‘The State is this dual-natured reality, simultaneously instituted and fallen.’Footnote 1
Introduction
The notion of ‘destituent power’ is essential for understanding dimensions of political power that extend beyond elections. Elections alone seem not sufficient to exercise political power, as they primarily function as a mechanism for delegating authority to representatives at periodic intervals. Between elections, it is often impossible for citizens to hold officials accountable for decisions that affect them directly. Elections have likewise demonstrated limited effectiveness in curbing corruption, highlighting the comparative importance of direct democracy mechanisms.Footnote 2 Destituent power addresses this accountability gap by providing juridical mechanisms – such as recalls, citizen initiatives or referenda – that allow citizens to challenge or remove officials who are deemed to violate the social contract by abusing their political mandates for personal gains or engaging in corrupt conduct. In times of political scandals and the international rise of autocratic tendencies within ostensibly democratic systems, the study of destituent power is particularly timely.
The concept of ‘destituent power’ has attracted growing recent attention in contemporary political theory.Footnote 3 Two forms of democratic power are usually distinguished. Constituent power, on one hand, refers to the people or sovereign body as the ultimate source of legitimacy. The tradition of constituent power has, of course, a long intellectual lineage, extending from Abbé Sieyès in revolutionary France to Antonio Negri in contemporary political theory.
On the other hand, there is destituent power, a concept recently developed by Italian thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben and the Invisible Committee, who contend that efforts to reform existing governments inevitably reproduce anti-democratic structures and fail to achieve authentic representation. According to this view, political renewal must emerge outside the state – through acts of withdrawal rather than insurrection. As Agamben writes:
Starting with French revolution, the political tradition of modernity has conceived of radical changes in the form of a revolutionary process that acts as the pouvoir constituant, the ‘constituent power’ of a new institutional order. I think that we have to abandon this paradigm and try to think something as a puissance destituante, a ‘purely destituent power’, that cannot be captured in the spiral of security.Footnote 4
One problem with Agamben’s interpretation is that it frames destituent power in purely negative terms – as merely the negation or destruction of the constituted order.
This paper argues that more constructive insights into destituent power can be found in the neglected political thought of the French philosopher Paul Ricœur. While Ricœur does not explicitly theorize ‘constituent’ nor ‘destituent’ power, his reflections on civic vigilance, responsibility and the ethical foundations of democracy appear to offer conceptual resources for seeing it as part of democratic equilibrium, rather than as a force of withdrawal or nihilistic rejection, in the manner of Agamben.Footnote 5
Destituent power highlights the role of recall procedures – juridical mechanisms that allow for the removal of a local official midterm in cases of gross misconduct. Yet, key questions remain: Who holds the authority to initiate recall, and on which grounds? How can mechanisms of democratic removal and oversight be designed to safeguard both accountability and the institutional stability required for a functioning democracy?
A central challenge for democracies is to design effective mechanisms of removal and accountability, without jeopardizing the rule of law and the legitimacy on which democratic governance rests. In other words, how to conceptualize mechanisms of democratic removal and control that do not accelerate ‘democratic backsliding’ but instead strenghthen democratic institutions and guarantee institutional stability?
The first part of this article will analyze how Ricœurian concepts of vigilance, the political paradox, the self, the state, and political agency provide useful resources for rethinking the overly simplistic dichotomy between destituent and constituent power, in a way that stays true to the spirit of his thought. Ricœur’s political ideas highlight the importance of maintaining a balance between elected authority and popular sovereignty, ensuring that political power remains both accountable and responsive throughout the duration of the mandate.
The second part operationalizes a Ricœurian conception of destituent power through a comparative and empirical analysis of impeachment and recall mechanisms across several East Asian democratic countries. This inquiry connects Ricœur’s political-theoretical arguments with East Asian democratic practices in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. It highlights the diverse normative and juridical ways in which destituent power can be institutionalized and exercised through recall procedures, revealing how local democratic cultures reinterpret the tension between institutional stability and political dynamism, giving concrete form to Ricœur’s notion of ‘will-to-live-together’ (vouloir-vivre-ensemble). Footnote 6
The conceptual framework – Elements for a theory of destituent power
Although Ricœur was associated throughout his life with pacifist movements and broadly aligned with the social-liberal tradition – positions that may seem at odds with the revolutionary and potentially violent dimensions of destituent power – I contend that his thought can be read as a bridge between constituent and destituent power. Ricœur does not dismiss, nor reject institutional framework, as Agamben does. His philosophy invites us instead to rethink the aftermath of constituent action and the ethical vigilance needed to sustain democratic life.Footnote 7
The political paradox and democratic equilibrium
The concept of ‘the political paradox’ (1957) identifies a fundamental tension in political representation: political authority is simultaneously necessary for collective action and inherently prone to abuse. This paradox creates what Ricœur describes as the ‘dual nature of political power’ – power both enables human flourishing through organized collective life and threatens individual freedom through its monopoly of legitimate force and its potential for domination.
The ‘political paradox’ refers to the very possibility of political evil inherent in the autonomy of the political sphere. Power is both rational and irrational, and this paradox can be explained, but never resolved:
A specific rationality, a specific evil — such is the double and paradoxical originality of the political. The task of political philosophy, in my view, is to make this originality explicit and to elucidate this paradox; for political evil can arise only from the specific rationality of the political.Footnote 8
In this seminal article, Ricœur revisits the theory of the social contract. He underscores that the social contract is, by nature, a fiction, but a necessary fiction upon which political community is established. Because the founding pact never actually occurred, the pouvoir constituant (constituent power) itself is fictional. In other words, since our political bond is not based on an empirical fact but on an ideal act of consent that exists only in the realm of thought, it is ‘inclined towards falsehood’ and lies. If this fiction is the ‘truth’ (vérité) of politics, it can, on the same token, easily foster falsehood:
People will say whatever they wish — and whatever must be said — against the abstraction, the ideality, the hypocrisy of the social pact. And that is true, in its own way and to some extent. But first we must recognize in this pact the founding act of the nation. It is this founding act that no economic dialectic can produce; it is this founding act that constitutes the political as such.
