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THE INFLUENCE OF GERMAN STATE-THEORY ON THE DESIGN OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 August 2010
Abstract
This article draws attention to an important but neglected story about the dissemination of German and Swiss state-theories among English-speaking scholars in the second half of the 19th century and the influence of these ideas on those who designed and drafted the Australian Constitution. In particular, the article focuses upon the theories of federalism developed by the Swiss-born scholar, Johann Caspar Bluntschli, and the Saxon-born Georg Jellinek, and explains their influence, via the British historian, Edward A Freeman, and the American political scientist, John W Burgess, upon the framers of the Australian Constitution. The story is important because it illustrates the way in which constitutional ideas can be transmitted from one social and political context into a very different one, undergoing significant, though often subtle, modifications and adaptations in the process. The story is also important because it sheds light on the way in which the framers of the Australian Constitution came to conceive of the kind of federal system that they wished to see created. The story seems to have been overlooked, however, not only due to a general neglect of the intellectual history of the Australian Constitution, but also due to the assumption that prevailing Australian political and legal ideas were of Anglo-American provenance. While this assumption generally holds true, a closer examination of the intellectual context of Australian federalism reveals a surprisingly significant German influence on the framers of the Australian Constitution.
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References
1 See eg S Choudhry, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (CUP, Cambridge, 2006); J Goldsworthy, Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (OUP, New York, 2006).
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3 See eg PC Oliver, The Constitution of Independence: The Development of Constitutional Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (OUP, Oxford, 2005).
4 Eg, W Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence: What Was It Like to Try a Rat?’ (1995) 143 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1889, and especially Pierre Legrand, ‘The Same and the Different’ in P Legrand and Roderick Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (CUP, Cambridge, 2003) 240.
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13 Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches (1871), Preamble.
14 N Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning of the Australian Constitution (CUP, Cambridge, 2009) ch 5.
15 Although the precise scope of the terms is slightly different, Volk was generally translated as ‘people’ or alternatively ‘nation’, Staat became either ‘State’ or ‘nation’, both Recht and Gesetz became ‘law’, with Recht alternatively rendered ‘right’, Verfassung was translated ‘constitution’, Regierung became ‘government’ or else ‘administration’, Staatsrecht was rendered ‘public law’, Rechtstaat became ‘legal state’, Bundesstaat became ‘federation’ or ‘federal-State’ and Staatenbund was translated ‘confederation’. See DG Ritchie, PE Matheson and R Lodge, ‘Translators’ Preface' in J Bluntschli, The Theory of the State (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1885, 1892).
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20 TO Hueglin, Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World: Althusius on Community and Federalism (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, 1999) ch 7.
21 Eulau, (n 18) 648–649; Schröder (n 19) 963. Earlier, Nicholas of Cues had argued that the Emperor was properly appointed following his election by the Electors, and should only legislate with the consent of the estates of the realm: De Concordantia Cathlica (1443), The Catholic Concordance, in PE Sigmund (ed) (CUP, Cambridge, 1991) Bk III, chs vi, xii.
22 Eulau (n 18) 650–654; P Riley, ‘Three 17th Century German Theorists of Federalism: Althusius, Hugo and Leibniz’ (1976) 6 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 21–25.
23 S Pufendorf, De statu imperii Germanici (1667), Cap VI, §9 (‘Irregulare aliquod corpus et monstro simile’), discussed in Schröder, ‘Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire’ and Wilson, ‘Still a Monstrosity?’ Pufendorf nonetheless thought that the Empire was in nature very close to a union of states (‘ad foederatorum aliquod systema ulto vergit’): De statu imperii Germanici (1667), Cap VI, §9. See H Neuhaus, ‘The Federal Principle and the Holy Roman Empire’ in H Wellenreuther (ed), German and American Constitutional Thought: Contexts, Interaction, and Historical Realities (Berg, New York, 1990) 27, 31–32.
24 Eulau (n 18) 654–56; Riley (n 22) 25–29. As Bluntschli later significantly pointed out, Leibniz's conception of sovereignty was relative rather than absolutist: J Bluntschli, Geschichte der Neueren Staatswissenschaft (3rd edn, Munich, 1881) 182, quoted in Eulau (n 18) 655 fn 44. Indeed, moving in a direction that Bluntschli would later develop, Leibniz considered that a (federal) union, as distinct from a confederation, involves a central administration whose decisions apply ‘as a matter of ordinary law’: Riley (n 22) 29.
