The Emerging Political Settlement of Independent Rwanda

Prior to independence, competing political coalitions attempted to mobilise support to assert control over what would become independent Rwanda. Rwandan politicians took different stances towards the politicisation of ethnicity, while the Tutsi monarchy attempted to reassert their claims to power. In the 1950s, conservative Tutsi elements around the monarchy created an atmosphere of anxiety among the Tutsi elite, hardening the group’s own position on race relations. Tutsi solidarity included references to their Hima descent and, in doing so, implicitly linked the identity to one of superiority. The choice to mobilise around Tutsi solidarity was a consequence of paranoia surrounding the Belgian administration’s tacit support for Hutus towards the latter end of colonial rule (Lemarchand Reference Lemarchand1970). However, as with ‘the very nature of dyadic relationships, based on reciprocal obligations between patron and client, the Hutu masses had little consciousness of themselves as a group’ (Lemarchand Reference Lemarchand1970, p. 96). Extremist Hutu leaders mobilised ethnic sentiment around Hutu marginalisation, highlighting the Tutsi monarchy as an enemy. In 1957, a group of Hutu intellectuals wrote the Bahutu Manifesto; it was the ‘first open revelation of fundamental social disharmony in Rwandan society’ where a Hutu counter-elite led by Kayibanda agitated against Tutsi political and economic control (Lemarchand Reference Lemarchand1970, p. 114). This Hutu movement argued that Tutsis gained most existing economic opportunities, while Hutus were marginalised.

In the 1950s, four parties emerged to mobilise the population politically. All parties took different stances towards the politicisation of ethnicity, the role of the monarchy and land. To a lesser extent, there were also regional frictions between parties and the question of how to deal with the Belgian colonial administration going forward. Kayibanda’s Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM) took a strong anti-Tutsi stance. L’Association pour la Promotion Sociale de La Masse (APROSOMA) called for freedom of oppressed groups in general, applying to both Hutu and Tutsi. Union Nationale Rwandais, which was closely linked to the Tutsi monarchy, ‘publicly opposed ethnic discrimination while pursuing exclusionist agendas’ (Golooba-Mutebi Reference Golooba-Mutebi2013, p. 4). Tutsi-dominated Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais took a more moderate stance.

The 1959 Hutu revolution began sporadically as groups collectivised to mount struggles against local chiefs. Kayibanda led the charge. He converted MSM into a tightly knit party, named the Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais-PARMEHUTU (MDR-PARMEHUTU). His party mobilised around ethnic distinctions, while APROSOMA’s moderate claims lost support. Tutsi refugees moved to neighbouring countries, including Uganda and the DRC. Also, the families of many of the RPF’s leaders left the country during this period, which contributed to a lived memory of refugee experience among RPF cadres.

Rwanda gained independence from Belgian rule in 1962. Kayibanda became president of the First Republic (1962–1973). Kayibanda’s new Southern Hutu elite effectively replaced the Tutsi elite, who held most positions in the colonial administration. The MDR-PARMEHUTU abolished the monarchy and patron–client relationships. However, little was done to address social inequality, including the provision of education and employment opportunities to the Hutu population (Mamdani Reference Mamdani2001). Initially, Kayibanda’s opponents were APROSOMA stalwarts who were slowly eased out of administrative responsibilities (Prunier Reference Prunier1995). Northern Hutus presented a more dangerous threat to his rule. Ethnic distinctions were used to bind Hutus politically, as was done during two episodes of inyenzi attacks in 1962 and 1963–1964, when Tutsi refugees attempted to return to Rwanda.Footnote ¹ The widespread Tutsi massacres in 1963/1964 were ‘the culmination of intermittent violence directed at Tutsi’ (Eltringham Reference Eltringham2004, p. 42).

Kayibanda’s power was later weakened by accusations of political paralysis, elite discontent and a faltering economy. The interests of Northern elites were preserved by the Hutu revolution, but Kayibanda restricted their access to lucrative business opportunities and political power (Verwimp Reference Verwimp2003). After the 1972 massacre of Hutus in Burundi, Kayibanda stressed the threat posed by inyenzi Tutsis. In January 1973, Kayibanda’s government led purges against Tutsis in schools and universities and later in the public and private sectors. Government officials justified the purge in the name of creating ‘ethnic proportionality’ (Straus Reference Straus2006). This later developed into an opportunity for Kayibanda’s rivals, as Rwandans mobilised against the government (ibid). Instead of binding the population against a common enemy, Kayibanda’s gamble eroded his legitimacy. Peasants mobilised around local grievances, while elites were divided by regional distinctions (Prunier Reference Prunier1995). Homes and businesses of Hutu officials in the Kayibanda regime were attacked, and Northern elites took the opportunity to mount a coup, with the stated objectives of ending ethnic division and regional favouritism while restoring national unity (Straus Reference Straus2006).

Political contestation was motivated by anger at the increasing consolidation of power among Southern elites at the cost of Northern elites. Kayibanda built loyalty through recruiting civil servants and allocating economic benefits to Southern and Central region elites (Lemarchand Reference Lemarchand1970). For example, Kayibanda used the coffee sector as a platform to grow his national political profile. Prior to independence, he acted as the president of Travail, Fidélité, Progrès’ (TRAFIPRO), which was Rwanda’s largest coffee cooperative. TRAFIPRO later became the state-run marketing board for agricultural products and operated as the economic arm of the regime (Verwimp Reference Verwimp2013). Kayibanda channelled profits to his Southern-Central allies and encroached on the interests of other Hutu elites, which led to opposition (Pottier Reference Pottier1993). The army, which was dominated by generals from the Northwest, largely recruited from the North (De Lame Reference De Lame2005). While Kayibanda was restructuring economic and political institutions to place them under the control of his own loyalists, he was unable to establish control over the security apparatus, which was dominated by his rival Northwestern elites.

In 1973, Habyarimana successfully mounted a bloodless coup against Kayibanda. He then became the president of the Second Republic (1973–1994). In Butare in 1973, Habyarimana said, ‘[T]he coup d’état we did, was above all a moral coup d’état. And what we want … is to ban once and for all, the spirit of intrigue and feudal mentality. What we want is to give back labour and individual yield its real value’ (Habyarimana, quoted in Verwimp Reference Verwimp2000, p. 335). The coup was ‘popular’ among large segments of the population because of the corruption that was associated with the Kayibanda regime and because Habyarimana promised to reduce ethnic violence (Jefremovas Reference Jefremovas1997).

Kayibanda cast the differences between Hutus and Tutsis as a racial issue. Habyarimana recast the difference as an ‘ethnic’ issue (Mamdani Reference Mamdani2001). During Habyarimana’s reign, Tutsis were recognised as indigenous to Rwanda, rather than being perceived as invaders as they were during Kayibanda’s reign. Gasana (Reference Gasana2002) claims that Habyarimana’s decision to portray ‘reconciliation’ as forward thinking and Hutu extremism as backward (and associated with the past) was part of his strategy to gradually exclude Alexis Kanyarengwe, another prominent general from the Northwest, from power.Footnote ² Kanyarengwe tried to gain the support of other Hutu elites on the basis of Hutu power, but he was unable to muster enough support (Gasana Reference Gasana2002). Habyarimana marked ethnic unity symbolically by declaring the day of the coup as ‘a day of peace and reconciliation’ (Verwimp Reference Verwimp2004). However, others contend that Tutsis were excluded from power during Habyarimana’s reign. Throughout Habyarimana’s reign, there were almost no Tutsi bourgmestres or préfets (Prunier Reference Prunier1995). A quota system remained. Allocation took place first on a regional basis (60 per cent of posts to Northerners; 40 per cent to Southerners) and then on an ethnic basis (within each region, 90 per cent of posts were reserved for Hutus) (Mamdani Reference Mamdani2001). Tutsi participation in politics and in the formal economy was regulated, although this was loosely enforced (Prunier Reference Prunier1995).Footnote ³

In 1975, Habyarimana renamed his party, the Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le Développement (MRND), and effectively centralised power. During the 1970s, he successfully played groups of Northern Hutu elites from Ruhengeri (Bagoyi clan) and Gisenyi (Bashiru clan) against each other. Habyarimana developed a ‘peasant’ ideology, which romanticised the position of Hutus as real peasants of Rwanda and cast clear enemies in Tutsi refugees (and the Tutsi population) (Verwimp Reference Verwimp2000). A rapidly growing economy and high coffee prices in the 1970s bolstered Habyarimana’s control over society, motivating him to increase coffee production. The economy suffered because of falling coffee prices in the late 1970s. In 1980, some Ruhengeri elites (led by Theoneste Lizinde and Stanislas Biseruka) attempted a coup. However, the coup failed, and Habyarimana later relied increasingly on the Gisenyi group.

