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President Trump Targets Latin American Countries and Nationals as He Begins His Second Term

Part of: AJIL Contemporary Practice of the United States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 November 2025

Jorge Contesse Open the ORCID record for Jorge Contesse [Opens in a new window]
Jorge Contesse*
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General International and U.S. Foreign Relations Law
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American Journal of International Law , Volume 119 , Issue 4 , October 2025 , pp. 747 - 758
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
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© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Society of International Law

President Donald J. Trump began his second term by targeting Latin American countries and nationals across a wide range of areas, including security, trade, immigration, diplomacy, and human rights. U.S. actions encompassed mass deportations and illegal arrests, the imposition of sanctions and tariffs for political or diplomatic disagreements, and the threat and use of force under the pretext of combating drug trafficking. Latin American countries have responded in a variety of ways to these actions that impinge on core provisions of international law.

The “Invasion” at the Southern Border

On Inauguration Day, President Trump declared that there was an “invasion” at the southern border.Footnote 1 In response to the “invasion,” which he claimed “caused widespread chaos and suffering in our country,” President Trump declared a national emergency.Footnote 2 According to the president, the emergency made it “necessary for the Armed Forces to take all appropriate action to assist the Department of Homeland Security in obtaining full operational control of the southern border.”Footnote 3 President Trump consequently authorized the secretary of defense to deploy U.S. military forces to help secure the southern border as needed and instructed him to provide “appropriate detention space, transportation (including aircraft), and other logistics service” to assist the department of homeland security’s border operations.Footnote 4 The president also suspended “the physical entry of any alien engaged in the invasion across the southern border of the United States, and direct[ed] the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to take appropriate actions as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of this proclamation.”Footnote 5

Concurrently, President Trump issued an executive order that initiated the process of designating cartels and other transnational criminal organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.Footnote 6 He asserted that the cartels “threaten the safety of the American people, the security of the United States, and the stability of the international order in the Western Hemisphere,”Footnote 7 and he directed the attorney general and the secretary of homeland security to “take all appropriate action … to make operational preparations regarding the implementation of any decision [he might] make to invoke the Alien Enemies Act.”Footnote 8 A few weeks later, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated nine criminal organizations from Latin America as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.Footnote 9 In August, Secretary Rubio observed that designating cartels as terrorists organizations “gives us legal authorities to target them in ways you can’t do if they’re just a bunch of criminals … it allows us … to use other elements of American power, intelligence agencies, the Department of Defense, whatever.”Footnote 10

These measures have had a direct impact on Latin American citizens living in the United States, Venezuelans in particular, and on Latin American countries. In March 2025, after invoking the Alien Enemies Act against Tren de Aragua (TdA), President Trump declared that “all Venezuelan citizens 14 years of age or older who are members of TdA, are within the United States, and are not actually naturalized or lawful permanent residents of the United States are liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as Alien Enemies.”Footnote 11 The measure resulted in a series of arrests of individuals who were eventually deported to El Salvador. The massive arrests sparked criticism both abroad and in the United States.Footnote 12 Individuals were not granted due process before being deported to a country with a concerning human rights records. Most notoriously, deportees were sent to El Salvador’s Center for Terrorism Confinement (CECOT, in Spanish), a maximum-security facility. Human rights advocates have branded the mega-prison “Guantánamo on steroids,”Footnote 13 and many organizations—including the department of state—have denounced prison conditions in El Salvador as “harsh and life-threatening.”Footnote 14

The Use of Force

The designation of criminal organizations as “foreign terrorist organizations” has also impacted Latin American countries, as President Trump has used military force against alleged drug traffickers in the Caribbean. In early August, it was reported that President Trump had “secretly signed a directive to the Pentagon to begin using military force against certain Latin American drug cartels that his administration has deemed terrorist organizations.”Footnote 15 By the end of the month, the administration was “creating conditions that could lead to a military confrontation”Footnote 16 with Venezuela, deploying U.S. warships into the southern Caribbean Sea, and claiming that the administration was “prepared to use every element of American power to stop drugs from flooding into our country.”Footnote 17 In response, Venezuela mobilized militiamen around the country, and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro “vowed to ‘defend our seas, our skies and our lands’ from any incursions,”Footnote 18 calling the deployment “the greatest threat that has been seen on our continent in the last 100 years.”Footnote 19

On September 2, the United States carried out an armed attack against a speedboat in international waters, killing eleven people.Footnote 20 President Trump claimed that the vessel was operated by “Tren de Aragua Narcoterrorists” and was “transporting illegal narcotics, heading to the United States,”Footnote 21 although he did not provide evidence of the occupants’ identities or the boat’s cargo. Secretary Rubio said that “the vessel’s destination was probably Trinidad or another country in the Caribbean.”Footnote 22 He claimed that interdicting and stopping drug boats has not worked in the past: “[w]hat will stop them,” he said, “is when you blow them up, when you get rid of them.”Footnote 23 He noted further that armed attacks against drug boats “[will] happen again.”Footnote 24

