ and that nothing in the Bible is contrary to reason or above it.Footnote 47 Using Locke’s definition of knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas as a starting point, he contended that ‘PROBABILITY is not KNOWLEDGE’ and that true knowledge is certain’.Footnote 48 Furthermore, he insisted that the matters revealed in the Bible are matters of fact that can be known with certainty, concluding that ‘Faith is [certain] Knowledg [sic].’Footnote 49 Contrary to Locke, who believed that faith could be based on highly probable matters of fact, Toland defended the notion that faith can only be justified by rational demonstrations. Interestingly, Toland used Hebrews xi.1 to argue that the Bible supports his argument:
The Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews do’s not define FAITH a Prejudice, Opinion, or Conjecture, but Conviction or Demonstration: Faith, says he, is the confident Expectation of things hop’d for, and the Demonstration of things not seen. These last Words, things not seen, signify not (as some would have it) things incomprehensible or unintelligible, but past or future Matters of Fact, as the Creation of the World, and the Resurrection of the Dead.Footnote 50
As I will observe in a later section, Greene responded to Toland’s reading of Hebrews xi.1.
Cambridge critics of Locke’s and Toland’s views on reason and faith
Greene was not the first Cambridge-trained or Cambridge-based scholar to criticise Locke’s (and Toland’s) views on reason and faith. Stillingfleet, a former student of St John’s (BA, 1653; MA, 1656),Footnote 51 was horrified to discover that Toland used some of Locke’s epistemic concepts and distinctions to attack the foundations of the Christian religion in Christianity not mysterious. Footnote 52 In response, in 1697, Stillingfleet criticised Toland and Locke, arguing that if one endorses Locke’s view that knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement between ideas, then one excludes ‘all certainty of Faith or Reason, where we cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas’.Footnote 53 By prompting Locke to defend his views, Stillingfleet sparked the Locke-Stillingfleet controversy, which Greene referenced in his work A demonstration of the truth and divinity of the Christian religion. Footnote 54 In 1698, Stillingfleet objected to Locke’s distinction between faith and reason as follows: ‘Knowledge and Faith are too [sic] distinct things, the one relates to Evidence and the other to Testimony; but Certainty is common to them both, unless you think it impossible to be certain upon any Testimony whatsoever.’Footnote 55
Stillingfleet was convinced that Christianity could be defended by rational means,Footnote 56 describing faith as ‘a rational and discursive act of the mind’.Footnote 57 In this context, he preferred ‘evident Demonstrations’ over ‘Moral Certainty’ when making conclusions from written sources.Footnote 58 However, he clearly distanced himself from the more radical religious rationalism promoted by Toland.
In 1698, F. M., a mysterious ‘M.A. of Cambridg.’, agreed with Stillingfleet that some passages in Locke’s Essay were ‘prejudicial to the Doctrine of the Trinity, and other Mysteries of the Christian Faith’, and that they were later used
by another Writer [i.e. Toland], to confront and oppose those Sacred Mysteries; for that zealous opposer of Mysteries (setting up with the other Gentleman upon the same Stock, and being Joint-partners in the same Principles) contends that we cannot be certain of the Truth of any thing, unless we have clear and distinct perceptions of it, and therefore where these are wanting, there is no Certainty; for all certainty of Knowledg depends upon Reason, and Reason depends on clear Ideas, which are inconsistent with Mysteries. Footnote 59
F. M. praised Stillingfleet for having demonstrated that ‘clearness of Ideas is not the only basis of Reason and (the consequence of that) Certainty, but that it is possible to be certain of the truth and reality of a thing without clear and distinct Ideas of it’.Footnote 60
