1. Introduction
In his 1953 work Philosophical Investigations, Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote ‘if a lion could speak, we could not understand him’.Footnote 1 Wittgenstein’s statement can be understood to be one about the importance of context, intention, and meaning in our shared communication. Put simply, because the frames of reference for the lion and humans are so vastly different, even if the lion could speak the same language as us, we would be talking at cross-purposes. We would be using the same words to mean very different things, based on our distinct contexts and understandings.
This article contends that a similar problem exists within the access and benefit-sharing (ABS) policy space, particularly concerning the terms ‘delinking’ and ‘decoupling’, with a range of different meanings deployed by negotiators, stakeholders, and academics. The ABS mechanism originates in environmental law and seeks to facilitate access to genetic resources while, at the same time, ensuring the benefits associated with their use are shared fairly and equitably. As a concept, ABS has been applied increasingly beyond physical genetic resources to associated information and, in some instances, to facilitate the delivery of international goals outside environmental concerns.Footnote 2 While the practical and efficient regulation of genetic resources and associated information that can meet the objectives of both providers and users of such resources is already a challenge, this is made virtually impossible if the designers of such systems are talking past each other. By their very nature, international negotiations will always contain multiple worldviews and contexts, but we can (and should) attempt to clarify the meanings of commonly confused (and confusing) terms to minimize misunderstandings and miscalculations.
This article aims to disambiguate the terms ‘delinking’ and ‘decoupling’, calling for clarity and precision in the use of these terms during ABS discussions in various United Nations (UN) fora. The highly contentious negotiations for a new Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) system under the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Pandemic AgreementFootnote 3 provided the impetus for this analysis. Indeed, the PABS system turned out to be so contentious that the Pandemic Agreement was adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2025, before the PABS system could be finalized. The failure to reach a consensus on the design of a PABS system arose, at least in part, from the confusion around the type and extent of ‘delinking’ proposed in various PABS alternatives. The newly adopted Pandemic Agreement will not open for signature until negotiations on the PABS system have been concluded by a specially appointed Intergovernmental Working Group;Footnote 4 that is, the Pandemic Agreement cannot enter into force until the PABS stalemate is resolved.
This article first provides background information on the Pandemic Agreement and the outline of the PABS system contained within Article 12 of the adopted text (Section 2). It then details the ‘foundational link’ of ABS – that is, how access to physical genetic resources was linked originally to the sharing of associated benefits in international environmental law (Section 3). The article then examines 30 years of ABS literature in the field of international environmental law to identify precisely what is meant by the terms ‘delinking’ and ‘decoupling’ (Section 4). We find these terms are being used interchangeably in the ABS literature (often within the same article) and are being used to refer to at least three different ideas. One recent usage that has emerged relates to the regulation of digital sequence information (DSI) on genetic resources. This refers to the ability to separate the informational component of genetic resources (for example, nucleotide sequence data) from the physical genetic resource.Footnote 5 The other two meanings that we find in the literature relate specifically to the operationalization of multilateral ABS systems. These latter two meanings are the two categories we address in detail in this article;Footnote 6 we name these ‘Category 1’ and ‘Category 2’ delinking.Footnote 7 Category 1 delinking refers to breaking the link between the country of origin providing access to a genetic resource and receipt of benefits. Category 2 delinking refers to a situation where the type and quantity of benefits are no longer linked to the particular genetic resources that are accessed and/or used.
This analysis forms the basis of a new ‘ABS Modalities Spectrum’, which helps to explain different aspects of multilateral ABS system design (Section 5). The hope is that future proposals for multilateral ABS mechanisms can use the ABS Modalities Spectrum to be more precise about the types of delinking being proposed, and that existing multilateral ABS mechanisms can be critiqued with greater specificity so that the outcomes of any proposed modifications are more predictable. By developing a common frame of reference for these key terms, we hope to ensure that negotiators are not talking at cross-purposes, as are the lion and human in the Wittgenstein quote above.
Finally, we examine our previous calls to ‘delink’ the two public health issues that the Pandemic Agreement’s PABS System is supposed to address (Section 6).Footnote 8 Since 2021, we have advocated addressing these two separate public health issues as two separate resource allocation problems (i.e., allocating pathogen resources and, separately, allocating scarce medical products in a pandemic), rather than treating them together as one ABS problem. Our proposal calls for both Category 1 and Category 2 delinking and, therefore, falls on the far end of the ABS Modalities Spectrum. In fact, ours is a proposal for extreme delinking, such that the solution drops off the Modalities Spectrum and no longer resides within the ABS policy space. This article, however, demonstrates that other stakeholders advocating delinking may fall somewhere else on the ABS Modalities Spectrum. As noted above, clarifying the various meanings of delinking and the creation of the ABS Modalities Spectrum will help to create a shared understanding that assists negotiators for the new multilateral PABS system. Building shared understandings on these key terms may help to promote consensus on the PABS system, on which the fate of the Pandemic Agreement now rests.Footnote 9
2. The Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) System in the Pandemic Agreement Negotiations
On 20 May 2025, the 78th World Health Assembly adopted the Pandemic Agreement,Footnote 10 after three years of negotiations between WHO member states to ‘draft and negotiate a WHO convention, agreement or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response’.Footnote 11 The Pandemic Agreement was praised as a triumph of multilateralism upon its adoption,Footnote 12 despite the fact that it cannot be opened for signature until after an annex detailing the operation of the PABS system is agreed by member states, via an Intergovernmental Working Group.Footnote 13 During the three-year negotiation period up to the adoption of the Pandemic Agreement, the provisions surrounding the creation and operationalization of a PABS system were undoubtedly the most contentious. In the time allocated for negotiations (which had already been extended by a year),Footnote 14 negotiators could agree only on the principles of a PABS system (outlined in Article 12 of the adopted textFootnote 15) but not the operational details of the system. The precise details of the PABS system are therefore yet to be negotiated. Put simply, negotiators excised the PABS system from the main text of the Pandemic Agreement so that the main text could be adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2025, giving member states extra time to negotiate a PABS annex.Footnote 16
It is clear from the few details provided in Article 12 of the Pandemic Agreement that the PABS system adopts the concept of ABS from international environmental law. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)Footnote 17 and its Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (Nagoya Protocol)Footnote 18 affirm that states have sovereign rights over all biological materials and conceive of access to ‘genetic resources’Footnote 19 as being regulated by states to ensure they receive a portion of the benefits associated with the use of those resources in research and development (R&D).Footnote 20 Typically, this transactional model of ABS requires potential users of genetic resources to obtain the prior informed consent of the country of origin to access those resources (unless otherwise determined by the provider party)Footnote 21 and access and use must be on mutually agreed terms,Footnote 22 which can include the fair and equitable sharing of associated monetary and/or non-monetary benefits.Footnote 23 Article 15(7) CBD states that ABS is to be carried out ‘with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources’.Footnote 24
ABS laws are implemented in domestic legislative, administrative or policy measures and can vary extensively around the world.Footnote 25 The bilateral ABS transactional mechanism described above – where providers and users come together to agree on terms about access to genetic resources and the sharing of benefits associated with their use – is just one way of regulating access to genetic resources. This article will describe various multilateral ABS mechanisms that have been devised for certain types of genetic resources (for example, plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and marine genetic resources found in areas beyond national jurisdiction).
