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All Roads Lead to Beijing? Shifts in Chinese Labour and Capital During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2023

Ying Wu ,
Leigha Crout  and
Aleksandar Matković
Ying Wu*
Affiliation:
Shanghai Jiao Tong University KoGuan Law School and Harvard Law School
Leigha Crout
Affiliation:
King's College London and the University of Wisconsin Law School
Aleksandar Matković
Affiliation:
Institute of Economic Sciences in Belgrade, Serbia
*
Corresponding author. E-mail: wuyingwy@outlook.com
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Abstract

The unprecedented global pandemic has shaken the world's foundations – upending legal institutions, toppling established principles of transnational governance, and limiting mobility between nations. In the People's Republic of China (the PRC or China), one of the most significant legal developments is the major reconfiguration of the state's labour and capital policies oriented towards its economic partners with emerging economies and economies in transition. These policies have changed dramatically, especially given the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on lower-income states. China's domestic situation and its need to meet evolving transnational demands also contribute to the reformation of these economic ties, and perhaps precede further changes to be implemented in the future. To provide much-needed insight into this ongoing transformation, this Article investigates how China's labour and capital policies towards its key international partners have developed in response to the pandemic. Drawing on three case studies, we use a socio-legal approach to analyse the status of migrants from African countries in China, labour immigration to China from its southwestern border regions, and the emigration of Chinese nationals to Serbia and the Balkans for the purposes of labour and investment. Through these representative developments, this Article unveils new trends in China's post-pandemic labour and capital policies, including enhanced responsiveness; a security-centric approach to border management; and an improving regulatory approach to ordinary migration channels.

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Article
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Asian Journal of Comparative Law , Volume 18 , Special Issue 1: China's Global Capital and the Coronavirus: Views from Comparative Law and Regulation , April 2023 , pp. 20 - 36
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the National University of Singapore

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Footnotes

*

PhD candidate, Shanghai Jiao Tong University KoGuan Law School; China-US Scholar, Harvard Law School.

**

J.D. LL.M., PhD candidate, King's College London; William H. Hastie Fellow at the University of Wisconsin Law School.

***

Philosopher and activist (Serbia). Research Assistant at the Institute of Economic Sciences in Belgrade.

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15 Also referred to as the Tanzam Railway or the Uhuru Railway. See ‘China's Assistance in the Construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway [中国援建坦赞铁路]’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 7 Nov 2000), <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cohk/chn/topic/zgwj/wjlshk/t9001.htm> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

16 ‘Data: China-Africa Trade’ (The China Africa Research Initiative, 2021) <http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade> accessed 21 Sep 2021

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18 Li Zhangpeng, ‘Analysis of Overseas Chinese in Africa [非洲侨情分析]’ (World Overseas Chinese Report [世界侨情报告], 1 Dec 2020) <https://www.pishu.com.cn/skwx_ps/databasedetail?SiteID=14&contentId=12330675&contentType=literature&type=%25E6%258A%25A5%25E5%2591%258A&subLibID> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

19 Bodomo, Adams, ‘Historical and contemporary perspectives on inequalities and well-being of Africans in China’ (2020) 21 Asian Ethnicity 526, 528CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 Shanshan Lan, Mapping the New African Diaspora in China: Race and the Cultural Politics of Belonging (Routledge 2017) 2; see also Asha-Rose Migiro, ‘Chinese Dream, African Dream: Achieving Common Development’ (China Daily, 28 Aug 2013) <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-08/28/content_16927171.htm> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

21 Ouassini, Anwar, Amini, Mostafa & Ouassini, Nabil, ‘#ChinaMustexplain: Global Tweets, COVID-19, and Anti-Black Racism in China’ (2022) 49 The Review of Black Political Economy 61CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

22 National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Main Data of the Seventh National Population Census’ (5 May 2021) <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202105/t20210510_1817185.html> accessed 3 Oct 2022.