Segments of the Hutu elite then increasingly championed Hutu power – an ideology that cut across party lines and embodied Hutu solidarity (Des Forges Reference Des Forges1999). This came to the fore when the economy was under stress after tea, tin and coffee prices had fallen by 1984. This shows that prior to 1994, the structural vulnerabilities of primary commodity dependence inhibited the government’s capacity to build elite cohesion. As the Kayibanda and Habyarimana governments tried to build their support bases through channelling rents to individuals and encouraging loyalty, once these revenues dried up, their support bases weakened, and elite contestation became a significant threat to their rule.

Even then, vulnerabilities were transnational in nature because of the commodity dependence that characterised the Rwandan economy. Towards the end of the 1980s, Habyarimana was forced to increasingly rely on foreign aid, which showed how donors shored up the government. Donors effectively financed the stability of Rwanda’s political settlement, where other external buyers of Rwanda’s commodities had done so earlier. Aid was made conditional on opening political space, and Hutu Power elites later used such space to mobilise support for their groups by identifying a common enemy – the Tutsi.Footnote ⁴ There were genuine revolutionary pressures in Rwanda at the time. Basic socio-economic inequality was crosscutting among ethnic groups – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa (De Lame Reference De Lame2005). Hutu elites attempted to mobilise supporters around ethnic differences to blame Tutsis outside the country and Tutsi elites within Rwanda. To maintain his own power, Habyarimana sided with, and increasingly empowered, a Hutu Power militia that ‘left a deadly retaliatory force in readiness after his sudden death’ (Tilly Reference Tilly2003, p. 110). Habyarimana was ‘captive – and possibly the victim – of a civilian/military oligarchy determined to hang on to its privileges’ (Lemarchand Reference Lemarchand1994, p. 602).

The akazu (who were also Hutu Power advocates) refers to a group that was empowered in political positions and provided access to rents in exchange for loyalty. Akazu referred to the inner group close to President Habyarimana. The term was associated with the accusation that this group abused power and privileges. The group was made up largely of family members of Habyarimana’s wife, who controlled most of the big enterprises in the country and influenced internal and external policy (Des Forges Reference Des Forges1999; Kamola Reference Kamola2007).

Some akazu members have often been cited as using their positions both to mobilise violence against Tutsis and to funnel funds to military efforts against the advancing RPA in the 1990s.Footnote ⁵ Akazu members controlled several businesses across the economy but also had management positions in key export sectors: coffee, tea and minerals. This was crucial, as Habyarimana’s ruling coalition needed to control access to foreign exchange. If rivals had relationships with foreign buyers, they could have leveraged their access to divert the flow of foreign exchange away from Habyarimana loyalists. Félicien Kabuga, one of the most prominent members of the akazu, owned coffee and tea plantations, as well as several businesses. He is often cited as one of the chief financiers of the genocide. His daughter was married to Habyarimana’s son (Kagire Reference Kagire2012). Several of Habyarimana’s relatives, including Protais Zigiranyirazo and Seraphin Rwakumba, played roles in ensuring coffee profits were diverted to akazu control (Des Forges Reference Des Forges1999; Kamola Reference Kamola2007). Other Hutu elites, who occupied senior positions in government-owned mining companies, are recognised to have had similarly close affiliations to the akazu. Verwimp (Reference Verwimp2001, p. 4) claims that ‘only the akazu really benefited from tea production’. Elites who held interests in the tea sectors included akazu members or perpetrators of the genocide (Des Forges Reference Des Forges1999; Verwimp Reference Verwimp2001). Many akazu elites derived power and profits from their positions at Société Minière de Rwanda (SOMIRWA), a government-owned mining company (Braeckman Reference Braeckman1994). Elites who were loyal to Habyarimana (including former ministers Shingiro Mbonyumutwa and Francois Habukubaho) represented the government at SOMIRWA offices and were responsible for activities at state-owned mines (Mbonyumutwa Reference Mbonyumutwa2009).

Certain European donors remained closely supportive of Habyarimana in the early 1990s, with France and Belgium both offering immediate military aid after the RPA attack (Verwimp Reference Verwimp2000). During this time, most Tutsi-owned businesses remained in a position of significant vulnerability.

The Establishment of the Present-Day RPF

The RPF was formed as a response to the vulnerability experienced by refugees and a collective desire among Tutsi refugees for security. Following the mass exodus of Tutsis beginning in 1959, the presence of Rwandan Tutsi refugees led to tensions in their adopted countries. Often, tensions emanated from competing claims over land (Mushemeza Reference Mushemeza2007). Neighbouring country governments – including Uganda and the DRC – manipulated local anti-Rwandan sentiments and mobilised support against refugees. The Idi Amin and Milton Obote governments in Uganda and the Mobutu regime in the Congo both singled out Tutsi refugees and argued that they had received political advantages. In Tanzania, promises to bestow citizenship status on Rwandan refugees had been plagued by ‘implementational ineptitude’ (Reed Reference Reed1996, p. 483). Rwandan refugees in Uganda reacted by joining forces with Yoweri Museveni’s NRA forces, which rebelled against the sitting Ugandan government. Habyarimana was reluctant to allow Rwandan refugees to return, given the scarcity of land within Rwanda. When refugees were allowed to return, they were quarantined in bad conditions, as in Nasho in Eastern Province in 1982 (Rudasingwa Reference Rudasingwa2013).

Returning to their own Rwandan land and being deprived of owning land in adopted countries became a source of agitation and alienation for individuals who became leading RPF officials. Banyarwanda refugees from Uganda formed the Rwanda Alliance for National Unity (RANU) in 1979, with a clear political programme of returning to Rwanda. At RANU’s meetings, members identified themselves as the oldest refugees in Africa and directed their actions to tackling problems associated with this status. ‘Objective conditions’ were identified, for which RANU members collectively sought solutions.

RANU called for a broad-based, inclusive Rwanda where refugees would be allowed to return. Both Habyarimana and Kayibanda always presented Tutsi refugees as an enemy to Rwandan unity, rejecting the right of return to refugees, claiming that they had been resettled in other countries or that they were enemies of Rwanda (Desrosiers Reference Desrosiers2022; Reed Reference Reed1995). Initially, RANU was inspired by a radical leftist ideology and advocated the abolition of the monarchy, as well as the creation of a socialist state (Reed Reference Reed1996; Roessler & Verhoeven Reference Roessler and Verhoeven2017). RANU’s establishment represented the beginnings of the creation of a vanguard movement, with individuals devoting themselves to the struggle for the liberation of Rwanda. RANU’s opponents highlighted similarities between RANU and the former Tutsi monarchy. Even today, the RPF’s opponents make similar claims, highlighting parallels between Kagame’s leadership and the monarchy.Footnote ⁸ However, RANU (and even most of the RPF) had a great deal of antipathy towards the monarchy.

RANU founding member Tito Rutaremara wrote a document entitled Dukore Iki? in 1983, echoing Lenin’s (Reference Lenin1956) ‘What is to be done?’ (Kimonyo Reference Kimonyo2014). However, there was limited progress in building a ‘refugee consciousness’ within the refugee community.Footnote ⁹ As Rutaremara said, ‘by 1985, RANU was still only restricted to young intellectuals. It was not yet a mass, dynamic movement’.Footnote ¹⁰

RANU was unable to appeal to varying shades of opinion and chose to temper its Marxist rhetoric by 1987. RANU was renamed RPF in 1987. Four political papers were adopted, including a political programme (with objective conditions), operational guidelines, a code of conduct and a zero option (to return to Rwanda through violent action).Footnote ¹¹ An Eight Point Plan was proposed, which presented a clear message to a broader audience. The central themes were democracy, national unity and the right of return of refugees, while corruption would be replaced with the rule of law (Reed Reference Reed1996). Rwigyema was the first chairman.