In fact, the United States conducted several more strikes. On September 15, President Trump announced on social media that he had ordered an attack against “positively identified, extraordinarily violent drug trafficking cartels and narcoterrorists … from Venezuela,”Footnote 25 killing three “male terrorists.”Footnote 26 Four days later, he announced a new attack against “a vessel affiliated with a Designated Terrorist Organization conducting narcotrafficking in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility,”Footnote 27 again killing three alleged “male narcoterrorists.”Footnote 28 In early October, the United States carried out a fourth attack against a vessel off the coast of Venezuela.Footnote 29 Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth posted on social media that “the vessel was transporting substantial amounts of narcotics—headed to America to poison our people …. Our intelligence, without a doubt, confirmed that this vessel was trafficking narcotics, the people onboard were narco-terrorists.”Footnote 30 However, the Trump administration offered no evidence regarding the identity and affiliation of the individuals killed in the attacks. After the second strike, President Trump was asked to provide evidence on the boat’s cargo and the occupants’ identities. His response was: “We have proof. All you have to do is look at the cargo, it’s spattered all over the ocean. Big bags of cocaine and fentanyl all over the place.”Footnote 31

Latin American leaders’ reactions to the attacks have varied. After the first strike, Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, while vowing to defend Venezuela’s sovereignty, seemingly tried to deescalate tensions by noting that “[n]one of our differences justify a high-impact military conflict in South America.”Footnote 32 Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Yván Gil stated that his country was “prepared to deter any deployment and we have a clear determination to defend our homeland.”Footnote 33 He criticized “[a] narrative [that] has been constructed within the United States by the staff surrounding President Trump, trying to link us to drug trafficking. I am concerned, as a Latin American, that this narrative is trying to be imposed.”Footnote 34 President Gustavo Petro of Colombia observed that the attack “violate[d] the universal principle of proportionality of force and result[ed] in murder.”Footnote 35 The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States expressed its “deep concern about the recent extraterritorial military deployment in the region.”Footnote 36 Chile’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Alberto van Klaveren, expressed concern about the U.S. “military presence” in the region, making the case for a commitment to multilateralism.Footnote 37

Others expressed support for the U.S. strike. At a press conference in Quito with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa praised the U.S. efforts to “actually eliminate any terrorist threat.”Footnote 38 Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said she was happy with the U.S. naval deployment, adding that “the U.S. military should kill … all [drug traffickers] violently.”Footnote 39

Legal experts questioned the strikes’ legal basis under both international law and domestic law, as the United States “is not involved in an armed conflict with Tren de Aragua,”Footnote 40 the attack “almost certainly violated fundamental principles of customary international law,”Footnote 41 and the president did not have authorization to carry it out.Footnote 42 Human rights activists labeled the strikes as an “extrajudicial execution.”Footnote 43 The Trump administration initially seemed unconcerned about the lack of legal justification for the strike. Responding to a social media user who called the killing of “civilians without any due process … a war crime,”Footnote 44 Vice President JD Vance responded: “I don’t give a shit what you call it.”Footnote 45 In early October, however, it was reported that President Trump had sent “a confidential notice to Congress” indicating that “the president [had] determined that the United States is in a noninternational armed conflict with these designated terrorist organizations.”Footnote 46

President Trump’s intention to resort to force was made explicit even before his second term began. On January 13, 2025, he announced his plan to regain control of the Panama Canal, causing a stir when he did not rule out the use of military force to achieve it.Footnote 47 On his first day back in office, President Trump stated: “We didn’t give [the Canal] to China …. We gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back.”Footnote 48 Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino “reject[ed] in its entirety the words expressed by President Donald Trump,” and submitted a letter to the United Nations denouncing President Trump’s statement as a violation of the UN Charter.Footnote 49 Despite President Trump’s incendiary statement, some Latin American leaders expressed support and admiration for the second Trump administration. For example, Paraguay’s President Santiago Peña called the incoming U.S. foreign policy team “a dream come true,”Footnote 50 and Argentina’s President Javier Milei commented after the November 2024 election that he was “exhilarated to be able to share with the new United States administration the same level of freedom.”Footnote 51

The threats and uses of force reflect an overt interventionist stance on the part of the United States toward Latin America that has not been seen in a long time.

Interfering in Judicial Independence in Brazil

The United States has also intervened in Latin America through non-military means. The investigation and conviction in Brazil against the country’s former president, Jair Bolsonaro, for his involvement in an attempt to overthrow the current government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, is another reflection of the Trump administration’s interventionist stance in Latin America.Footnote 52 In March 2025, Bolsonaro and a group of officers were put on trial for their participation in the insurrection.Footnote 53 In July, President Trump posted a letter that he sent to Brazil’s President Lula da Silva. In the letter, President Trump criticized “[t]he way that Brazil has treated former President Bolsonaro, a Highly Respected Leader throughout the World during his Term, including by the United States, [as] an international disgrace,” adding that the “Trial should not be taking place. It is a Witch Hunt that should end IMMEDIATELY!”Footnote 54 President Trump also informed President Lula that the United States would impose 50 percent tariffs on all Brazilian goods imported into the United States, claiming the decision was necessary “to rectify the grave injustices of the current regime.”Footnote 55

