2. Desiderata

Several intuitively plausible desiderata must be satisfied in order to provide a comprehensive account of inquiry. First, a theory of inquiry should identify the components that structure inquiry and how they relate to each other. Providing a theory of a particular phenomenon, whether a natural one like digestion or an artifactual one like the game of cricket, implies that one can describe in a minute fashion its main components. Similarly, “when analyzing the structure of inquiry, what is wanted is insight into the components of inquiry, and how those components are related so as to constitute a certain kind of process” (Bengson et al., Reference Bengson, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau2022, p. 15). Second, a theory of inquiry should account for the fact that questioning attitudes are constitutive of any inquiry. It is part of the definition of an inquiry that it implies “the action of asking or questioning” (Oxford English Dictionary). It would indeed be absurd to describe a subject as inquiring into a matter while that person manifests absolutely no questioning attitude towards the matter. It means that you cannot inquire, e.g., about Caesar's last words without, at least, asking yourself what his last words were. You need to have some kind of specific attitude directed towards some content in order to count as an inquirer. Third, a theory of inquiry is supposed to respect the natural idea that inquiry is an activity. Imagine a police detective who, instead of inquiring into some current issue pertaining to his job, is just lying all day long on his sofa binge watching soap operas. Now, suppose his partner calls him and narrates the latest developments about the case he's supposed to be working on. We wouldn't want to qualify this detective as being engaged in any inquiring activity. It follows that we should not characterize inquiry as a mere mechanical gathering of information. Friedman is crystal clear on this point when she writes that “inquiring is something we do, it's not something that happens to us, it's not a reflex or a tic or ‘mere behaviour’. On the whole, inquiring is a piece of intentional action — by and large it's an intentional activity” (Friedman, Reference FriedmanForthcoming (a)). Its character as an activity is a commonly well-recognized feature. Inquiring is something that we do about a variety of objects, in different ways, e.g., superficially, methodically, with or without success, etc. It is something we can decide to do or refuse to do and can be blamed for if we do not do. There are certainly different forms of inquiring activities or attitudes, but the general idea is that inquiry is not a passive acquisition of information. It should be part of the definition of inquiry that it includes the deployment of capacities and not mere behaviours.Footnote ² Fourth, a theory of inquiry should clarify how inquiry is, like other activities, goal-directed. An inquiry can have or not have a result, such as a discovery or resolution of the initial question or problem. Christopher Hookway aptly illustrates this in noting that

The aim-directedness or teleological structure of inquiry is a vastly discussed topic. However, Friedman notes that the fact that “inquiry is a goal-directed activity can make reference to a number of different aspects or features of inquiry — its structure, its norms, the mental lives of its participants” (Friedman, Reference FriedmanForthcoming (a)). To avoid the risk of ambiguity, I will try to be clear about which aspects are targeted by the view I am advancing. But, from now on, I will start arguing for the process-based view of inquiry.

3. Inquiry as a Process

In this section, I will explore how the ontology of processes offers insights into inquiry's characteristics. Initially, it's crucial to note the long-standing notion in literature, predating the “zetetic turn,” that inquiry fundamentally is a process. Here is small a sample:

There are several general features of inquiry as a process. First, inquiry is a localized process, much like walking to the office or the occurrence of rainfall in a particular region. Second, inquiry is a generic process that can occur and reoccur in different places and times, such as swimming or roller skating. Third, inquiry involves a part-whole relationship, where the parts of inquiry are not inquiries in themselves but contribute to the overall process. Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, in contrast to most natural processes, inquiry is intentional. We actively engage in inquiry as a daily process, in contrast to our passive relationship with processes like rain, digestion, or respiration.

It is crucial to note that inquiry is not a series of individual events, but rather a structurally configured process with specific elements that possess causal powers. Despite variations between the starting point and endpoint of an inquiry, the fundamental nature of the inquiry process remains the same. As Helen Steward states, processes are

Fred Dretske similarly characterizes a process as

Both authors provide an effective framework for understanding the key elements of the inquiry process: its different phases and the bringing about of a product. In this sense, inquiry has a specific endpoint that is targeted from the outset. The process of inquiry itself results from a goal that one has already fixed, i.e., wanting to know when is the last train to London, how decaf is made, or whether the Zodiac Killer is one individual or different ones. The role of initiating inquiry is always devoted to the questioning activity, and the phases of inquiry are constituted by various cognitive and physical activities.