RANU’s eventual success was partly because of the military experiences of its leading members in Museveni’s NRA. Two of their prominent members – Rwigyema and Kagame – were part of the inner clique who ‘returned to the bush’ to begin a civil war against the Obote government. Obote had persecuted Tutsis within Uganda while Museveni relied on them for military support (Reed Reference Reed1995). Rwandans within the NRA were sent on training missions abroad, also developing links with the American military (Otunnu Reference Otunnu, Adelman and Suhrke1999). Many later held senior posts within Uganda’s military once Museveni became president. Rwigyema was the NRA’s Deputy Commander and later became Uganda’s Deputy Minister of Defence. Kagame was Head of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Peter Bayingana was Head of the NRA Medical Services. Chris Bunyenyezi and Sam Kaka were commanding officers.Footnote ¹² These officers rallied support for Museveni within the Tutsi community. Led by Rwigyema, these military officers were ‘instrumental in recruiting, training and sensitising refugees, a process, which crystallised into a military and political organisation that later made empowerment of refugees a reality’ (Mushemeza Reference Mushemeza2007, p. 104). During this period, the RPF transformed from a ‘merely socio-political organisation to a political-military organisation’ (Rusagara Reference Rusagara2009, p. 174). Two events motivated Rwigyema and others to prioritise returning to Rwanda. The Ugandan parliament forbade non-citizens from owning land, specifically naming Banyarwanda refugees (Mamdani Reference Mamdani1996b), and Rwigyema was removed from his position as Deputy Minister of Defence.

In October 1990, the military wing of the RPF – the RPA – invaded Rwanda. Rwigyema led the RPA. He had led a parallel command structure within the NRA, code-named Inkotanyi (tough fighters). The group largely consisted of Rwandan Tutsis whom Rwigyema and Kagame had recruited to support Museveni’s NRA. Refugees in neighbouring countries joined the effort. The war effort was funded by Rwandan businesspeople, including Valens Kajeguhakwa, François Xavier Mironko, Tribert Rujugiro, Silas Majyambere (Hutu), Assinapol Rwigara, Vedaste Rubangura and Evariste Sissi. Some of these businesspeople (including Mironko and Majyambere), at times, funded Habyarimana and were close to akazu members like Félicien Kabuga. Even at that time, businesspeople were in a difficult position, trying to stay on side with Habyarimana while also supporting opponents abroad. Habyarimana faced difficulties of managing domestic businesspeople, aware of the threat they posed in terms of funding rivals. However, the villainisation of Tutsi businesspeople was always an option, given the vulnerable predicament they experienced in pre-1994 Rwanda.

The RPA succeeded in recruiting other Tutsi refugees, and some claim they even set up thirty-six cells within Rwanda by the end of 1987 (Misser Reference Misser1995). However, they were unable to convince a significant number of Hutus to join their cause. Hutus who joined the RPF cause included those who had quarrelled with Habyarimana.Footnote ¹³ Most leading RPF members were Tutsis and had Ugandan roots. However, others, including Denis Polisi, Rutaremara and Jacques Bihozagara, were from other countries or had worked outside the region.Footnote ¹⁴

The RPA suffered a major setback when Rwigyema died on the second day of battle.Footnote ¹⁵ Two other senior officers, Bayingana and Bunyenyezi, died soon after. A month later and upon his return from a training course at Fort Leavenworth in the United States, Kagame assumed command of the RPA. After military setbacks, Kagame made the decision to regroup in the Virunga mountains. President Museveni continued to provide tacit support (Scherrer Reference Scherrer2002). Senior RPA leaders retrained, reorganised and recruited for his army, relying on contacts in Uganda and elsewhere. Many senior cadres included female leaders such as the then Financial Commissioner Aloysia Inyumba, who raised funds for the liberation effort. In early 1991, the RPA launched two military operations that were significant. The RPA took control of Gatuna – a border post on the transport corridor to Mombasa. A raid on Ruhengeri prison was launched, which freed Habyarimana’s allies-turned-rivals, including Lizinde and Biseruka. Lizinde and other freed inmates joined the RPA’s military effort.Footnote ¹⁶ The RPA only held Ruhengeri for a day before withdrawing to the mountains. In the process, they increased (what is now glorified as) ‘the mythic power of the guerrilla forces’, captured military equipment and reinvigorated their movement (Rucyahana Reference Rucyahana2007, p. 50).

The Civil War and Genocide

Within Rwanda, Habyarimana’s popularity and dominance over the country’s political system was under increasing threat in the 1980s. Because of reduced global coffee, tea and tin prices, the national budget was under strain. There was also increasing resentment among the population, with the government imposing increasingly coercive policies, including forced coffee cultivation. Rising inequality characterised this period. Though 86 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line, the income share of the wealthiest decile of the population increased from 22 per cent in 1982 to 52 per cent in 1994 (Uvin Reference Uvin1998). Donors made aid conditional on opening political space, which made it increasingly difficult for Habyarimana to manage opposition, as well as deal with increasingly agitated segments of the population. Aid formed the life support for Habyarimana’s government until it was cut in 1993.Footnote ¹⁷ The imposition of a structural adjustment programme resulted in cuts in health and education spending, which contributed to increasing popular grievances (Uvin Reference Uvin1998). The government was required to devalue the Rwandan franc and remove support provided to rural producers (Storey Reference Storey2001). During this period, the ruling MRND chose to mobilise support by increasing anti-Tutsi rhetoric, trying to identify a villain that was responsible for the weakening of Rwanda’s economy: the invading RPA and their Tutsi supporters domestically. Tutsi civilians, perceived as allies to RPF invaders, were victims of arbitrary arrests, assassinations and organised massacres (Lemarchand Reference Lemarchand1995). This strategy eventually culminated in the genocide that followed in 1994.

Between 1990 and 1994, the events that led up the genocide have been widely discussed in the academic literature (African Rights 1994, 1995; Des Forges Reference Des Forges1999; Gasana Reference Gasana2002; Guichaoua Reference Guichaoua1995; Mamdani Reference Mamdani2001; McDoom Reference McDoom2021; Melvern Reference Melvern2004; Prunier Reference Prunier1995; Straus Reference Straus2004, Reference Straus2006). Much is debated, including the numbers who died during the genocide and how many Rwandans did the killing.Footnote ¹⁸ For the RPF, a crucial source of their legitimacy externally and among their domestic supporters is the claim that the RPF is primarily responsible for ending the genocide when ‘the international community’ failed them.

The RPF cannot be blamed for the murders of vast numbers of Tutsis in 1994. On 6 April 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana, Deogratias Nsabimana, President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, and key hardliners Elie Sagatwa and Juvénal Renzaho, was shot down on its approach to Kigali. Immediately, Hutu hardliners blamed the RPF for shooting down the plane. Hutu extremists painted Habyarimana’s assassination as ‘undeniable proof’ that Tutsis would do anything to regain power (Turner Reference Turner2005). Within hours, Interahamwe roadblocks were set up in Kigali, and houses were searched (Prunier Reference Prunier1995). In a few hours, the fastest genocide of the twentieth century was under way (Straus Reference Straus2006). The Presidential Guard, militias and the army largely conducted it. The first victims were the prime minister, opposition politicians (including Ndasingwa) and large numbers of Tutsis.

Kagame calls the genocide ‘the defining event in Rwandan history’ (Gourevitch & Kagame Reference Gourevitch and Kagame1996, p. 167). Events in 1994 signalled clear winners (RPF leaders) and losers (Hutu extremists). RPF rule has been legitimised through positioning its cadres as saviours of Rwanda, following the genocide. The RPF’s victory also cemented its ideology and the central goals of the struggle as the fulcrum of Rwanda’s future. RPF cadres argue that they achieved this victory on their own. The RPF argues that the international community – or Europeans and Americans, in particular – failed them and French forces colluded with Hutu extremists (Wallis Reference Wallis2006). Others have strengthened the RPF’s position by showing that foreign actors (such as the United Nations and the United States) ignored the genocide (Barnett Reference Barnett2002). This contributes to strengthening elite cohesion and the importance of the RPF’s ideological goal of self-reliance, reinforcing the collective memory of being isolated during the genocide.

The most contested debate has centred on which group was responsible for shooting down Habyarimana’s plane.Footnote ¹⁹ Initially, scholars (African Rights 1995; Des Forges Reference Des Forges1999; Prunier Reference Prunier1995) seemed convinced that extremist political and military leaders had shot down the plane. Many akazu members lied about their whereabouts on the night before the plane was shot down. Senior officials, including Bagosora (who was in direct contact with the Presidential Guard and key leaders), seemed in control of events (Des Forges Reference Des Forges1999). The Presidential Guard’s decision to immediately target moderate leaders, who were next in line to succeed Habyarimana, also supports such claims. Extremists were also not content with the concessions made by Habyarimana to the RPF in the Arusha Peace Agreement. Most damning is the geometric-ballistic research report by French judges, which found that rockets were fired from the Kanombe military base, which the Presidential Guard had occupied.