On July 17, Brazil’s Federal Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes—the judge who presided over the investigation of President Bolsonaro’s involvement in the attempted 2023 coup—issued an order prohibiting President Bolsonaro to “approach or access the premises of foreign embassies and consulates … maintain contact with ambassadors or any foreign authorities … [and] use social media, either directly or through third parties.”Footnote 56 The following day, Secretary Rubio announced visa restrictions on Justice de Moraes and his family members under the Global Magnitsky Act.Footnote 57 Three days later, Justice de Moraes issued a clarification. The prohibition on President Bolsonaro’s use social media, the justice wrote, “includes, obviously, transmissions, retransmissions, or broadcasting of audio, videos, or transcripts of interviews on any third-party social media platforms.”Footnote 58

On July 30, President Trump issued an executive order declaring a national emergency as “the recent policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Brazil constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat … to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”Footnote 59 The order accused Justice de Moraes of “abus[ing] his judicial authority to target political opponents, shield corrupt allies, and suppress dissent, often in coordination with other Brazilian officials … [and] issu[ing] secret orders to United States social media companies to censor thousands of posts and de-platform dozens of political critics, including United States persons, for lawful speech on United States soil.”Footnote 60 That same day, the department of the treasury imposed further sanctions against Justice de Moraes.Footnote 61 The administration reiterated its accusation of de Moraes’s “political witch hunt” against Bolsonaro, resulting in “a persecution and censorship complex so sweeping that it not only violates basic rights of Brazilians, but also extends beyond Brazil’s shores to target Americans.”Footnote 62

On August 4, 2025, Justice de Moraes issued a new order against President Bolsonaro, placing him under house arrest because he violated the previous precautionary measures.Footnote 63 The new order prohibited President Bolsonaro from using his cell phone, and reiterated the prohibition of approaching or accessing diplomatic or consular facilities, and maintain contact with ambassadors and foreign authorities.Footnote 64 The order expressly mentioned “demonstrations in which [President Bolsonaro’s] supporters carried U.S. flags in support of U.S. imposition of tariffs to coerce the Federal Supreme Court,”Footnote 65 and found that President Bolsonaro’s actions sought “to induce and incite a foreign head of state to take measures to unlawfully interfere in the regular course of the judicial process, so as to result in social pressure on the Brazilian authorities, in flagrant violation of national sovereignty.”Footnote 66 The order found that “the defendant produced material for publication on the social media accounts of his three children and all of his followers and political supporters, with clear content encouraging and inciting attacks on the Federal Supreme Court and openly supporting foreign intervention in the Brazilian Judiciary.”Footnote 67

Justice de Moraes’s references to “a foreign head of state” and “foreign intervention” were directed to the United States. Foreign intervention, particularly by the United States, in Brazil and Latin America is a sensitive topic, as demonstrated by Brazil’s president’s reaction to the Trump administration’s measures. President Lula da Silva said he did not plan to hold talks with the Trump administration as it would be a “humiliation,” and added that his country’s Supreme Court “does not care what Trump says.”Footnote 68 President Lula da Silva added that Brazil “had already pardoned the U.S. intervention in the 1964 coup … the president of the United States think[s] he can dictate rules for a sovereign country like Brazil. It’s unacceptable.”Footnote 69 In an interview with U.S. media, Justice de Moraes observed that “for an American culture it’s more difficult to understand the fragility of democracy because there’s never been a coup there. But Brazil had years of dictatorship under [President Getúlio] Vargas, another 20 years of military dictatorship and innumerable coup attempts. When you’re much more attacked by a disease, you form tougher antibodies, and you seek out a preventive vaccine.”Footnote 70

Tensions between the two countries kept escalating. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau accused Justice de Moraes of “destroy[ing] Brazil’s historically close relationship with the U.S.,” and called him “the usurper [who] cloaks himself in the rule of law [while] the other branches insist that they are powerless to act.”Footnote 71 Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of former Brazil’s president and a member of Brazil’s Congress called for further U.S. hostilities against Brazil.Footnote 72 Back in the United States, one of the co-authors of the Magnitsky Act wrote a letter to the secretary of the treasury and the secretary of state calling the U.S. government’s actions “disgraceful,” and condemning the use of sanctions under the Act “in a manner contrary to their purpose by undermining the Brazilian judiciary’s efforts to defend democratic institutions and uphold rule of law.”Footnote 73 International organizations also criticized the Trump administration’s selective use of the act, denouncing the “instrumentalization of the human rights discourse for geopolitical purposes, undermining the very principles the Magnitsky Act claims to uphold.”Footnote 74

On September 11, the Federal Supreme Court convicted President Bolsonaro and sentenced him to twenty-seven years in prison for his role in the attempted 2023 coup.Footnote 75 In response to President Bolsonaro’s conviction, Secretary Rubio commented on social media that Brazil’s supreme court “unjustly ruled to imprison former President Jair Bolsonaro,” and warned that “[t]he United States will respond accordingly to this witch hunt.”Footnote 76 Days later, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on a company owned by Justice de Moraes.Footnote 77

Relations with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

As a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), the United States plays an active role in one of the OAS’s central bodies, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and is its main funder. The United States has nominated and secured the election of many candidates to the Commission, a body that has jurisdiction to hear human rights cases brought against countries in South, Central, and North America, including the United States.