Did this pact ever take place? Precisely not. It is in the very nature of political consent — the consent that forms the unity of an organized human community guided by the State — to exist only as something that did not actually happen: as a contract that was never contracted, as an implicit and tacit pact that appears only through political consciousness, retrospection, and reflection. That is precisely why falsehood so easily enters the political realm: the political is prone to lies because the political bond has the reality of ideality. Footnote 9
Ricœur reminds us that political regimes are born out of violence and bear the trace of this origin. All political power is structured by an internal contraction between law and arbitrariness, sovereignty and its usurpation.Footnote 10 Even democratic republics carry the enduring mark of this initial violence. A power that claims to represent the people can always turn against popular sovereignty itself:
See how, last year, we were robbed of our votes by clever politicians who turned factual power against the sovereignty of the electorate; the sovereign always tends to cheat sovereignty itself — that is the essential political evil.
No state exists without a government, an administration, a police force; therefore, this phenomenon of political alienation runs through all regimes.Footnote 11
From a more religious perspective, Paul Ricœur writes in the ‘Adventures of the state and the task of Christians’, that the state lends itself to a dual interpretation: one of Saint Paul and one of Saint John, ‘for one, the State has the face of the magistrate; for the other, it is the face of the beast’.Footnote 12 Ricœur notes that the rationalization of power through constitutionalism and rational administration does not eliminate the danger of tyranny. On the contrary, legality may become its mask: ‘In Russia, the constitution is an alibi for tyranny’.Footnote 13 It is well known by constitutionalists that the autocratic ruler tends to not abolish constitutions, but rather grants himself powers under their guise, treating constitutions as an ‘operating manual, billboard, blueprint, and window dressing’.Footnote 14 Ricœur concludes: ‘the State is the unresolved contradiction of rationality and power’.Footnote 15
In a later essay, ‘The Paradox of Authority’ (1997), Paul Ricœur further explains the paradox by bringing into play the intersection between the horizontal and vertical axes of power. The philosopher explains that it is impossible to locate an original or founding act of power – the first and unique legislator can never be found. Authority is therefore not a substance or a source, but a relationship: a hierarchical relation grounded in mutual recognition. To put it differently, authority becomes ‘authorized’ only through the acknowledgment of those over whom it is exercised:
This means that political power lies at the intersection of two axes: a vertical and a horizontal one. On the one hand, power simply arises from the will-to-live-together; there exists a historical community for as long as people wish to live together. When they no longer do, the civic bond unravels — in the strong sense of dé-faite (“un-made”): one can speak of a historical defeat just as one speaks of a military defeat. This tragic spectacle of dé-faite is what we see today among entire peoples in the former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union. But power acquires lasting stability only when the horizontal axis intersects with the vertical axis of authority.Footnote 16
Conceived through a Ricœurian lens, destituent power becomes an internal mechanism for negotiating the political paradox. Rather than standing in opposition to constituent power, ‘destituent power’ functions as a necessary counterbalance within democratic systems – a means of sustaining the fragile equilibrium that the political paradox entails.
This new framing carries important implications: the vitality of democracy does not depend on eliminating destituent power, but on giving it a place within the political paradox. Democracies that neglect destituent power in favor of constituent power, or suppress destituent impulses, risk letting tensions build until they erupt into crises that destabilize the system from below. By contrast, those that channel such impulses through legitimate procedures stand a better chance of securing what could be called ‘dynamic stability’ – the ability to adapt and transform while preserving their institutional foundations.
Vigilance as democratic practice
Ricœur underlines that his statement of the evilness of politics should not lead to defeatism or pessimism, but rather to ‘political vigilance’Footnote 17 – to the awareness that human beings are always confronted both with their greatness and their finitude,Footnote 18 their capacity to create, and corrupt, a political order. I would argue that the concept of vigilanceFootnote 19 is central to Ricœur’s political philosophy and has not yet received the attention it deserves.
‘Vigilance’ is the active, ongoing attentiveness of citizens to potential abuses of instituted power. Ricœur writes: ‘(…) we ought simultaneously to improve the political institution in the direction of greater rationality and to exercise vigilance against the abuse of power inherent in state power’.Footnote 20 Vigilance represents more than passive monitoring; it constitutes an active democratic practice that must be continuously exercised to prevent the pathologies of power that Ricœur identified.
For Paul Ricœur, vigilance is the ethical and political attitude that prevents democratic life from lapsing into inertia. Thus, this concept does not solely refer to a ‘critical vigilance on the level of thought’,Footnote 21 a hermeneutic and a perceptive task of reading politics and symbols, but to a practical and moral task that ‘must also take the form of a summons and an awakening’.Footnote 22 Vigilance reminds both rulers and citizens of the original pact that grounds political life – the shared commitment to justice, freedom and the common good. When this pact is forgotten or betrayed, acts of protest or dissent become necessary. Ricœur insists that such gestures, ‘negative in appearance, are in reality very positive: they reaffirm the ethical foundation of the nation and the state’.Footnote 23 Vigilance is at once reflective and active: it keeps alive a critical spirit that guards against ideological distortion, and it manifests publicly whenever citizens call institutions back to their founding principles.
Vigilance could then operate on two axes: vertical (relationships between citizens and state institutions) and horizontal (relationships among social groups).Footnote 24 These axes must function as counterweights to maintain a healthy democratic system. Destituent power, understood through vigilance, becomes the institutionalized expression of this dual monitoring.
Democracy depends on a delicate balance of trust and distrust.Footnote 25 Citizens must trust their leaders for the system to function, yet durable democratic institutions are built on the assumption that officials may act in self-interest if their power is unchecked. On the one hand, excessive trust can gradually open the door to corruption and special-interest capture; on the other hand, too little trust can prevent democracy from taking hold at all.Footnote 26 In a democratic system, this delicate balance makes vigilance essential – not only as a part of civic engagement but also as a complement to institutional checks on state authority.