Other scholars (Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2013, Reference Reyntjens2020; Straus Reference Straus2006) have regularly accused Kagame of ordering Habyarimana’s assassination, with their claims bolstered by new evidence. Recently, high-profile books by renowned journalists like Wrong (Reference Wrong2021) have taken a similar position. French judge Jean-Louis Bruguière conducted an investigation, which supported these claims. Observers who claim that the RPF are responsible have relied on testimonies of former RPF officers who have left the country in exile. Such officers include Abdul Ruzibiza, Theogene Rudasingwa and Kayumba Nyamwasa. However, these observers seem willing to accept these testimonies as evidence, without acknowledging that exiled officers have an incentive to delegitimise the RPF. Others also cite evidence that Kagame was more concerned with outright victory than saving the Tutsi population (Dallaire Reference Dallaire2003; Des Forges Reference Des Forges1999; Kuperman Reference Kuperman2001; Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2013).

Identifying who is responsible for shooting down Habyarimana’s plane is viewed as an essential determinant of the RPF’s external legitimacy. Melvern (Reference Melvern2008) argues that ‘whoever is eventually found guilty will carry the moral responsibility for starting the genocide’. However, this should not be the case. Regardless of who shot down the plane, the RPF is not responsible for murdering large numbers of Tutsis after the plane was shot down.

The RPF government and many scholars argue that the genocide was preordained and followed a master plan (Des Forges Reference Des Forges1999; Prunier Reference Prunier1995; Verwimp Reference Verwimp2013). However, other scholars disagree and argue that the genocide was a strategy improvised by elites out of opportunity and threat (Mamdani Reference Mamdani2001; Mann Reference Mann2005). Inflammatory claims centre on the denial of the genocide. Davenport and Stam (Reference Davenport and Stam2009) used spatial mapping software to suggest that most victims were Hutus (500,000–700,000) and not Tutsis (300,000–500,000). Davenport and Stam’s (Reference Davenport and Stam2009) assumptions regarding the population of Tutsis in Rwanda is estimated based on calculations regarding Tutsi numbers in the 1991 census. However, the calculations on which these claims are made are dubious because the population of Tutsis is likely to have been underreported because of the Habyarimana regime’s exclusionary policies (Des Forges Reference Des Forges1999). One estimate has underreporting at around 40 per cent (Verpoorten Reference Verpoorten2005).

Scholars have also highlighted that the RPF engaged in revenge killings after the war was over. The RPF was criticised for ignoring these crimes (Pottier Reference Pottier1996; Prunier Reference Prunier2009) and for killing hundreds of thousands before, during and after the genocide (Des Forges Reference Des Forges1999; Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens1996). Kagame has admitted that individuals carried out revenge killings (Gourevitch & Kagame Reference Gourevitch and Kagame1996). However, he highlighted the difference between such killings and those that occurred during the genocide, arguing that since many of these soldiers were being tried in courts, it showed that the killings were not state-sanctioned (ibid). Reyntjens (Reference Reyntjens2009) acknowledges that some military officers were prosecuted but notes that ‘sentences were lenient’ and no one was charged for massacres.

A variety of factors led to the genocide. These factors included conflicts over land, regional tensions, population pressure, the weakening economy, the politicisation of ethnicity and the desire of the extremist Hutu-led government to hold on to power. The RPF’s official discourse of the 1994 genocide maintains that moderate Hutus are victims of politicide, while Tutsis are victims of genocide (Eltringham & Van Hoyweghen Reference Eltringham, Van Hoyweghen, Doom and Gorus2000). Developing a story that clearly outlines the parties involved as two ethnic groups downplays the class and regional dimensions of conflicts.

This book does not have any additional information to add to the debate regarding who shot Habyarimana’s plane, the exact number of killings during the genocide or reprisal killings. This book analyses the vulnerabilities associated with Rwanda’s development trajectory and that trajectory is heavily dependent on external legitimacy. As a result, it highlights how the RPF’s hub-based strategy depends on maintaining the image of the RPF as saviours of Rwanda. Discrediting such portrayals goes against the collective memory that the RPF seeks to promote and protect at all costs. The RPF’s political opponents consistently discredit the RPF’s claims of ending the genocide. Instead, they accuse the RPF of provoking the genocide by shooting down the plane carrying Habyarimana. The RPF’s (and in particular, the RDF’s) identity as ‘saviour’ (both during the genocide and in peacekeeping efforts) is regularly at odds with its image as a ‘villain’ (through interventions in the DRC and accusations of human rights violations domestically) (Kuehnel & Wilen Reference Kuehnel and Wilen2018). These images are contested domestically and externally, directly shaping decisions about foreign investment in the country and the external legitimacy of the RPF government and its development strategy.

The First Phase of RPF Rule: Empowering Victors and Their Allies

After the genocide, the RPF continued to fight opponents within the country and in the DRC. There was mutual distrust between the ruling RPF and the population (Ingelaere Reference Ingelaere2010; Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2016). Hutu RPF elites – though occupying prominent political positions – remained a consistent threat (because they could potentially mobilise popular grievances). The RPF maintained the appearance of a broad-based coalition. The RPF built elite cohesion and commitment to ideological goals of achieving self-reliance by highlighting the need to reduce dependence and driving home the idea that the international community deserted Rwanda during the genocide. Diversification quickly became a mantra for RPF policymakers – both diversification of the economy and of domestic and external relationships.

After 1994, Vice President Kagame led the dominant coalition within the RPF, which comprised the Tutsi Ugandan inner clique and other loyalists (including some Hutu politicians). Formally, power was shared with other political parties, including Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) and the Parti Démocrate Chrétien. President Bizimungu (RPF) and Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu (MDR) were both Hutus. Nine ministers were Tutsi, while twelve were Hutu. Under labels of ‘power sharing’ and ‘national unity’, the 1994 government represented (on paper) ‘a genuine government of national unity’ (Prunier Reference Prunier2009, p. 7).Footnote ²⁰

During that time, the RPF was increasingly anxious about being perceived to be a Tutsi-dominated government governing a majority Hutu population. However, donors did not force political liberalisation, fearing it would be a recipe for violence (Uvin Reference Uvin2001). Formal democratic institutions, including a democratic constitution and regular elections, were put in place, with some opposition allowed.

While the RPF may have envisioned a society where broad-based inclusion could mean open political competition, the party’s own survival quickly became predicated on Tutsi rule (Mamdani Reference Mamdani2001). The RPF’s central concern till 2000 was countering security threats inside and outside Rwanda.Footnote ²¹ Hutu ministers such as Seth Sendashonga and Prime Minister Twagiramungu protested the military’s reluctance to rein in reprisal killings. Kagame replied by arguing that soldiers were ‘defending the honour of the army’, either denying the charge or claiming the security forces were doing the best they could (Prunier Reference Prunier2009, p. 9). Twagiramungu later resigned, while Sendashonga was fired in August 1995. Soon after, both left Rwanda. Other Hutu leaders, such as Lizinde, also fled.Footnote ²² The initial years were a ‘period of massive imprisonment, arrests and killings, both public and discreet, of an unprecedented magnitude’ (Ruzibiza, quoted in Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2013, p. 10). Kanyarengwe was among those who chose silence as a method of protest, rather than exit.Footnote ²³ He officially resigned ‘because he wanted to devote himself to other functions’, but he may have resigned in protest against massacres committed by the RPA in Ruhengeri (Kanyarengwe’s home district) (Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2013, p. 18). When Hutu leaders chose to leave, many formed rival political parties in exile. The RPF attempted to contain the growth of rival coalitions that were in exile. For example, Sendashonga had built support in neighbouring countries (even meeting Ugandan government officials to apprise them of his plans) before he was allegedly assassinated on RPF orders (Prunier Reference Prunier2009).

After Kanyarengwe’s resignation, the façade of ‘power sharing’ gave way to executive dominance. By 2000, even President Bizimungu resigned.Footnote ²⁴ When Hutu leaders decided to voice their protest and challenge the regime, such protests were not tolerated. Bizimungu’s attempt at establishing a new party in 2001 led to his house arrest (Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2011). He was imprisoned in 2004 and given a fifteen-year prison sentence.Footnote ²⁵ When some Hutu leaders were punished for their dissidence, the RPF government replaced them with other loyal Hutu leaders. In this case, Pierre-Célestin RwigemaFootnote ²⁶ replaced Twagiramungu as prime minister. Bernard MakuzaFootnote ²⁷ later succeeded Rwigema once the latter had also fallen foul of the government. When politicians showed dissent, they were replaced with loyalists, helping Kagame consolidate his power and position. This pattern continues even decades later, with certain ministerial positions (including that of the prime minister) often reserved for loyal Hutu RPF politicians.