The Commission has remained vigilant in the face of numerous measures adopted by the Trump administration. It has, for example, “expressed its concern” regarding the massive deportation of Venezuelans to El Salvador, noting that the mass deportation “appears to have been implemented without full adherence to due process guarantees.”Footnote 78 Among the many cases of individuals deported to Latin American countries under these regulations, the case of Salvadoran national Kilmar Armando Ábrego García, a resident of Maryland mistakenly deported to El Salvador without a court hearing, drew national and international attention.Footnote 79

Taking into consideration that the first Trump administration did not appear before the Commission, and the Commission’s comments on U.S. actions, it was expected that the review of U.S participation in international organizations, directed by President Trump,Footnote 80 would severely impact the Commission’s operations.Footnote 81 The concern was somewhat mitigated, however, after the United States announced the nomination of Cuban human rights activist Rosa María Payá for membership on the Commission.Footnote 82 Payá’s nomination, and her subsequent election in June 2025, signaled a less confrontational U.S. approach toward the OAS, in general, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in particular.Footnote 83 In fact, when Payá’s candidacy was announced, the State Department praised the Commission’s “political autonomy and objectivity” and called it “a leading human rights body” whose work “impacts thousands of lives in the hemisphere through the issuance of reports on petitions and cases as well as recommendations to OAS member states.”Footnote 84

In July 2025, the Commission held a thematic hearing on the human rights situation of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.Footnote 85 At the hearing, U.S. officials stated that “the United States strongly supports the work of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.”Footnote 86 Despite these words of support, the officials criticized what they described as the Commission’s “standard practice to insert itself into ongoing domestic political discussions,”Footnote 87 in reference to the topics addressed at the hearing—migration, asylum, and refugees. The officials stressed the complexity of issues “of great political and diplomatic sensitivity” that are “subject of significant domestic litigation or congressional consideration,” all of which, they said, “makes it very difficult for the United States to meaningfully engage with the Commission, and reduces the value of the Commission’s involvement.”Footnote 88

The argument does not stand up to scrutiny. Frequently, matters before the Inter-American Commission—and indeed any international human rights body—address topics and situations “of great political and diplomatic sensitivity” that are subject of domestic litigation. The United States itself has routinely appeared before the Inter-American Commission despite pending litigation in domestic courts on issues addressed by the Commission.Footnote 89

Conclusion

Latin America has an ambivalent relationship with the United States. The United States has influenced Latin America politically, economically, and culturally in multiple ways. At the same time, such influence has also generated strong friction and at times conflict and rejection: from the Mexican-American War in the nineteenth century to diplomatic and non-diplomatic interventions during the Cold War, to even armed interventions, such as in Panama in 1989. The United States is synonymous with progress and strategic alliances and, at the same time, interventionism of various kinds. The measures adopted by the second Trump administration in its first months have reinforced the aggressive features of the U.S-Latin American relationship, particularly with the administration designating Latin American individuals as the direct cause of many of the ills afflicting the United States. Latin American countries have had to adjust to unilateral measures, many of them without legal basis. In response, some have aligned themselves with the policies of the Trump administration, such as El Salvador and Ecuador;Footnote 90 some have maintained pragmatic positions, such as Guatemala and Mexico;Footnote 91 some have confronted President Trump’s measures politically, such as Brazil; and one, Venezuela, has had to manage overt U.S. hostility. The first months of the Trump administration can thus be seen as a new phase in the relationship between the United States and Latin America, marked by aggressive and overt interventionism.

References

1 See Protecting the American People Against Invasion, Exec. Order 14159, 90 Fed. Reg. 8443 (Jan. 20, 2025); Securing Our Borders, Exec. Order 14165, 90 Fed. Reg. 8467 (Jan. 20, 2025); Guaranteeing the States Protection Against Invasion, Proclamation 10888, 90 Fed. Reg. 8333 (Jan. 20, 2025) [hereinafter Proclamation 10888].

2 See Declaring a National Emergency at the Southern Border of the United States, Proclamation 10886, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327 (Jan. 20, 2025) [hereinafter Proclamation 10886]. President Trump adopted a similar measure during his first presidency. See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 377, 380 (2019).

3 Proclamation 10886, supra note 2, pmbl.

4 Id., Sec. 1. The proclamation also ordered the construction of “additional physical barriers along the southern border,” see id., Sec. 2, and revoked Biden’s 2021 proclamation that put an end to Trump’s national emergency at the southern border. See Proclamation 10142, Termination of Emergency with Respect to the Southern Border of the United States and Redirection of Funds Diverted to Border Wall Construction, 86 Fed. Reg. 7225 (Jan. 20, 2021).

5 Proclamation 10888, supra note 1, Sec. 4. The proclamation imposes much stricter requirements on individuals in need of international protection than a predecessor proclamation issued in 2019. See Proclamation 9842, Addressing Mass Migration Through the Southern Border of the United States, Sec. 2(c) (Feb. 7, 2019); see also Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 377, 380 (2019).