Pathogens, like the SARS-CoV-2 virus that caused the COVID-19 pandemic, are genetic resources over which states have sovereign rights, and are therefore captured by domestic ABS laws.Footnote 26 While some states openly share their pathogens with scientists around the world, others regulate access to their pathogenic samples and associated genetic sequence data, and can require the sharing of benefits that arise from their use in medical R&D.Footnote 27 In such instances, scientists or pharmaceutical companies who want to access pathogen samples or associated data for use in R&D must negotiate mutually agreed terms with the provider state on a case-by-case basis. This means that bilateral ABS laws can, and do, hinder access to pathogenic genetic resources, introducing delays to the time-sensitive response to infectious disease emergencies.Footnote 28
The PABS system being negotiated under the Pandemic Agreement was proposed, among other things, to provide a multilateral alternative to the bilateral domestic laws for accessing samples of pathogens with human pandemic potential and associated data.Footnote 29 During the first three years of the Pandemic Agreement negotiations, opposing views emerged as to how the PABS system should be designed. Many disagreements revolved around the degree to which access would be linked to benefit-sharing.Footnote 30 As a generalization, low- and middle-income countries wanted to see access to pathogen samples and genetic sequence data linked with the sharing of associated benefits during a pandemic, while high-income countries and the pharmaceutical industry preferred a system where access to pathogens and associated data were not linked to the sharing of specific benefits.Footnote 31 The position of high-income countries and the pharmaceutical industry has been referred to as ‘delinking’ or ‘decoupling’ access from benefit-sharing.Footnote 32 The term ‘delinking’ is used here because the link between access and benefit-sharing is already well and truly established under international environmental law (reflected in the fact that the concept is called access and benefit-sharing). As discussed below, the deployment of the term ‘delinking’ during the negotiations for the PABS system under the Pandemic Agreement was the impetus for this article because ‘delinking’ has a more nuanced aetiology.
3. The Foundational Link of ABS: How Access to Genetic Resources Became ‘Linked’ to the Sharing of Associated Benefits
After the failed quest for a ‘New International Economic Order’ in the 1970s,Footnote 33 the newly decolonized and low-income countries promoted the idea that biodiversity was a global concern best addressed as the common heritage of humankind, for the benefit of everyone.Footnote 34 This changed in the 1980s with the increasing global recognitionFootnote 35 of a distinction between ‘elite’ germplasm (plant genetic resources), which could be appropriated with intellectual property like patents, versus unmodified germplasm, considered ‘common heritage’ and freely available. The injustice here was that low-income countries were often the source of this unmodified germplasm, which, as a result of being patented, became unavailable for research and breeding. Low-income countries were being forced to buy back patented inventions that were based on that unmodified germplasm. This germplasm was, in fact, ‘not a free gift of nature, but is the product of millions and millions of hours of human labour’ from Indigenous peoples and local communities (principally farmers).Footnote 36
This was, for many, a colonial erasure that denied the technology, culture, and agriculture informing the germplasm, and an abuse of the common heritage ideals making these materials a terra nullius and freely available for appropriation by ‘multinational companies’.Footnote 37 The new approach was to reject the application of the common heritage principle to genetic resources because while it ‘may be intuitively appealing … even if achieved, [it] would not necessarily bring material advantage to Third World nations’.Footnote 38 The solution posited at the time was ‘national sovereignty and the creation of compensatory mechanisms that ‘would help redress a significant asymmetry in the economic relationship between the advanced capitalist nations and the less developed countries’.Footnote 39 This was put into effect with the adoption of the CBD, which rejected common heritage, instead recognizing the sovereign rights of states to control access to their genetic resources, and linking access to the sharing of benefits.Footnote 40 Specifically, the CBD provided for facilitated access to physical resources (‘appropriate access to genetic resources’) in exchange for finances (‘appropriate funding’) and technology, including biotechnology (‘appropriate transfer of relevant technologies’).Footnote 41 This is the foundational link of ABS: states have sovereign rights over their genetic resources and can exchange access to those genetic resources for various (monetary and non-monetary) benefits. The explicit purpose of this foundational link in the CBD was to create an incentive to conserve all non-human genetic resources because they now had value as potential generators of benefits, compensating providers of genetic resources for sustained and ongoing in situ conservation efforts.Footnote 42
As noted in the previous section, Article 15 CBD outlines minimum requirements for ABS: the provider party (usually the country of origin of the genetic resource in question) gives prior informed consent to the user party (for example, a research institute or pharmaceutical company),Footnote 43 and both parties must come to mutually agreed terms about how the resources are to be used in R&D, and how the associated benefits will be shared.Footnote 44 Meeting these (typical) minimum requirements generally amounts to bilateral ABS agreements (permits or contracts) between the provider party and the user party, on a case-by-case basis.Footnote 45 While there is nothing in the CBD that ‘would prevent Contracting Parties from implementing the ABS provisions of the CBD through a multilateral approach’, most countries have implemented ABS in their domestic legislative, administrative, and policy measures in a way that defaults to bilateralism.Footnote 46
The 2010 Nagoya Protocol is a supplementary agreement to the CBD that is more explicit about the potential for multilateral ABS modalities. Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol asks parties to consider the need for other ABS modalities, including that of a Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism, which could collect the benefits from the use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge ‘that occur in transboundary situations,Footnote 47 or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent’ of the originating country.Footnote 48 The benefits generated through any such Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism are to ‘be used to support the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components globally’.Footnote 49 The negotiating history of Article 10 provides an interesting insight into the thinking behind its construction. The African Group had originally called for the establishment of a trust fund ‘for sharing the benefits arising from transactions that CBD Parties could not agree to include or exclude from the temporal and spatial scope of the Protocol – namely, acquisitions before the entry into force of the Protocol, notably in ex situ collections, and acquisitions from areas beyond national jurisdiction’.Footnote 