In his 1701 work, A free discourse concerning truth and error, especially in matters of religion, John Edwards (1637–1716), a Church of England clergyman and Fellow of St John’s College, lambasted Locke’s view on the relation between reason and faith. Edwards, who graduated with a BA in 1658 and an MA in 1661,Footnote 61 rhetorically questioned ‘whether Mr. Lock or the Infallible Apostle ought to be credited, the one who peremptorily tells us the Prophecy or Revelation is not so sure as the attestation of Sense, or the other who in plain terms acquaints us that it is more sure’.Footnote 62 Edwards also attacked Locke’s ‘way of ideas’. He noted that Stillingfleet reprimanded ‘Mr. Lock for joining with another Writer [i.e. Toland] in rejecting Mysteries, and afterwards he was pleas’d to maintain this Point against him, and to take him the Trouble of baffling his groundless Doctrine of Ideas’.Footnote 63 In his 1695 work, Some thoughts concerning several causes and occasions of atheism, Edwards criticised those who demanded demonstrations in religious matters, arguing that ‘[t]here can be no greater than a Moral Certainty of a Deity: for there are no grounds in it Mathematically Demonstrative’. He continued, ‘by being Morally Certain we are certain enough’, asserting that it is ‘unreasonable to demand any more’.Footnote 64 By asserting that moral certainty is the highest epistemological standard attainable in religious matters, Edwards followed thinkers such as William Chillingworth (1602–44) and John Tillotson (1630–94), who believed that the authority of the Bible is not absolutely certain, but morally certain.Footnote 65 In Some thoughts concerning several causes and occasions of atheism, Edwards attacked the alleged certainty of mathematical demonstrations, maintaining that mathematicians frequently bicker among themselves and that mathematical demonstrations sometimes prove to be paralogisms.Footnote 66 He was also critical of natural philosophy, contending, without much detail, that ‘even Natural Philosophy, which is one of the Choicest Accomplishments of humane minds, leads men even to the denial of the Author of Nature’.Footnote 67 He noted, again without much detail, that in some cases natural philosophy ‘hinders Men from taking notice of Divine Providence, and Supernatural Influences’, and accused Newton of introducing a system of nature ‘without any interposing of a God’.Footnote 68
In 1702, Henry Lee (c.1644–1713), a Fellow of Emmanuel College who graduated with a BA in 1665 and an MA in 1668, contended that Locke’s account of faith undermines the certainty of revelation.Footnote 69 According to Lee, Locke’s view on the relation between faith and reason ultimately leads to scepticism:
He [i.e. Locke] says indeed as plainly as can be desir’d, that what God has reveal’d is certainly true …; but I have not yet observ’d, that he any where tells us how we shall certainly know any Proposition is reveal’d or comes from God; … for what signifies Revelation, or the Certainty of the Truth, if it be not certainly known to us?Footnote 70
He added that
those supernatural Events [reported in the Scriptures] are as plain Indications from the Author of Nature of the true or real Relation between the parts of those Propositions above reason, as sensible Observations are of the true or real Relation between the parts of those Propositions which are according to Natural Reason.Footnote 71
In 1710, a year before the publication of Greene’s A demonstration of the truth and divinity of the Christian religion, John Milner (1628–1703), a nonjuring Church of England clergyman and Christ’s College graduate (BA, 1645), criticised not only Locke’s rejection of innate ideas and his Christology,Footnote 72 but also argued that Locke prioritised natural religion, which Locke considered certain and intelligible, over revealed religion, which he deemed obscure and only probable, thereby casting doubt on the certainty of revelation.Footnote 73
Greene on the truth and divine origin of revelation
In this section, I discuss Greene’s defence of Christianity’s truthfulness, which, according to him, relies on the epistemic legitimacy of testimony as a source of knowledge. In 1712, Greene explicitly identified Locke’s principles as one of his primary targets.Footnote 74 In Jenkin’s 1702 dialogue, A brief confutation of the pretences against natural and revealed religion, a dialogue between a Christian and a deist, the Christian says to the deist:
It [i.e. the truth of Christ’s resurrection on which the truth of Christianity is based] was infallibly proved by Witnesses at first, as has been delivered down to us by a continued successive Testimony to this day. This Testimony has been confirmed by Martyrs, and asserted in Histories of all Ages and Nations, and preserved by yearly and weekly Festivals, which have been, and still are observed in all Parts of the World.Footnote 75
In addition, the Christian responds to the deist that the divinity of the Scriptures is proved ‘[b]y Matter of Fact, by the Prophecies and Miracles, which confirmed them’.Footnote 76 Like Jenkin, Greene consistently prioritised testimony over reason in religious matters.
