In his Commentary on the Cratylus, Proclus allegorically interprets (§53, 22.8–9) Circe as ‘weaving all of life in τῷ τετραστοίχῳ’.Footnote 1 LSJ translates τὸ τετράστοιχον as ‘four classes of ζῷα’ and this rendition is very frequently followed. Suffice it to mention here the most recent translations of Proclus’ commentary by Brian DuvickFootnote 2 or Michele Abbate.Footnote 3 Some scholars, however, have questioned the validity of this rendition. For example, Sibylle Tochtermann has asserted that the LSJ translation makes no sense:
Die Übersetzung des Hapaxlegomenon τῷ τετραστοίχῳ bei Liddell-Scott als ‘vier Klassen der Lebewesen’ leuchtet nicht ein. Eher scheint in diesem Zusammenhang das Leben, d.h. der Bereich des Irdischen, gemeint zu sein, der sich aus den vier Elementen zusammensetzt.Footnote 4
Although this paper argues that Tochtermann is right to impugn the accuracy of the LSJ rendition, her characterization of τὸ τετράστοιχον as a hapax legomenon needs qualification, since the term is used by Proclus twice more in the Commentary on the Timaeus (2.268.6–7 and 2.268.9).Footnote 5 Unsurprisingly, here again scholars are divided about the appropriate translation. Thomas Taylor renders it as ‘the four elements’.Footnote 6 André-Jean Festugière, on the other hand, suggests, on the basis of In Cra. §53, 22.9, ‘les quatre classes de vivants’.Footnote 7 Finally, Dirk Baltzly, in the most recent translation, makes a strong case for ‘the four elements’.Footnote 8 In what follows, it will be proposed that the same applies to the Commentary on the Cratylus, since Proclus’ allegoresis of Circe sits much better with the four-elements interpretation than with the four-genera reading. Let us first provide the context.
As Proclus discusses the deities who weave ‘the order of life’ (τὸν διάκοσμον τῆς ζωῆς), he explains (In Cra. §53, 22.3–15) that this weaving
μετεχομένην δὲ ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ θεῶν (καὶ γὰρ ὁ εἷς δημιουργὸς τοῖς νέοις δημιουργοῖς προσυφαίνειν τῷ ἀθανάτῳ παρακελεύεται τὸ θνητὸν εἶδος τῆς ζωῆς), περατουμένην δ᾽ εἰς τοὺς τῆς γενέσεως προστάτας θεούς, ὧν ἐστιν καὶ ἡ παρ᾽ ῾Ομήρῳ Κίρκη πᾶσαν ὑφαίνουσα τὴν ἐν τῷ τετραστοίχῳ ζωὴν καὶ ἅμα ταῖς ᾠδαῖς ἐναρμόνιον ποιοῦσα τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην τόπον. ἐν ταύταις οὖν ταῖς ὑφαντικαῖς καὶ ἡ Κίρκη ὑπὸ τῶν θεολόγων παραλαμβάνεται, χρυσῆ μέντοι, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐνδεικνύμενοι τὴν νοερὰν αὐτῆς καὶ ἄχραντον οὐσίαν καὶ ἄυλον καὶ ἀμιγῆ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς διακρίνειν τὰ ἑστῶτα τῶν κινουμένων καὶ χωρίζειν κατὰ τὴν ἑτερότητα τὴν θείαν.
is participated in by all the gods in the cosmos (for the one Demiurge bids the young demiurges to interweave the mortal form of life with the immortal), and is completed among the gods presiding over generation, amidst whom there is Homer's Circe, who weaves all of life in τῷ τετραστοίχῳ and at the same time makes the region under the moon harmonious with [her magic] songs.Footnote 9 Among these weavers, then, also Circe is included by the theologians, indeed, the golden [one], as they say, thus indicating her intellectual and immaculate essence, both immaterial and unmingled with generation, as well as her task [which is] to discriminate the things at rest from those in motion, and to separate [them] according to divine difference.