While many Hutu leaders have been prominent figures within the RPF government and military, their positions have often been insecure. For instance, Marcel Gatsinzi was Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) in April 1994. Gatsinzi was removed from his post in the early 1990s after publicly opposing the genocide. He was re-integrated into the RPA after the genocide and was eventually promoted to the rank of General. He later served as Minister of Defence and then as Minister of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs.Footnote ²⁸ During that time, Gatsinzi was repeatedly accused of genocide charges. Emmanuel Habyarimana preceded Gatsinzi as Minister of Defence, serving from 2000 to 2002. In 2002, he was removed from his position for his ‘extreme pro-Hutu’ views (BBC 2003). He fled Rwanda in 2003. Boniface Rucagu, a popular Ruhengeri politician, was arrested on genocide charges six times between 1994 and 1997 (Kinzer Reference Kinzer2008). In 1997, he was appointed Governor of Northern Province to wean the Northwest away from Hutu extremism (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi Reference Golooba-Mutebi2013). Over the years, he served in several prominent positions. He consistently highlighted his distance from the MRND’s killings despite being an MP during Habyarimana’s government (Nkurunziza Reference Nkurunziza2024). Pierre Damien Habumuremyi served as minister of education and then prime minister between 2011 and 2014. In his case, Habumuremyi remains vociferously loyal to the RPF but also served a three-year jail sentence for a breach of trust and for offering bounced cheques to those to whom he owed money.

The inclusion of Hutu leadership has been central to maintaining the RPF’s public claims that it is a broad-based party. Yet, because these leaders were consistently charged with judicial action, they remained in vulnerable positions, with few opportunities to mobilise support among themselves or galvanise popular grievances against the RPF.

The RPF has acted quickly against Hutu leaders who challenge its authority, especially using ethnic divisionism. In 2010, Victoire Ingabire, president of FDU-Inkingi, returned to Rwanda to contest the elections. She challenged the RPF discourse by publicly saying that Tutsis were not the sole victims of the genocide (at a genocide memorial centre). After the speech, she was arrested and charged with ‘genocide ideology, minimising the genocide and divisionism’ (Waldorf Reference Waldorf, Straus and Waldorf2011, p. 58). Ingabire served eight years in prison on terrorism charges and for threatening national security. Her sentence was later increased to fifteen years (but she was freed following a presidential pardon in 2018). She remains banned from running in elections.

Some loyal Hutus have remained prominent throughout RPF rule. François Kanimba was the Governor of the National Bank of Rwanda (BNR) and then Minister of Trade and Industry.Footnote ²⁹ Since 2020, he has been the Commissioner of the Economic Community for Central African States. Kanimba has been one of many former Rwandan ministers who have recently taken on leadership positions in regional organisations. Anastase Murekezi served as prime minister from 2014 to 2017 and later became ombudsman.Footnote ³⁰ Then Edouard Ngirente served as prime minister for eight years between 2017 and 2025. He was replaced by former banker and civil servant Justin Nsengiyumva in July 2025.

Initially, discussions about Rwanda’s post-genocide politics were largely focused on power sharing and ethnic representation. Critics (Lemarchand Reference Lemarchand2007) argue that ‘real’ power sharing would have led to a more equitable distribution of power. There were regular predictions of RPF rule descending into violence because of the apparent increased inequalities between ethnic groups (Ingelaere Reference Ingelaere2010). During the initial years of RPF rule, there was a gradual increase in the concentration of power among RPF Tutsis, mostly from Uganda (Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2004). Economically, the government was heavily reliant on businesspeople who funded the liberation effort like Tribert Rujugiro, Silas Majyambere, Assinapol Rwigara, the Mbundu family, François Xavier Mironko and Valens Kajeguhakwa. These businesspeople took ownership of state-owned firms that were privatised in the 1990s. Many RPF-allied businesspeople were also entrusted with taking over industrial assets that were abandoned during the genocide and were also encouraged to take leadership in investments central to reconstructing the country. Their investments included construction and property development, establishing coffee washing stations (CWS), taking ownership of tea factories and becoming key shareholders of banks and some industrial firms. In the second phase of RPF rule, the strategy changed to centralising control over political and economic decision-making while also partnering with foreign investors and managing threats within the ruling coalition.

Phase 2: Attempting to Centralise Control

In the 1990s, private and government investment was mobilised to support rebuilding the country, with capitalists who funded the liberation effort entrusted (and rewarded) as first-movers in several sectors. However, the distribution of economic benefits and political positions also contributed to increasing tension among RPF elites, which constituted a threat to Kagame’s hold on power. Senior RPF cadres were the primary rivals to Kagame’s power. They retained individual holding power and shared the collective memories and experiences of the liberation effort. Though few of them were accorded the same degree of heroism within RPF narratives as Kagame, many cadres were respected because of their contributions during the liberation effort and after 1994. Since 2000, Kagame has countered their power and capacity to collaborate against him. Appeals to the collective memories of shared experiences of these elites are used to instil elite cohesion while legitimising the increased centralisation of political decision-making authority and the distribution of rents.

Starting in 1994, Kagame retained some degree of control over most decision-making despite the government being led by President Bizimungu and the RPF by Chairman Kanyarengwe (Prunier Reference Prunier2009; Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2004). Kagame was thirty-six when he became vice president in 1994. He was not the only RPF leader who enjoyed loyalty from younger cadres; to a lesser degree, senior leaders like Polisi, Rutaremara, Patrick Mazimhaka,Footnote ³¹ Frank Mugambage,Footnote ³² Charles Murigande,Footnote ³³ Joseph KaremereraFootnote ³⁴ and Theogene Rudasingwa, among many others, had support bases within the RPF.Footnote ³⁵ As Kagame increased his hold on power in the 1990s, he relied on several military officers. Most prominent among those were Kayumba Nyamwasa,Footnote ³⁶ Patrick Karegeya,Footnote ³⁷ James Kabarebe,Footnote ³⁸ Charles Kayonga,Footnote ³⁹ Karenzi Karake and others.Footnote ⁴⁰ While these names were the most often mentioned in interviews, there were also countless other Rwandan politicians and military officials who had significant influence in the 1990s and 2000s.

As Kagame attempted to centralise control over political decision-making and the distribution of rents, some RPF cadres have often been excluded or marginalised. Such decisions have coincided with accusations that those RPF cadres went against RPF ideals (most often corruption), collaborated with enemies and advanced their own interests above collective ideological goals of achieving self-reliance. Kagame’s supporters defend him by suggesting that corruption charges are genuine.Footnote ⁴¹ Such charges are important because they serve as reminders of the ruling coalition’s power. They are also warnings to dissenting members of the RPF.

Through military victory in the 1990s and later through additional military honours and occupying prominent positions in military and trading networks with the DRC, certain military cadres, including Kabarebe, Nyamwasa and Karake among others, gained substantial holding power. In interviews and exchanges with other military officers, it was clear that these individuals commanded respect from their peers and subordinates.Footnote ⁴² Evidence of power can be determined by the formal positions that individual elites occupied during and after the liberation effort. For military elites, holding command positions gives them holding power as they develop loyalties within military networks. If elites choose to dissent, the government often highlights them as ‘terrorists’ (Kagame Reference Kagame2010). Dissidents like Karegeya highlighted how accusations were used as ‘a political tool’ (Mukomobozi Reference Mukomobozi2014). Not everyone who left Rwanda and is accused of terrorism had the same holding power. Individuals such as Joel Mutabazi and Abdul Ruzibiza were not prominent officers during the liberation effort and were not as significant threats to the RPF as officers such as Nyamwasa and Karegeya.

High-profile rivals and dissidents fell afoul of Kagame’s ruling coalition in the 2000s.Footnote ⁴³ In 2000, Joseph Sebarenzi, the Speaker of the National Assembly, resigned. Sebarenzi, in his autobiography (Reference Sebarenzi2009), claimed that he chose to resign because he was under pressure from RPF cadres whom he had begun to investigate. Reyntjens (Reference Reyntjens2013, p. 14) highlighted that Sebarenzi was accused of ‘dictatorial tendencies’. Sebarenzi fled to Uganda and later to America. Sebarenzi (Reference Sebarenzi2009) claimed that Kagame’s exclusion of Tutsi elites was motivated by ‘fear of his enemies’.

Four prominent Rwandan officials – Nyamwasa, Karegeya, Rudasingwa and Gerald Gahima – established the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) in December 2010. In 2010, this group published the Rwanda Briefing, which accused the RPF government of corruption and nepotism, human rights violations and marginalising Hutus (Nyamwasa et al. Reference Nyamwasa, Rudasingwa, Karegeya and Gahima2010). Senior Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) officials Rutatina and Rutaremara (Reference Rutatina and Rutaremara2010) defended the government against such accusations and accused the ‘Gang of Four’ of hypocrisy. Nyamwasa had been among Kagame’s closest allies in the 1990s and was a high-ranking general within the RDF, responsible for overseeing some of Rwanda’s military involvement in the DRC. Nyamwasa’s relationship with Kagame became frosty, starting in 2001. He was sent on a ‘study tour’ to the United Kingdom later that year. However, he was officially re-integrated into the government on his return. Rumours spread that he was plotting a coup in the early 2000s.Footnote ⁴⁴ He was later sent to India as ambassador, a common tactic employed by the RPF to re-integrate troublesome military generals (with substantial holding power) but send them to foreign countries to ensure they cannot mobilise their own support bases.