23 Lan, Shanshan, ‘State Regulation of Undocumented African Migrants in China: A Multi-Scalar Analysis’ (2015) 50 Journal of Asian and African Studies 289, 295CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 See eg, ‘Investigation on the Gathering of People of African Descent: Tens of Thousands of People Reside Illegally in Guangzhou’ [非洲裔人员聚集事件调查：数万人非法居留广州]’ (Sina News Center [新闻中心], 20 Jul 2009) <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2009-07-20/095918257011.shtml> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

25 Heidi Haugen, ‘Destination China: The Country Adjusts to its New Migration Reality’ (Migration Policy Institute, 4 Mar 2015) <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/destination-china-country-adjusts-its-new-migration-reality> accessed 21 Sep 2021

26 ibid. Guangdong province, where Guangzhou is located, issued its own anti-immigration rules during this time that provided “rewards” for individuals or businesses that reported suspected san fei offenders and broadened police powers to deal with illegal migrants. Interim Provisions of Guangdong Province on Foreigner Management Services [广东省外国人管理服务暂行规定] (16 Mar 2011), arts 10 and 48 <http://www.gd.gov.cn/gkmlpt/content/0/139/post_139630.html#6> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

27 Jenni Marsh & Nectar Gan, ‘Africans in Guangzhou are on Edge’ (CNN, 12 Apr 2020) <https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/10/china/africans-guangzhou-china-coronavirus-hnk-intl/index.html> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

28 Hillary Leung, ‘Africans in Guangzhou Say They Are Targets of Discrimination Over Coronavirus’ (Time Magazine, 16 Apr 2020) <https://time.com/5820389/africans-guangzhou-china-coronavirus-discrimination/> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

29 ibid.

30 Leigha Crout, ‘Economic Migration of African Migrants to China in the Era of COVID-19: Tensions and Transitions’ (The University of Oxford China, Law and Development Project, Research Brief No 1/2021, 27 Apr 2021) <https://cld.web.ox.ac.uk/files/finalrbleighacroutpdf> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

31 Ouassini et al, ‘#ChinaMustexplain’ (n 21) 68.

32 Jenni Marsh, ‘Beijing Faces a Diplomatic Crisis After Reports of Mistreatment of Africans in China Causes Outrage’ (CNN, 14 Apr 2020) <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/13/asia/china-guangzhou-african-blacklash-hnk-intl/index.html> accessed 21 Sep 2021; see also Oloye Akin Alabi (@akinalabi), ‘Mr Speaker reads the riot act to the Chinese ambassador: We will not tolerate maltreatment of Nigerians in China!!!’ (Twitter, 11 Apr 2020) <https://twitter.com/akinalabi/status/1248690552486400001> accessed 21 Sep 2021; Dave Kirton, ‘Treatment of Africans in Southern China Sparks Diplomatic Backlash’ (Reuters, 16 Apr 2020), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-africans/treatment-of-africans-in-southern-china-sparks-diplomatic-backlash-idUSKCN21Y0PL> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

33 Kirton (n 32).

34 See eg, Huaxia, ‘Rumor Buster: Videos Showing Discrimination in China's Anti-Epidemic Measures are Fake’ (Xinhua, 24 Apr 2020) <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-04/24/c_139005055.htm> accessed 1 Jan 2023.

35 While a complaint hotline was established in Guangzhou to report unequal practices, at present the effectiveness of this initiative is not clear. Feng Shuang, ‘Guangdong Orders Same Treatment to All Amid Epidemic Control’ (China News, 2 May 2020) <http://www.ecns.cn/news/2020-05-02/detail-ifzvxzhm6834063.shtml> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

36 Jenni Marsh, ‘China Keeps Promising Africa Coronavirus Vaccines. But Where Are They?’ (CNN, 11 Jan 2021) <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/09/china/china-vaccine-diplomacy-africa-dst-intl-hnk/index.html> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

37 See eg, ‘China to Donate 100,000 COVID-19 Vaccine Doses to the Congo Republic’ (Reuters, 5 Feb 2021) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-congorepublic-vacc/china-to-donate-100000-covid-19-vaccine-doses-to-congo-republic-idUSKBN2A42OI> accessed 21 Sep 2021.