I assume here, for the sake of argument, that activities are not events at all. Rather, they are ongoing processes that unfold through time and may change as they are going on. The temporal shape of inquiry is thus the following: an inquiry is an activity taking place across some interval of time, [t ₀, t_n]. The inquiry starts at t _0, proceeds across that interval, and then ends at some later time t_n (Friedman, Reference Friedman2019a). Of course, an inquiry may not have a terminal temporal boundary and can remain unsettled.

In the next section, I will examine the defining essential components of inquiry as a process: (a) the attitude of questioning with which it begins, and (b) the zetetic actions of exploring and exploiting the evidence in one's possession to answer the focal question of the inquiry.

4. Questions and Actions in Inquiry

I will now spell out in more detail the process-based view of inquiry: necessarily, an inquiry is a structured process consisting of (1) questioning attitudes guiding (2) zetetic actions, which are (3) aiming at an epistemic goal.

4.1. Questions in Inquiry

Questioning attitudes have different functional roles. In this section I will argue for the following two claims:

Inquirers do not only make decisions and take actions when engaged in inquiries; they necessarily have what is referred to interchangeably as “inquiring attitudes” or “interrogative attitudes.” According to Friedman (Reference Friedman2019a, p. 300), having some interrogative attitude at t is necessary to count as an inquirer at t.Footnote ³ The family of attitudes constitutive of the activity of inquiry — the attitudes that one is disposed to have in the course of inquiry — includes wondering, being curious, considering a question, examining or exploring it, deliberating, and presuming.Footnote ⁴ Following Friedman (Reference Friedman2013) and Peter Carruthers (Reference Carruthers2018), I view questioning attitudes as first-order, world-directed attitudes. This last term means that, when inquiring about a question Q, an inquirer is, according to Friedman, “not merely reflecting on her own mind or desiring that she improve her epistemic standing” (Friedman, Reference Friedman2013, p. 156) with respect to Q; her thoughts are not mind-directed. In the same vein, Carruthers argues that the interrogative behaviour of inquirers (whether infants and toddlers, or non-human animals) is “manifesting first-order questioning attitudes, rather than metacognitive awareness of their own states” (Carruthers, Reference Carruthers, Butler, Ronfard and Corriveau2020, p. 9). Carruthers defends the idea that “questioning attitudes are not only basic and widespread, but are fundamental to our understanding of cognition generally” (Carruthers, Reference Carruthers2018, p. 141). In contrast to Friedman concerning their nature, Carruthers argues that they constitute sui generis forms of affective states. These attitudes have questions, rather than propositions, as their content (see Friedman, Reference Friedman2013) and it “can be as simple as what that is or where the toy is” (Carruthers, Reference Carruthers, Butler, Ronfard and Corriveau2020, p. 24). Carruthers also notes that “the content of a questioning attitude is the set of propositions or possible states of affairs […] that would satisfy the attitude (normally removing it)” (Carruthers, Reference Carruthers2018, p. 135). Plunging further into the metaphysical nature of our various questioning attitudes will not be necessary. However, what needs to be emphasized is that questioning attitudes have different functional roles. It is generally assumed that the primary role is INITIATING INQUIRY (see Friedman, Reference FriedmanForthcoming (a), Reference Friedman, Reed and FlowerreeForthcoming (b)). Interestingly, INITIATING INQUIRY was already noticed by John Cook Wilson in his account of the relation of knowing to thinking:

Cook Wilson is thus addressing the question “What needs to happen for an inquiry to start?” aligning with contemporary views that consider wondering central to genuine inquiry. Adolf Reinach concurs, viewing the questioning attitude (or interrogative stance) as sui generis (“something of which definition is not only impossible, but would also be pointless”), and as “the founding phenomenon” of inquiry. According to Reinach, the first stage's sole function is to make possible the last stage of deliberation. He notes that the last stage “towards which the reflection is aimed is always a position-taking by the subject” (Reinach, Reference Reinach, Schuhmann and Smith1989, p. 280). Reinach interestingly observes that “should [inquiry] end with the lack of or with the abstention from taking any position, with an absolute ‘I don't know,’ then it has failed in its immanent purpose; then the process has failed” (Reinach, Reference Reinach, Schuhmann and Smith1989, p. 280). It means that, according to Reinach, ending inquiry in suspended judgement — which is traditionally conceived as a kind of doxastic abstention — is a mark of the failure of inquiry.