50 In the view of the African Group the need for such a fund was connected to the notion that users owed a ‘moral obligation’ when they made use of any genetic resource or traditional knowledge, regardless of whether access predated the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol.Footnote 51 As set out by Morgera and others, the final text of Article 10 was not subject to any formal negotiation, but was rather put forward as a compromise in the final hours of the Protocol’s negotiations by the Conference of the Parties (COP) Presidency (Japan).Footnote 52 Accordingly, while Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol very much represents a compromise, its ultimate acceptance in the final text indicates that the negotiators understood the importance of multilateral ABS modalities when bilateralism cannot work (for example, when the country of origin for a particular sample cannot be identified, as in the case of ‘orphaned’ genetic resources) or is complicated by other factors (for example, the genetic resource of interest occurs in multiple countries). The Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism is intended to supplement, rather than replace, domestic bilateral ABS transactions in instances where the bilateral approach is not practical or feasible.Footnote 53
However, multilateral ABS frameworks can also be beneficial outside these specific situations. Multilateral ABS modalities with multiple providers and/or multiple users can reduce transaction costs when compared with bilateral ABS agreements on a case-by-case basis by introducing economies of scale.Footnote 54 Standardized multilateral approaches for accessing genetic resources can enhance legal clarity for provider and user parties.Footnote 55 The pooling of genetic resources can also create a greater variety of choice for user parties, and aggregating benefits can lead to better outcomes for provider parties. Furthermore, multilateral ABS mechanisms often have a centralized body (an ABS facilitator or other intermediary) with collective negotiating powers for providers and a greater capacity for monitoring and compliance. Thus, there are many reasons for countries to consider multilateral ABS modalities where there is no direct relationship between the genetic resource being accessed and the benefits being shared. However, any multilateral ABS system must be carefully designed to balance the opposing interests of providers and users: providers will not contribute genetic resources to a multilateral ABS system unless it delivers a greater quantum of benefits than would be expected through their own bilateral arrangements, and, relatedly, users are unlikely to use a multilateral ABS system if there are provider parties willing to provide the same (or similar) genetic resources outside the system at a lower cost.Footnote 56
While the CBD’s foundational linking of access to genetic resources with the requirement to share benefits was an attempt to mitigate inequitable and unfair exploitation of the resources of low-income countries, it was also the basis for further justice-related problems: (i) it led to the entrenchment of economic liberalism via the use of market-based instruments into decisions about biological materials (and information); and (ii) it gave states control over resources that had traditionally been governed by Indigenous peoples and local communities (including farmers). In short, linking access to benefit-sharing addressed one injustice while, at the same time, creating a gamut of other problems that now require solutions. One such problem includes the conceptual difficulties that arise when discussing the operation of multilateral ABS modalities.
4. ‘Delinking’ and ‘Decoupling’ in the ABS Literature
This section analyzes how the terms ‘delinking’ and ‘decoupling’ have been used in the ABS literature since the early 1990s. Of the three categories of meaning assigned to these terms in the literature, two relate to the operation of multilateral ABS modalities. This is because multilateral ABS modalities necessitate the breaking (or loosening) of the tight links between the bilateral default ABS transaction envisioned in Article 15 CBD (in terms of which prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms are negotiated directly between provider and user parties).Footnote 57 The breaking (or loosening) of these links may be unintentional (for example, when it is impossible to identify the country of origin for a particular sample), or it can be achieved conceptually in a number of different ways and to differing degrees. The next section analyzes the two categories of delinking that appear in the ABS literature, which are conceptually important for structuring multilateral ABS systems and are therefore relevant to the ongoing PABS negotiations.
4.1. Category 1: Breaking the Link Between the Country of Origin and the Receipt of Benefits
The CBD affirms that states have ‘sovereign rights’ over their natural resources, including genetic resources.Footnote 58 Hinterberger and Porter call these ‘sovereign rights’ a ‘tether’ that ‘anchors biological samples and data to territories and geopolitical bodies’.Footnote 59 Article 15(7) CBD states that Contracting Parties shall ‘take legislative, administrative or policy measures … with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources’.Footnote 60 The ‘Contracting Party providing such resources’ is considered to be those ‘Contracting Parties that are countries of origin of such resources or … Parties that have acquired the genetic resources in accordance with [the CBD]’.Footnote 61
Therefore, this conceptual tether extends from the country of origin to the genetic resource and through the ABS process,Footnote 62 with the benefits flowing back down the tether to the country of origin. Indeed, in elucidating this conceptual tether, Hinterberger and Porter explain how countries that may not otherwise hold a great deal of power in the biomedical research space can use this tether to capture some of the value generated in the R&D process.Footnote 63 Even when the provider of the genetic resource is a party that has ‘acquired the genetic resources in accordance with [the CBD]’, it is assumed that the country of origin is the Contracting Party that authorized the original collection of the sample, so the tether can remain intact (to some degree) through multiple ABS transactions.
Category 1 delinking can be thought of as a break in the tether between the country of origin and the benefits generated through R&D; that is, the country of origin of the genetic resource being accessed and/or used through the multilateral ABS system is not necessarily the recipient of resulting benefits. The benefits generated from the use of the genetic resources are pooled by the multilateral system, and the benefits are distributed according to criteria other than where the genetic resource originated. Genetic resources can be contributed to a wider pool of genetic resources (centralized genetic resources pool), or can be decentralized, with genetic resources stored in various ex situ repositories (which may or may not exist in the country of origin). Countries contribute their sovereign genetic resources to the multilateral system on the understanding that there will be no one-to-one transaction, where benefits are directed to the country of origin. Of course, some of the benefits may find their way back to the country of origin, but country of origin is not the sole criterion for determining the beneficiary, as it would be in the case of bilateral ABS negotiations.
