Introduction
What did comfort stations mean to the Japanese military, especially the Army? There are many ways to answer this question, but this hand-drawn map from the official records of one Japanese artillery regiment is one of the simplest and easiest answers. It shows that they were spaces to confine women who were in some ways civilians but whose daily lives were regulated in full accordance with the Imperial Japanese Army’s institutions and systems.
This sketch depicts a military camp in the eastern corner of Dangyang City, Hubei Province, China, where the 3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment was stationed on October 11, 1940. The rectangular space surrounded by the lines with x’s is called the “walking area.” Inside, from the right, are Comfort Station No. 3 and Comfort Station No. 2, while Comfort Station No. 1 is adjacent to a photo studio and restaurant. The line marked → shows two sentries. The first sentry, located in the center of the top edge, patrols the top border of the camp, while the second sentry on the right side monitors the surrounding area from the right edge and part of the bottom edge of the camp. The headquarters’ barracks and kitchen are located on the right side. In other words, the people confined at Comfort Stations 1–3, the photo studio, and the restaurant were only allowed to walk around in extremely narrow spaces, patrolled by sentries 24 hours a day. It would be no exaggeration to say that the image above is a prison without walls.
I emphasize this point because, since the mid-1990s, researchers have worked hard to uncover the full story of military comfort stations. Unfortunately, however, it must be said that this task is unfinished, since hostile analysts still argue that these were places in which civilians lived fairly normal lives. The uproar surrounding J. Mark Ramseyer’s recent publications can be said to be a typical example.Footnote 1 This research is dedicated to conveying the extent to which the military controlled and framed these relationships.
One reason why there is any doubt over the military’s intensive control over the comfort station system is that their organization and management varied widely depending on region and time. For this reason, Yoshiaki Yoshimi (吉見義明), who led much of the early research on comfort women, classified the comfort stations used by the Japanese military into four types on the basis of how intensively they were under official control. Some were simply operated by the military (A), some were exclusively for the military and were run by civilian employees of the army or navy under direct military supervision (B), while a third type were managed jointly by soldiers and civilians (C), and the fourth were pure brothels, used by both military and civilian men (D). Of these, only A and B were identified by Yoshimi as “military comfort stations.”Footnote 2 These comfort stations may have been off-base in the sense that soldiers had to get permission to leave their own quarters to enter them, but military regulators were nonetheless involved with many aspects of their operation, as demonstrated below.
Ikuhiko Hata (秦郁彦) provided the academic foundation for the claim that the comfort women system was in no way out of the ordinary.Footnote 3 Hata’s argument can be summarized into two points: Comfort stations were a wartime version of the peacetime licensed prostitution system, and comfort stations are common to all countries. Since then, followers of Hata have focused on finding similarities between comfort stations and the licensed prostitution system. Focusing only on the subset of what Yoshimi called type C and D comfort stations, they emphasized the existence of contracts between the managers and the comfort women in those establishments, and asserted that all the comfort stations were no different from ordinary brothels.
One reason this conclusion was even remotely plausible was that some of the early scholarship on the system was presented in a way that inadvertently understated the level of coercion at many of the military comfort stations. For example, the five volumes of the Asian Women’s Fund extracted selections from longer documents and compiled only selected passages that mentioned comfort stations and comfort women.Footnote 4 Unfortunately, while these compilations demonstrated the temporal and spatial existence of comfort stations and comfort women, they obscured other information. The negative effects of this were by no means small. In particular, these publications did not show the mechanisms of regulation and institutional structures that framed the comfort stations.
When we consider the flow of research and historical materials, we can see the path that research should take going forward. I would like to demonstrate that the essence of military comfort stations was wartime sexual slavery, which was fundamentally different from the peacetime licensed prostitution system in brothels. The greatest weapon to support this interpretation is the daily records kept by army officers as part of their official duties, that is, army war diaries.