This ingenious allegoresis of Circe enables Proclus not only to buttress his interpretation of Plato's dialogue with the authority of Homer but also to illustrate an important assumption of Neoplatonic metaphysics with the poet's beautiful and suggestive image of the enchantress. Circe is, then, deciphered as an encosmic deity who rules over the realm of coming to be and passing away, distributes life there and arranges the sublunary sphere into a harmonious whole. The sorceress is referred to as ‘golden’,Footnote 10 because her nature remains undefiled by the contact with the material world even as she braids the eternal with the perishable.
While Proclus skilfully adapts the figure of Circe to the framework of his theology, her inclusion might have been prompted by the example in the lemma on which he comments: at Cra. 389b1–7 Socrates examines the problem of the intelligible Forms of artefacts, which he illustrates with the case of a ‘shuttle’ (κερκίς).Footnote 11 Given that the etymological connection between κερκίς and Circe appears (s.v. Κίρκη) in the Suda, the Etymologicum Gudianum and the Etymologicum Magnum, the association must have been quite natural for Proclus.Footnote 12 This helps explain why he refers to a deity absent from the Platonic dialogue that he investigates.Footnote 13 Before we address the difficult question ‘in what Circe weaves all of life’, we have to briefly touch upon the thorny issue of the originality of Proclus’ account of the enchantress.
By far the most popular Circe episode with ancient allegorists is the transformation of Odysseus’ companions and the hero's miraculous resistance (Od. 10.233–335).Footnote 14 Proclus himself adduces this episode in his Commentary on the First Alcibiades.Footnote 15 As he clarifies that embodiment is by no means natural to souls (256.10–257.9), Proclus quotes Od. 10.326 to illustrate that souls ‘clothed’ (ἠμφιεσμέναι) in bodies which nevertheless strive to live an immaterial life in the world of generation ‘have drunk this potion but not been charmed’.Footnote 16 Subsequently, Proclus puts forward an allegorical interpretation which presents (257.10–258.3) Circe as responsible for the realm of the earthly and for the transmigration of the souls.Footnote 17 What is the relation between this account of the enchantress and the account Proclus offers in the Commentary on the Cratylus?
Scholars have variously answered this difficult question. Félix Buffière emphasizes the affinity between the two accounts.Footnote 18 So does Erich Kaiser.Footnote 19 But Sibylle Tochtermann stresses that the ‘Tenor’ between the two interpretations is quite different.Footnote 20 Undeniably, there is a correspondence between the two accounts, since in both cases Proclus assigns to Circe the realm of the earthly, that is, the world of becoming (In Alc. 257.13–14, In Cra. §53, 22.7–8). Thus in both commentaries the implication is that the soul's descent into generation and its imprisonment in the body are as abominable as the transformation of Odysseus’ men into animals. Yet in the Commentary on the Cratylus the sorceress is not so much in charge of the cycle of metempsychosis but rather in charge of the cosmic weaving. Thus Proclus alludes here specifically to Od. 10.220–3, where Odysseus’ comrades arrive at Circe's palace, hear the enchantress’ beautiful singing and see her great ‘imperishable’ (ἄμβροτος) web, which they immediately recognize as the work of a goddess. Tochtermann rightly observes that the moral dimension of Proclus’ allegoresis is not that conspicuous in the Commentary on the Cratylus. At the same time, however, she overemphasizes the difference between the two accounts. If we seek to ascertain in what Circe weaves all of life, it is more fruitful to treat the two accounts as complementary and to read them in light of Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus, the only other work by Proclus where τὸ τετράστοιχον appears.