Accepting INITIATING INQUIRY, it is crucial to understand the additional functional roles of questioning attitudes beyond this primary one. An often overlooked role is GUIDING ACTIONS. Friedman correctly points out that “Qua inquirers we are motivated by question-directed attitudes and we act on those attitudes in ways that can be conceived of as question-askings” (Friedman, Reference FriedmanForthcoming (a)). However, if we emphasize the centrality of question-directed attitudes in inquiry, it's essential to clarify the term “question-askings,” as it can be ambiguous. Wolfgang Künne distinguishes:

Sense-1-questions correspond to the interrogative attitude of wondering or having a question in thought (i.e., possible content corresponding to sense-4-question). These questions can be voiced and directed towards others. Sense-1-questions are prior to sense-2-questions (illocutionary asking). Sense-3-questions serve as linguistic vehicles for both the illocutionary acts and mental acts of asking a question (e.g., “Charlie asks whether Sylvia Ageloff was part of the plot to kill Trotsky”). Importantly, sense-2-questions are a subtype of a more general action-type (asking in general). Friedman views this action-type as central to inquiry: “In asking questions we try to remake our informational environments in particular ways: ways that align with our questions” (Friedman, Reference FriedmanForthcoming (a)). Thus, the questioning activity is a necessary condition for any inquiry to occur. The process-based view concurs that we do act on these questioning attitudes by asking questions (in sense-1 or sense-2). However, contrary to Friedman, I argue that it's also necessary for questioning attitudes to guide other types of mental and physical actions (see Section 4.2 below). To expand on this idea, here is an analogy: questioning attitudes are to inquiry what intentions are to actions. By this, I mean that questioning attitudes guide inquiry like intentions guide actions. Inquiry has guiding states: the questioning attitudes. If they are not manifested (as mental or verbal question-askings) or if they cease to exist during inquiry, the process will stop. One is no longer inquiring as long as one's questioning attitude disappears. Similarly, as long as one entertains questioning attitudes guiding one's actions, one is still inquiring. The questioning attitudes are, so to speak, the forms or the internal structure of inquiry, guiding the actions — the external structure — deployed by the inquirer to reach a terminal point.

Let me elaborate further on this analogy that questioning attitudes are to inquiry what intentions are to actions. According to Elisabeth Pacherie:

What is an equivalent to intentions in inquiry? In general, an intention is executed, or not executed. What happens in inquiry? In inquiring, a subject S aims at determining the truth about a question Q. In inquiring, S has a questioning attitude towards Q. Like intentions having a guiding function in the production of action, the representational content of S’ questioning attitude has a guiding function in the process of inquiry.Footnote ⁵ But, which are the actions guided by the questioning attitudes? That will be the topic of the following section.

4.2. Actions in Inquiry

Inquiry involves more than simply asking questions to oneself or to others. What is required, for inquiry to obtain, is the deployment of actions, which compose the exploration and exploitation phases, i.e., what is roughly characterized in the epistemological literature as gathering and evaluating evidence. Let's call these actions “zetetic actions” and “zetetic tasks.”Footnote ⁶

What are zetetic actions? Zetetic actions refer to actions that aim to seek, improve, or transform information, without necessarily having an immediate practical goal (see Clark, Reference ClarkForthcoming; Proust, Reference Proust2014). For instance, searching online for the address of a nearby grocery store is an example of a zetetic action. These actions can be carried out externally, by gathering evidence in the environment, or internally, by recalling information from one's memory. Zetetic actions can be broadly categorized as physical or mental actions, with the latter including memory retrieval, directed imagining, considering alternative views, and performing directed reasoning (e.g., checking the soundness of an argument). Other activities deployed in inquiry include conducting experiments, consulting books, and making observations, all of which involve managing attention and considering how to understand what is being attended to in a particular context (see Hookway, Reference Hookway2009). These actions reflect the aim-directedness of inquiry and are essential for successful inquiry. Which token actions will be deployed, or which attitudes will be adopted during inquiry, is indeed a contingent matter depending on the specific inquiry in which one is engaged.Footnote ⁷ We can be, you and I, working independently on the same inquiry (for example, “What was the role of Ageloff in Trotsky's assassination?”) while engaging in very different zetetic actions. The important thing is that they participate as a type of action essential to inquiry, viz., with an epistemic purpose, and are guided by (in this case, by the same) questioning attitudes.Footnote ⁸ Let's take another example:

Hide-and-seek is a game mostly done for fun. Its goal is not purely epistemic, but nonetheless, discovering and thus knowing your brother's precise situation is arguably an epistemic enterprise. The hide-and-seek game example, simple as it is, provides all of the elements constitutive of inquiry. It is processual, it has a questioning attitude as its initiating point and manifested throughout the search, and is realized via zetetic actions and capacities that are deployed in aiming at a stopping point. This example illustrates how inquiry involves zetetic tasks manifested by the deployment of specific capacities of exploration and exploitation. Of course, some of these capacities can be intentionally or non-intentionally deployed during the inquiry process. They are mainly realized through sub-tasks, for example, such as direct or indirect inferences produced from one's stock of information. But the main task of inquiry remains intentional.Footnote ⁹

In contrast, the deficit in the deployment of capacities, and the inability to evaluate one's evidence correctly would result in failure to discover the truth. Take as an example some famous fictional detectives like Inspector Clouseau or Thomson and Thompson. If they are not totally failing in the exploration phase, they are absolutely failing when it comes to the exploitation phase of inquiry. The results are most of the time delivered through jumping to erroneous conclusions, misunderstandings, and flawed reasoning, despite, from time to time, some well-motivated efforts. But this leads us to the normative territory that will need to be scrutinized another time.

4.3. Inquiry and Its Aim(s)

Recent literature on inquiry primarily focuses on the epistemic states and attitudes that result from inquiry. It explores questions about the epistemic standings constitutively aimed at in inquiry, such as reasonable belief, confidence, knowledge, certainty, understanding, etc., indicating that “the goal of mental state acquisition” is “an essential feature of the activity of inquiry” (Friedman, Reference FriedmanForthcoming (a)). It is part of the process-based view that inquiry is a structured process that aims at an epistemic goal. I have assumed that the goal of inquiry is always to adopt some positive epistemic standing on a given question Q. However, I believe that the process-based view can remain neutral regarding inquiry's specific aim. It is as compatible with a knowledge-centred approach (Friedman, Reference Friedman2017; Kelp Reference Kelp2021; Williamson, Reference Williamson2000) as with pluralist approaches that include weaker, or stronger, epistemic states. As H. H. Price points out, knowledge is ideally what we aim at in inquiry but often we cannot get it and thus “belief is a second best. It is not what we wanted, but it is better than nothing” (Price, Reference Price1969, p. 72). It is crucial to recognize that until an inquiry about a question Q is closed, the representational content for any inquirer remains <not known> (see Carruthers, Reference CarruthersForthcoming). This contrasts with episodic acts like asking a question or wondering whether p, as well as other mental processes that are transient phases of inquiry. The representational content <not known> persists from the beginning to the end of the inquiry, assuming there is a definitive endpoint. However, recent objections (Falbo, Reference Falbo2021; Woodard, Reference WoodardForthcoming) challenge the necessity of questioning attitudes (and thus the representational content <not known>) for inquiry. Their view consists in arguing that one can know p and still inquire into whether p. I will discuss this point at length in Section 6. From the descriptive angle adopted in this article, the termination of inquiry is not necessarily conceived of in terms of knowledge. Instead, other epistemic outcomes like understanding, certainty, uncertainty, or credence are also potential products. More often than not, this is a context-dependent matter, and it is an obvious claim that different inquiries aim to solve different problems and, in this sense, have different objectives. What is important here is to respect the desideratum that a theory of inquiry explains its aim-directedness feature.

The package-deal conception of inquiry comprising questioning attitudes and zetetic actions effectively elucidates its teleological aspects. Echoing Reinach's observation, the first stage's sole function (corresponding to INITIATING INQUIRY) is to make possible the last stage of deliberation, while the actions guided by the questioning attitudes (corresponding to GUIDING ACTIONS) are naturally goal-oriented. The process-based view supports Friedman's claim that an “interrogative attitude is part of what motivates and guides inquiry, encoding the inquirer's zetetic goals” (Friedman, Reference FriedmanForthcoming (a)). Regardless of whether one favours a knowledge-centred or pluralist approach, the common thread is the pursuit of a correct, reasonable, or provisional answer to the inquirer's questions. As noted earlier, identifying a specific constitutive aim of inquiry is not essential for the present descriptive project. In agreement with Friedman, I propose that a deeper understanding of the components and characteristics of inquiry might emerge from shifting focus away from the aim of inquiry and instead examining its other aspects.