25 Blackbourn described the Holy Roman Empire of this time as a ‘ramshackle, invertebrate entity’ which ‘neither was, nor aspired to be, a German nation-state’, and its constituent principalities, ecclesiastical territories and free cities as a ‘patchwork of small worlds’, an ‘archipelago of jurisdictions’ and a ‘jumble of rights and privileges all over the map’: Blackbourn (n 12) 9, 10, 11.
26 The independence of the German states was acknowledged in the Treaty of Paris of 1814 (art VI), but was not repeated in the text of the definitive Treaties of Paris of 1815.
27 See H Boldt, ‘Federalism as an Issue in the German Constitutions of 1849 and 1871’ in H Wellenreuther (ed), German and American Constitutional Thought: Contexts, Interaction, and Historical Realities (Berg, New York, 1990) 259, 260–278; C Clark, ‘Germany 1815–1848: Restoration or Pre-March?’ in J Breuilly (ed), Nineteenth-Century Germany: Politics, Culture and Society 1780-1918 (Arnold, London, 2001) 40, 41–46.
28 Under the Imperial Constitution of 1871, the King of Prussia was designated German Emperor and President of the Confederation (art 11), the Chancellor (Bismarck) was appointed by the Emperor (art 15), Prussia was strongly represented in the Bundesrat (art 6), and the Constitution could not be amended without the support of Prussia's representatives in the Bundesrat (art 78). For a survey of recent literature on the themes of decentralization and centralization within the German Empire and individual German states, see Green, A, ‘The Federal Alternative? A New View of Modern German History’ (2003) 46 Historical Journal 187CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an insightful account of the genesis of the Imperial Constitution, see D Ziblatt, Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy, Germany, and the Puzzle of Federalism (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006) ch 6.
29 M Stolleis, Public Law in Germany, 1800–1914 (Berghahn, New York, 2001) 341–345.
30 Allgemeines Staatsrecht (1851–1852); Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundesrechtes von den ersten ewigen Bünden bis auf die Gegenwart, 2 vols (Meyer & Zeller, Stuttgart, 1875); Lehre vom modernen Staat (1875–1876). On Bluntschli's contribution to German state-theory, see Stolleis (n 29) 425–427.
31 JK Bluntschli, The Theory of the State, DG Ritchie, PE Matheson and R Lodge (trans) (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1885; 2nd edn, 1892; 3rd edn, 1895) [translation of Lehre vom modernen Staat: Pt. I Allgemeine Staatslehre (1875)]. Quotations are from the 3rd edition of 1895.
32 On Freeman and his influence, see Part II.B below, and on the Australian appropriation of Bluntschli's ideas, see Part IV.
33 Bluntchli, 3rd edn (n 31) 15–17.
34 ibid 86–92.
35 ibid 97–98; cf 109.
36 ibid 17.
37 ibid 98–100.
38 ibid 100–103.
39 ibid 105, cf 25–34, 242. Bluntschli speculated that a such a state would need to be federal in form: Bluntschli (n 31) 33 (n 2). On Bluntschli's debt to Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–1861) for this conception the völkisch character of law and its influence on Bluntschli's attitude to international law, see M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (CUP, Cambridge, 2001) 42–47.
40 Bluntschli (n 31) 107, cf 93–96.
41 ibid 259–275. Bluntschli separately considered the possible sub-division of a state into provinces, circles (Kreise), districts (Bezirke) and communes (Gemeinde), but was there concerned with what he described as subordinate bodies within the state, deriving their powers and existence from the state even if afforded relatively substantial degrees of independent power by that state: ibid 246–248.
42 ibid 260.
43 ibid 264. Bluntschli here adverted to the case of the American state of California, whose constitution was originally adopted by majority vote of the people, and not unanimously.
44 ibid 268–270. Recall that the German Confederation of 1815–1866, formed by the Congress of Vienna of 1815, had been called the Deutscher Bund.