Earlier scholars characterized Proclus’ metaphysics as a convoluted and arbitrary development of Plotinus’ thought.Footnote 21 Laudably, the recent trend in research on the Lycian philosopher has been to seek to do justice to the originality and depth of his thought, as scholars have painstakingly reconstructed Proclus’ rich and complex system of divinities.Footnote 22 However, Circe's place in the hierarchy has so far received no scholarly attention. Given that the enchantress presides over the realm of γένεσις (In Cra. §53, 22.7–8, In Alc. 257.13–14), her weaving must be of the lower kind. Indeed, in the Commentary on the Cratylus Proclus counts Circe among the deities who complete the weaving in the world of becoming (§53, 22.7–8). She is, however, preceded by several other weaving deities: the young demiurges (22.4–6), Kore (22.1–3) and Athena (21.21–22.1). This suggests that Circe is a goddess in the series of Athena, whose power passes through the σειρά of Kore before it eventually reaches the sorceress.Footnote 23 A detailed investigation of all these weaving deities would take us deep into the maze of Proclus’ polytheistic theology. Fascinating as this journey in itself might be, it would distract us from our modest purpose, which is to establish in what Circe weaves all of life. Accordingly, the ensuing discussion will be confined to the young gods, whose weaving is particularly relevant for the question of this paper.Footnote 24
When Proclus says (In Cra. §53, 22.4–6) that the one Demiurge orders the young demiurges to weave together the mortal and the immortal, he is referring to Plato, who introduces these νέοι θεοί at Ti. 42d6 to explain the genesis of mortal bodies: the Demiurge hands down the second creation to the young gods because, if he himself had produced the living creatures, they would be immortal (41c2–3). Yet before he passes the task of ζῴων δημιουργία over to his servants (41c4–5), the Demiurge clarifies (41c6–d2) that he had ‘sown’ (σπείρας) and ‘instituted’ (ὑπαρξάμενος) the divine part of the ζῷα, which he now delivers to the young gods so that they could weave onto it the mortal and thus generate the ζῷα proper. In his commentary on the dialogue, Proclus explains (In Ti. 3.233.13–234.5) that what the Demiurge ‘sows’ is the ‘soul’ (ψυχή), that is, a ‘rational principle from rational principles’ (λόγος ἐκ λόγων), which he ‘institutes’ by producing the ‘vehicle’ (ὄχημα) of the soul and the ‘life’ (ζωή) contained within it. Most generally, then, the one Demiurge engenders two eternal components of the ζῷα: the rational soul and the first vehicle. Onto these, the young gods weave the mortal, which comprises the irrational soul and the second vehicle. More specifically, though, the Demiurge creates the ‘highest pinnacles’ (ἀκρότητες) of the irrational life and their vehicle (both of which are eternal), whereas the young gods fashion the mortal extension of this irrational life and its perishable vehicle, which connects the immortal vehicle to the individual's material body (3.236.31–237.14). Thus the first vehicle brings about the mortal irrational life in the second vehicle, which then gives rise to the various irrational faculties in the earthly body.Footnote 25
Hence if Plato has the Demiurge put every soul into one ὄχημα (Ti. 41e1–2), Proclus differentiates three distinct vehicles of the soul: (1) the first is ‘congenital’ (συμφυές),Footnote 26 lasts forever and makes the soul encosmic; (2) the second is ‘pneumatic’ (πνευματικόν),Footnote 27 makes the soul a ‘citizen of generation’ (γενέσεως πολῖτις), precedes and survives the body but is eventually jettisoned; and (3) the third is ‘shell-like’ (ὀστρεῶδες),Footnote 28 makes the soul chthonic and endures only for the time of an individual life upon earth, since it changes with each rebirth.Footnote 29 Only the first indissoluble vehicle is engendered by the one Demiurge, whereas the two perishable ones are woven onto the first one by the young gods. Now, in the Commentary on the Cratylus Proclus specifies (§53, 22.7–8) that the weaving performed by the young demiurges is brought to an end by Circe and other deities in charge of generation. How could the enchantress’ weaving in τῷ τετραστοίχῳ be related to that of the young gods?