38 Kwasi Gyamfi Asiedu & Yomi Kazeem, ‘Chinese workers are facing a backlash across Africa over the Guangzhou racism incidents’ (Quartz, 20 Jul 2022) <https://qz.com/africa/1860045/china-faces-african-backlash-of-guangzou-racism-incidents/> accessed 3 Oct 2022.

39 ‘Chinese Ambassador Meets the Deputy Chairperson over the Attack on Africans in China’ (African Union Directorate of Information & Communication, 31 Apr 2020) <https://qz.com/africa/1860045/china-faces-african-backlash-of-guangzou-racism-incidents/> accessed 3 Oct 2022.

40 The other is Russia.

41 Huang, Daquan, Lang, Yue & Liu, Tao, ‘Evolving Population Distribution in China's Border Regions: Spatial Differences, Driving Forces and Policy Implications’ (2020) 15(10) PLoS ONECrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed <https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0240592 > accessed 20 Nov 2021.

42 Daming Zhou [周大明]，’The Review and Prospect of the Study on Borderland Immigration in China

[我国边境移民研究的回顾与展望]’ (2021) 5 Academic Research [学术研究] 39.

43 Franziska Plümmer, ‘Border Crossers and the Militarization of China's Border in Times of COVID-19’ (Transient Spaces, 13 Aug 2020) <https://www.transient-spaces.org/blog/blog-border-crossers-and-the-militarization-of-chinas-border-in-times-of-covid19/> accessed 20 Nov 2021.

44 See eg, Niva Yau, ’China's Security Management towards Central Aisa’ (Foreign Policy Research Institute, Apr 2022) <https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/chinas-security-management-towards-central-asia.pdf> accessed 5 Oct 2022 (a very recent study on China's security-centric migration governance towards Central Asia).

45 Yew Lun Tian & Keith Zhai, ‘China scrambles to plug border gaps as thousands flood home’ (Reuter, 3 Apr 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-border/china-scrambles-to-plug-border-gaps-as-thousands-flood-home-idUSKBN21L1B8> accessed 20 Nov 2021.

46 ibid.

47 Grid management is a mode of social management system by Chinese government aims to impose a direct and close monitoring of society to collect information and pre-empt social instability in a timely manner. The adoption of grid management signals the government's tightened monitoring of society in China. See Yongshun Cai, ‘Grid Management and Social Control in China’ (Asia Dialogue, 28 Apr 2018) <https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/04/27/grid-management-and-social-control-in-china/ > accessed 12 Oct 2022.

48 ‘Yunnan Reported 114 New Confirmed Coronavirus Cases, Three Lines of Defense Have Been Set Up [云南确诊新型冠状病毒感染病例 114 例，已设三道防线全力外堵输入]’ (Yunnan News [云南网], 3 Feb 2020) <https://m.yunnan.cn/system/2020/02/03/030580259.shtml> accessed 20 Nov 2021.

49 ‘Li Keqiang presided over the meeting of the Chinese Central Leading Group on Taskforce on Responding to the COVID-19 Outbreak, requiring the continued efforts to normalize the prevention and control of the epidemic and the further prevention of the cross-border import of epidemics on land borders, as well as optimizing the prevention and control measures of enterprises and institutions to effectively promote the resumption of work and production [李克强主持召开中央应对新冠肺炎疫情工作领导小组会议 要求持续抓好疫情常态化防控 进一步防范陆地边境疫情跨境输入 动态优化企事业单位防控措施有力有序推进复工复产]’ (Central Government of the Peoples’ Republic of China [中央人民政府网], 6 Apr 2020) <http://www.gov.cn/premier/2020-04/06/content_5499619.htm> accessed 27 Nov 2021.

50 Plümmer (n 43).

51 ibid.

52 For example, see Yew & Zhai (n 45). See also Yang Zekun, ‘China tightens land borders to contain COVID-19’ (China Daily, 6 Apr 2020) <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202004/06/WS5e8b1179a310128217284949.html> accessed 20 Nov 2021.

53 ‘20 sentenced for illegal border crossing during COVID-19 in SW China's Yunnan’ (Global Times, 28 Sep 2020) <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202009/1202312.shtml> accessed 20 Nov 2021.