On the basis of the Camp Requirements Order (陣中要務令, from 1938, the Operational Requirements Order [作戦要務令]), unit commanders at the company level and above were required to prepare war diaries every day from mobilization to their return to civilian life. These daily records were official accounts of their group activities, not personal observations meant to express the interests of individual soldiers. These official records include various military operations such as garrisoning and movement of troops, army maneuvers, and training exercises, as well as occasional descriptions of comfort stations. Most of the war diaries were systematically destroyed after the war, but those that survived contain information that reveals what comfort stations meant to the Japanese military. To state the conclusion first, comfort stations were attached facilities that were established and operated in full accordance with Army institutions and systems.
As explained in detail below, the Army controlled the conditions of life down to tiny details in China, Southeast Asia, and Okidaito Island, on the eastern tip of Okinawa. The women were not free to leave and, in the case of Okidaito, during US military air raids and naval attacks, were tasked with additional cooking, cleaning, and medical support duties. Only by reading the entire war diaries is it possible to see that the comfort women were made to take part in military operations.
Although comfort stations were defined by the Army as military facilities, there are no written regulations that clearly state this. Nevertheless, the contents of the Field Canteen Regulations (野戦酒保規程), which were revised on September 29, 1937, immediately after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, are worthy of attention.Footnote 5 Kazu Nagai (永井和) conducted pioneering research that demonstrated that “comfort facilities” were established as a subset of field canteens, concluding that comfort stations were “logistical attachments established by the military to allow soldiers to dispose of their sexual desires.”Footnote 6 By attachments, the military meant physical buildings within or next to military bases. I would like to add that this definition was applied to “zones of incidents” as well as “war zones.” They specified this because in international law, the Sino-Japanese War was an incident without a formal declaration of war until December 1941.
In addition to the Field Canteen Regulations, several other regulations covered the establishment and operation of comfort stations. The regulations I am going to introduce next were all military orders. Military orders were issued by the Emperor regarding supreme command, and were the highest-level laws and regulations for both the Army and Navy. In addition, my research included attention to three other kinds of regulations. The first, the Camp Requirements Order (慰安所規定), included the provisions for keeping war diaries.Footnote 7 Second, the Comfort Station Regulations (慰安所規定) were primarily subordinate regulations linked to the Internal Affairs Manual (軍隊内務書, from 1943, the Army Internal Affairs Order [軍隊内務令]), and finally, the Garrison Duty Order (衛戍勤務令), which included rules for when soldiers and civilian employees were allowed to leave their barracks.Footnote 8 These provide circumstantial evidence of soldiers’ movements and the nature of comfort stations. What supported the establishment of comfort stations and the actions of the soldiers who entered there was none other than the Japanese Army’s laws and regulations.
That is why comfort stations were also called “off-base facilities” (営外施設). This was the case with the 35th Division, stationed in Kaifeng, Henan Province, China. According to the Division Headquarters’ “Off-base Facilities Regulations,” “special comfort stations” exclusively for military personnel and military civilians were established for the purpose of “hygienic and low-cost comfort.”Footnote 9 A feature of these “special comfort stations” is that they were organized through “contract management” rather than “direct management,” according to the Regulations.
In addition to hygienic and low-cost comfort, comfort stations had another advantage over other forms of recreation for soldiers. On December 2, 1938, the 2nd Field Service Unit stationed near Wuhan created the “Security and Service Regulations.”Footnote 10 Since it was just after the occupation of Wuhan, the soldiers were not allowed to go out on Sundays, with the exception of visits to comfort stations. In other words, comfort stations were considered the safest form of comfort immediately after the end of hostilities.
Comfort stations as military facilities
14th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment and comfort station
After the Battle of Nanjing, the 10th Army moved to the Lake Tai area of China, and the 6th Field Artillery Brigade was assigned to guard Songjiang, west of Shanghai. The 14th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (hereinafter referred to as 14th Regiment), which began garrisoning in January 1938, opened a comfort station on the 27th of the same month, and the details of the process are recorded in the war diaries at the 1st Battalion Headquarters.Footnote 11 The 14th Regiment consisted of four units: the regimental headquarters, the 1st and 2nd battalions, and the logistical support unit for the regiment.