6 See Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists, Exec. Order 14157, 90 Fed. Reg 8439 (Jan. 20, 2025).

7 See id., Sec. 1(a)(iii).

8 Id., Sec. 3(b).

9 See Jacob Katz Cogan, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 119 AJIL 573, 574 (2025). The organizations include Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha, Cártel de Sinaloa, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, Cártel del Noreste, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, Cártel de Golfo, and Cárteles Unidos. See U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Designation of International Cartels (Feb. 20, 2025), at https://www.state.gov/designation-of-international-cartels.

10 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Raymond Arroyo of EWTN’s The World Over, Interview (Aug. 7, 2025), at https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-with-raymond-arroyo-of-ewtns-the-world-over [https://perma.cc/H45L-JEF5].

11 See Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren de Aragua, Proclamation 10903, 90 Fed. Reg. 13033, 13034 (Mar. 14, 2025).

12 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, President Trump’s Unprecedented Violations of the Non-Refoulement Principle, 119 AJIL 758 (2025); see also Jacob Katz Cogan, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 119 AJIL 314, 320 (2025).

13 Rights Groups Accuse US of Using El Salvador’s Mega-prison as Shady Deportation Dump, Le Monde (Apr. 17, 2025), at https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/04/17/rights-groups-accuse-us-of-using-el-salvador-s-mega-prison-as-secretive-deportation-dump_6740320_4.html.

14 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2023, El Salvador, at 1, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/528267_EL-SALVADOR-2023-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9MQ-NVMD]; see also Human Rights Watch, Deported to Danger: United States Deportation Policies Expose Salvadorans to Death and Abuse (Feb. 5, 2020), at https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/02/05/deported-danger/united-states-deportation-policies-expose-salvadorans-death-and [https://perma.cc/SX4E-MPLV].

15 Helene Cooper, Maggie Haberman, Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trumps Directs Military to Target Foreign Drug Cartels, N.Y. Times (Aug. 8, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/08/us/trump-military-drug-cartels.html.

16 Charlie Savage, Helene Cooper & Eric Schmitt, Is the Trump Administration Building Up to a Military Confrontation with Venezuela?, N.Y. Times (Aug. 22, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/22/us/politics/trump-venezuela-drug-war.html.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Julie Turkewitz & Isayen Herrera, Maduro Tells Trump War with Venezuela Would “Stain Your Hands with Blood,” N.Y. Times (Sept. 2, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/02/world/americas/maduro-trump-venezuela-war.html.

20 See Statement on the United States Airstrike on a Tren de Aragua Vessel in the Caribbean Sea, American Presidency Project (Sept. 2, 2025), at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-united-states-airstrike-tren-de-aragua-vessel-the-caribbean-sea [https://perma.cc/PJA6-JQ5T].

21 Id.

22 See Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, Edward Wong & Alan Feuer, Trump Says U.S. Attacked Boat Carrying Venezuelan Gang Members, Killing 11, N.Y. Times (Sept. 2, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/02/us/politics/trump-venezuela-boat-drugs-attack.html. The next day, however, the secretary of state changed his version, now claiming that the vessel was “headed towards the United States.” See U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Mexican Foreign Secretary Juan Ramón de la Fuente at a Joint Press Availability (Sept. 3, 2025), at https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-and-mexican-foreign-secretary-juan-ramon-de-la-fuente-at-a-joint-press-availability [https://perma.cc/K2J4-Y5WD] [hereinafter Rubio Press Availability].

23 Rubio Press Availability, supra note 22.

24 Id. Similarly, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth warned that military action in the region “won’t stop with just this strike.” See Taylor Penley, Hegseth Issues Stark Warning to Drug Traffickers Following US Military Strike on Venezuelan Vessel, Fox News (Sept. 3, 2025), at https://www.foxnews.com/media/hegseth-issues-stark-warning-drug-traffickers-following-us-military-strike-venezuelan-vessel.

25 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Sept. 15, 2025, 3:57 p.m.), at https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115210075167747572.

26 Id.

27 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Sept. 19, 2025, 7:28 p.m.), at https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115233555445134712.

28 Id.

29 Natasha Bertrand, US Strikes Another Boat Off Venezuela Coast, Killing Four, Defense Secretary Announces, CNN (Oct. 3, 2025), at https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/03/politics/strikes-boat-carribbean-fourth.

30 Secretary of War Pete Hegseth (@SecWar), X (Oct. 3, 2025, 12:33 p.m.), at https://x.com/SecWar/status/1974150886084485503.

31 See Ryan Lucas, With “Drug Boat” Strikes, Trump Leans into War on Terror Tactic Against Cartels, PBS (Sept. 30, 2025), at https://www.npr.org/2025/09/30/g-s1-91091/trump-bombing-drug-boats-terror.

32 Maduro Vows to Defend Venezuela’s Sovereignty as Tensions with U.S. Escalate, PBS (Sept. 6, 2025), at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/maduro-vows-to-defend-venezuelas-sovereignty-as-tensions-with-u-s-escalate.

33 Stefano Pozzebon, Osmary Hernandez & Rocio Muñoz, Venezuela Not Seeking Conflict with the United States, Its Foreign Minister Tells CNN, CNN (Sept. 10, 2025), at https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/09/americas/venezuela-foreign-minister-exclusive-interview-intl-hnk-latam.