54 China accounts for approximately 30% of Vietnam's imports and 22% of its exports. The World Bank – World Integrated Trade Solution, ‘Vietnam Trade’ (3 Jan 2020) <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/VNM> accessed 15 Nov 2021.

55 See generally ‘Net Migration – Vietnam’ (The World Bank, 2020) <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.NETM?locations=VN&name_desc=false> accessed 23 Nov 2021; ‘Net Migration – China’ (The World Bank, 2020) <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.NETM?locations=CN&name_desc=false> accessed 23 Nov 2021.

56 China is considered a ‘top destination’ country for international migrants as assessed by the Migration Policy Institute: Migration Policy Institute, ‘Top 25 Destinations of International Migrants’ (2020) <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/top-25-destinations-international-migrants> accessed 23 Nov 2021.

57 Qiao Long (乔龙), ‘More Than 100 Guangxi Migrant Workers Arrested for Crossing into Vietnam to Make a Living [中国再掀出逃潮逾百广西民工偷渡越南谋生被捕]’ (Radio Free Asia, 28 Oct 2020).

58 ibid.

59 Hackney, Laura K, ‘Re-evaluating Palermo: The case of Burmese women as Chinese brides’ (2015) 4 Anti-Trafficking Review 98Google Scholar.

60 Lhomme, Laetitia, Zhong, Siren & Du, Billie, ‘Demi Bride Trafficking: A Unique Trend of Human Trafficking from South-East Asia To China’ (2021) 22 Journal of International Women's Studies 28, 28Google Scholar

61 Traditionally, a betrothal gifts are the Chinese pre-wedding custom to thank and show respect to the bride's parent. In accepting the gifts, the bride's parents formally pledge her to the groom.

62 ‘COVID-19 Drives New Surge in Trafficking of Women From Laos to China’（Radio Free Asia, 3 Jul 2021）<https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/surge-07032021082612.html> accessed 20 Nov 2021.

63 Matt Blomberg, ‘Pandemic seen fuelling Cambodian “bride trafficking” to China’ (Reuters, 11 Dec 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/article/cambodia-china-trafficking/pandemic-seen-fuelling-cambodian-bride-trafficking-to-china-idUSL8N2IQ2MF> accessed 20 Nov 2021.

64 Anthea Roberts and Nicolas Lamp use this concept to capture the narrative that reflects a ‘securitisation’ of economic policy and an ‘economisation’ of security policy. See Anthea Roberts & Nicolas Lamp, Six Faces of Globalization (Harvard University Press 2021)

65 ‘26,117 Burmese people received the Chinese ID card: Extremely Convenient! [26117 名缅甸人拿到中国“身份证”纷纷点赞：太方便!]’ (The Paper [澎湃], 19 Nov 2020） <https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_10056055> accessed 20 Nov 2021.

66 ‘Integrating Six Certificates into One: China (Yunnan) Pilot Free Trade Zone Dehong Area Issues the First BAOBO Card’ (China Yunnan Pilot Free Trade Zone Dehong Area – News and Info, 29 May 2020) <http://dehong.ynmaker.com/en-us/news/detail/id/1545.html> accessed 20 Nov 2021.

67 Darko Marjanović, Elena Jovičić & Danijela Stojanović, ‘The Global Distribution of Chinese Investments – Importance for the Economy of Serbia’ (2021) 1 Ekonomika 67, 48.

68 Fang Lianquan, Improving the social protection of workers migrating between China and the EU countries (International Labour Organisation and International Organisation for Migration 2019) 5 <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-beijing/documents/publication/wcms_732201.pdf> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

69 Now, by default, ‘14+1’ because Estonia, Lithiuania and Latvia have left the group.

70 Anne-Marie Brady & Hiromichi Higashi, ’Are we real friends? Albania-China relations in the Xi era’ (Sinopsis, 17 Sep 2021) <https://sinopsis.cz/en/are-we-real-friends-albania-china-relations-in-the-xi-era/> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

71 That is, except for Denmark and Switzerland where the length of time of Chinese nationals' exemption from social security contributions in party host countries is six years: Fang (n 68) vi.