On January 10, 1938, the 6th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters divided the security area into four, and assigned the 14th Regiment to guard Shanghai County (now the southwestern part of Minhang Ward) south of Songjiang. Each of the four locations formed a camp area, and the commander of the 14th Regiment became the camp commander. The regimental bulletin of January 13 reported two relevant pieces of information. Captain Arai and an Army Surgeon, Second Lieutenant Nomiyama, were appointed as “comfort committee members,” and one noncommissioned officer from each headquarters, company, and logistics unit (段列) were told to gather at the regimental headquarters on the 14th. On January 25, the 1st Battalion Headquarters received an order to send 2 noncommissioned officers and 10 soldiers, including 3 carpenters, to work on the “comfort hall” the next day, and announced this in the bulletin. On January 26, the company commander assigned personnel to serve as “discipline guards” from January 26 to February 6.
The war diaries dated January 27 include a battalion bulletin stating, “we will open a comfort hall today in accordance with the attached regulations,” along with the Temporary Regulations for Special Comfort Stations. I would like to draw attention to three provisions in these Temporary Regulations. First, the list of people allowed to enter the comfort station included “committee members” Captain Arai and army surgeon Nomiyama. The 14th Regiment’s order appointing two officers as “comfort committee members” on January 13 was without doubt part of a measure to open a comfort station. Second, the units using comfort stations were each ordered to send a noncommissioned officer to police the comfort stations and collect “entertainment fees” (遊興料), showing that the military had control of day-to-day operations inside the comfort stations.Footnote 12
The Temporary Regulations also included a table listing the schedule for use of the comfort stations from January 27 to March 15, by days of the week.
In fact, the 14th Regiment did not neglect measures to carry out this arrangement. Monthly special event plans for each unit were aligned with the days when they were scheduled to use the comfort stations. In the case of the 1st and 2nd Battalion Headquarters in February, all comfort station use dates were kept clear, except for the horse inspection on February 28 at the 2nd Battalion Headquarters.
Furthermore, the entry dated January 31 includes the Special Comfort Station Control Regulations. Looking at the details of the Control Regulations, including the Application for a Special Comfort Station Business License, the Temporary Regulations appear to be a condensed version of the Control Regulations. The Control Regulations declared that the authority to establish comfort stations in Shanghai County, or the security area of the 14th Regiment, belonged to the camp commander. The “dedicated officer” of the comfort station could order the expulsion of personnel, restrict the operation area, or shut down the facilities either temporarily or permanently. Full authority over the establishment and operation of comfort stations rested with the camp commander and his deputy, the dedicated officer assigned to this role.
2nd Independent Siege Heavy Artillery Battalion and comfort station
After the fall of Nanjing, the 5th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade (hereinafter referred to as 5th Brigade) of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was divided into two and deployed to Zhenjiang and Changzhou, respectively. The war diaries of one of them, the 2nd Independent Siege Heavy Artillery Battalion (hereinafter referred to as 2nd Battalion) that moved from Changzhou to Zhenjiang tell us about the conditions at the comfort stations established in both regions.Footnote 13 The person in charge of the Changzhou Guard was the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment under the 3rd Infantry Division. The 2nd Battalion arrived in Changzhou on December 25, 1937.
The Changzhou Guard bulletin, received on December 29, stated that the logistics department would soon prepare an “entertainment center” (battalion diary). On January 6, the logistics unit leader gave a lecture on army rules related to alcohol and women (logistics unit diary). Then, on January 9, an “entertainment area” was opened, with visiting hours for the 2nd Battalion specified as 10:00 to 19:00 every fifth day. The logistics unit’s soldiers had “rest days” on three of the same four January dates: the 19th, 24th, and 29th (logistics unit diary). Visiting comfort stations was typically allowed on “rest days” (休養日). As of January 20, the commander of the 2nd Battalion reported that he was allowing his five units to use two “comfort facilities” in Changzhou for 1 hour each on a set day (battalion diary). On January 29, the logistics unit bulletin announced that the comfort station that had opened on January 9th had been closed, so unit members should use the remaining comfort station (logistics unit diary).