Sometimes the tether between the country of origin and the genetic resource is broken not through the choice of the country of origin to contribute the genetic resource to a particular multilateral system, but through historical circumstances. Genetic resources might find their way into a multilateral ABS system because the country of origin is unknown (for example, where provenance information was never collected or is missing), or the genetic resource was accessed without the permission of the country of origin (often prior to the entry into force of the CBD). This is the type of situation envisioned by Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on the Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism, discussed above.Footnote 64
Category 1 delinking in the Plant Treaty
An example of a multilateral ABS system that employs Category 1 delinking is the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA or Plant Treaty)Footnote 65 Multilateral System, in terms of which there is a ‘complete delinking of the countries, individuals or communities who provide [plant genetic resources for food and agriculture] from the monetary benefits generated from the use of these materials’.Footnote 66 Monetary benefits arising from the use of plant genetic resources within the Multilateral System are shared on the basis of obligations arising from a Standard Material Transfer AgreementFootnote 67 (SMTA) and then pooled in a financial mechanism (a Benefit-Sharing Fund).Footnote 68 These benefits are designed to flow primarily (directly and indirectly) to farmers in all countries, but especially low-income countries, which conserve and sustainably use plant genetic resources.Footnote 69 Monetary benefit-sharing is required under the Plant Treaty when a recipient commercializes a product incorporating material from the Multilateral System and where that product is not made available without restriction to others for use in further plant research and breeding.Footnote 70 Such a restriction on research and breeding will occur, for example, if patent protection is granted for the particular product.Footnote 71 The default option for benefit-sharing under the Plant Treaty’s SMTA is payment of 1.1% of sales (less 30% for expenses)Footnote 72 when a product incorporating plant genetic resources from the Multilateral System is commercialized.Footnote 73 However, no payment is due where that product is made freely available for further research and breeding, though voluntary payments are encouraged.Footnote 74 The Plant Treaty Multilateral System fund ‘thus constitutes a pool that delinks the sharing of monetary benefits from the individual provider but maintains the purpose of assisting providers in general in their conservation endeavours’.Footnote 75 It takes the bilateral negotiations of ABS agreements that usually occur on a case-by-case basis, standardizes the terms on which the genetic resources are accessed and the benefits shared, and recognizes ‘the collective and incremental nature of the innovation process’.Footnote 76 In doing so, it intentionally breaks the tether between the country of origin as the recipient of benefits that would be expected in the default bilateral ABS arrangements.
Category 1 delinking in the PIP Framework
Another example of Category 1 delinking where the country of origin is not necessarily the recipient of benefits can be found in the WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework. WHO Member States contribute samples of influenza virus with human pandemic potential to the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System on standardized terms, and the benefits (pandemic influenza products such as diagnostics and vaccines) are pooled and shared with the WHO member states during an influenza pandemic.Footnote 77 The WHO is directed to distribute these products to member states on the basis of ‘public health risk and needs’ during an influenza pandemic.Footnote 78 That is, the beneficiaries of vaccines and other medical products need not include the country that provided the influenza virus sample used to develop said vaccines and other products.
Category 1 delinking in the BBNJ Agreement
A final example is the Agreement (under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)Footnote 79) on the Conservation and Sustainable use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement),Footnote 80 agreed in 2023. States cannot claim sovereignty or sovereign rights in areas beyond national jurisdiction, which are the high seas and the deep seabed below, constituting about two-thirds of the world’s oceans.Footnote 81 This means there is no country of origin as the provider of the marine genetic resources and DSI within the scope of the BBNJ Agreement that would have a direct entitlement to benefits from their use. Instead, the multilateral system has a notification (not authorization)Footnote 82 system for sharing information about collection and utilization activities, including sharing the location of marine genetic resources and DSI in repositories and databases for access by third parties (from any country) as forms of non-monetary benefit sharing.Footnote 83 As discussed in the next section, the phased approach to monetary benefit-sharing requires parties to make direct contributions (which are not dependent on ‘access’ or utilization) to a fund, but the COP has the mandate to make decisions after the BBNJ Agreement enters into force about any future modalities for benefit-sharing that might be tied to utilization activities, and to make decisions about how benefits will be distributed. This multilateral system does not link a country of origin with the receipt of benefits because the genetic resources in question came from areas beyond national jurisdiction – where no tether to a country of origin can exist.
Problems associated with Category 1 multilateral ABS systems
There are, however, some problems with these multilateral ABS systems related to Category 1 delinking. For example, the Plant Treaty’s Multilateral System pools benefits and distributes them based on project proposals.Footnote 84 As the country of origin of the plant genetic resource is unlikely to be the recipient of benefits, the Plant Treaty’s Multilateral System ‘does not take advantage of a potential motivation for making material available’ in the first place.Footnote 85 This disincentivizes novel contributions of plant genetic resources to the Multilateral System. This disincentive could be overcome if the contributing country was guaranteed at least a portion of the benefits associated with the use of those particular resources;Footnote 86 that is, if Category 1 delinking was (at least partially) relinked and the tether to the country of origin was one of the criteria used to determine beneficiaries.