45 ibid 268–269.
46 ibid 268.
47 ibid 269.
48 ibid 269; J Bluntschli, Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundesrechtes von den ersten ewigen Bünden bis auf die Gegenwart, 2 vols (Meyer & Zeller, Stuttgart, 1875) I: 554. The latter was cited on precisely this point by Edward Freeman in his History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy (2nd edn, Macmillan, London, 1893) 8 (n 2), and taken up by several of the Australians, as explained below.
49 Bluntschli (n 31) 487–489. Significantly, Bluntschli contrasted the foundational structures of the German Empire of 1871 with those of federations of the United States and Switzerland. Although the German arrangement was formally founded upon a ‘free contract’ of all the constituent states expressed through the consent of both their respective princes and their governing chambers, in fact the constitution came into being under the guiding will of the Prussian government in conjunction with the efforts of the Imperial Diet as the representative of the German nation as a whole: Bluntschli (n 31) 269–270. The Australians would adopt fairly well the same assessment of the German model at the time—regarding it as an unsymmetrical federal arrangement dominated by the Prussian state.
50 ibid 493–496.
51 ibid 497–502.
52 ibid 244, 495, 501, 506–507.
54 ibid 495.
55 ibid 506.
56 S Paulson, ‘Jellinek, Georg (1851–1911)’ in Encyclopedia of Law & Society: American and Global Perspectives (SAGE Publications, 2007). On Jellinek's influence, see Stolleis (n 29) 440–444.
57 Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen (Alfred Holder, Vienna, 1882); The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen: A Contribution to Modern Constitutional History, trans M Farrand (Henry Holt and Co, New York, 1901). See also Kelly, D, ‘Revisiting the Rights of Man: Georg Jellinek on Rights and the State’ (2004) 22 Law and History Review 493CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
58 G Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (O Härting, Berlin, 1900; 2nd edn 1905, 3rd edn 1914; Hermann Gentner Verlag, Bad Homburg Vor Der Höhe, 1960).
59 G Jellinek, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen 16–36. I rely here on the summaries of Jellinek's argument in S Mogi, The Problem of Federalism: A Study in the History of Political Theory (Allen & Unwin, London, 1931) and Stirk, P, ‘The Westphalian Model, Sovereignty and Law in Fin-De-Siècle German International Theory’ (2005) 19 International Relations 153CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
60 Jellinek ibid 34 (translation in Stirk, 159). On the neo-Kantian background to Jellinek's views here, including the sociological side to his thought, see Koskenniemi (n 39) 198–206 and DF Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of State in the nineteenth Century (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997) 307–308.
61 Jellinek (n 58) 58–60.
62 ibid 63–88.
63 ibid 91–157.
64 ibid 158–314.
65 ibid 172–197.
66 ibid 253–314.
67 G Waitz, Grundzüge der Politik (Verlag von Ernst Homann, Kiel, 1862) 164–166.
68 Jellinek (n 58) 187–197.
69 See H Dippel, Germany and the American Revolution, 1770–1800, trans BA Uhlendorf (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1977) and H Dippel, Americana Germanica 1770–1800: Bibliographie deutscher Amerikaliteratur (Stuttgart, 1976).
70 A Hamilton, J Madison and J Jay, The Federalist Papers (1787–1788) C Rossiter (ed) (New American Library, New York, 1961), Nos 12, 14, 19, 21, 42, 43, 80; J Madison, Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies in RA Rutland and WME Rachal (eds), The Papers of James Madison, Vol IX (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975). Note also the comments on ‘la république fédérative d'Allegmagne’ in Baron de Montesquieu, De l'esprit des Lois (1748), IX:ii, cited in The Federalist No 43.
71 Adams, WP, ‘German Translations of the American Declaration of Independence’ (1999) 85 The Journal of American History 1325CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 1327, 1336–1337. See also Dippel (n 69) 37, 174–175, 276–277, 320–322 (drawing attention to the relatively very few well-informed German works published in the late eighteenth century). For a more general account, see D Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2007).