34 Id.

35 Roxanna Vigil, U.S. Military’s Boat Strike Escalates Tensions with Venezuela, Council on Foreign Relations (Sept. 9, 2025), at https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/us-militarys-boat-strike-escalates-tensions-venezuela.

36 La Celac Expresa “Profunda Preocupación” Ante el Despliegue Naval de Estados Unidos, CNN en Español (Sept. 5, 2025), at https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/09/05/latinoamerica/celac-profunda-preocupacion-despliegue-naval-estados-unidos-orix.

37 Latin American Nations Concerned by US-Venezuela Tension, Buenos Aires Times (Sept. 4, 2025), at https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/latin-american-nations-concerned-by-us-venezuela-tension.phtml.

38 Matthew Lee, Regina Garcia Cano & Jacquelyn Martin, US Designates 2 More Gangs in Latin America as Foreign Terrorist Groups, AP (Sept. 4, 2025), at https://apnews.com/article/rubio-ecuador-venezuela-military-strike-immigration-0bde0bbf862734facbd0df5f5361935b.

39 Anselm Gibbs & Bert Wilkinson, Trinidad and Tobago Leader Praises Strike and Says US Should Kill All Drug Traffickers “Violently,” AP (Sept. 3, 2025), at https://apnews.com/article/trinidad-caribbean-us-strike-boat-drugs-f0529291209ffbf4162340df7860ba4c.

40 Michael Schmitt, Striking Drug Cartels Under the Jus ad Bellum and Law of Armed Conflict, Just Security (Sept. 10, 2025), at https://www.justsecurity.org/120235/drug-cartels-jus-ad-bellum-loac [https://perma.cc/5292-BV7Q].

41 See Marty Lederman, The Many Ways in Which the September 2 Caribbean Strike was Unlawful … and the Grave Line the Military Has Crossed, Just Security (Sept. 10, 2025), at https://www.justsecurity.org/120296/many-ways-caribbean-strike-unlawful [https://perma.cc/J9GC-BUAP].

42 Id.

43 Gibbs & Wilkinson, supra note 39.

44 Brian Krassenstein (@krassenstein), X (Sept. 6, 2025; 10:53 a.m.), at https://x.com/krassenstein/status/1964341267568984402.

45 JD Vance (@JDVance), X (Sept. 6, 2025; 10:54 a.m.), at https://x.com/JDVance/status/1964341436096057502.

46 Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump “Determined” the U.S. Is Now in a War with Drug Cartels, Congress Is Told, N.Y. Times (Oct. 2, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/02/us/politics/trump-drug-cartels-war.html.

47 Eric Bradner, Key Lines from Trump’s Mar-a-Lago News Conference, CNN (Jan. 7, 2025), at https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/07/politics/trump-news-conference-key-lines/index.html. In his first administration, President Trump imposed sanctions against Venezuela and hinted that he could also resort to military force against Nicolás Maduro’s regime. See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 105, 106 (2018).

48 Annie Correal & Farnaz Fassihi, Panama Alerts United Nations to Trump’s Inaugural Remarks, N.Y. Times (Jan. 21, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/21/us/panama-canal-trump-un.html.

49 Id. Concurrent with his threat to take the canal, President-elect Trump announced that his administration would “be changing the name of the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America.” On Inauguration Day, President Trump signed an executive order on “Restoring Names That Honor American Greatness,” that required the secretary of the interior to “take all appropriate actions to rename” the Gulf of Mexico as the “Gulf of America.” See Restoring Names That Honor American Greatness, Exec. Order 14172, 90 Fed. Reg. 8629 (Jan. 20, 2025). Three weeks later, President Trump “proclaim[ed] February 9, 2025, as Gulf of America Day, … call[ing] upon public officials and all the people of the United States to observe this day with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities.” See Gulf of America Day, 2025, Proclamation 10894, 90 Fed. Reg. 9505 (Feb. 9, 2025).

50 Eric Martin & Ken Parks, Paraguay, a Remote Nation, Thrilled to Be on Trump’s Radar, Bloomberg (Jan. 17, 2025), at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-17/paraguay-is-thrilled-to-be-on-trump-team-s-radar-president-says.

51 Stephanie Lai & Skylar Woodhouse, Argentine President Milei Praises Trump at Mar-a-Lago Event, Bloomberg (Nov. 15, 2024), at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-15/argentine-president-milei-praises-trump-at-mar-a-lago-event.

52 Many, including former U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, have compared the Brazilian 2023 insurrection to the January 2021 storming of the U.S. Capitol. Vice President Pence said that he had “no doubt that that tragic day in January of 2021, in this country, played some role in sowing the seeds of what’s taking place in Brazil.” See Former Vice President Mike Pence on Biden Classified Document Discovery, CBS News, at 2:28 (Jan. 11, 2023), at https://www.cbsnews.com/video/former-vice-president-mike-pence-on-biden-classified-document-discovery; see also Chris Cameron, The Attack on Brazil’s Seat of Government Resembles the Storming of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, N.Y. Times (Jan. 8, 2023), at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/08/world/americas/brazil-jan-6-riots.html; Meredith Deliso, Did the Jan. 6 Attack Lay the Blueprint for Brazil’s Insurrection?, ABC News (Jan. 12, 2023), at https://abcnews.go.com/International/jan-6-attack-lay-blueprint-brazils-insurrection/story?id=96312273.