Karegeya was also perceived to be a possible threat because of his extensive contacts in the Ugandan government. In 2005, he was arrested for indiscipline, subordination and desertion. He spent eighteen months in prison. After his sentence ended in 2007, he fled to South Africa.

Rudasingwa developed a diplomatic reputation abroad. He was responsible for establishing the Office of the President, serving as Kagame’s key civilian aide. In 2005, he fled from Rwanda and moved to the United States after being gradually eased out of political responsibilities.Footnote ⁴⁵ Rudasingwa joined his brother Gerald Gahima, former attorney general and vice president of the Supreme Court, who had gone into exile in 2004 after being accused of corruption. In 2010, the four were indicted for ‘menacing the authority of the state, ethnic divisionism, terrorism and forming a terrorist group’ (Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2013, p. 95).

The RPF is often assumed to be a cohesive ruling party. However, ‘the RPF is a deeply divided, fragile, paranoid party’ (Clark Reference Clark2010b). There are schisms between elites, and immature factions vie for power within the RPF’s centralised hierarchy. Elite cohesion exists, stitched together by a haunting collective memory, backed by the threat of coercion and the imperative of achieving an ideological goal of self-reliance to avert a return to a refugee past.

In the 2000s, as elite frictions increased and cohesion had to be built within a broader environment of elite vulnerability, VISION 2020 (GoR 2000) highlighted the goal of achieving self-reliance through what may have seemed a contradictory strategy: services-first development, which was inherently more externally reliant. One example of the RPF’s attempts to centralise control over political and economic decision-making was its treatment of Rwanda’s first indigenous factory owner, François Xavier Mironko, who established Mironko Plastics, the first and oldest manufacturer of plastic products in Rwanda, in 1978. During Habyarimana’s reign, he also invested in banking. He was close to the Habyarimana government and had reportedly been seeking payment owed to him by the current Rwandan government for $12.5 million of arms that he had paid for prior to the 1994 genocide (KT Press 2025). Other manufacturers highlighted that Mironko’s investments, which had grown after 1994 (since he also funded the invading RPA), were targeted.Footnote ⁴⁷ A Mironko Plastics representative also suggested that the RPF’s focus on a ban on plastic materials, which began to be discussed in the mid-2000s, was also partly motivated to target Mironko’s investments.Footnote ⁴⁸ Since the 2000s, Mironko has spent time in jail and has fought legal battles, including with the government-owned energy utility, Rwanda Energy Group, which accused him of stealing electricity through an illegal connection (Sabiiti Reference Sabiiti2023a). Among domestic manufacturers, there was a feeling that the focus on promoting Rwanda as an environmental leader through targeting plastic pollution had another motivation: targeting domestic businesspeople who had industrial investments and were perceived as a threat.Footnote ⁴⁹

Domestically, strengthening intelligence services and dealing with dissent within the military has been crucial to managing elite vulnerability and keeping elite cohesion intact. Kagame used a group of loyal Tutsi elites – mostly within his intelligence services – to counter the capacity of the RPF’s older Tutsi elite from mobilising. As one senior RPF official mentioned, ‘the biggest fear is that the elders begin talking about what is going on. Here, everyone is watching’.Footnote ⁵⁰ As new intelligence officers were entrusted with watching others, they enhanced their own position of authority within leadership structures.Footnote ⁵¹ The RNC accused a group of intelligence officers (primarily Jack Nziza and Emmanuel Ndahiro) of promoting the image that Nyamwasa was building an ‘army-within-the-army’ to overthrow Kagame (Rudasingwa Reference Rudasingwa2013, p. 382). Increasing surveillance over the lives of elites has been used to impose discipline in line with uniform party behaviour.Footnote ⁵² The ruling coalition is accused by dissidents of creating an atmosphere of mutual suspicion among elites so that they do not voice dissent through collective action.

The ‘Gang of Four’ publicly argues that they formed the RNC because they disagreed with the direction of RPF policies. This group rejected the corruption charges that had been levied against them (Nyamwasa et al. Reference Nyamwasa, Rudasingwa, Karegeya and Gahima2010).Footnote ⁵³ During the 2000s, several elites (including members of the RNC) who had secured vast amounts of land in Eastern province without permission were disciplined (Musahara & Huggins Reference Musahara, Huggins, Huggins and Clover2005; Reyntjens Reference Reyntjens2013). These charges affected the reputation of individuals against whom these accusations were made.Footnote ⁵⁴ Crucially, the RPF’s ruling coalition employed these charges to rein in the personal accumulation of wealth and power outside the RPF’s centralised control. From the 2000s, the RPF’s ruling strategy has centred on the goal of centralising control over political decision-making and the distribution of rents. While individual elites have been allowed to make profits, the government avoids any over-reliance on certain Rwandan individuals, fearing it could pose a threat to Kagame’s rule in the future.

The RPF’s official stances towards rival elites were crucial in demobilising transnational rival factions from threatening the RPF’s external legitimacy. In 2010, the RNC appealed across ethnic lines to Hutus in exile. Rudasingwa (Reference Rudasingwa2013) lists the Hutus who joined the organisation. While the RPF also presented itself as having a broad-based appeal, its leaders criticised the RNC for reaching out to dissidents who had been allies of pre-1994 governments. However, the RNC itself was treated with suspicion by those whom they tried to recruit.Footnote ⁵⁵ Nyamwasa and Karegeya were accused of human rights abuses by potential recruits (Rudasingwa Reference Rudasingwa2013). Gahima was accused of illegally detaining people after the genocide (ibid). Many potential recruits questioned why they would partner with a group that sidelined previous Hutu allies like Kanyarengwe (ibid). In 2012, Paul Rusesabagina, the former hotel manager whose role in saving refugees during the Rwandan genocide was made famous in the movie Hotel Rwanda, left the RNC because of similar doubts.Footnote ⁵⁶ Rusesabagina fled Rwanda in 1996 and later became a prominent critic of the RPF. Yet RPF leadership remained anxious about transnational coalitions threatening RPF legitimacy abroad. Kagame explicitly recognised this threat:

The exit of political, military and economic elites who share collective memories of the struggle against the Habyarimana government began to pose the main threat to the RPF’s ruling coalition. Since 1994, the RPF has ensured that no Hutu elite can mobilise support along ethnic lines (as evidenced by Ingabire’s arrest). Former RPF allies-turned-dissidents have fled Rwanda. Rwanda’s future strategy to maintain political order depends on ensuring transnational coalitions cannot mobilise against RPF rule. Reflecting the external dependence of Rwanda’s economic future, the RPF has mobilised a significant nation-branding apparatus to contest the legitimacy of dissidents’ claims abroad. After foreign aid was cut in 2012 when Rwanda’s national brand was contested and its economy weakened, this led to political ramifications domestically, which will be described in the next section.

Phase 3: Increasing External Reliance and the Threat of Rival Transnational Coalitions

In the 2010s, the fault lines within the RPF’s political settlement became evident as global press began to accuse Rwanda of supporting the March 23 Movement (M23), a rebel group based in the DRC that was accused of having links to Rwanda. When foreign aid was withdrawn by several European governments in 2012, the Rwandan government eventually withdrew support. By 2013, M23 leader Bosco Ntaganda surrendered at the US Embassy in Kigali. In 2019, the International Criminal Court found Ntaganda guilty of eighteen counts of war crimes committed in the DRC.