72 R von Mohl, Das Bundes-Staatsrecht der Vereinigten Staaten von Nord-Amerika (Stuttgart, 1824).
73 A de Tocqueville, De la Démocratie en Amerique (Charles Gosselin, Paris, 1835, 1840).
74 L von Ranke, Über die Epochen der neuren Geschichte (1854) cited in Dippel, Germany and the American Revolution (n 69) xv.
75 IP V Troxler, Die Verfassung der Vereinigten Staaten Nordamerikas als Musterbild der schweizerischen Bundesreform (Brodtmann, Schaffhausen, 1848).
76 Compare Boldt, ‘German Constitutions of 1848 and 1871’ 260–274, 280–289, and M Dreyer, ‘American Federalism—Blueprint for Nineteenth-Century Germany?’ in H Wellenreuther (ed), German and American Constitutional Thought: Contexts, Interaction, and Historical Realities (Berg, New York, 1990) 328.
77 Waitz (n 67) 164–166.
78 M von Seydel, Commentar zur Verfassungs-Urkunde für das Deutsche Reich (1st edn, Würzburg, 1873; 2nd edn: JCB Mohr, Freiburg, 1897), discussed in PC Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (Duke University Press, Durham, 1997) 28–29 and Mogi (n 59) 414–417. See also JC Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States (1853) and A Disquisition on Government (1853), both in RM Lence (ed), Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of John C Calhoun (Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1992).
79 Germans were the largest immigrant group in 19th century United States. See HJ Rupieper, ‘The United States and Germany in the Time of Francis Lieber, 1798–1872’ in CR Mack and HH Lesesne (eds), Francis Lieber and the Culture of the Mind (University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 2005) 149.
80 J Farr, ‘Political Science and the State’ in J Farr and R Seidelman (eds), Discipline and History: Political Science in the United States (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1993) 63.
81 See BE Brown, American Conservatives: The Political Thought of Francis Lieber and John W Burgess (Columbia University Press, New York, 1951); Mack and Lesesne (n 79).
82 D Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (CUP, Cambridge, 1991) 71.
83 Burgess's ‘The Ideal American Commonwealth’ (1895) 10 Political Science Quarterly 404 was also read and quoted by the Australians. However, his Recent Changes in American Constitutional Theory (Columbia University Press, New York, 1923), which protested against the expansion of federal government authority, came too late to influence the Australian framers.
84 See Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide (Government Printer, Adelaide, 1897) 181, 698, 1022 (Isaacs); Official Record of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney (Government Printer, Sydney, 1897) 306–309, 426, (Isaacs), 433 (O'Connor's reply), 862 (Isaacs), 913 (Glynn's reply); HB Higgins, Essays and Addresses on the Australian Commonwealth Bill (Atlas Press, Melbourne, 1900), 73; J Quick and RR Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1901) 325, 333–334; W Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (2nd edn, 1910) 68, 598.
85 This section draws substantially on Aroney (n 14) 96–100.
86 Farr (n 80) I, 1–2, 21, 38–39.
87 ibid I, 51–5, 57–8, 72–6, 79–80 (criticizing Bluntschli), 88, 101; II, 4–9, 184.
88 In adhering to the indivisible sovereignty of the unitary nation state, Burgess preferred to follow Jellinek rather than Bluntschli: see Farr (n 80) I, 74–82.
92 Burgess, ‘The Ideal American Commonwealth’ (n 83) 418; see Convention Debates, Sydney (1897), 306–309.
93 On Freeman, see Fiske, J, ‘Edward Augustus Freeman’ (1893) 71 The Atlantic Monthly 423Google Scholar, 99; Clarke, W, ‘Edward Augustus Freeman’ (1892) 12 The New England Magazine 5 607Google Scholar; HA Cronne, ‘Edward Augustus Freeman, 1823–1892’ (1943) 28 History 78.
94 Freeman (n 48).
95 M Frenkel, Federal Theory (Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Canberra, 1986), 97.
96 S Collini, D Winch and J Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Intellectual History (CUP, Cambridge, 1983) ch 7.
97 See Aroney (n 14) 87–92, on which this section is substantially based.
98 cf KC Wheare, Federal Government (4th edn, OUP, New York, 1967) 16–17.
99 ibid 1–3, 7–8.
100 ibid 70.