A further problem with delinking the country of origin from the recipient of associated benefits is that the multilateral ABS system in question is potentially vulnerable to bilateral exchanges outside the system. The PIP Framework is a perfect example of this, whereby the WHO (as the multilateral intermediary) must distribute benefits on a ‘public health needs’ basis, according to whichever country has the greatest public health requirements, irrespective of whether that country provided samples to the system.Footnote 87 We have previously noted that:
[u]nder the PIP Framework, the WHO facilitates an ABS transaction where access is provided in exchange for the potential to obtain benefits. The link between the act of providing access to the sharing of benefits is therefore too weak to discourage free riders: those who do not submit samples to the [PIP Framework’s multilateral system] but can still expect to receive benefits if their country exhibits the greatest need in the event of a pandemic.Footnote 88
This makes the whole multilateral sharing arrangement vulnerable to bilateralism. A similar vulnerability appears to be being built into the PABS system currently being negotiated as part of the Pandemic Agreement, which may not be able to discourage free riders in an emergency situation.Footnote 89
4.2. Category 2: Delinking the Type and Quantity of Benefits Shared from the Particular Genetic Resources Accessed and/or Used in R&D
As previously discussed, the foundational link of ABS is about access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits associated with the utilization of such resources. The second category of delinking and/or decoupling used to describe the operationalization of multilateral ABS systems is about the type and quantity of the benefits shared – specifically, when the type and quantity of benefits are not connected to a specific genetic resource used in the R&D process. We call this ‘Category 2 delinking’, meaning that the benefits shared by the user parties to the multilateral ABS system are not based on the use of a particular sample obtained from the system but ‘on a more aggregated level’.Footnote 90 This category of delinking is recognition of the fact that scientific R&D occurs on an iterative and cumulative basis, using multiple inputs associated with both the physical and informational components of genetic resources. It is rare for a single genetic resource to be associated with a single innovation, and measuring the value that any one input might have contributed to a scientific innovation is difficult (if not impossible).Footnote 91
Category 2 delinking does not appear as frequently in the literature as Category 1 delinking, most likely because it had not been used as the primary basis for the pooling of benefits under any multilateral ABS frameworks.Footnote 92 There are, however, aspects of this approach incorporated within the PIP Framework, the Plant Treaty, the BBNJ Agreement, and the emerging arrangements for benefit-sharing on DSI under the CBD, all of which are discussed in this section. One point to note is that Category 2 delinking cannot exist without Category 1 delinking already being part of the design of a multilateral ABS system; that is, it is impossible to have benefits determined without reference to a specific genetic resource sample (Category 2), and then have those benefits returned to a country of origin (Category 1). This is because if there is no specified genetic resource dictating the type and quantum of benefits, there is no relationship to any particular country of origin. However, Category 1 delinking can exist in the absence of Category 2 delinking. In the examples below, we discuss aspects of existing multilateral ABS systems, demonstrating that the systems themselves may contain elements of both types of delinking, but may not (as a system) fit neatly and entirely into a single category.Footnote 93
Category 2 delinking in the PIP Framework
A particular feature of the PIP Framework that could be considered to fit within Category 2 delinking is the Partnership Contribution. Every year, some of the users of the WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response SystemFootnote 94 (namely, large pharmaceutical companies) make a payment to the PIP Framework, totalling United States (US) $28 million per yearFootnote 95 (which was considered to be half of the operating costs of the system when the PIP Framework was devised in 2011).Footnote 96 This payment, and the amount of the payment, have nothing to do with any one sample of influenza virus with human pandemic potential that is accessed through the PIP Framework. It is required by virtue of the fact that these users intend to use the WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System to access physical samples under the terms of the PIP Framework’s multilateral ABS system at some point. The Partnership Contribution therefore constitutes benefits that are delinked from any particular sample or its utilization in their R&D process.
Category 2 delinking in the Plant Treaty
In a similar vein, an alternative benefit-sharing option is available under the Plant Treaty’s SMTA to that discussed above in the Category 1 delinking example. Under this option, recipients pay 0.5% of ‘gross sales on all products of the species they accessed from the [Multilateral System], regardless of whether the products incorporate the material accessed and regardless of whether or not the new products are available without restriction’.Footnote 97 Accordingly, this alternative option requires benefit-sharing payments to be made at the specific, albeit discounted rate, regardless of whether the product actually incorporates material from the Multilateral System; that is, benefit-sharing is about a broader category (species) and not about a particular sample of that species (plant genetic resource) used in the R&D process. Notably, however, this option has proven unpopular with users, the majority of whom have opted for the standard benefit-sharing option discussed under Category 1 delinking above.Footnote 98
The Plant Treaty’s governing body is currently undertaking a reassessment of the SMTA, and is reconsidering the scope of the Multilateral System.Footnote 99 This reassessment is part of a more wide-ranging process to enhance the overall functioning of the Multilateral System,Footnote 100 and is intended (among other things) to address concerns regarding the very low levels of returns from user-based payments under the Plant Treaty,Footnote 101 which has relied mainly on voluntary contributions to finance the Benefit-Sharing Fund. A subscription system has been considered as part of these discussions, to ensure more predictable monetary benefits, rather than waiting for the results of commercialization.Footnote 102 A subscription system would constitute Category 2 delinking, as payment would be required based on an intention to access but delinked from any particular sample of a plant genetic resource or its utilization. A subscription system would hence break the link between the genetic resource and the type and quantum of benefits to be shared. The ‘decoupling of benefit-sharing from the actual use of an individual genetic resource’ in the Plant Treaty (and other multilateral ABS systems) ‘would have the enormous advantage of completely removing the need to track the use of individual genetic resources [and is a] promising way to keep monitoring costs as low as possible’.Footnote 103
Category 2 delinking in the CBD DSI Multilateral Mechanism
Category 2 delinking may also be seen in the CBD under its nascent arrangements for the sharing of benefits associated with the use of DSI on genetic resources. In December 2022, the CBD COP adopted Decision 15/9, beginning the formal process of developing a multilateral mechanism for benefit-sharing associated with DSI.Footnote 104 Decision 15/9 stated that benefits from the use of DSI should be shared fairly and equitably, that the distribution of DSI and distinctive practices regarding its use require a distinctive solution for benefit-sharing, and parties agreed to ‘establish a multilateral mechanism for benefit-sharing from the use of digital sequence information on genetic resources, including a global fund’.Footnote 105 One suggestion for distinctive solutions included ‘[c]ompanies in sectors that are highly dependent on the use of DSI will contribute X per cent of their revenue’ to the global fund.Footnote 106 It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that the CBD COP meeting in 2024 adopted Decision 16/2 on DSI, directing that ‘[u]sers of digital sequence information on genetic resources in sectors that directly or indirectly benefit from its use in their commercial activities should contribute a proportion of their profits or revenue to the global fund, according to their size’.Footnote 107 The multilateral Cali FundFootnote 108 is to be established for this purpose.