According to Plato (Ti. 42c4–d2), release from the cycle of reincarnation is only possible when reason triumphs over the ‘troublesome mass’ (πολὺς ὄχλος) which (1) has adhered to the soul ‘of fire, water, air and earth’ (ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς), and which (2) is further characterized as ‘turbulent’ (θορυβώδης) as well as ‘irrational’ (ἄλογος). When commenting on this difficult lemma, Proclus explains (In Ti. 3.297.21–3) that ‘souls descending to earth take on from the elements one type of garments after another: airy, watery, earthy’ (εἰς γῆν κατιοῦσαι γὰρ αἱ ψυχαὶ προσλαμβάνουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων ἄλλους καὶ ἄλλους χιτῶνας, ἀερίους ἐνυδρίους χθονίους).Footnote 30 Proclus thus equates Plato's troublesome mass of the four elements with ‘the second vehicle (δεύτερον ὄχημα) and the life (ζωή) within it’.Footnote 31 While this pneumatic vehicle forms around the soul during its descent through the celestial spheres, it weathers through the round of rebirths until the soul cleanses itself of its irrationality. Yet although the second vehicle precedes and survives the body, its formation overlaps with that of the third vehicle.Footnote 32
Most importantly, however, the Commentary on the Timaeus makes it clear (3.320.14–15) that both the body and the pneumatic vehicle are made of the four elements. Indeed, Proclus states in no uncertain terms (3.320.18–26) that the two perishable vehicles differ primarily in the variety of their garments, for the organic body is not ‘merely a complex of simple (ἐκ τῶν ἁπλῶν) elements but also of homoiomerous (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν) ones’.Footnote 33 Proclus makes interesting use of the Anaxagorean notion of homoiomeriesFootnote 34 to show that, while the second and the third vehicles are obviously not identical, they are nevertheless both aggregates of the four elements. The crucial difference is that the shell-like vehicle forms through the accretion of additional elemental vestures.
The above account of incarnation could be corroborated by many passages of Proclus, but suffice it to cite here the Elements of Theology.Footnote 35 In this work, the soul's vehicle is also said (§209, 182.16–17) to descend ‘by the addition of garments increasingly material’ (προσθέσει χιτώνων ἐνυλοτέρων) and the descent itself is likewise presented (182.19–20) as being due to the soul's ‘acquisition of irrational lives’ (ἀλόγους προσλαβοῦσα ζωάς). This is consistent with what Proclus says in the Commentary on the Timaeus. As a matter of fact, in his groundbreaking edition, E.R. Dodds points precisely to In Ti. 3.298.1, where the soul's second vehicle is ἐκ παντοδαπῶν χιτώνων συγκείμενον, which means—as the scholar acutely observes—that ‘it consists of successive layers of the four elements, which are successively attached to the immortal vehicle in the course of the soul's descent’.Footnote 36 Hence the Elements of Theology also account for the formation of the soul's vehicles in terms of the elemental vestures.
If we now turn to Circe's weaving in τῷ τετραστοίχῳ, we shall see that it is challenging to determine whether Proclus conceived of the sorceress as involved in the weaving of the second or of the third vehicle, since what he says in his Commentary on the Alcibiades can be interpreted in either way. A strong case can be made for the fleshly garments.Footnote 37 Given that souls are explicitly characterized (257.3–4) as ‘clothed in bodies’ (ἠμφιεσμέναι … σώματα), it is probable that Proclus had precisely these corporeal tunics in mind when he spoke of Circe weaving all of life in τῷ τετραστοίχῳ. On the other hand, the pneumatic vehicle along with the mortal manifestation of irrationality cannot be ruled out, since the accounts of the formation of the second and of the third vehicles intersect.Footnote 38 Thus when Proclus diagnoses (257.14–258.1) that many embodied souls are ensnared by Circe's draught because of their ‘immoderate desire’ (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία), we may construe this as implying that the enchantress participates in the weaving of the second vehicle and its life. Since the soul must vanquish the troublesome mass through reason, it is no surprise that Proclus gives (258.1–3) Hermes,Footnote 39 who symbolizes ‘reason’ (λόγος) and ‘knowledge’ (ἐπιστήμη), as the antidote to the sorceress’ potion and charm.Footnote 40
Be that as it may, the crucial point is that both the pneumatic vehicle and the shell-like one are composed of τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων. The two differ primarily in the character of their χιτώνων, since the second vehicle is made of simple elements, whereas the organic body consists of homoiomerous ones. This strongly suggests that, when Proclus has Circe weave all of life in τῷ τετραστοίχῳ, what is meant are not the four genera but the four elements. It is these elemental vestures that weigh the soul down to the realm of generation.
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