However, Ricœur’s thought also reveals the inherent risks of vigilance. When it bypasses institutional structures and procedures entirely, vigilance can destabilize the political order it seeks to protect. This ambivalence points to a crucial distinction between vigilance that works through institutional channels and vigilance that operates outside or against them.
The capable and fallible subject in political contexts
Ricœur’s concept of the ‘capable subject’ (1990), developed in Soi-même comme un autre, adds further depth to our understanding of destituent power. The capable subject is characterized by specific capacities: the ability to speak, to act, to narrate one’s story and, crucially, to be accountable for one’s actions.Footnote 27 In political contexts, this translates to citizens’ capacity to exercise judgment, participate meaningfully in collective decision-making and take responsibility for political outcomes.Footnote 28 However, Ricœurian anthropology of human beings also emphasizes humans as fundamentally fallible—that is, limited, prone to error, never fully self-transparent, yet still capable of responsibility, self-interpretation, and correction.
Destituent power rests on capable subjects – citizens who can discern when institutional power has exceeded its legitimate bounds, who can express grievances within the frame of democratic discourse, and who can mobilize collectively to for equal treatment and fair institutions. This concept steps aside from the notion of ‘the people’ as an undifferentiated mass, instead highlighting the individual and collective capabilities necessary for the responsible exercise of democratic control.
For that reason, even the politician himself should be kept in check: ‘the politician is faced by a terrible problem; it is not a problem of maintaining its innocence, but that of limiting his culpability’. Footnote 29
Fair institutions and their fragility
Ricœur’s analysis of ‘fair institutions’ (1995)Footnote 30 introduces the concept of institutional fragility – the recognition that democratic institutions are necessary for justice, but also remain perpetually vulnerable to internal corruption and external pressure. This fragility is not a flaw but a feature of human institutions - it reflects both our capacity for creating just orders and our propensity to distort them.
Unlike C. Castoriadis, who locates the creative force of radical imagination outside institutions, Ricœur views renewal as arising within them – through interpretation, critique, and reform, rather than rupture.Footnote 31 According to this vision, destituent moments could then be conceived not acts of radical negation but as expressions of vigilance: they would represent the capacity of democratic societies to scrutinize, question, regulate and reinterpret their own foundations.
Because institutions are human creations, they are never perfect or immune to decay; they must therefore be continually adjusted to preserve justice and civic trust.
Ricœur proposes several directions for institutional improvement:
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(1) ‘pursu(e) constitutional evolution in a reasonable way’Footnote 32 – advocating in favor of moving toward a federal state,Footnote 33
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(2) ‘renew the life of the parties’, through internal debate, and
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(3) ‘invent new forms of citizen participation beyond elections and parliamentary representation’.
At the same time, he calls for a paradoxical strengthening of state authority,Footnote 34 in particular the executive branch, while maintaining strong liberal safeguards such as judicial independence.
Understanding destituent power through the lens of institutional fragility reveals the dual nature of its power: it is both a threat to institutional stability and a mechanism to preserve the fairness of institutions. Properly institutionalized destituent power – through, for example, impeachment procedures – acknowledges the inner fragility of power by creating structured pathways for removing leaders who threaten democratic norms, thereby protecting institutions from more destabilizing forms of opposition.
Non-violence and democratic transformation
Ricœur’s early work on non-violence (1949) provides an important ethical grounding for understanding legitimate forms of destituent power. In his article ‘L’homme Non Violent et Sa Présence à l’histoire’Footnote 35, Ricœur develops a vision of transformative political action that eschews violence yet allows for active opposition to injustice. Within this framework, destituent power derives its legitimacy from its steadfast commitment to non-violent forms of action, and not only from procedural correctness or incorrectness.
This non-violent criterion helps us distinguish democratic destituent power from revolutionary overthrow or coup d’état. It requires that mechanisms of democratic control – even when removing leaders or destabilizing existing arrangements – operate within a framework that respects both institutional forms and the non-violence commitment.
Over the span of this philosophical exploration, I hope to have shown that Ricœur’s work offers decisive conceptual resources for rethinking a theory of destituent power. Its negative power, inseparable from constituent power, emerges as an expression of vigilance. Destituent power becomes a critical hermeneutic task questioning the meaning of political foundations, as well as a practical form of action that resists injustice and recalls institutions to their ethical origins. Rooted in the ‘political paradox’ – the tension between the monopoly of violence and political legitimacy – ‘destituent power’ points to a capacity of the capable self in relation to others, conscious of his own fragility, who seeks to reform without destroying and to found anew without violence. In this sense, vigilance appears as the living counterpart to institutional reform: it gives reforms their meaning and prevents the state from hardening into an empty shell of legality.
Empirical analysis. Recall mechanisms as forms of ‘institutionalized’ destituent power
Recall mechanismsFootnote 36 represent the most explicit institutionalization of destituent power in contemporary democracies. The recall is part of a direct mechanism of control setting accountability beyond elections,Footnote 37 but is the ‘rarest instrument of direct democracy’.Footnote 38 Only around 20 countries have introduced it in their constitutional systems, often with restrictions at the subnational level. Despite being the birthplace of the ‘constituent power’ tradition, it is interesting to note that there is no ‘destituent power’ in France – the president cannot be impeached and parliamentarians cannot be recalled by citizens. Debates on recalls are very few, as the demands of recall have generally been associated with the French political left, rather than being broadly shared by the citizenryFootnote 39.