In the preface to A demonstration of the truth and divinity of the Christian religion, Greene commented on like-minded scholars’ efforts to demonstrate the truth and divinity of the Scriptures. He first discussed the arguments advanced by Ofspring Blackall (1655–1716), a St Catherine’s College alumnus who was known for arguing in favour of the truth and divinity of the Scriptures in his 1700 Boyle Lectures, published as The sufficiency of a standing revelation in general, and of the scripture revelation in particular (1700). Greene’s verdict was that Blackall’s arguments were ‘laid too general, and are not so convincing, as if they had been drawn out into the particular Proofs we have of the Internal and External Evidence, both Humane and Divine, of these Sacred writings, which we have endeavour’d to do’.Footnote 77 Greene further claimed that no one demonstrated the truth and divinity of Christianity better than Jenkin and Francis Gastrell (1662–1725). Jenkin, who called Locke the ‘Dictator of the Ideal World’,Footnote 78 authored The reasonableness and certainty of the Christian religion (1696), and in 1709 he criticised Locke’s rationalising Bible hermeneutics.Footnote 79 The Oxford-educated Gastrell, who wrote The certainty and necessity of religion in general (1697) (from his 1697 Boyle Lectures), was a vocal opponent of deism and Socinianism. Although Gastrell defended the view – contra Locke – that the truth of the Scriptures can be established with certainty from the testimony it is based on, he invoked Locke’s criterion for knowledge, according to which knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement between ideas, using it to argue that we can have only ‘Obscure confused Knowledge’ of the Trinity.Footnote 80 In his Boyle Lectures, Gastrell contended that ‘to call for Mathematical Demonstrations in Points of Religion, is as much as to say, let Religion be turned into Mathematics, and we will believe it; the meaning of which is only this, that such Men as these like Mathematicks better than they do Religion’.Footnote 81
In his work, A demonstration of the truth and divinity of the Christian religion, Greene aimed to establish the truth and divine authority of the Scriptures from both ‘External Testimony, independent of, and separate from their Internal’ and ‘Internal Testimony, distinct and abstracted from the External’.Footnote 82 Like Jenkin and Gastrell, Greene denounced deism, atheism, Socinianism and what he termed ‘Popish Enthusiasm’.Footnote 83 From the outset, Greene made three points clear. First, he argued that it is impossible to demonstrate God’s attributes and our moral duties by ‘Natural Arguments, and manifest and plain deductions of Reason, which may not be liable to a Contradiction’. Footnote 84 He insisted that reason is ‘but a dim Light in comparison with Revelation’.Footnote 85 Second, Greene contended that attempts to prove Christianity’s reasonableness miss the mark, as such attempts do not show that Christianity is ‘either true, or of a divine Original’ but merely that it is ‘a Rational System’ – a sneer at works that sought to harmonise Christianity with reason, such as Locke’s The reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures (1695) and John Toland’s Christianity not mysterious. Footnote 86 The final and most important argument Greene put forward is that
what the World now generally means by Rational, is, the deducing of one Proposition from another in Matters of Science and Speculation, and the whole Province is committed to the Mind of forming and abstracting its Notions at pleasure, and discoursing upon them; and where the Understanding is thus employ’d, we cannot but think it is more capable of being deceiv’d, by the plain Instances we shall give in Mathematics and Philosophy, than when it only considers Matters of Fact, and the Testimony we have for’em; which tho’ it may be call’d Reason, yet is widely different from what is meant and intended by the former.Footnote 87
This point is central to Greene’s entire defence of Christianity. Greene is not only criticising what he considered a narrowly conceived conception of reason, which was becoming dominant at the time, he also expressed one of his most salient epistemological convictions: matters of fact – whether known through our own observations or from trustworthy witnesses – are generally more reliable than propositional deductions inferred by human reason. One source of error arises from the abstract notions introduced in deductions, which might not be ‘in all respects answerable and proportion’d to the things we intend to consider’.Footnote 88 Another source of error is that the human mind cannot maintain the consistency of ideas through a series of deductions.Footnote 89 Reason, Greene contended, ‘usurp’d by its Artifice and Cunning, and its subtle and plausible Insinuations, an unwarrantable Power and Authority’.Footnote 90 This conviction is the common thread running through A demonstration of the truth and divinity of the Christian religion.