72 ibid 23.

73 For example, when it comes to energy loans, Bosnia seems to take the lead with €1,084,980 for coal-related projects, compared to €918,494 in total for Serbia (both CDB and Exim bank). ‘China's global energy finance’ (Global Development Policy Center, 30 Sep 2021) <https://www.bu.edu/cgef/#/all/Country> accessed 30 Sep 2021.

74 During the breaking-up of Yugoslavia, an initial wave of Chinese migration occurred during the 1990's when Serbia was still a member of what was left of the Yugoslav Federation under Slobodan Milošević (ie, Serbia and Montenegro). According to Jelena Gledić, a researcher from Belgrade, the wave of Chinese nationals came mostly from other Eastern European countries ‘after unfavorable changes in Hungary's visa requirements. They were mostly traders originating from China's southern provinces, operating transnational businesses and living in relatively isolated communities. They continued to distribute goods across the region, only now from Belgrade instead of Budapest.’ See Jelena Gledić ‘The Changing Status of the Chinese in Serbia’ (Global Dialogue, 21 Feb 2021) <https://globaldialogue.isa-sociology.org/the-changing-status-of-the-chinese-in-serbia/> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

75 The number of dispatched persons subsequently rose twelvefold from 193 in 2019 to 2374 by August 2021, while the total number of work permits in 2021 is currently 5535, according to the statistics from the Serbian National Employment Bureau made available to the author via e-mail. For more information, see Aleksandar Matković, ‘Unfree labor, from Hanoi to Belgrade: Chinese Investment and Labor Dispatch in the case of 750 Workers from Vietnam’, in Jelena Minović, Milica Kočović De Santo & Aleksandar Matković (eds), Značaj institucionalnih promena u ekonomiji Srbije kroz istoriju [The significance of institutional changes in Serbia's economy throughout history] (Institut ekonomskih nauka [Institute of Economic Sciences] 2021) 114.

76 The agreement was approved on 25 September 2018, during the same week that President Vučić visited Beijing to sign another agreement with Linglong tyres.

77 Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, ‘Меморандум о разумевању између Министарства унутрашњих послова Републике Србије и Министарства јавне безбедности Народне Републике Кине о спровођењу заједничких полицијских патрола [Memorandum of understanding between Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia and Ministry of Public Security People's Republic of China on conducting joint police patrols]’ (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 19 May 2019) <http://www.mup.gov.rs/wps/wcm/connect/94593249-ea65-4af8-a6fd-a7e9a1a0a165/Kina+-+Memorandum+o+razumevanju+o+sprovo%C4%91enju+zajedni%C4%8Dkih+policijskih+patrola.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=nca3uwf> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

78 Aleksandar Matković, ‘Discourse analysis of ideological stances on Chinese investments in Serbia 2018–2022 – pilot study’ (Research & Alternatives, 18 Aug 2021) <https://aleksandarmatkovic.wordpress.com/2021/08/18/antikineska-propaganda-u-srbiji-kako-ne-kritikovati-kinu/> accessed 29 Sep 2021.

79 Aleksandar Matković, ‘Nekoliko statistika povodom kineske radničke klase u Srbiji [Some Statistics Regarding the Chinese Working Class in Serbia]’ (Research & Alternatives, 24 Aug 2021) <https://aleksandarmatkovic.wordpress.com/2021/08/24/nekoliko-statistika-povodom-kineske-radnicke-klase-u-srbiji/> accessed 29 Sep 2021.

80 For example, from the 1950s until the 1970s, China sent about 150,000 workers to African countries on building infrastructure, including the aforementioned railway from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia. See Biao Xiang, ‘Emigration Trends and Policies in China: Movement of the Wealthy and Highly Skilled’ (Transatlantic Council on Migration, Emigration Trends and Policies in China, Feb 2016) <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM_Emigration-China-FINAL.pdf> accessed 29 Sep 2021.