In its report on the recall of mayors and local elected representatives,Footnote 40 the Venice Commission emphasizes the importance of distinguishing recall – ‘a popular vote that grants voters the direct power to remove an elected official’Footnote 41 – from revocation, which refers to the power of another body to withdraw a mandate, and from destitution, understood as ‘a sanction following a violation of the law’, akin to impeachment. These are all, however, ‘political instruments entailing political responsibility’.Footnote 42
Recall usually tends to reflect a form of political distrust. However, I would like to argue that recalls are not merely a symptom of the ‘crisis of democracy’ but an expression of its very essence and dynamism.
The recall raises the question of whether, once the power to decide has been transferred to elected representatives, citizens might still retain a ‘right’ to withdraw that power through a given procedure. Interestingly, most examples of such mechanisms are found outside Europe, as both ‘the imperative mandate and the recall of representatives are largely unknown in modern European democracies’.Footnote 43 Recalls have a long tradition in North and South AmericaFootnote 44 and have existed since the 19th century in Swiss cantons. Some recalls have been introduced since the 1980s in some European countries as part of ‘a specific instrument of direct democracy in a representative system’.
Recalls can offer potential benefits, such as empowering citizens, enhancing political accountability and helping to ‘bridge the democratic gap’ by encouraging public participation.Footnote 45 They also provide a sensible alternative to impeachment to check undue influence.Footnote 46 However, their political risks should not be overlooked: recalls may be abused as political tools, against the use of unwanted policy rather than against misconduct. They can represent a threat to democratic stability, be influenced by money and may have problematic democratic grounds, especially when initiated by local councils rather than by the wider electorate (revocations).
One is left to wonder whether the recall procedure is democratically acceptable and compatible with the principles of representation and deliberation. If it is to be deemed acceptable, what safeguards are required to ensure recalls’ democratic legitimacy and the minimum conditions for their useFootnote 47?
Variations in models of recalls in democratic systems
As previously stated, recall procedures formalize the capacity to remove elected officials before the completion of their terms, exemplifying the principle that democratic authority remains conditional and revocable. Their primary function is an accountability of last resort in case of gross mismanagement or scandals committed by political representatives.
Building on the theoretical framework we previously established, it seems that effective recall procedures should balance three main elements:
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1. Broad democratic participation: Recalls must emerge from genuine popular will rather than elite manipulation, reflecting the agency of capable subjects,
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2. Institutional respect: Procedures must work through established legal frameworks, honoring institutional fragility and the political paradox, the essence of political representation, rather than exploiting it,
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3. Non-violent implementation: The process must remain peaceful, non-violent even amid political conflict.
If we look at recall procedures around the world, a comparative analysis reveals significant variations in how different democratic systems institutionalize destituent power.
Minimal Institutionalization Models (e.g. most Western European democracies)
These systems feature limited formal mechanisms for removing executives between elections. Parliamentary votes of no confidence exist but reflect the voice of parliamentarians, and not the popular will. In these contexts, destituent power expresses itself primarily through social mobilization – protests, demonstrations and civic pressure that operates outside formal institutional channels.
From a Ricœurian perspective, these systems risk channeling vigilance into potentially destabilizing forms. When legitimate concerns about power abuse cannot find institutional expression, they may bypass procedures entirely, creating the very institutional fragility that Ricœur warns against.
Robust Procedural Models (e.g. United States, certain European states and East Asian states)
These systems have developed more extensive formal mechanisms for democratic recall, often following historical experiences with authoritarian rule. South Korea’s impeachment procedure, for instance, combines parliamentary initiative with Constitutional Court review and popular participation, creating multiple checkpoints that balance accessibility with institutional protection. A few European countries allow recall at the national level, such as the Republic of Moldova, Romania (recall referundum to remove the President), and in Latvia or Liechtenstein, where recall applies specifically to parliament.Footnote 48 The impeachment in the United States is enshrined in Article IFootnote 49 and Article II of the Constitution.
A priori, these models better reflect Ricœurian principles of channeling vigilance through institutional structures. Even though they do not foresee the concentration of power in the systems of checks and balances, or the equilibrium among other branches, they acknowledge destituent power as legitimate while subjecting it to procedural requirements that prevent its abuse.
East Asian democratic innovations on destituent power
Contemporary East Asian democracies offer particularly instructive examples of institutionalized destituent power.
Though it remains unclear why this part of the world – alongside the United States and Latin America – is particularly prone to such recall procedures, several factors might account for this specific situation. In countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, recalls can be seen as a democratic response to long periods of martial law or authoritarian rule,Footnote 50 offering citizens a way to exert control over elected officials and prevent the resurgence of an unaccountable power. For all these countries, the American traditionFootnote 51 of national or local democratic governanceFootnote 52, emphasizing, in theory, oversight over the president (impeachment) and participatory control at the municipal levelFootnote 53, may also have influenced the introduction of recall and impeachment mechanisms, such as in the 1947 Local Autonomy Law (LAL) in Japan. These recall procedures are finally linked to specific democratic moments of each country’s political history. Be that as it may, recalls function not merely as procedural tools, but as a form of watchfulness – allowing societies with different historical experiences to embed accountability directly into their constitutional framework and political systems.
Japan
At the national level, there are no ‘bottom-up mechanisms for direct democracy at the national level’.Footnote 54 Japan’s parliamentary system grants the National Assembly (Diet) the power to pass a vote of no confidence against the Cabinet, compelling the latter either to resign collectively or to dissolve the House. Citizens, however, have no direct means to demand the resignation of the Cabinet. However, a constitutionally institutionalized recall mechanism exists at the national level in the form of the popular review of Supreme Court justices, yet is often overlooked in comparative discussions of recall institutions. Under this system, citizens directly assess newly appointed Supreme Court justices – and those who have served for 10 years at the time of House of Representatives elections to enhance judicial accountability (Article 79, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Constitution). In practice, however, the mechanism remains mostly symbolic, as it is difficult for voters to evaluate judicial appointments and public interest is low, with only about 10 percent of votes supporting dismissal.Footnote 55 Consistent with this perspective, the literature suggests that recall-type procedures can be hindered by persistent informational gaps on complex issues and collective action challenges, reducing their capacity to serve as instruments of democratic oversight.Footnote 56
In Japan, recalls are often used at the local level:Footnote 57
It was around the 1970s, with the appearance of city planning movements (machizukuri), and environmental movements that the origins of Japanese participatory democracy can be found (Numata 2006). One of the most influential forerunners of direct democratic processes in Japan was the movement against environmental pollution of the late 1960s and early 1970s that was politically independent and involved all levels of society.Footnote 58
At the local level, the 1947 Local Autonomy Law (LAL) allows for recalls for mayors and members of parliaments, as part of a broader effort to strengthen local self-governments.