Greene discussed the certainty of mathematical knowledge, drawing an implicit distinction between simple mathematics – such as basic arithmetic – and advanced mathematics – such as calculus. He contended that reliable testimony is as certain as simple mathematics, whereas advanced mathematics is considerably less certain. Therefore, advanced mathematics is less certain than reliable testimony. For example, Greene claimed that disputes in advanced mathematics (especially those on fluxions and infinite series) illustrate ‘the Fallibleness even of that which is pretended to be no less than Mathematick and uncontroulable [sic] Evidence’.Footnote 91 By contrast, faith is based on the reliable testimony of a number of trustworthy reporters – the Apostles – who ‘wou’d not dissemble the Truth from us upon any Considerations’. As such, faith is ‘as certain as the very Grounds of Mathemathicks [i.e. simple mathematics], and therefore more certain than those Demonstrations, which are deriv’d from them, which are sometimes erroneous, and do frequently lead us into sophistical and wrong Conclusions’.Footnote 92
The upshot of all this is that, for Greene, reliable testimony is as certain as simple mathematics. The realm of reason extends beyond simple mathematics, also encompassing reliable testimony. Consequently, he rejected the notion that the mathematical-deductive approach is the only road to certainty. He insisted that one should not follow the ‘Professors of Theorems and Axioms’,
who plead so incessantly for Demonstration, which at last is no more than to be peevishly addicted to some set of Notions or other, which they have form’d to themselves, and to require that nothing shou’d be stamp’d with the Image or Resemblance of Reason, but what shall be found agreeable to them, as if their own Opinions were the Rule of right thinking.Footnote 93
Greene argued that a pertinent unbroken chain of infallible human testimony extends from the Apostles to the present day.Footnote 94 This chain attests to the divinity of the Gospels ‘from the earliest Times, from the very Times in which these Books were wrote … thro’ all the Ages of the Church, and by Men whose Fidelity and Credit we have no manner of Reason to suspect’.Footnote 95
Greene formulated three arguments to demonstrate the veracity of the Apostles’ reports. First, the style and textual expressions of the Gospels show ‘an Eye to nothing but a Punctual and Faithful Delivery of Matter of Fact’.Footnote 96 Second, inaccuracies and apparent contradictions in the Scriptures actually provide evidence in favour of their authenticity, ‘for had they … all deliver’d the very same things, without any Variation, their Exactness in ev’ry minute particular might have been interpreted a Contrivance’.Footnote 97 Third, the Gospels contain ‘Passages of History express’d … so very minute and singular, and which are so peculiarly adapted to those Times, in which they are suppos’d to have been first extant’.Footnote 98 We should believe the Apostles’ testimony because they provide complex and nuanced descriptions of the historical times, Greene urged. As he puts it, ‘Men receive into their Temper a particular kind of Tincture from the Age they live in, which is almost impossible to derive into another, so as to make it appear the same.’Footnote 99 This ‘historical tincture’ cannot be (easily) feigned, and it therefore stands as proof that the Apostles really witnessed the events described in the Gospels.
