In the WTO, all members are equal, but some are more equal than others. Giants like the United States, European Union, and China leave a large wake due to the size of their markets or their share of global trade. Small, dynamic players of high ambition like New Zealand, Singapore, and Costa Rica drive initiatives and build coalitions through sheer force of hustle and will. Yet any list of WTO members that had an outsized influence on negotiations – from the GATT to the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference – could fail to include India in a place of prominence. This is precisely why this book, written by former Director of the Trade Policy Division in India’s Commerce Ministry, is a fascinating read.

Das’s book attempts to do several things and speaks to a range of audiences. It is part academic overview, part negotiator’s guide for developing countries, part historical memoir, and part personal reflections from a storied career on and near the frontlines of trade negotiations. It weaves together in one run of paragraphs game theory, the GATT/WTO Rounds, and General Kutuzov’s wisdom in the Russian campaign against Napoleon. This mixed approach is perhaps where the book is strongest, benefitting from both the author’s vast experience, significant research, and polymathic and eclectic knowledge. Suffice it to say that the book covers a lot of ground.

It begins with a brief introductory guide to the history and core components of the WTO and the GATT. It is a concise and generally fair primer, though it does at times leave the reader yearning for more insight into the narrative arcs and negotiating dynamics that the author is better placed than most to illuminate. For example, the book describes multi-year Indian and Brazilian “resolute resistance” to bringing intellectual property into the WTO “collaps[ing]”, but misses the opportunity to flesh out the ups and downs of what is almost certainly a fascinating and potentially edifying tale.

The bulk of the book delves into discussions of negotiating tactics for developed and developing economies in the GATT/WTO context and then explores a broader meditation on those dynamics. For those not already inclined to agree with Das’s central thesis of scheming and underhanded developed countries looking to strong-arm the world’s poor into disadvantageous deals against heroic opposition by a valorous Indian-led coalition, the book becomes considerably more challenging. In no small part, much of what he writes rings true. Readers would be advised to treat these characterizations as strategic insights from an experienced negotiator and an eloquent presentation of the Indian perspective on proceedings, rather than obsessing over the objective fairness of every characterization. From where the author sat, this is how he saw things.

The book is for the most part appreciatively clear on when the author is speaking from direct knowledge and when he is drawing conclusions through inference or supposition. In reading the characterizations of developed country strategies, the key takeaway should be how the results were perceived, and the impression given to developing country interlocutors. To name just one example, the EU’s arguing for limited ambition on anti-dumping reforms in light of US sensitivities is characterized as strategic and coordinated burden sharing by the two giants because this is likely how it appeared to other parties. In reality, however, the EU was likely being pragmatic in light of the centrality of anti-dumping to continued US commitment to the system writ large (something the current paralysis of the Appellate Body clearly speaks to).

Among the most fascinating chapters of the book is one that focuses on the emergence of the G20 negotiating coalition in agriculture and the strategies it employed. While somewhat hagiographic in parts, it is a remarkably insightful window into the formation and evolution of a group currently central to negotiations on agriculture, one of the WTO’s most critical and fraught subjects. It is especially edifying for the subtextual point it makes about the nature of consensus. On paper and by convention, decision making at the WTO requires consensus and any member, no matter how small, can simply ‘veto’ any proposal by refusing to join that consensus. However, what this book illuminates is that in practice all but the largest or most stubborn members must strategize carefully and build coalitions lest they become isolated and their veto is positioned as standing in the way of an emerging consensus backed by major players.

The play by play the book offers on India’s campaign for legal certainty around Public Stockholding for Food Security makes for particularly fascinating reading as this issue has been central to the negotiations at every WTO ministerial for a decade. As with some other parts of the book, there are plenty of statements a negotiator not aligned with India’s strategy might push back on, and a slight tendency to conflate the interests of India with those of all developing countries. However, the insider’s view of events is invaluable and the articulation of the Indian position is as clear, readable, and compelling as one can find anywhere.

This summarizes much of the book more generally. Das is a compelling and interesting writer, with a wealth of personal experience. The book is well researched and sourced, not just with academic literature but extensive interviews and personal conversations conducted as part of the writing process. It offers genuine insight into the play by play of the negotiations and compromises which shaped key inflection points in the multilateral trading system.

It should be noted that to some extent, the book is shortchanged by the pace of events that followed its writing. After years of largely glacial movement, rapid advancements across the world of trade both inside and outside the WTO have recently surged. Plurilateral initiatives like e-commerce, investment for development, and domestic regulation in services surged forward in recent years, all with significant developing country participation and leadership. And, of course, the Trump administration upended many of the traditional positions and rules. It would however seem churlish to judge a book by events it could not have predicted, and the broader advice the book offers on negotiation strategy, coalition building, forum selection, and evidence are timeless.

While I would not want someone trying to understand trade history and negotiating practice over the last two decades to be informed solely by this book, and its particular perspective, I would also not hesitate to include Strategies in GATT and WTO Negotiations prominently in any comprehensive trade history or negotiating strategy reading list. The historical perspective is fascinating, the strategic insights are valuable, and the prose is a pleasure to spend time with. Like the Indian position in any negotiation I have witnessed, this book is charmingly presented and compellingly argued, even in the places one strongly disagrees with it. I can think of no stronger recommendation than that.