101 ibid 8 (note 2), citing J Bluntschli, Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundesrechtes von den ersten ewigen Bünden bis auf die Gegenwart, 2 vols (Meyer & Zeller, Stuttgart, 1875) I: 554.
102 Wheare (n 8), 8–13, 69, 77–8, 156. cf Bluntschli (n 31) 252–253. Freeman also drew upon Henry Wheaton, Austin, Calhoun, Hamilton, Madison, Mill and Tocqueville.
103 Indeed, writing before the cessation of the war between the American States, Freeman was careful to remain neutral as between the positions of Presidents Abraham Lincoln and John Jefferson Davis. Freeman expressed doubt concerning the constitutional arguments of the Confederate states, but was sympathetic to their arguments, at least on the grounds of expediency. See Freeman (n 48) 70–71, 91–92.
104 Freeman (n 48) 1–3, 7–8. Collini et al (n 96) 224, draw attention to a tension between Freeman's Federal Government and his Comparative Politics (Macmillan, New York, 1874). Freeman's Australian readers, however, appear to have been unaware of the latter work. Freeman's Federal Government was the decisive influence; his Comparative Politics was not mentioned in the convention debates or in any of the major Australian publications of the late 19th century.
105 Freeman (n 48) 34, 64, 69.
106 See Freeman, E, ‘The Landesgemeinden of Uri and Appenzel’ (1864) 17 Saturday Review 623Google Scholar; E Freeman, The Growth of the English Constitution from Earliest Times (3rd edn, Macmillan, London, 1898) 9–10, 37, 60, 66. Freeman was cited to this effect by Edmund Barton: Convention Debates, Adelaide (1897) 388. On nineteenth century Teutonism, see J Farr, ‘The Historical Science(s) of Politics’ in R Adcock, M Bevir, and S Stimson (eds), Modern Political Science: Anglo-American Exchanges since 1880 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007) 79–86.
108 See Freeman (n 48) 211.
109 The four of these constitutions were compiled in a comparative table by E Carlile, Comparative Analysis of the Australian Commonwealth Bill 1891 and Four Federal Constitutions (Government Printer, Melbourne, 1897). For two relatively extensive discussions of the German model, see J Quick, A Digest of Federal Constitutions (JB Young, Bendigo, 1896) 60–77 and R Garran, The Coming Commonwealth: An Australian Handbook of Federal Government (EA Petherick and Co, Adelaide, 1897) 93–102.
110 R Baker, Executive in a Federation (CE Bristow, Government Printer, Adelaide, 1897) 5–8.
111 Convention Debates, Adelaide (1897), 99–100 (Barton, Higgins); Convention Debates, Sydney (1897) 263 (Higgins), 279–282 (Glynn), 298 (Symon).
112 Convention Debates, Sydney (1897) 1086 (Howe); cf Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian Convention, Melbourne (Government Printer, Melbourne, 1898) 1993 (Barton).
113 See Aroney (n 14) 130–133. J Quick and R Garran were also influenced by Burgess, especially in their commentary on the Australian Constitution published in 1901, but less so in their contributions to the federal convention debates of 1891 and 1897–1898. See Aroney (n 14) 3–6, 119–128, discussing Quick and Garran (n 84) 292–294, 332–342.
114 Higgins (n 84) 9, 11, 13, citing AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (4th edn, Macmillan, London, 1893) 135.
115 Convention Debates, Sydney (1897) 308–309 (Isaacs), citing Burgess (n 83). See also Convention Debates, Sydney (1891), 303–313 (Isaacs); Convention Debates, Adelaide (1897) 171–178, 660 (Isaacs).
116 Convention Debates, Adelaide (1897) 101–102 (Higgins), 171–178 (Isaacs), 641–649 (Higgins); Convention Debates, Sydney (1897) 303–313 (Isaacs), 259–265, 345–351 (Higgins); Higgins (n 84) 8–16.
117 Isaacs and Higgins regarded the American model of the House of Representatives as representative of the nation and the Senate as representative of the states to be a mere ‘compromise’ rather than as a ‘principle’ of federation. See, e.g., Convention Debates, Adelaide (1897) 171–173 (Isaacs). However, acknowledging that their case was hopeless, Isaacs eventually voted with the inevitable majority at the convention of 1891.