Having established the truth of the Apostles’ testimonies, Greene proceeded to demonstrate the Gospels’ truth and divinity, based on internal evidence. He offered seven arguments: (1) the Gospels agree ‘in the essential parts’, suggesting a harmony that can only be the offspring of truth; (2) the Gospels report on Jesus’ reproaches and teaching, showing that the Apostles were certain of the truth contained in the Scriptures; (3) the Gospels differ ‘in the more minute Circumstances’, indicating that their authors were sincere; (4) the Gospels were written ‘with those Affections and Passions, which do not only prove the Genuiness [sic], but the Truth of them’; (5) the Gospels bear the marks of the time in which they were written; (6) the fulfilment of prophecies contained in the Gospels attests to their truth; and (7) the Gospels are not deceitful, for the ‘Temper and Genius of the Doctrine, advanc’d in the Holy Scriptures is directly opposite to any base or sinister Designs of Deceiving’. For these reasons, Greene concluded that the internal evidence of the truth of the Scriptures is beyond all doubt.Footnote 100
Two kinds of external testimony also attest to the truth and divinity of the Scriptures: human and divine.Footnote 101 Greene introduced four arguments based on human-external evidence to support the truth and divinity of the Scriptures: (1) it is extremely unlikely that simple fishermen could have deceived mankind; (2) it is implausible that the Apostles could have invented a doctrine as profound as that contained in the Gospels; (3) it is unlikely that the Apostles would have endured persecution had they not been fully convinced of the Christian doctrine’s truth; and (4) it is doubtful that the world would have believed the Apostles had they themselves not firmly believed in the doctrine of the Gospels.Footnote 102
Greene also introduced four arguments based on divine-external evidence to support the truth and divinity of the Scriptures: (1) the doctrine contained in the Scriptures is clearly the result of a divine afflatus; (2) the infinite goodness and wisdom of God, for the ‘Genius and Temper of Christianity is such, that no other than an Infinitely good and All-wise Being cou’d offer to us such Great and Noble Principles’,Footnote 103 including Christ’s resurrection, the redemption of our sins, universal love and God’s justice, i.e. principles that are ‘superior to any Human Reason, and yet agreeable to it’;Footnote 104 (3) the miracles reported in the Scriptures can only be of divine origin; and (4) the remarkable spread of the Gospels is a token of God’s providence.Footnote 105 Clearly, most of this evidence rests on the reliability of the Apostles as actual witnesses to the events described in the Gospels. Without testimony as a legitimate source of knowledge, Greene’s defence could never be successful in proving the truth and divinity of the Scriptures. Greene explicitly argued for testimony as a source of certainty.
Against the ‘Reveries of a Crazy Brain’: Footnote 106 an epistemology supporting revelation
In this section, we delve into Greene’s epistemology of testimony, which he employed to defend the truth and divinity of the Scriptures. Generally, Greene criticised scholars who, in his opinion, undermined the divinity of the Scriptures, with Locke and Toland being the most prominent figures. To be fair to Locke, it should be noted that, in The reasonableness of Christianity and its second vindication, he aimed to prove the truth and divinity of the Scriptures. He based his arguments on the moral excellence of the Christian teachings, the fulfilment of Old Testament messianic prophesies in the New Testament, the profound wisdom evident in Christ’s propagation of the Gospel and the miracles performed by Christ.Footnote 107 At several points he seemed to assert that these arguments demonstratively establish the truth and divinity of the Scriptures. For instance, in The reasonableness of Christianity, Locke asserted that the miracles performed by Christ affirm that his teachings ‘cannot but be received as the Oracles of God, and unquestionable Verity’.Footnote 108 In A second vindication of the reasonableness of Christianity (1697), he noted that the truth and necessity of Christ’s teachings ‘carries such a Thread of Evidence through the whole History of the Evangelists, as I think is impossible to be resisted; and makes it a Demonstration, that the Sacred Historians did not write by concert as Advocates, for a bad Cause’.Footnote 109 If this reading is correct, then Greene actually reiterated some of the points made by Locke.