5. Some Clarifications and Consequences

There are indeed two plausible and general views that I take on board, as they offer important insights relevant to the nature of inquiry. They are what I call the “state-of-mind view” and the “aim-directed view.”Footnote ¹⁰ According to these respective views:

• • Inquiry is just being in a specific state of mind.

• • Inquiry is just an activity of answering questions.

These approaches are valuable in that they shed light on what exactly should be considered as a part of an inquiring activity. However, they both provide a somewhat reductionist characterization of inquiry by focusing, first and foremost, on its teleological or psychological dimension, respectively. Embracing these aspects of these views, while rejecting their reductionist tendency in understanding what inquiry is, is a consequence of the common-sense view of inquiry that I advocate.

To establish the limitations of these views, consider the following. Regarding the state-of-mind view, it does not offer much insight into how inquirers’ inquisitive mental states guide their investigative activity. For instance, if I ask myself how decaf is made, according to the state-of-mind view, asking myself the question is a clear indication of inquiry. However, it is possible that I merely contemplate the question without exhibiting any behaviour aimed at seeking information. In this case, I am not genuinely inquiring into the question. I might simply wonder about how decaf is made without any real intention of seeking an answer. My questioning attitude of wondering simply does not guide some actions in such a case. Moreover, I could procrastinate eternally without aiming for an answer to this question, or even forget about it altogether.

Similarly, concerning the aim-directed view, it is insufficient in capturing the essence of the activity of inquiry. For example, if I am participating in a quiz game, according to the aim-directed view, I am engaged in an inquiry because I aim to find an answer to a question. However, let's consider a situation where I am asked about the capital of Honduras and I am ignorant of the correct answer. In such a case, I might merely guess the answer without engaging in genuine inquiry. In both the decaf and quiz scenarios, I am doing what the two views suggest — I am in a particular mental state, and I am answering a question. However, in neither case am I truly inquiring.Footnote ¹¹ These mental events of questioning and answering can be phases within an inquiry, but they do not fully constitute the essence of inquiry. Genuine inquiry involves a combination of questioning and actions. In essence, inquiry necessitates both questioning and actions — no inquiry without questions, and no inquiry without actions.

The process-based view offers two notable advantages over the state-of-mind and aim-directed views of inquiry. First, it satisfies all the desiderata of a comprehensive theory of inquiry. As previously mentioned, my proposal is essentially a common-sense view of inquiry with philosophical elaboration. However, it is not merely ornamental but serves a substantive purpose. In fact, I argue that the process-based view captures the full spectrum of inquiry's nature by highlighting the interdependence of inquiry's various aspects in a systematic, coherent, and natural manner. Second, it integrates the theoretical strengths of both the aim-directed and state-of-mind views. While the aim-directed view underscores the teleological nature of inquiry as an activity directed towards answering questions (Smith Reference Smith2020), the state-of-mind view concurs but recognizes this central aspect as insufficient. In this regard, the state-of-mind view emphasizes the psychological component of inquiry, particularly the role of questioning attitudes and their centrality in characterizing inquiry (Friedman, Reference Friedman2017, Reference Friedman2019a, Reference FriedmanForthcoming (a), Reference Friedman, Reed and FlowerreeForthcoming (b)). It's important to clarify that while both views make priority claims about the nature of inquiry, such claims need not be mutually exclusive. The process-based view doesn't prioritize one aspect over another; instead, it sees them as interconnected. By advocating for a common-sense view, I contend that it is insufficient to define inquiry solely in terms either of activity, attitudes, or aims. It is necessary to articulate these different aspects to achieve a more informative and comprehensive understanding of this familiar phenomenon, which extends beyond a mere sequence of actions aimed at answering questions. Therefore, my project can be seen as an endeavour to descriptively capture, in a unified manner, at least three key dimensions of inquiry: ontological, psychological, and teleological.

6. What if Questioning Attitudes Are Not Necessary for Inquiry?

Recently, some authors have argued that inquiring into p while knowing that p is not inherently problematic (see Falbo, Reference Falbo2021; Woodard, Reference WoodardForthcoming). They support this view with examples where a “subject is seeking further epistemic goods beyond knowledge” (Woodard, Reference WoodardForthcoming). Common illustrations include situations like double-checking or cases derived from linguistic data. Woodard, for instance, contends that these scenarios suggest “that inquiry does not require interrogative attitudes, such as wondering” (Woodard, Reference WoodardForthcoming). This challenges the process-based view, which posits questioning attitudes as central and indispensable to any inquiry. If there really are cases in which a subject inquires into Q without having a questioning attitude on Q, such as wondering or deliberating about Q, this could potentially undermine the process-based view. In order to alleviate this problem, I will examine two types of double-checking cases and provide two responses to the potential objection that questioning attitudes are not necessary for inquiry.