53 Ana Ionova, Jair Bolsonaro Ordered to Face Trial in Brazil for Attempting a Coup, N.Y. Times (Mar. 26, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/26/world/americas/brazil-bolsonaro-trial-coup-2022-elections.html.

54 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (July 9, 2025, 4:17 p.m.), at https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114825119138468153.

55 Id.

56 Petiçao 14.129, Distrito Federal (Relator: Min. Alexandre de Moraes) (Braz.), at 42–43 (July 17, 2025), at https://noticias-stf-wp-prd.s3.sa-east-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/wpallimport/uploads/2025/07/18100935/Decisao-PET-14129.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4A4-4Z74].

57 The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, enacted in 2016, authorizes the president to impose economic sanctions and deny entry into the United States to foreign persons identified as engaging in human rights violations or corruption. In December 2017, the first Trump administration significantly broadened the scope of the Act. See Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption, Exec. Order 13818, 82 Fed. Reg. 60839 (Dec. 20, 2017).

58 AÇÃO PENAL 2.668 DISTRITO FEDERAL, AP 2668/DF (July 21, 2025), https://portal.stf.jus.br/processos/downloadPeca.asp?id=15378566709&ext=.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9JT-NXPQ].

59 See Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil, Exec. Order 14323, 90 Fed. Reg. 37739 (July 30, 2025).

60 Id.

61 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Alexandre de Moraes (July 30, 2025), at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0211 [https://perma.cc/66PM-8W4G]. The Treasury Department cited as authority Executive Order 13818, issued during the first Trump administration. See Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption, Exec. Order 13818, 82 Fed. Reg. 60839 (Dec. 20, 2017).

62 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Announcement of Visa Restrictions on Brazilian Judicial Officials and Their Immediate Family Members (July 18, 2025), at https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/announcement-of-visa-restrictions-on-brazilian-judicial-officials-and-their-immediate-family-members [https://perma.cc/Y7FL-E9RX]. In August 2024, Justice de Moraes ordered the suspension of the social media company X, after the company failed to name a legal representative in Brazil and pay fines. He had previously blocked dozens of social media accounts under investigation for allegedly spreading disinformation that led to the January 2023 assault of Brazil’s capital. See Sofia Ferreira Santos, Musk’s X Banned in Brazil After Disinformation Row, BBC (Aug. 31, 2024), at https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y3rnl5qv3o.

63 Petiçao 14.129, Distrito Federal, Relator: Min. Alexandre de Moraes (Braz.) (Aug. 4, 2025), at https://download.uol.com.br/files/2025/08/1379732704_pet-14129-decisao-assinada_compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D26-WJKJ].

64 Id. at 2.

65 Id. at 3.

66 Id. at 6–7.

67 Id. at 21–22.

68 See Brad Haynes & Lisandra Paraguassu, Exclusive: “I Won’t Humiliate Myself”: Brazil’s President Sees No Point in Tariff Talks with Trump, Reuters (Aug. 7, 2025), at https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/i-wont-humiliate-myself-brazils-president-sees-no-point-tariff-talks-with-trump-2025-08-06.

69 Id. President Lula da Silva had previously called out President Trump, stating that “[t]he world has changed. We don’t want an emperor.” See Manuela Andreoni & Lisandra Paraguassu, Lula Tells Trump World Does Not Want “Emperor” After US Threatens BRICS Tariffs, Reuters (July 7, 2025), at https://www.reuters.com/world/china/brics-nations-resist-anti-american-label-after-trump-tariff-threat-2025-07-07. In February 2025, President Lula da Silva accused President Trump of trying to “become an emperor of the world.” See SwissInfo, Lula Acusa a Trump de Querer «Convertirse en Emperador del Mundo», Swiss Info (Feb. 22, 2025), at https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/lula-acusa-a-trump-de-querer-%22convertirse-en-emperador-del-mundo%22/88913654.

70 Terrence McCoy & Marina Dias, The Judge Who Refuses to Bend to Trump’s Will: “We’ll Do What’s Right,” Wash. Post (Aug. 18, 2025), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/18/brazil-moraes-judge-trump-bolsonaro.

71 Christopher Landau (@DeputySecState), X (Aug. 9, 2025, 12:03 p.m.) https://x.com/DeputySecState/status/1954196884920148305.

72 See McCoy & Dias, supra note 70.

73 See Letter of Representative James P. McGovern to Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and Secretary of State Marco Rubio (Aug. 20, 2025), at https://mcgovern.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20250820_brazil_glomag_rubio_and_bessent_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/L86D-KF7J].

74 Transparency International-Brazil, Public Statement: Alarming and Unacceptable Misuse of the Magnitsky Act (July 30, 2025), at https://transparenciainternacional.org.br/posts/public-statement-alarming-and-unacceptable-misuse-of-the-magnitsky-act [https://perma.cc/35X2-BV7Q].