Greene took a strong stance in these debates. The final discourse of A demonstration of the truth and divinity of the Christian religion, titled ‘To Prove that Matters of Faith are Equally, if not more Demonstrable, than Those of Reason’, is particularly noteworthy from an epistemological perspective. Here, Greene provided a detailed account of the difference between reason and faith. He argued that knowledge based on reliable testimony can be as certain as commonly accepted mathematical propositions. He states:
Are we not as certain, and do’s not the persuasion stick as fast, and ly as deep in our Minds, that there are such places as York and Edinburgh, as if we our selves had seen them; as if any one shou’d propose to us the most infallible Truth, and the most indisputable Propositions in the Mathematicks?Footnote 110
For Greene, faith, which is based on reliable testimony, is ‘a Perfect Assent of the Mind to things which are not seen, a full Assurance and Conviction which we have receiv’d, and an undoubted certainty which we have of those things, which we were never Eye-witnesses of’.Footnote 111 Here, Greene offered his own interpretation of Hebrews xi.1, linking testimony to certainty. This should be seen as a response to Toland’s Christianity not mysterious, in which Toland interpreted Hebrews xi.1 to support his own view. Greene maintained that in contrast to faith, reason is ‘Evidence of things which are seen; it is the same Assent as to the Mind with the other [i.e. with faith], but to that which lies within every one’s View’.Footnote 112
Greene maintained that faith and reason differ ‘in the Methods and Ways of producing our Assent’.Footnote 113 In this regard, he viewed faith as generally superior to reason. He argued that it is preferable for the mind to assent to well-attested matters of fact rather than to propositions deduced through reason. Faith is primarily superior to reason because of the different ways in which both manage error. Greene wrote,
All the Objection which I know of, which lies against our being certain from the Testimony of others, is, because there is a possibility of our being deceiv’d, either by the Mistake or the disingenuity of those who challenge our Assent, or by their want of Power and Capacity, or of Will to inform us.Footnote 114
If we can eliminate doubt about the reliability of testifiers, then testimony can secure the certainty of relevant convictions.
Greene’s attack on Locke’s philosophy is most explicit in book v of The principles of the philosophy of the expansive and contractive forces (1727), which is entitled ‘Concerning the Metaphysics and Logicks, or the Systeme of Ideas of Mr. Locke’. Here, Greene forcefully rejected Locke’s claim that knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement between ideas.Footnote 115 According to Greene, Locke’s distinction between reason and faith requires us to conclude
that the most Certain and Undoubted Matters of Fact, that there is such a Country as Spain …, and such Historians, as Thucydides and Livy, that there was such a Person, as our Saviour, such a Doctrine which he Taught, and such Miracles, which he Performed, … are not Certain, and only highly ProbableFootnote 116
Such a conclusion was simply unacceptable to him. Ultimately, for Greene, revelation was superior to human reason. As he concluded in book vi of the same treatise,
The Case in the Present Age seems to be This, that Men are Grown very Fond of Philosophy, and what they Call Reason, and would therefore Reduce even the Christian Religion it’s self to the Dictates of it; But Christianity, and a Revelation from God, cannot Bend to every Man’s Fancy and Humour.Footnote 117
Greene attacked Locke’s probabilistic account of revelation by arguing that the tenets of the Scriptures, based on reliable testimony, are as certain as the truths of simple mathematics. Against Toland, who used some of Locke’s ideas, Greene argued that rational demonstration is not the only road to certainty, because reliable testimony also provides certainty.
Greene was not only a critic of Newton, as has been documented in the literature, but also a castigator of Locke’s views on the epistemology of faith and those who radicalised Locke’s view, like Toland. Greene offers an intriguing entry point into the reception of Locke’s ideas on the relationship between faith and reason at the University of Cambridge. Like Jenkin, the enigmatic F. M., Lee, Milner, Stillingfleet and Edwards, Greene attacked Locke’s probabilistic take on faith. However, Greene differed from the above-mentioned scholars by explicitly providing an epistemology that prioritised reliable testimony over propositional deductions, thereby providing perhaps the most elaborate response to Locke’s view on the relationship between reason and faith among Cambridge-based or Cambridge-trained scholars. This approach allowed him to respond to Locke’s probabilistic stance on faith, Toland’s rationalistic approach to Christianity and mathematicians and natural philosophers who believed that mathematical demonstration is the pinnacle of rationality.
The results obtained in this essay warrant further scrutiny. Additional research is needed on the intellectual and institutional relationships between Lee, Milner, Jenkin, Stillingfleet and Greene, as well as on the criticisms of Locke’s philosophy at the University of Cambridge in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Here, I have shown that the above-mentioned scholars, despite their differences, shared similar concerns regarding Locke’s probabilistic take on faith. I have not fully examined potential common or mutual influences, nor potential personal relationships. In future work, I also hope to pinpoint the connection between Greene’s criticism of Locke and his critique of Newton.
Open access