An indicative list of sectors that may benefit directly or indirectly from the use of DSI is set out in Decision 16/2,Footnote 109 together with indicative payment rates,Footnote 110 with precise thresholds and contribution rates to be determined by the COP. The multilateral ABS mechanism for DSI set out in Decision 16/2 is an example of Category 2 delinking as the type and quantum of the benefits shared into the Cali Fund look to be disconnected from the actual access and use of any particular resource(s) within the multilateral mechanism. It breaks the link between the genetic resource (or in this case the DSI on the genetic resource) and the type and quantum of benefits to be shared.Footnote 111
Category 2 delinking in the BBNJ Agreement
When it enters into force, the BBNJ Agreement will be the only multilateral benefit-sharing fund that is solely dependent on direct contributions of parties, independent (and hence Category 2 delinked) of the regulated objects (marine genetic resources from areas beyond national jurisdiction and associated DSI), until such time as new rules are agreed by the COP. Developed country parties must make annual contributions to the fund at the rate of 50% of that party’s assessed contribution to the budget adopted by the COP.Footnote 112 This is to be paid only by developed countries and is designed as a reliable and predictable flow of financial resources into the fund to be used for capacity-building and conservation measures.Footnote 113 These contributions must continue until a decision is taken by the COP on modalities for monetary benefit-sharing, which might include milestone payments, a percentage of revenue or a set of indicators measuring the aggregate level of activities by a party.Footnote 114 One such indicator might be the biennial aggregate reports to the ABS Committee that will be prepared by repositories and databases on access to marine genetic resources and DSI linked to the BBNJ standardized batch identifier,Footnote 115 which is in turn linked to the notification for collection of marine genetic resources as a transparency measure.Footnote 116 Aggregate use – Category 2 delinking – offers a compromise that would not require an extensive track-and-trace system, thereby keeping the costs of the system as low as possible.Footnote 117
Problems associated with Category 2 delinking
Like Category 1 delinking, this type of delinking has its own disadvantages, which were also recognized in the literature:
[D]ecoupling benefit-sharing from use, even if there are important transaction-cost gains for all, might in some cases lead to less willingness to pay, as the level of payment would be determined in accordance with the benefits from use activities in general, without necessarily differentiating between high added value uses and low added value uses. In this regard, a proper balance between general cost-sharing (such as in a tax system) and more targeted contribution from those who have the highest willingness to pay, because they are the direct beneficiaries of a specific added value or service (such as in a mandatory insurance or a liability system), would have to be carefully considered.Footnote 118
More generally, if the benefits to be shared with a multilateral ABS system are not associated with any particular genetic resource, then benefit-sharing would be triggered ‘from use activities in general’ and ‘without necessarily differentiating between high added-value uses and low added-value uses’.Footnote 119 That is, a payment for access to a multilateral ABS system (as opposed to a particular sample from that system) may not reflect the type or value of benefits that the user generates (or potentially, whether they even generate any benefits at all). If users are required to pay either monetary or non-monetary benefits delinked from access to a particular genetic resource, the user may decide that the payment does not adequately reflect the value obtained by using the system (remembering that bilateral alternatives often coexist with the multilateral system), and the incentive for users to participate starts to decline.Footnote 120 To reiterate, the biggest problem with Category 1 delinking is that it can reduce the incentive for providers to participate, while the biggest problem with Category 2 delinking is that it can reduce the incentive for users to participate.
Furthermore, if the degree to which the delinking occurs is too extreme and there is no longer any discernible association between the multilateral ABS system’s genetic resources and the benefit shared, providers and users may find that the system in which they are participating is no longer an ABS system at all. For example, in reference to the negotiations for the BBNJ Agreement, Oldham, Chiarolla and Thambisetty noted that:
[the degree of] ‘decoupling’ has perhaps gone to unreasonable lengths when it seeks to dissociate benefit sharing from all kinds of (individual and aggregate) use of [marine genetic resources], leaving only the option of payments that are not a ‘share’ of anything because they are untethered with respect to any specific activity or outcome.Footnote 121
5. The ABS Modalities Spectrum
5.1. Introducing the ABS Modalities Spectrum
Having discussed the two categories of delinking, we now set out what we call the ‘ABS Modalities Spectrum’. Clearly, a multilateral ABS system will generally necessitate some form of delinking to work; this is the nature of making what was designed to be a bilateral transaction operate as a multilateral mechanism. However, what Oldham and co-authors highlight is that delinking can occur in degrees. This was also noted by Louafi and Schloen in 2013, when they stated that in designing a multilateral ABS system ‘careful consideration would have to be given to the various possible models of decoupling, which may be partial or total’.Footnote 122 This points to the existence of a spectrum of multilateral ABS options: the ‘ABS Modalities Spectrum’ (see Figure 1).
The ABS Modalities Spectrum
The ABS Modalities Spectrum shows that the two categories of delinking discussed above can be combined in different ways to create different forms of multilateral ABS system.Footnote 123 The top of Figure 1 shows the canonical ABS transaction as envisioned by Article 15 CBD (bilateral ABS between provider and user parties). Then, as delinking takes place, a spectrum of options unfold. One option for a multilateral ABS system is a situation where many bilateral ABS transactions can take place between approved parties, managed by an intermediary. As Category 1 delinking occurs, we see other options emerge, where benefits are pooled by an intermediary, and the provider country (country of origin) and the beneficiary are not necessarily the same party. As explained above, one example of this is the Plant Treaty Multilateral System where 1.1% of the royalty on the sale of the product using specific genetic resources is pooled and later distributed to applicants on the basis of project proposals.
Another example is the PIP Framework’s commitments between vaccine manufacturers and the WHO.Footnote 124 The WHO intends to pool vaccine doses in the event of an influenza pandemic to be distributed to countries on the basis of public health risk and need. The WHO member state(s) that provided the influenza sample(s) used in the research, development, and/or production of the vaccine are not necessarily the member states that will receive those doses as benefits. In the context of the BBNJ Agreement, non-monetary benefits in the form of opportunities for involvement in collection, R&D activities, or depositing samples and DSI in publicly accessible repositories and databases are pooled benefits for uptake by researchers in any country.Footnote 125
As we move down the delinking spectrum and further away from the bilateral ABS model, we come to an option where both Category 1 and Category 2 delinking exists: where the provider country and the beneficiary are delinked and the benefits that are pooled are not directly linked to the specific resources obtained or used by the user parties. Examples of this would be a fee paid to log into a sequence database, the Partnership Contribution component of the PIP Framework, the Cali Fund to be established by the CBD, and the BBNJ Agreement’s direct contribution.