While trade from DRC is the source of much-needed revenues (and particularly foreign exchange) for the Rwandan economy through military and commercial trading networks, involvement in the DRC also presents a threat to the ruling coalition’s authority. Some military leaders and economic elites, with substantial holding power of their own, have gained considerable prominence within RPF and RDF ranks through involvement in the DRC. Crucially, while meddling in neighbouring countries goes against Rwanda’s Pan-African image, the government legitimises its presence there in two ways. First, the RPF argues that it is protecting Tutsis in the DRC. Second, it argues that it is combating the FDLR, which is a group that retains links to Hutu Power militias that conducted the genocide. Thus, Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC is justified in line with the RPF’s own principles of stopping genocide against Tutsis. Rwanda’s decision to withdraw support for groups perceived to be protecting Tutsis in the DRC was a source of frustration for some Rwandan military and political elites, as well as for those who may personally benefit economically from commercial and trading networks. While the DRC is not the only source of political frictions among the ruling coalition, decisions taken about Rwanda’s involvement there shape how the ruling coalition both maintains elite cohesion and manages political order amid frictions among elites. Elites had previously disagreed with Kagame’s decision to put Laurent Nkunda, the leader of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), under house arrest in 2009.Footnote ⁵⁸ Some elites retained interests in the DRC – both material and in the form of personal loyalties with former soldiers. Others were ‘sick of war’ and were no longer convinced the FDLR posed a significant threat.Footnote ⁵⁹

After support was withdrawn for the M23 in 2012/2013, the RPF’s ruling coalition immediately clamped down on dissent. There were regular political and military reshuffles over the next two years, including large numbers of military retirements (Behuria Reference Behuria2016a). In 2014, there were two assassination attempts on RNC leaders attributed to Kigali. Out of the two targets, Nyamwasa survived, while Karegeya died. Initially, Kagame did not deny allegations of the RPF’s involvement and did not show remorse when news of Karegeya’s death was received. Kabarebe marked it by saying, ‘Karegeya chose to be a dog and died like a dog’, while Kagame called him a traitor (Himbara Reference Himbara2014). The RPF accused Nyamwasa and Karegeya of supporting the FDLR, assisting enemies of the regime and engaging in terrorist activities (Behuria Reference Behuria2015a). These former allies were depicted as traitors and were depicted as security threats. The RPF’s lack of remorse was a signal to those elites who considered supporting the rival coalition. As Wrong (Reference Wrong2014) writes, ‘the more dramatic the retribution, the stronger the reminder of loyalty’s value’.

One of the RPF’s closest economic allies and a funder of the liberation effort, Tribert Rujugiro, had his assets seized in 2013. Rujugiro, the controlling shareholder of Pan-African Tobacco Group, is one of the most influential businessmen in Rwanda. He not only contributed to financing the RPA’s military efforts but was also a significant investor across the post-1994 Rwandan economy. He also occupied government positions. He established the Rwandan Chamber of Commerce and served as its first chairman. He was also the first chairman of several associations and government agencies: the Rwandan Chamber of Commerce, the Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency and Akagera Task Force. He was closely associated with Crystal Ventures Ltd. (the party-owned investment group) and was also one of the key funders and former chairman of Rwanda Investment Group, a holding company that pooled together funds of independent Rwandan businessmen who had links to the RPF. Rujugiro was ‘in almost every sector in Rwanda’ and was perceived to be ‘Kagame’s go-to financier’.Footnote ⁶⁰

Later, Rujugiro was perceived to be someone capable of financing the mobilisation of a rival coalition against Kagame. Rujugiro had previously been named as benefiting directly through military and commercial networks in the DRC. In the mid-2010s, he fell out with Kagame and left Rwanda. His assets were confiscated in Rwanda at the same time. After that, when Rujugiro entered a business partnership with Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni’s brother, Salim Saleh, tensions between the Rwandan and Ugandan governments flared, highlighting the animosity between the RPF and Rujugiro. Rujugiro later began working with and allegedly funding David Himbara, who had formerly worked for the Office of the President and had become a high-profile dissident in North America. In 2015, Himbara presented a resounding critique of the Rwandan government at a US Congressional Hearing, with testimony from a retired RDF officer and now-dissident Robert Higiro. Rujugiro and Higiro have both been linked to the RNC (Africa Confidential 2014; Special Correspondent 2014).Footnote ⁶¹ Another prominent businessperson, Assinapol Rwigara, died in 2015 in a car accident in Kigali, with family members claiming there was foul play (Special Correspondent 2015). Rwigara’s family – including his wife and daughter, Diane – later became vocal critics of the RPF within Rwanda. Diane Rwigara and her mother were jailed between 2017 and 2018 before being acquitted of all charges. Previously, several other prominent Rwandan businesspeople, including Valens Kajeguhakwa and Evariste Sissi, fled Rwanda in the 2000s.

Fear of transnational coalitions of dissidents threatening domestic political stability became evident in the mid-2010s. RPF cadres with familial links to Himbara and other dissidents – Frank Rusagara, Byabagamba and David Kabuye – were arrested in 2014.Footnote ⁶² Rusagara and Byabagamba were charged with ‘spreading rumours with intent to incite people into rebellion against government and carrying out activities aimed at tarnishing the image of the country’ (Uwiringiyimana Reference Uwiringiyimana2014). Kabuye completed a six-month sentence and was arrested on his release for ‘inciting insurrection and insulting senior government officials’ (Special Correspondent 2015). Rusagara and Byabagamba were sentenced to fifteen years in prison. In 2020, Byabagamba was accused of attempting an escape from prison, with several of his family members imprisoned or detained following the incident. Rusagara eventually died in custody in 2025.

Soon after their initial arrest, Kagame said (at an RPF meeting):

These arrests were part of a series of warnings, aimed at countering any potential mobilisation among prominent senior RPF cadres. Leading female RPF cadres, who were wives of two of these officers, were also publicly admonished for speaking out against the government (Behuria Reference Behuria2015a). Other government officials were also charged during this time. Angelique Katengwa (of the RSSB) was charged with illegal tendering and abusing her public office. Jean-Damascène Ntawukuriryayo (President of the Senate) resigned after being accused of taking unilateral actions and failing to work with other senators.

While these tensions resurfaced, Kagame also reinforced the importance of committing to achieving paradigmatic goals of self-reliance. As tensions resurfaced between RPF elites, Kagame astutely used the symbolism associated with the Agaciro Development Fund (AgDF) to bind the elite together. He presented the establishment of the fund, which was financed by the direct contributions of civil servants and other Rwandan citizens, as an answer to aid cuts. He called the AgDF a symbol of ‘an invisible army of the nation’ (Kagame Reference Kagame2012).Footnote ⁶⁴

The AgDF was used as a symbol of self-reliance and drew directly on the collective experiences of vulnerability of senior cadres. The official line was that the withdrawal of aid had bound the elite to a common purpose – ‘they thought this would weaken us but it had the opposite effect’.Footnote ⁶⁶

The government shores up elite cohesion in familiar ways. Tilly (Reference Tilly2003, p. 35), for example, has previously illustrated how ruling coalitions employ instruments such as activating ‘us-them boundaries between their networks and outsiders, fend off rival claimants to coordinate and represent all or the same networks, draw necessary resources from their networks and reproduce the structures they have built, while sustaining their own power’. The RPF highlights the threat of the FDLR in the DRC or donors’ threats to withdraw aid. The RPF regularly stresses the importance of placing the national effort above individual priorities. Even domestically, articles have been published highlighting how senior RPF cadres have ‘fallen from limelight’ (Special Correspondent 2014). The party-owned newspaper, The New Times, replied to the article, reiterating that the RPF defined itself on three principles: ‘efficiency, accountability and delivery’. The article emphasised that there are ‘no sacred cows’ within the party, and aggrieved cadres have an ‘internal transparent mechanism of addressing issues’ (The New Times 2014).

The RPF shores up elite cohesion by cultivating an official narrative of memorialising the genocide and of Rwandan history – through the annual commemoration that starts in April and ends in June, gacaca courts (community-based tribunals) and lieux de memoire (sites of memory) (Mwambari Reference Mwambari2020). However, the attempt to impose a single narrative of memory – of the genocide and of broader history – has been contested within the evolving domestic arts scene (Norridge Reference Norridge2009). The use of music – both to mobilise genocidaires and mobilise support for the RPA’s military effort – has been highlighted widely (Chemouni & Mugiraneza Reference Chemouni and Mugiraneza2020; Mwambari Reference Mwambari2020). In post-genocide Rwanda, artists have been employed to bolster the RPF’s domestic legitimacy. However, within creative (and even religious) spaces, there has also been substantial dissent from the RPF narrative (Grant Reference Grant2018). Kizito Mihigo, a prominent Tutsi musician who was also a genocide survivor, is the most high-profile case of a musician who was initially perceived to be regime-friendly but was later punished for showing dissent. In February 2015, after releasing a critical song that challenged the RPF’s official narratives of the Rwandan genocide, Mihigo was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment for conspiracy against the government and for collaborating with the FDLR and the RNC. In 2018, Mihigo was released. He was imprisoned again in 2020 and died in prison. The popularity of musicians is crucial because they could be argued to be leaders of ‘intermediate classes’ (Khan Reference Khan2010) with substantial holding power, capable of helping mobilise support for rival coalitions or, at least, contesting certain aspects of RPF legitimacy.