Three types of recall, which need at least one third or more of registered voters, can be mentioned: the early termination of a municipal or prefectural assembly (LAL, Art. 76(3); the removal of a specific assembly representative (LAL, art. 80(3)); and the dismissal of a mayor (LAL, art. 81(2)).
Once the threshold is met, the proposal is submitted to a popular vote – known as recall tōhyō – in which the outcome is determined by a simple majority of valid ballots cast in favor of removal.Footnote 59 There is also a petition system introduced by the LAL where citizens have the right to: amend or abolish a local ordinance with one-fiftieth or more of eligible voters’ signatures (Article 74); call for an inspection of the administration of local affairs (Article 75); audit for the use of public funds and start a ‘taxpayer lawsuit’ in case of illegal contracts.
A most famous case of recall happened in Aichi Prefecture, for the Governor Hideaki Omura, led by the campaigner Takashi Kawamura, cofounder of the anti-tax party Genzei Nippon, to push his agenda of cutting taxes and halving the parliament, then resign and run again to obtain a more supportive base. After a controversial signature collection (83% were forged and could not be recognized as valid)Footnote 60 according to the Aichi election commission, the referendum on February 6, 2011, led to the local assembly’s recall and new elections.Footnote 61
More recently, an overwhelming second vote of no confidence (19–1) passed against Maki Takubo, the mayor of Ito city in Shizuoka, after she falsely claimed to have graduated from Toyo University, a university in Tokyo. Following the initial no-confidence motion on September 1, dissolved the 20-seat assembly, yet 18 of her opponents were re-elected on October 19. The assembly voted to file charges against her four violations of the Local Autonomy Law (refused to appear in court and testify, failed to submit records, gave false testimony)Footnote 62, and she was removed from office on October 31, 2025.
Interestingly, Japan also offers an instructive example of the limits of local recall mechanisms in practice. A September 2024 case involved the governor of Hyōgo Prefecture. After being unanimously dismissed by the prefectural assembly on grounds of workplace harassment and repression of whistleblowers,Footnote 63 the governor resigned without dissolving the assembly. His supporters exploited social media to contest the charges and galvanize public support, ultimately securing his reelection in a subsequent vote (November 2024).Footnote 64 This case highlights how social media abuse can affect the functioning of direct democratic mechanisms and aligns with broader findings in the literature: recall and accountability mechanisms can present a risk of being subject to strategic manipulation, political revenge or polarized political communication, creating weak incentives to improve office performance.Footnote 65 Such dynamics emphasize the importance of considering both institutional design and broader political context in assessing the effectiveness of recall mechanisms.
Taiwan
The Taiwan recall process is a constitutional right granted by the ROC Constitution, which allows for the supervision and removal of elected officials (Article 17 and Article 133 of the ROC ConstitutionFootnote 66).
At the national level, the impeachment and recall of the president and vice president are governed by the Additional Articles of the Constitution (Article 2 and Article 4Footnote 67) and the Constitutional Court Procedure Act. Under Article 4, Paragraph 7 of the Additional Articles, impeachment may be initiated by at least half of all members of the Legislative Yuan and must be approved by no less than two-thirds of its total membership. Once passed, the Legislative Yuan may petition the Constitutional Court to uphold the impeachment, pursuant to Article 2, Paragraph 10 of the Additional Articles and Article 68 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act. If the Constitutional Court affirms the motion, the impeached official is immediately removed from office.
At the local level, recall is governed by the ‘Public officials election and recall act’ (公職人員選舉罷免法) adopted in 1980,Footnote 68 which provides its legal and procedural basis. The Recall Act likely marks the first visible sign of Taiwanese efforts to challenge and ultimately end martial law – one of the longest in the world,imposed by the Kuomintang (KMT) on May 19, 1949, and lifted on July 15, 1987, by President Chiang Ching-kuo. At that time, the KMT government experienced mounting pressure to lift martial law after the Kaohsiung accidents and civil rights movements, during which opponents were charged with ‘sedition’ and ‘attempt to overthrow the government’.Footnote 69
The act concerns legislators of the Legislative Yuan (National Assembly) and local public officials, such as mayors or councilors, elected by a specific constituency. The recall day should be on a holiday (Article 5–1) and excludes from voting people who were convicted of corruption (Article 26). The requirements are quite high and follow a three-step process overseen by a central election commission:
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• Any voter can start a petition and initiate a recall, if they have recalled signatures from 1% of the electorate,
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• After passing the proposal stage, the recall must receive signatures from at least 10% of voters in the district. Qualified voters should present their national identification (ID),
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• To pass, the recall must garner 1/4 of the electorate in the relevant constituency. If the recall fails, the official cannot be recalled again during the term. If the recall succeeds, special election must be held within 60 days to fill vacant seats.Footnote 70
The 2025 recall campaign, dubbed the ‘Great Recall Wave’ (大罷免潮), highlighted citizens’ groups efforts to recall 31 district legislators from the majority party (KMT). To provide some contextual background, the 2024 general elections had given the KMT (Kuomintang Party), the party favoring closer links with China, a legislative majority in Taiwan, but the Legislative Yuan had remained divided and deadlocked, with more than 20% of major cuts undertaken in the General Budget. The ruling party, the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), accused the KMT of being pro-China and jeopardizing Taiwan’s security, especially through defense budget cuts. The KMT further consolidated its power through a variety of procedural abuses: keeping final legal texts secret until the last moment without allowing parliamentary debate, creating investigative committees so that the Legislative Yuan that could target and impose criminal charges over private individuals, government officials, corporate executive and military staff – a legislation deemed unconstitutional and breaching the separation of powers by the Taiwanese Constitutional Court.Footnote 71 The legislative majority also introduced new procedural requirements to make petitioning for recall elections harderFootnote 72 and blocked the appointment of seven constitutional court judges, which led to the court ceasing its activities as the quorum could not be achieved.Footnote 73 The situation prompted some citizen groups to launch the ‘Bluebird Movement’, accusing the KMT of betraying the constitutional spirit, under the slogan: ‘no discussion, no democracy’.Footnote 74