Of course, there may also arise situations whereby access is so thoroughly delinked from benefit-sharing that the system can no longer be said to even qualify as ABS in any sense envisioned by the CBD or its Nagoya Protocol. Examples of this might be taxes, levies or dues that are paid by stakeholder groups even if they do not necessarily access or use the pooled genetic resources governed under the multilateral arrangement. In this vein, at least two drafts of the Pandemic Agreement contained language to the effect that any stakeholder in the world producing pandemic-related products would be required to share benefits whether or not they had obtained pathogens with pandemic potential (or related genetic sequence data) through the PABS system.Footnote 126 In this instance, the foundational link of ABS no longer exists (i.e., there is no direct or even indirect relationship between the provider of genetic resources and a user party).Footnote 127 This is the type of disconnect to which Oldham and co-authors were referring in the previous section, where the benefits ‘are not a “share” of anything because they are untethered with respect to any specific activity or outcome’ related to genetic resources.Footnote 128
Conceptualizing ABS modalities as a spectrum has a further advantage, beyond adding conceptual clarity to debates. It may also assist with interpreting the evolving principle of the fair and equitable sharing of benefits under international law, including international human rights law.Footnote 129 Whereas fair and equitable benefit-sharing is expressed in ABS frameworks as an objective, the BBNJ Agreement articulates ABS as both an objective and a principle: to achieve the objectives of the BBNJ Agreement (the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction in the present and the long term) and the objectives of its marine genetic resource governance framework (benefit-sharing, capacity-building, generation of knowledge and transfer of marine technology), parties ‘shall be guided by … (d) [t]he principle of equity and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits’.Footnote 130
The principle of equity is well established under international law, where intergenerational equity can mean ensuring that actions of current generations do not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their needs, and intragenerational equity can mean an equitable distribution of resources, opportunities and benefits among current countries and individuals. Morgera has argued that interstate benefit-sharing has been established either as a principle or as a mechanism to realize equity in relations among states ‘concerned with the global commons or situations of exchange’.Footnote 131 However, the BBNJ Agreement has gone further and conflated the established principle of equity with the more nebulous principle of fair and equitable benefit-sharing, the significance of which is yet to be understood through state practice. In the context of the analysis in this article, different considerations of equity may arise depending on the extent to which benefits owed are linked to the provenance of genetic resources (Category 1) and depending on the extent to which benefits are linked to resources that are accessed or used (Category 2). If ABS is conceived of as a spectrum of relationships that can contain different combinations of these categories of delinking, then the context for fairness and equity might be more clearly articulated to guide decision-making in these relationships. Such a contextual elucidation is likely to be particularly useful for the ongoing negotiations on the PABS annex, with negotiators’ desire for equity in the Agreement very much finding expression in the fair and equitable sharing of benefits to be provided for under the PABS system.Footnote 132
5.2. Considering ‘Upstream’ and ‘Downstream’ Models of ABS
In his 2021 article, Winter discusses upstream and downstream ABS models, so categorized on the basis of ‘who controls the valorisation chain of [genetic resources]’:Footnote 133 ‘Models at the upstream end are characterized by provider state control of the chain down to benefit sharing while models at the downstream end delink benefit sharing from provider state control although providing them with shared benefits in a generalized way’.Footnote 134 At the downstream end of the valorization chain, Winter presents options that incorporate what we have called Category 1 delinking. He states that organizing various ABS options as being upstream or downstream along the valorization chain is a more useful way to consider ABS options than making a simple distinction between bilateral and multilateral systems.Footnote 135 There are certainly overlaps with the bilateral/multilateral distinction ‘because while the upstream models could be bilateral and multilateral the downstream models only make sense if being multilateral’.Footnote 136
The ABS Modalities Spectrum developed in this article offers yet another way of thinking about multilateral ABS options. While Winter’s organizing principle is about who controls the valorization of genetic resources, the ABS Modalities Spectrum presented here is focused on the various categories and degrees of delinking that can exist within multilateral ABS options. While Category 1 delinking, as we have called it, is discussed in Winter’s schema, Category 2 delinking is yet another consideration for the design of multilateral ABS systems that is not often recognized as a separate category of delinking. The distinction is important because the degree to which Category 2 delinking occurs can alter the very nature of the multilateral system to the point that it is no longer engaging in ABS at all. Those tasked with negotiating new multilateral ABS systems, including the PABS system under the WHO Pandemic Agreement, must therefore think carefully about the categories of delinking they want the new system to employ, and to what degree.Footnote 137
5.3. The Utility of the ABS Modalities Spectrum
Our hope is that the ABS Modalities Spectrum, organized around the two categories of delinking employed throughout the last 30 years of ABS literature in environmental law, can help those negotiating new multilateral ABS systems (or modifying existing ones) to determine how best to operationalize certain aspects of the system they are designing. The ABS Modalities Spectrum might allow them to think more creatively about how to combine various options, rather than defaulting to standard legal tools that may not always be the best fit for the multilateral ABS systems. As a case in point, for many, the idea of multilateral ABS is associated inextricably with SMTAs or some other form of (direct or indirect) contractual arrangement between provider and user parties. This is almost certainly a legacy of the CBD’s framing of ABS as a contractual arrangement requiring prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms, a framing that carried over to the Plant Treaty’s Multilateral System and the PIP Framework. We can also see the influence of the PIP Framework carried across to the Pandemic Agreement’s PABS system. The outline of PABS provided in Article 12 of the adopted Pandemic Agreement demonstrates something of a cookie-cutter approach to multilateral system design, adopting the PIP Framework approach that employs SMTAs (referred to in Article 12 as ‘legally binding contracts’) to establish legal obligations for private actors to share benefits with the WHO. This is despite significant practical and conceptual differences between PABS and the PIP Framework.Footnote 138
It is a timely reminder, then, that multilateral systems that delink access from benefit-sharing (in both Category 1 and Category 2 senses) can be implemented without the use of private contracts (like SMTAs).Footnote 139 Multilateral ABS modalities can instead ‘require the contracting parties to legislate and create the obligation to share benefits by public, rather than private, law … [and] require the state to enforce the execution of obligations’.Footnote 140 CBD COP Decision 16/2 on benefit-sharing associated with the use of DSI, for instance, does not seek to utilize private law contracts to operationalize its provisions. Instead, it invites ‘Parties and non-Parties … to take administrative, policy or legislative measures, consistent with national legislation, to incentivize users in their jurisdiction to contribute to the global fund in line with the modalities of the multilateral mechanism’.Footnote 141
It is therefore likely that national laws will help to operationalize the benefit-sharing mandates of the (non-binding) COP Decision 16/2, underscoring that a range of design solutions do exist, and may be especially useful in times of global emergencies.Footnote 142
6. Implications for Proposals to Delink Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing
As this analysis has shown, when negotiators for the PABS system under the Pandemic Agreement deploy the term ‘delinking’, they could be referring to any number of options on an ABS Modalities Spectrum. It is therefore essential for negotiators to clarify which category of delinking they are referring to and where on the ABS Modalities Spectrum their delinked proposal sits. Without such a clarification, WHO member states could be agreeing to a poorly defined PABS system containing provisions that carry different meanings for different parties. Given the critical public health importance of both timely access to pathogen samples and related genetic sequences – as well as access to vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics – negotiators cannot afford to get this wrong.