Similarly, individuals who became central to promoting Rwanda’s hub-based strategy externally include Rwandan designers, as well as sportspersons. Such individuals, with access to both domestic and external audiences can publicly weaken Rwanda’s progressive image and thereby destabilise the financing of the political settlement. As part of efforts to boost Rwandan fashion brands externally, Rwandan LGBTQ designer Moses Turahirwa’s Moshions brand was promoted extensively by the president’s family. Turahirwa’s clients included Didier Drogba, Chimamanda Ngozie Adichie and Winston Duke. Turahirwa’s brand promoted the importance of gender fluidity in clothing and aimed at confronting taboos within Rwanda. In 2023, Turahirwa was charged with passport forgery, alleging that they had changed their identity without going through official procedures. Drug abuse charges were later added. In Rwanda, homosexuality is not illegal unlike in neighbouring countries (Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania). Rwanda was also one of very few African countries to sign a joint UN declaration condemning violence against LGBTQ people, abuse and stigma. Turahirwa tried to test whether Rwanda followed some of these principles, with a video published in 2023 revealing them having sex with two men, as well as publishing nude photographs. The RPF’s progressive image was challenged again when a Congolese footballer (Heritier Luvumbu) playing for one of Rwanda’s leading football clubs covered his mouth with his left hand while pointing fingers to his head, mimicking a gun gesture to signal solidarity with those killed in the DRC. Luvumbu was suspended and then was allegedly forced to leave Rwanda, with the United Kingdom’s Guardian newspaper highlighting the incident as an example of the problems associated with the UK–Rwanda asylum deal (Townsend Reference Townsend2024).

While elite frictions have contributed to the marginalisation of some individuals, younger RPF cadres and former rivals have been re-integrated into political positions. Ex-FAR and former FDLR soldiers have also been re-integrated. By 1998, 38,500 ex-FAR officers were re-integrated into the RDF (Jowell Reference Jowell2014). Former FAR and FDLR officers now occupy senior positions across Rwandan government branches. Examples include Paul Rwarakabije (Rwanda Correctional Services), Jerome Ngendahimana (Deputy Chief of Staff – Reserve Force), Daniel Ufitikirezi (RSSB), Andre Habyarimana (Head of Reserve Force, Northern Province), Evariste Murenzi (Commanding Officer of the Rwanda Mechanised Infantry Battalion) and Albert Murasira (Zigama CSS). Murasira served as Minister of Defence, replacing James Kabarebe, from 2018 to 2023. Along with other ex-FAR officials like Daniel Ufitikirezi, he established himself as a key part of the RPF’s bureaucracy. However, Murasira was also placed under house arrest after being removed as Defence Minister, showing the vulnerability of re-integrated soldiers in present-day Rwanda.

Official elections and the existence of rival political parties are not persuasive evidence of significant political contestation in Rwanda. Donors tend to focus their efforts on engaging with civil society and rival political parties. However, the most significant political contestation that occurs happens within the RPF and is often dealt with swiftly. In the lead-up to the 2017 elections, Sheikh Harerimana, the leader of another party in the ruling coalition (Parti Démocrate Idéal), initiated discussions to change the constitution to end term limits. A referendum approved the extension of term limits, with Kagame allowed to serve a third term till 2024 and then two consecutive five-year terms after that if he wishes to contest future elections. In the 2017 election, Kagame won 98.8 per cent of the vote against one other candidate. Diane Rwigara was disqualified from contesting the election on technical grounds. Later, nude photos were leaked on the internet to discredit her candidacy. In 2024, Kagame won over 99 per cent of the vote, with neither Ingabire nor Rwigara allowed to contest the election.

Senior military officials remain the biggest threats but also the most important sources of support for Kagame’s ruling coalition. Over the last decade, the importance of generals like James Kabarebe, Charles Kayonga, Patrick Nyamvumba, Fred Ibingira and Mushyo Kamanzi have been evident in the military.Footnote ⁶⁸ Their threat lies not in their position as individuals but in their holding power, particularly their potential to mobilise support within the RPF and the military. All these generals played a significant role in either the DRC, UN Peacekeeping efforts or in domestic intelligence. Nyamvumba, who served as Chief of Defence Staff, Force Commander for UN Peacekeeping Operations in Darfur and Minister for Internal Security, achieved significant prominence. Nyamvumba became Minister for Internal Security in 2019 but was sacked in 2020 ‘owing to matters of accountability under investigation’, as part of Kagame’s pledge to fire government officials for ‘lying, carelessness and indiscipline’ (Africa Research Bulletin 2020). Several other generals had also been sent away from Rwanda to serve as ambassadors.

In 2023, all senior generals mentioned here were retired as part of a new spate of 924 military retirements. However, as tensions escalated in the DRC, Kabarebe (who retired a few months earlier) was reappointed to a position in government as Minister of State of Foreign Affairs in Regional Cooperation. Kabarebe has long been considered to have been a key figure, leading Rwanda’s Congo policy. Kabarebe never fully left government, serving as an advisor to the president. However, he left his position as Minister of Defence in 2018 (but was later re-integrated into an official ministerial position once violence in the DRC flared up in 2023). Patrick Nyamvumba, too, was appointed High Commissioner to Tanzania. Nyamvumba’s brother, Andrew (who was appointed brigadier general), was sanctioned by the US Treasury for leading Rwandan forces in the DRC in 2023. Between 2023 and 2025, Kagame was forced to re-integrate several ‘retired’ senior RDF officials. Their importance increased as the war continued.

What PSA Offers to Understanding Rwanda

Most analyses of contemporary Rwandan politics and political economy have focused on coercive elements of RPF rule or frictions among elites or rival groups. Instead, PSA provides us with a way to examine how multi-scalar pressures have shaped Rwandan economic policy and the vulnerabilities that accompany Rwanda’s integration into the world economy. Existing literature employing PSA to analyse Rwanda has tended to focus on domestic actors (Chemouni Reference Chemouni2018; Chinsinga et al. Reference Chinsinga, Weldeghebrael, Kelsall, Schulz and Williams2022; Goodfellow Reference Goodfellow2014; Williams 2017). Instead, this book employs a multi-scalar political economy analysis. Contemporary late development is shaped by increased interactions with the global economy because of the global fragmentation of production, increased global financial integration and increased flow of people around the world. In Rwanda, the most significant threat is now neither domestic popular revolution nor domestic elite frictions alone. Instead, political order is contested among rival transnational coalitions, which are either aligned with the RPF or work against it.

Unlike its predecessors, the RPF government has prioritised altering its external dependencies in two significant ways. First, conscious of its geographical and structural vulnerabilities, the RPF has based its rule on the principal ideological goal of achieving self-reliance. The RPF government has tried to achieve this by reducing its dependence on exporting unprocessed coffee and finding new exports. Above all, it aims to transform its landlocked geographical vulnerabilities into presenting itself as a land-linked hub, which can project Kigali as a hub for continent-wide economic activity. To do this, it has embarked on a services-oriented, hub-based strategy, which deepens its dependency on external actors. The RPF has made progress in achieving this goal through distancing itself from an over-reliance on specific European donors (as was the case with preceding governments). Instead, the RPF has prioritised closer relationships with the United States and United Kingdom and a broader range of non-state actors, including philanthropic donors, football teams, environmental activists and celebrities. Export diversification and diversifying its relations with external actors have increased policy space. However, crucially, elite vulnerability has contributed to the government failing to develop effective state–business relationships with domestic capitalists, which impedes broader structural transformation.

The RPF’s external reliance depends on presenting itself as a leader on the continent for governance and on progressive causes on the environment and gender fronts. Rwandan dissidents have targeted RPF legitimacy abroad. Opponents target Rwanda’s brand-building attempts, highlighting the RPF’s human rights violations and incursions in the DRC. While the RPF has invested heavily in its public relations externally, several actions often threaten its positive image abroad. For example, Rwandan dissident Paul Rusesabagina (who gained global fame after the movie Hotel Rwanda) was abducted in Dubai and taken by force to Rwanda in 2020. In 2021, he was sentenced in Rwanda to twenty-five years in prison on terrorism charges. After pressure from the US government, his sentence was commuted by Presidential Order. Rusesabagina, the RNC, Himbara and other critics continue to publicly question the positive narrative of RPF-led growth. For the RPF, such criticisms and reputational damage represent the most significant challenges to its development strategy, because they pose a threat to how the political settlement is financed.

Chapter 5 details how Rwanda’s economic development has been financed and the politics shaping both its choice of financial partners and its contemporary vulnerabilities as it integrates into the world economy. The RPF government has had to present itself as adhering to market-led principles to satisfy donors and financial markets while developing innovative ways to mobilise domestic resources to finance its development strategy.