Even though the recalls did not succeed in the final vote, the campaign was widely seen as a success, providing citizens a tangible way to voice dissatisfaction. It heightened awareness of foreign influence risks and showed the potential for civic action to deter misconduct. Over a million signatures were gathered nationwide in 60 days, mostly by volunteers, and the movement inspired cultural initiatives, such as a coalition of over 100 filmmakers producing short films to support the recall after a KMT legislator disparaged Taiwan’s film industry amid budget cuts.Footnote 75
A Taiwan constitutional court ruling has clarified that the right of recall is not restricted by parliamentary immunity.Footnote 76 It states that delegates of the National Assembly and legislators enjoy immunity under Articles 32 and 73 of the Constitution, meaning they cannot be criminally prosecuted, sued in civil court or held administratively responsible for opinions expressed or votes cast in their official capacity – except for internal disciplinary violations. At the same time, the ruling emphasizes that the right to recall is a form of the people’s suffrage rights under Article 133. Therefore, constituents may legally recall their representatives for improper speech or votes, and this right of recall is not limited or negated by parliamentary immunity. In essence, while immunity protects legislators from external legal consequences, it does not shield them from accountability to their voters. The ruling states that ‘According to the foregoing Article, once delegates and legislators have been in office for a specified period, electors may monitor and analyze such representatives demeanor, attitude and voting stance, so as to exercise the electors political responsibility’.Footnote 77
Interestingly, the Central Election Commission, in charge of Taiwan’s elections, recalls and referendums,Footnote 78 explains in short document on ‘introduction of recall’ that:
The purpose of the right of election is to select the best and most capable, and the right of recall is designed to enable self-vigilance Footnote 79 by elected officials and has the function of supervising and replacing unsuitable elected officials. Through the exercise of the right of election and the right to recall, politics can be based on public opinions and a truly democratic politics can be implemented.Footnote 80
The notion of ‘self-vigilance’ is particularly interesting, as it directly echoes Ricœur’s notion of ‘vigilance’, encompassing both political and ethical, external and internal, accountability. In Ricœur’s view, the self is similar to and distinct from others, and ethical judgment should refer to the Kantian moral imperative that works as an imperative to ‘not do something’.Footnote 81 By holding oneself accountable for one’s actions, one is therefore also refrained from doing harm.
Taiwan shows how recall elections can be a powerful example of citizens and democracy defending oneself in face of what has been described as an ‘existential threat’.Footnote 82 Recalls have been used to uphold constitutional integrity and maintain the ‘political paradox’ threatened by legislators who undermine the separation of powers and are suspected of corruption and foreign interference.Footnote 83
South Korea
At the national level, the South Korean president or ministers, judges of the Constitution Court and other State Council members can be impeached for serious violations of the Constitution or other laws, as provided by Article 65 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea (1948).Footnote 84 The process begins in the National Assembly, where a one-third majority vote and two-third majority or more are required to adopt a motion of impeachment, which is then reviewed by the Constitutional Court (Constitutional Court Act of 1988).Footnote 85 If the Court upholds the motion, the president is immediately removed from office, as it was the case in 2024 with the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-Yeol, and with Park Geun-hye in 2017, impeached and sentenced to 24 years of prison for illegally soliciting donations from major business conglomerates (chaebols) and for granting access to confidential government documents to Choi Tae-min, a personal mentor with no official position. The impeachment took place amid massive public mobilizations of sixteen million people (almost a third of the country’s populationFootnote 86), including both anti-Park ‘candlelight protests’Footnote 87 (촛불집회) and pro-Park rallies.
Since taking office, Yoon’s administration has been marred by a series of political scandals, including alleged government interference in a high-profile investigation, inadequate disaster management during the Itaewon Halloween crowd crush, suppression of labor unions and media outlets, as well as accusations against the First Lady involving stock manipulation and bribery.Footnote 88
The impeachment of Yoon Suk-Yeol followed the declaration of national martial law on December 3, 2024, and was approved by 204 of the 300 members of the National Assembly. The Acting President of the Constitutional Court was himself impeached but later acquitted. The Court unanimously upheld Yoon’s impeachment in an 8–0 ruling. The former president now faces the prospect of a life sentence for ‘insurrection’, though he has rejected calls for his detention. Citizens took to the streets – the majority demanding his removal,Footnote 89 others denouncing it.Footnote 90 However, the impeachment has sharply divided public opinion, with recent polls indicating 57 percent in favor and 37 percent opposed, revealing pronounced regional disparities.Footnote 91
Former President Moon Jae-in already advocated for a National Recall System during the 2017 presidential election and included it in a 2018 constitutional amendment proposal. The measure was part of a broader effort to devolve power to citizens and local governments, in order to address the perceived crisis of representative democracy and intensifying polarization.Footnote 92 The constitutional amendment package, however, stalled in parliament amid opposition parties’ resistance.Footnote 93 In 2019, a Blue House petition calling for recall powers for National Assembly members gathered over 200,000 signatures, surpassing the threshold for an official response, but did not lead to legislative change. For that reason, South Korea allows recalls only for certain local officials under the Resident Recall Act.