First, let's consider a case based on one of Woodard's examples featuring an apparently non-paradoxical assertion:

Woodard suggests that this subject “is represented as both knowing that something is the case and inquiring further into it,” and adds that “we often claim to double-check that p or corroborate that p” (Woodard, Reference WoodardForthcoming). While I concur with her observation about frequent double-checking or corroboration, I disagree with the idea that, in the present case, the subject is further inquiring into the same question. Rather, the subject inquires into her epistemic standing on this matter (e.g., “Do I (really) know that p?”). More generally, I would argue that when a subject knows that p, that subject cannot inquire into the truth-value of p, but can inquire into the epistemic standing (or other properties) of one's doxastic state on whether p, as it is not clear, for instance, that if I know that p, I am aware that I know that p. Considering the tickets example, let's assume that I genuinely know that p (<I bought tickets>) rather than merely think that I know that p. When double-checking, I'm inquiring about whether I know that I did indeed buy them. It is not the case that my knowledge has somehow been destroyed. My inquiry is about whether my doxastic state on this issue amounts to knowledge, which may require having conclusive evidence that I bought the tickets. This double-check is more a way to reassure myself than to inquire into Q. If I double-check while uttering that I know that p, I am mostly seeking some irritation-relief. We could reformulate this as follows: S is not genuinely seeking a better epistemic good (e.g., than knowledge) in double-checking, but S is instead seeking “irritation-relief,” so checking again is a form of reassurance-seeking and not strictly a zetetic/epistemic affair. It means that the subject aims at being in a certain psychological state rather than aiming at a further epistemic good. In inquiring into Q* (<Do I (really) know that p?>), a questioning attitude is in place: wondering whether I know that I bought tickets. Thus, I have a questioning attitude into a question in the vicinity of the original question.Footnote ¹² INITIATING INQUIRY and GUIDING ACTIONS are playing their roles (see above Section 4.1). I can begin an inquiry about that question, warning others not to bank on what I say when I assert <I know I bought tickets>. As Douglas Arner observes, “‘Know’ closes questions, stops debates. Allowing that someone knows or knew something is incompatible with continued inquiry and caution” (Arner, Reference Arner1959, p. 89). The idea here is that if I know that I bought tickets, I authorize others to consider the issue resolved, and thus I “assume a special responsibility for the consequences of error” (Arner, Reference Arner1959, p. 89). This brings us to the second case in which, according to some, questioning attitudes are dispensable for inquiring. My response will be that in that kind of case, subjects are simply not inquiring.

Our second case is as follows. Suppose you're trying bungee jumping for the first time. The jump operator, a safety expert, assures you that the equipment is functional and that your harness is secure. He and a second operator independently double-check everything as a routine procedure. According to Arianna Falbo, in such scenarios “if one already knows that p, it seems rationally permissible […] for one to lack an attitude of curiosity or wonder concerning the answer to the question” (Falbo, Reference Falbo2021, p. 627). This suggests that questioning attitudes are not essential for inquiry. However, according to my “code-of-conduct solution,” in high-stakes situations like these, subjects are not truly inquiring into what they already know; they are following a prescribed code of conduct. They are not genuinely inquiring when double-checking whether p in such cases. Consider an analogy without practical stakes. Suppose I know that p (<Jack Ruby shot Lee Harvey Oswald>), and a friend asks me whether I am sure that p. Does my effort to explain my reasoning and assure my friend that I'm right count as inquiring further into p, which I already know? The answer, I would argue, is no. In this scenario, I'm not engaging in further inquiry about a known fact; instead, I am merely applying a procedure of demonstration — exposing the method by which I arrived at my knowledge of p to my friend. In such a case, INITIATING INQUIRY and GUIDING ACTIONS are not involved.

The upshot is that type-1 cases of double-checking involve a questioning attitude about Q*, e.g., one is questioning one's epistemic position regarding p by aiming for a psychological state of reassurance rather than an epistemic good beyond knowledge. Here, one is not inquiring into the original question Q, as one already possesses (or believes one already possesses) the answer. Conversely, in type-2 cases, there's no questioning attitude because it simply is not about inquiring into known information; it's about adhering to and applying a standard procedure.Footnote ¹³