In February, the 2nd Battalion’s use of the comfort station got back on track. The Battalion Bulletin was dated February 1, announcing dates for the use of the “entertainment center” (2nd Company diary). On February 2nd, the 2nd Battalion, which was slotted in for every Wednesday, published an internal bulletin that allotted usage times (battalion diary). The Battalion Headquarters were free to use the “entertainment center” from 10:00 to 11:00, the 1st Company from 11:00 to 12:00, 2nd Company from 13:00 to 14:30, the logistics unit from 14:30 to 16:00, and the 3rd Tow Truck Unit had visiting privileges from 16:00 to 18:00. On February 2nd, the first Wednesday that this group visited the logistics comfort station, all members of the logistics unit relaxed (2nd Company diary), which the 2nd Company’s war diaries recorded as a “rest day” (2nd Company diary) On February 9, the battalion headquarters issued reminders regarding the approved use of “entertainment areas” on “comfort day” (慰安日), and the adjutant contacted logistics department (battalion diary). Moreover, on the previous day, February 8, these men were told that they had to submit an application to their squad leader to leave barracks on February 9, resulting in 64 people going out the next day (logistics unit diary). Undoubtedly, many of them went to the comfort center.
On February 14, the Army reorganized, abolishing the Central China Front Army (中支那方面軍) and creating the Central China Expeditionary Army (中支那派遣軍), causing the troops stationed in Changzhou to move. The 2nd Battalion attempted to systematize training in preparation for the next operation, and these changes in garrison posture also affected the regulations for use of comfort stations. The 5th Brigade, in its bulletin dated March 11, ordered the creation of internal regulations (battalion diary), leading to new Changzhou Garrison Internal Affairs Regulations on March 16. The Internal Affairs Regulations cover all activities of the military, excluding combat and training. Their days off were set as Thursdays and other public holidays, and Comfort Stations Usage Regulations were included in the Internal Affairs Regulations. On the basis of this, it is clear that the days when troops stationed in Changzhou went to the comfort station were these designated days of rest.
On April 13, the 2nd Battalion completed its movement from Changzhou to Zhenjiang and rejoined the 5th Brigade. The Brigade’s Bulletin continued to issue similar announcements in April, such as a ban on patients with venereal diseases from entering comfort stations (2nd Company diary), and an announcement that the 2nd Battalion’s rest day would be every Sunday (battalion, 2nd Company diaries) (previously, the “comfort day” set aside for the 2nd Battalion was Thursday). The existence of comfort stations in Zhenjiang can be confirmed from the Zhenjiang Garrison Hygiene and Epidemic Prevention Regulations dated April 20 and the Zhenjiang Garrison Internal Affairs Regulations dated April 25. According to the Internal Affairs Regulations, holidays were defined as Sundays and other public holidays, and soldiers were not allowed to go out on those days without being accompanied by a noncommissioned officer. The Hygiene Regulations also made it compulsory for soldiers to receive and use condoms and sexually transmitted disease prevention drugs when they left their barracks to go to a comfort station. The only records of outings in May are the 22nd (battalion, 2nd Company diaries) and the 29th (logistics unit diary), but the record of six patients with sexually transmitted diseases on May 10 suggests recent visits to comfort stations (battalion diary).
The 2nd Battalion participated in the Wuhan Operation from September 1938 and the Nanchang Operation from February 1939. After resting and recuperating in Jiujiang in late April, they returned to Kobe by ship in late June. Their activities during their stay in Jiujiang exhibited a typical pattern of using comfort stations. The May 7 Battalion Bulletin announced that the day of rest was set for Thursday (2nd Company diary). On May 10, the logistics unit made known the timetable and rules for each platoon’s “comfort outing” (logistics unit diary). Not only did they have designated visiting hours (8:00 to 13:00 for the 2nd Platoon, 12:00 to 17:00 for the 1st and 3rd Platoons, and 18:00 to 21:00 for noncommissioned officers), but they were also admonished to promptly return to base and forbidden from going to restaurants. The first Thursday was May 11. Although the 2nd Company’s diary only recorded a “rest day,” the logistics unit explicitly allowed “comfort outings” in either the morning or the afternoon (logistics unit diary). Similar adjustments occurred on May 17, when the transport officer recording the diary announced the change in his own hours (logistics unit diary). On May 18, the entire 2nd Company was allowed out in the afternoon (2nd Company diary), while logistics unit members conducted “comfort outings” in the morning and afternoon (logistics unit diary). In May, it was discovered that one logistics-unit patient had a sexually transmitted disease, after having gone to a comfort station (logistics unit diary).