At the local level, recall is possible for mayors and members of the local council at the request of 15% of the constituents (10% in metropolitan municipalities),Footnote 94 as stated in the Recall of Elected Official Acts from 2021.Footnote 95 Residents may also file different types of lawsuits against ‘any unlawful act or the neglect of duties’ to prevent or correct administrative wrongdoing.Footnote 96 These include:
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1. Suspension suits: to stop an act that could cause irreversible harm;
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2. Cancellation or confirmation suits: to cancel, modify or confirm the validity or existence of an administrative act;
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3. Neglect suits: to confirm the unlawfulness of inaction by authorities;
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4. Compensation suits: to demand the government or responsible officials repay damages or unjust gains.
However, suspension cannot be requested if it would endanger life, safety or public welfare.
While South Korea’s resident recall system allows citizens to petition to remove local officials, actual full recall votes have been rare and frequently unsuccessful, often failing to meet the turnout thresholds required. In 2007, Hanam City Mayor Kim Hwang-sik faced the country’s first recall attempt, after residents opposed his plan to build a large crematorium in the city. The recall vote was, however, invalidated by the Suwon district court on the grounds that recall procedures require citizens to prove illegal actions, corruption, neglect of duty or abuse of power.Footnote 97 Another notable case occurred in 2011, when residents sought to recall the mayor of Gwacheon, for the decision to designate a public housing site in the city. The vote failed because turnout did not reach the required quorum of one-third eligible voters (only 17.8% cast a ballot).Footnote 98 In 2025, a recall effort targeted Kim Jin-ha, the mayor of Yangyang County (Gangwon Province), amid allegations of graft, bribery and sexual misconduct. Residents collected enough signatures to trigger a recall, but turnout fell just below the required one-third threshold, rendering the recall invalid.Footnote 99 However, the Seoul High Court later sentenced the Mayor to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10 million Korean won, suggesting that criminal proceedings may sometimes deliver accountability more rapidly than popular recall mechanisms.Footnote 100
Failed recalls in South Korea have led to criticism that the process is too easily triggered, wastes taxpayer money, generates unneeded conflict and intensifies political partisanship and manipulation. In contrast, citizen-led groups argued that strengthening recall procedures could incentivize lawmakers to be more responsive to public concerns.Footnote 101
Despite the polarization of the South Korean electorate, the successful impeachment of South Korean presidents demonstrates how the protection of the rule of law can lead to large-scale popular mobilization and ultimately maintain democratic and institutional stability, including by subjecting the highest officials to mechanisms of accountability rooted in destituent power.
Some lessons for recall theory?
If we were to draw lessons from the recall mechanisms that we have discussed above, we can identify several features that characterize these processes:
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• The linkage between popular demands of social movements and institutional procedures: For example, millions of citizens participated in peaceful candlelight protestswhile formal procedures simultaneously advanced through constitutional channels.
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• Judicial oversight: Constitutional courts provided fair, independent review, ensuring that recalls and removals met legal standards and were not a mere reflection of political influence or partisan bias.
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• The existence of ethics committees at the national and local level:
Even though these committees often do not possess the authority to impose sanctions, their presence contributes to the prevention of misconduct or corruption and can serve as a mechanism for upholding democratic safeguards and enforcing disciplinary measures.
At the national level, the South Korea’s Ethics Committee (국회 윤리특별위원회), established under the National Assembly Act (Articles 155–160, amended in 2012), is responsible for examining cases where members of the National Assembly violate laws, parliamentary order, or ethical standards such as engaging in corruption or misconduct. It operates with an Investigation Advisory Committee that conducts fact-finding and provides recommendations for disciplinary action.
At the local level, the Special Committee on Ethics in Local Councils (지방의회 윤리특별위원회), established under Article 99 of the Local Autonomy Act, performs a similar function within municipal and provincial councils. This committee reviews alleged violations of law, ordinances or ethical codes by council members – such as conflicts of interest, corruption or breaches of conduct – and recommends appropriate disciplinary measures, including warnings, apologies or suspension from meetings.
In Japan, at the national level, both chambers of the Diet – the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors – have their own Ethics Committees (倫理審査会) established under the Diet Law. These committees examine complaints regarding members’ behavior, including conflicts of interest, misuse of position or other forms of misconduct. Their work is complemented by broader transparency regulations set out in the Political Ethics Law and the Political Funds Control Act, which regulate financial disclosure and political funding.
At the local level, municipalities and prefectural assemblies are required under the Local Autonomy Law (地方自治法) to adopt their own ethical guidelines and may establish ethics review boards. These local mechanisms aim to uphold integrity, prevent corruption and maintain public trust in local governance.
At the national level, Taiwan’s Discipline Committee (紀律委員會) within the Legislative Yuan functions similarly to an ethics committee. It handles disciplinary cases against legislators who violate the Law on the Exercise of Powers of the Legislative Yuan or the legislative Code of Conduct, and may act on petitions submitted by other legislators or citizens. Sanctions can include a warning, suspension, loss of committee membership or expulsion, subject to a legislative vote.Footnote 102
In addition, Taiwan emphasizes transparency and anti-corruption through the Sunshine Acts (to ‘uphold accountability and integrity, keep corrupt money out of politics, and ensure a clean and honest government’Footnote 103), which require asset declarations by legislators and public officials. Oversight is exercised by the Control Yuan (監察院), an independent constitutional body that investigates ethics violations and corruption cases across all branches of government. At the local level, municipal and county councils have Departments of Government Ethics or Disciplinary CommitteesFootnote 104, which initially were a a tool to curb foreign (communist) influence during the period of martial law, before later evolving into a mechanism for promoting integrity in government.Footnote 105
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• Restoration rather than revolution: Procedures are used to restore prior democratic norms and not overturn the democratic system itself.