81 China's Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, ‘Obaveštenje o privremnoj obustavi ulaska u NR Kinu za strance koji su imali važeće vize i boravišne dozvole izdate pre 28. marta [Announcement on the Temporary Suspension of Entry by Foreign Nationals Holding Valid Chinese Visas or Residence Permits issued before March 28]’ (China's Embassy in Belgrade, 7 Apr 2021) <http://rs.chineseembassy.org/srp/lsyw/tz/202007/t20200724_3370651.htm> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

82 China's Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, ‘Obaveštenje o novoj viznoj politici (23.09) [Announcement Regarding the New Visa Policy (23.09)]’ (China's Embassy in Belgrade, 24 Sep 2020) <http://rs.chineseembassy.org/srp/lsyw/tz/202009/t20200924_3370655.htm> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

83 China's Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Hertzegovina, ‘Vizne olakšice za strane državljane sa važećim dozvolama boravka u NR Kini [Visa facilitation for foreign nationals with valid residence permits in the PRC]’ (China's Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Hertzegovina, 13 Aug 2020) <http://ba.chineseembassy.org/ba/qzfw_1/202008/t20200813_2316925.htm> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

84 The only factor that varied between embassy statements was the time they were released, which is understandable as the pandemic hit different countries at different times.

85 The only clear orientation towards a country-of-origin-approach could be argued to have been implemented through a proclamation issued later, on 31 August 2021, when it was announced that only citizens for whom Serbia is considered the country of origin (ie, holders of passports or ID and temporary residents of Serbia who have obtained a visa to stay in Serbia) could enter China. See China's Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, ‘Najnoviji uslovi za podnošenje zahteva zdrastvenog koda za putnike koji putuju iz Srbije za Kinu (ažurirano 31. avgusta) [The latest conditions for submitting a health code request for travelers traveling from Serbia to China (updated on 31 August)]’ (China's Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, 8 Sep 2021) <http://rs.chineseembassy.org/srp/sgxx/sghd/202109/t20210908_10251376.htm> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

86 Brady & Higashi (n 70).

87 RTCG, ’CRBC: Na gradilištu 411 kineskih i 106 domaćih radnika [CRBC: 411 Chinese and 106 local workers on construction yard]’ (Radio-Television Network of Montenegro, 21 Sep 2021)

<http://www.rtcg.me/vijesti/ekonomija/335385/crbc-na-gradilistu-411-kineskih-i-106-domacih-radnika.html> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

88 See Grega Strban, ‘Social Security of (migrant) seasonal workers’ (Council of Europe, 2010) <https://www.coe.int/t/dg3/sscssr/Source/Social%20security%20of%20migrant%20seasonal%20workers%20-%20Montenegro.doc> accessed 19 Nov 2021. Since the figures are for 2010, for a comparison, a recent ILO study could be more appropriate. This ILO study estimates the total number of seasonal workers in 2019 at around 27,634 based on the number of work and employment permits issued to foreigners. See Mihail Arandarenko et al, ‘COVID-19 and the World of Work: Rapid Assessment of the Employment Impacts and Policy Responses, Montenegro’ (International Labour Organisation, 2020) <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---sro-budapest/documents/publication/wcms_749201.pdf> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

89 Liu Jin, ‘Budućnost bilateralnih odnosa izgleda svijetlo [The future of billateral relations looks bright]’ (China's Embassy in Podgorica, Montenegro, 1 Oct 2020) <http://me.chineseembassy.org/mon/sghd_1/202009/t20200930_2845324.htm> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

90 China's Embassy in Podgorica, Montenegro, ‘Obavještenje o apliciranju za vize za osoblje koje je primilo kineske vakcine protiv COVID-19 [Notice on Providing Conveniences for China-bound Foreign Nationals taking Chinese Vaccines]’ (China's Embassy in Podgorica, Montenegro, 15 Mar 2021) <http://me.chineseembassy.org/mon/lsfw/202103/t20210315_9900483.htm> accessed 19 Nov 2021.

91 China's Embassy in Tirana, Albania, ‘Notice on Visa Facilitation for Applicants Inoculated with Chinese COVID-19 Vaccines’ (China's Embassy in Tirana, Albania, 7 May 2021) <http://al.china-embassy.org/eng/lsfw/fhqz/202105/t20210507_9046511.htm> accessed 19 Nov 2021.