3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment and comfort station
The 3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment, mentioned above, was organized similar to other artillery regiments, consisting of regimental headquarters, 1st and 2nd battalions, and a logistics unit. This regiment moved from place to place, and after the Wuhan Operation, it was stationed in Yingshan, north of Wuhan. The regiment commander was Colonel Kiyoshi Morikawa (森川清).Footnote 14
On June 17, 1939, the main forces of the 3rd Mountain Artillery Regiment, excluding the Regimental headquarters, were stationed at the Morikawa Troop Camp Area and went on guard duty in accordance with the Yingshan Garrison Regulations of the 3rd Division, its superior unit. On July 1, the Morikawa Camp Area Regulations were enacted, which clarified the working rules for the camp area, including information regarding rest days and comfort stations. The “general rest day” was established as Friday for the 1st and 2nd Battalions and Monday for the logistics unit. On general rest days and on days when all the soldiers were allowed to leave the base, patrol officers worked at the comfort station area in Yingshan once in the morning and once in the afternoon, and reported to the Yingshan garrison commander via the camp commander early the next day. These duties at the comfort station were instead of duties in the camp area.
Their procedures were similar to those described above for other military units. From the end of August, the 3rd Regiment went on operations, and from late October onward they established bases at Gedian and Huarong on the south bank of the Yangtze River. Here, the 3rd Regiment established and operated their own comfort stations. The 3rd Regiment’s Morikawa Troop Security Regulations of November 6 divided the guard force into three: 1st Battalion at Gedian, 2nd Battalion at Huarong, and the logistics unit at Xindian. The 22nd article of these Security Regulations is as follows:
Each unit is entitled to use the comfort station in accordance with the regulations related to comfort operations in a separate volume to the extent that there is no interference with security.
The use of comfort stations was clearly integrated with the regulations specifying official duties, including military operations. The Special Comfort Service Regulations (特種慰安業務ニ関スル規定) dated November 14, stated that the comfort stations were intended to encourage military discipline by alleviating or controlling the brutal atmosphere experienced by soldiers. In other words, comfort stations were considered essential facilities for the Japanese military. Therefore, the Comfort Regulations stipulated that one of the duties of the guard commander was to supervise and provide guidance on “comfort operations.” Two comfort stations were established, one in Gedian and one in Huarong. On December 16, noncommissioned officers’ access to the comfort station was extended by 1 hour, but because this change was an amendment to the Comfort Regulations, it was issued as a regimental daily order.
The 3rd Mountain Artillery Regiment that participated in the Yichang Operation from April 1940 moved to a new guard area, Dangyang, Hubei Province, in July. While stationed on the southeast side of Danyang, the regimental commander was replaced with Colonel Kohei Takamori (高森孝平), and the 3rd Regiment was placed under the command of the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade. Then, until September, when unit preparations finished, they rebuilt the comfort station system while conducting chemical warfare exercises.
In addition to setting new daily routines on October 6, on the 11th, Colonel Takamori notified his subordinate units of the Takamori Troop Special Comfort Service Regulations. The purpose of the regulations was similar to the previous year’s Comfort Regulations in that it also was intended to maintain military discipline by raising morale among soldiers through the use of four types of “local merchants” (地方商人) within the security area. These local merchants consisted of three comfort stations, four restaurants, two photo shops, and one watch shop. Moreover, the regulations provided for the standard ratio of 1 comfort woman for every 100 military personnel.Footnote 15 The “walking area” for employees, comfort women, and hostesses, other than business owners, was restricted as shown in Fig. 1. The operational regulations also listed the dates of use for each unit, as presented below in Table 2.
Figure 1 : Walking area of the comfort station of the 3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment.
Source: Official daily records, also known as war diaries, from October 1, 1940 to October 30, 1940, 3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment (5) [陣中日誌 自昭和15年10月1日至昭和15年10月30日 独立山砲兵第3連隊(5)],” Ref. C13070262500, Japanese Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR). All the war diaries and related materials cited below are in the possession of JACAR, so references to JACAR are omitted after this mention.