The protests embodied citizens’ vigilance aimed at restoring the balance of power and defending democratic institutions. The institutional framework channeled this vigilance productively, preventing the destabilization that might have resulted from extra-institutional action. The non-violent nature of mobilizations honored Ricœur’s ethical framework, by demonstrating the capability of fragile democratic subjects.
Lessons for ‘older’ democracies?
‘Older’ democracies, particularly those with minimal recall procedures, face challenges arising from the mobilization of populist or ‘nihilistic’ destituent forces. Recent years have witnessed increasing popular dissatisfaction with elected leaders, yet formal mechanisms for addressing these concerns remain limited. This absence, or disconnection of institutions from political reality, risks channeling destituent impulses into more destabilizing directions.
East Asian innovations suggest several possibilities:
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1. Lowering thresholds for initiating recall procedures while maintaining substantive requirements for completion;
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2. Ensuring that judicial or quasi-judicial bodies can assess whether grounds for removal genuinely exist;
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3. Creating formal roles and arenas for citizen participation beyond mere voting, acknowledging the active dimension of vigilance;
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4. Creating institutional procedures and making them visible and understandable for citizens, including their risks and benefits.
These reforms would acknowledge destituent power as the essence of democratic legitimacy and structure its exercise to protect institutional fragility from abuses.
The ethics of democratic recall
In sum, Ricœur’s ethical and political framework could help us establish clear criteria for legitimate destituent power, including the following:
The criterion of responsibility
Exercises of destituent power must be responsive to genuine democratic concerns and not to factional interests. The capable subject should exercise judgment and accept accountability for political actions.
The criterion of institutional respect
Procedures must seek to protect institutional fragility rather than exploiting it. Even when removing leaders, the integrity of democratic institutions must be preserved. Citizens cannot act as a tribunal or substitute themselves to institutions; both must keep their distinct and complementary functions within the democratic order.
The criterion of non-violence
The ways in which destituent power is exercised matter politically and ethically. Violence – whether physical or symbolic – undermines the democratic values that destituent power should serve.Footnote 106
The criterion of safeguards
The seriousness of removal procedures must match the severity of alleged abuses. Trivializing impeachment through partisanship rhetoric weakens the institutional guarantees underpinning democracy. High procedural safeguards ensure that destituent acts (like removal or impeachment) remain within the bounds of institutional mediation and do not collapse into pure expressions of popular passion or political struggle.
It seems that Ricœur’s concept of vigilance finally invites to reconsider the meaning of democratic citizenship itself. Citizens are not merely voters who periodically authorize power but active monitors who assess its constitutional exercise. This ongoing vigilance requires an ethical capability – the knowledge, judgment and commitment to sustain and renew democratic life.
As such, destituent power represents the institutional recognition of this vigilant citizenship. By formalizing pathways for ‘destituent power’, aimed at removing leaders who abuse authority, democracies acknowledge citizens’ role as a constituent power. Yet these pathways must be thought and embedded carefully through institutional means – accessible enough to respond to genuine abuses, constrained enough to prevent factional manipulation and the destabilization of the ‘political paradox’ at the heart of democracy.
Conclusion
This study sought to demonstrate that Paul Ricœur’s political philosophy offers crucial insights for rethinking the role of destituent power in contemporary democracies. By examining destituent power through concepts including the political paradox, vigilance, the capable and faillible subject, fair institutions and non-violence, it becomes possible to think about destituent power not as a ‘practice of political negativity’,Footnote 107 or as an act of violence that severs its constitutional relation to law, but rather in its connection with both constituent and constituted power.
The empirical analysis of recall procedures – particularly the recent innovations in East Asian democracies – reveals that destituent power need not destabilize democracy when properly structured. On the contrary, it can restore democratic stability and strengthen democratic resilience by providing legitimate channels for addressing constitutional abuses of political power.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis:
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- Destituent power should be conceived as an essential component of democratic equilibrium; it is not the antithesis of constituent power.
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- Institutionalization should provide some high procedural safeguards to avoid its misuse.
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- Non-violent and legally-enshrined forms of destituent action can reinforce democracy and do not undermine it.
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- Vigilance must be understood as an ongoing democratic practice, as citizens’ political power is not captured only by the periodic exercise of electoral choice.
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- The study of contemporary democratic innovations – particularly those emerging from East Asian contexts – provides interesting sources of inspiration for strengthening mechanisms of democratic accountability and control in ‘older’ democracies.
Recall mechanisms can enhance political accountability and empower citizens, although they also present challenges, including low participation, informational deficits, political manipulation and susceptibility to majoritarian or elite capture. Recent actions in several US states, where legislatures with supermajority control have limited citizens’ power to use petitions and referenda,Footnote 108 highlight the continuing relevance of debates over direct democracy and the persistent tension between representative institutions and popular sovereignty.
Paul Ricœurx’s thought reminds us that the challenge for contemporary democracies lies in maintaining destituent impulses within the political paradox and within the mediating framework of institutions, through procedures that respect both the will-to-live-together and the legitimacy of political representation and authority. As Sun Yat-sen argued early on (1924), citizens’ rights should not be confined to the will of elections; they must also encompass the effective right to monitor political leaders through correctly designed mechanisms that extend beyond the scope of social movements.
However, Qvortrup is also right to observe that the recall is a ‘last-resort tool, but not one that fundamentally changes politicians’ behavior’.Footnote 109 Preventive measures, such as ethical and political education for representatives, might be further developed to ensure political representatives grasp the meaning, and implications, of the will-to-live-together.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Sung-Ho Kim (Yonsei University, South Korea) and Hajime Yamamoto (Keio University, Japan) for valuable discussions on East Asian constitutionalism, as well as the participants and organizers of the 2025 Annual Conference on Paul Ricœur at Fordham University, USA, ‘Hermeneutics of Global Justice in Polycrisis’, in particular George Taylor (University of Pittsburgh), for his insightful remarks on my interpretation of Paul Ricœur.
Funding statement
This research did not receive any funding.
Competing interest
The author has no competing interests to declare.
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