75 See Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF Fixa Penas de 16 a 27 Anos para Condenados por Tentativa de Golpe de Estado (Sept. 11, 2025), at https://noticias.stf.jus.br/postsnoticias/stf-fixa-penas-de-16-a-27-anos-para-condenados-por-tentativa-de-golpe-de-estado [https://perma.cc/L3N6-Z8NG]. Seven other defendants, including the former minister of justice and high-ranking military officials, were also convicted.

76 Marco Rubio (@SecRubio), X (Sept. 11, 2025, 5:49 p.m.), at https://x.com/SecRubio/status/1966257934129864715.

77 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Support Network of Brazilian Supreme Court Justice (Sept. 22, 2025), at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0257 [https://perma.cc/A4P2-RXE2].

78 Inter-Am. Comm. Hum. Rts. Press Release, IACHR Concerned Over United States’ Measures that Impact the Effective Exercise of Human Rights (Mar. 31, 2025), at https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2025/065.asp [https://perma.cc/96CY-JQ3Z]. More than a dozen UN human rights experts also “expressed alarm at the unclear legal basis for the detention of the deportees in El Salvador and the lack of effective remedies …,” adding that “[t]here has plainly been no ‘invasion’ or ‘predatory incursion’ of the US by any foreign State … gang activity is a crime, not an act of war.” UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Press Release, UN Experts Alarmed at Illegal Deportations from the United States to El Salvador (Apr. 30, 2025) at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/un-experts-alarmed-illegal-deportations-united-states-el-salvador [https://perma.cc/2XXY-UDCR].

79 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 12.

80 See Withdrawing the United States from and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations, Exec. Order 14199, Sec. 3(b), 90 Fed. Reg. 9275 (Feb. 4, 2025).

81 See The Editorial Board, An Abdication on Human Rights, N.Y. Times (Mar. 27, 2017) at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/opinion/an-abdication-on-human-rights.html.

82 See U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Announcement of Candidate to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Mar. 26, 2025), at https://www.state.gov/announcement-of-candidate-to-the-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights [https://perma.cc/573C-J788] [hereinafter Announcement of Candidate].

83 See U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States Press Release, Rosa María Payá Elected to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (July 16, 2025), at https://usoas.usmission.gov/rosa-maria-paya-new-commissioner-to-the-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-2026-2029 [https://perma.cc/G42Q-R6UC].

84 See Announcement of Candidate, supra note 82.

85 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Human Rights Situation of Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 193rd Period of Sessions (July 24, 2025) at https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/sesiones/audiencia.asp?Hearing=3841.

86 Id. at 26:10.

87 Id. at 27:30.

88 Id. at 27:49.

89 Id.; see Michael Camilleri & Danielle Edmonds, The Inter-American Human Rights System in the Trump Era, Dialogue (June 15, 2017), at https://thedialogue.org/analysis/the-inter-american-human-rights-system-in-the-trump-era.

90 Of all the Latin American leaders, President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador is probably the closest ally to the Trump administration. In early February, Bukele welcomed Secretary of State Marco Rubio and pledged to work with the United States to receive “criminals” into El Salvador’s infamous mega-prison CECOT. See Simon Lewis, El Salvador Offers to House Criminals Deported from the US in its Jails, Reuters (Feb. 4, 2025), at https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/rubio-meet-el-salvadors-bukele-amid-migration-push-2025-02-03. At the meeting, President Bukele said they would accept “only convicted criminals” by U.S. courts (including U.S. citizens). In reality, the United States has sent to El Salvador many individuals who have not been convicted by U.S. courts. The following month, Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem also visited El Salvador. Secretary Noem “expressed her appreciation for the Salvadoran government’s cooperation in accepting deportation flights.” See U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, U.S. and El Salvador Reaffirm Security Cooperation Ties (Mar. 26, 2025), at https://sv.usembassy.gov/secretary-kristi-noem-visits-el-salvador. [https://perma.cc/ZN3V-ZG9K].

91 Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum, for example, has “categorically reject[ed] the defamatory claims made by the White House accusing the Mexican government of having alliances with criminal organizations.” See Presidency of the Republic of Mexico Press Release, Statement from President Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo to the People of Mexico Regarding U.S. Tariffs (Feb. 2, 2025), at https://www.gob.mx/presidencia/prensa/mensaje-traducido-al-ingles-de-la-presidenta-claudia-sheinbaum-pardo-al-pueblo-de-mexico-por-aranceles-de-estados-unidos. [https://perma.cc/N2D6-EUUK]. At the same time, President Sheinbaum has made calls for “shared responsibility, mutual trust, collaboration, and above all, respect for sovereignty.” Id. Guatemala’s President Bernardo Arévalo has also kept a pragmatic position, calling Guatemala “one of the United States’ few trusted partners” in the region, while expressing concern about some U.S. policies. See Sonia Pérez D., Guatemalan President Says He’s Optimistic of Finding Common Ground with Trump, AP (Jan. 15, 2025), at https://apnews.com/article/guatemala-arevalo-trump-immigration-bca26caafc7629ff3b20292994580e14; see also Jacob Katz Cogan, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 119 AJIL 313, 319 (2025).