Since 2021, we have argued that pathogens should not be subject to the ABS transaction on the basis that the WHO, as the UN specialized agency for health, must distribute medicines to the countries with the greatest public health need. It cannot provide such ‘benefits’ as a reward for contributing pathogens to a multilateral ABS system.Footnote 143 However, as noted above, the link between providing samples and receiving benefits is too weak and hence may not be sufficient to discourage free riders (that is, countries that do not contribute to the system, but can still receive benefits from it).Footnote 144 This, in turn, creates the perverse incentive for other countries to withhold valuable pathogen samples and engage in bilateral ABS transactions outside the multilateral system.Footnote 145 In a previous article, we called for the ‘conceptual delinkage of access from benefit-sharing in public health’Footnote 146 so that each part of the system could be designed independently ‘rather than being framed as a trade-off between parties with opposing incentives’.Footnote 147 That is, access to pathogens and associated data would be addressed as an entirely different problem from access to diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics, and the like.Footnote 148
Though we did not express it in such terms at the time, our proposal constitutes both Category 1 and Category 2 delinking, where the provider country and the beneficiary are delinked, with benefits pooled and not directly linked to the specific resources obtained or used by the user parties.Footnote 149 Indeed, our proposal is at the bottom end of the ABS Modalities Spectrum, with access to pathogenic genetic resources delinked from the sharing of tangible benefits to the point where it can no longer be considered ‘access and benefit-sharing’ in the sense created by the CBD and reinforced by the Nagoya Protocol. In essence, the access system we propose (access to pathogens) is so thoroughly delinked from benefit-sharing (access to medicines) that it would not be considered ABS at all.Footnote 150 We argued that ‘it is not necessary to link these issues through anything that looks like an ABS transaction, whether bilateral or multilateral’.Footnote 151 Instead, we have advocated the creation of a permanent medical countermeasures platform for the distribution of vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics during public health emergencies, together with technology transfer and a loosening of intellectual property rules.Footnote 152 We proposed that this system could be funded multilaterally via taxes and/or levies paid for by the pharmaceutical industry.Footnote 153 Our proposal therefore falls at the extreme (bottom) end of the ABS Modalities Spectrum, and reflects the type of total disconnect to which Oldham and co-authors referred as arising when benefits ‘are not a “share” of anything because they are untethered with respect to any specific activity or outcome’ using genetic resources.Footnote 154 Accordingly, while this is ‘delinking’, it is very clear our proposal is markedly different from the delinking proposed by the likes of the pharmaceutical industry.Footnote 155
7. Conclusion
It is now clear that the Pandemic Agreement negotiations are locked into a multilateral PABS system based on contracts that commit industry to sharing diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics.Footnote 156 While we do not believe that such a PABS system will be capable of delivering equitable outcomes for low-income countries,Footnote 157 particularly during a pandemic emergency, we still think it is important to ensure that whatever PABS system is ultimately negotiated has the best chance of working. Therefore, our intent here has been to clarify precisely what is meant by the terms ‘delinking’ and ‘decoupling’ as they have been used in the ABS space over the last three decades. The ABS Modalities Spectrum that emerges through the analysis of existing ABS literature may be helpful in clarifying the positions of negotiators who are trying to develop and operationalize the PABS system. Some degree of delinking is necessary to make what was initially designed as a bilateral ABS transaction work as a multilateral system. However, designing such a system requires a careful balancing of incentives as Category 1 delinking can reduce the incentive for provider parties to contribute genetic resources to a multilateral system, while Category 2 delinking can reduce incentives for users to participate if they decide the benefits they have to contribute do not reflect the value they obtain from the system. This is particularly the case when users can find alternative sources of the same (or similar) genetic resources outside the multilateral system.
This analysis also serves as a timely reminder that benefit-sharing (as a principle and an objective) does not need to take the form of the ABS transaction at all. Benefit-sharing can occur without access, but it is no longer ‘access and benefit-sharing’ in accordance with the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol. Benefit-sharing need not be tethered to a country of origin (Category 1 delinking); nor do the types of benefit and their amounts need to be linked to the access and/or use of a particular genetic resource (Category 2 delinking). Furthermore, it is not necessary to operationalize a multilateral benefit-sharing system using private law contracts. As member states continue to negotiate the PABS system, it is worth keeping these design elements in mind and remembering that there are alternatives to ABS that may have a better chance of delivering on the goals of fairness and equity in the conduct of scientific R&D. More generally, however, it is essential that negotiators begin to understand what they mean by delinking access from benefit-sharing. In creating the ABS Modalities Spectrum we hope to provide a better understanding of what the lion is saying.
Acknowledgements
Not applicable.
Funding statement
This research was supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC) through the Discovery Early Career Research Award (DECRA), Project DE240100562.
Competing interests
Stephanie Switzer has previously undertaken paid consultancies for the CBD and the European Commission.
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