118 cf Higgins (n 84) 16–17.
119 Convention Debates, Adelaide (1897) 96–97 (Higgins).
120 Higgins (n 84) 6–8, 52, 73, 85, 104, 111, 115; Convention Debates, Adelaide (1897) 181–182, 1022 (Isaacs, citing Burgess); Convention Debates, Melbourne (1898) 716, 718–722 (Isaacs, citing Burgess).
121 For the first federal convention in 1891 delegates were nominated by each colonial legislature; for the second convention they were elected by the voters in four of the six of the colonies (Western Australia nominated its delegates; Queensland did not participate).
122 See eg, Convention Debates, Sydney (1897) 259–260 (Wise).
123 Provision for this was made by Enabling Acts enacted in each colony.
124 For a fuller survey of the intellectual influences on the Australians, see Aroney (n 14) chs 3 and 4.
125 For this set of general attitudes, see eg, Official Record of the Proceedings and Debates of the Australasian Federation Conference, Melbourne (Melbourne, Government Printer, 1890) 8 (Griffith); Convention Debates, Adelaide (1897) 105–110 (Wise), 303 (Clarke), 650 (Deakin), 656 (Quick), 665 (Higgins, responding to Barton); Convention Debates, Sydney (1897) 340 (Barton).
126 This is the expression used in the preamble to the Australian Constitution to describe the kind of political entity that was to be established.
127 J Bryce, The American Commonwealth (2nd edn, Macmillan, London, 1889) I, 12–15, 332.
128 See eg R Baker, Federation (Scrymgour and Sons, Adelaide, 1897) 3–5, 10, 19; Convention Debates, Adelaide (1897) 443–444 (Barton); Convention Debates, Sydney (1897), 340, 620, 622–623 (Barton). For a detailed account, see Aroney (n 14) chs 7–8.
129 The Federal Council of Australasia Act 1885 (UK) had established a confederation lacked a federal executive government and participation in which remained voluntary. In this context, the framers of the Australian Constitution of 1900 wished to create an independent, fully-constituted federal government, with direct power to implement federal laws without having to rely upon the states. Bluntschli's theory indicated that this was the crucial difference between a federation and a confederation, and the Australians' experience and aspirations confirmed this. See Aroney (n 14) 116–117, 146–148, 193–194; N Aroney, ‘Sir Samuel Griffith's Vision of Australian Federalism’ in M White and A Rahemtula (eds), Sir Samuel Walker Griffith: The Law and the Constitution (Thomson Law Book Co, Sydney, 2002) 179, 182–184.
130 See eg R Baker, A Manual of Reference to Authorities for the use of the Members of the National Australasian Convention 31; Conference Debates, Melbourne (1890) 8–9 (Griffith); S Griffith, Notes on Australian Federation: Its Nature and Probable Effects (Government Printer, Brisbane, 1896) 5; S Griffith, Australian Federation and the Draft Commonwealth Bill: A Paper Read before the Members of the Queensland Federation League (Brisbane: Government Printer, 1899) 8.
131 See eg, Convention Debates, Sydney (1891) 884–885 (Gillies), 893–894 (Cockburn, Griffith, debating the use of conventions or direct referenda, but agreeing that a dual majority of both the nation as a whole and of the states should be required); Garran (n 109) 184; Convention Debates, Melbourne (1898) 772 (Barton).
132 A prospect which Higgins acknowledged, and lamented. See Higgins (n 84) 16–17. This latter element of the Australian Constitution is one of its most contested features, controversially exercised in 1975 to bring down the government. See G Sawer, Federation under Strain (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1977) and LJM Cooray, Conventions, the Australian Constitution and the Future (Legal Books, Sydney, 1979).
133 For more detail, see Aroney (n 14) chs 7–11.
134 The English ‘federal’ is derived from the Latin feodus, meaning covenant, pact, treaty or agreement, and corresponds closely in meaning to the Germanic bund, although the Proto-Indo-European roots, *bheidh- and *bhendh-, are etymologically different. See Julius Porkorny, Indogermanishes Etymologisches Wörterbuch (Francke, Bern, 1959) 117, 127.