Table 1 Dates for use of comfort stations by the 14th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment
Note: February 15 is a holiday for comfort stations, so starting from the 16th, the schedule was shifted by 1 day.
Source: War Diaries No. 5, from January 1, 1938 to January 31, 1938, 14th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, 1st Battalion Headquarters (4) [陣中日誌第5号自昭和13年1月1日至昭和13年1月31日 野戦重砲兵第14連隊 第1大隊本部(4)], Ref. C11110646000.
Table 2 Schedule for use of the comfort station by the 3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment
Source: War Diaries, from October 1, 1942 to October 30, 1945, 3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment (5) [陣中日誌 自昭和15年10月1日至昭和15年10月30日 独立山砲兵第3連隊(5)], Ref. C13070262500.
On October 15, the 3rd Mountain Artillery Regiment, in accordance with its superior unit, received an order to change the operating hours of the comfort stations. In line with the 18th Brigade’s time slot, the Regiment also reduced the available time for noncommissioned officers and soldiers by 1 hour. Similarly, the change in Service Regulations dated April 9, 1941 was also issued in the form of a daily order.
Provisionally organized units in Southeast Asia and comfort stations
On December 8, 1941, the war finally reached Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean. As the battlefront expanded, the comfort station system established on the Chinese front was reproduced in various parts of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Below, I would like to discuss two cases that are somewhat different from the situation in China in their details but continue to establish how fully integrated the comfort stations were into the everyday operations of the Imperial Japanese Army.
The first case is the 11th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division. After the fall of the Malay Peninsula, the 11th Regiment became the Southern Guard, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions under its command were assigned to guard the two southeastern provinces of Kuala Lumpur, Melaka and Negeri Sembilan.Footnote 16
The 1st Battalion entered Melaka on February 26, 1942, and the next day they established their daily schedule according to the Melaka Guard Station Regulations.Footnote 17 Although we do not have copies of these regulations, their contents can be deduced from the battalion’s daily order on March 20 that mandated a change in them. Chapter 5, Section 18 of the Melaka Station Regulations was adjusted to adapt to the Comfort Station Regulations, so that the 1st Battalion members would have free time on the designated day for their comfort station use. For example, the Artillery Platoon was given a Friday every week. In short, the establishment of comfort stations dictated the changes in the Station Regulations rest days.
On March 27, the first “rest day,” 37 soldiers, including the sergeant, went to the Paradise (極楽園), which was probably a movie theater, and a comfort station, returning to the base at 18:20. From 09:20 to 10:30, all members of the Artillery Platoon were required to participate in venereal disease education. On March 29, 11 soldiers who were on duty on the rest day went out to a comfort station and an “entertainment hall” (娯楽場), also most likely a theater. Almost all the members of the Artillery Platoon left their quarters during these 2 days. A week later, on April 3, 35 soldiers (and on the 5th, 6 soldiers who had worked on the 3rd) went to the entertainment hall and a comfort station. After that, the Artillery Platoon’s rest day was changed to Thursday, and nearly all of its members took advantage of the opportunity to visit these facilities every week, according to the record.
The 11th Regiment controlled the outings by its soldiers, as we know from the April 10 Southern Guard Bulletin, which instructed that each unit must dispatch patrols to provide supervision when they left the base (3rd Company). This instruction was also conveyed by the Artillery Platoon Commander in a 30-minute lecture at 20:20. This order was repeated on April 27 and 28 with a reminder that it had been issued in accordance with the Army Internal Affairs Manual (3rd Company). The 1st Battalion was told the same thing before 31 soldiers from the Artillery Platoon went out on April 29.
In addition, the arrival of new garrison troops brought about changes in the schedule for use of the comfort stations. On September 2, the 1st Battalion issued a daily order to change the “rest day allocation table” as presented in Table 3. This is because the Ikagura (猪鹿倉) Unit of the Sawamura Detachment was assigned to the 1st Battalion on August 31, that is, an infantry company belonging to the 5th Imperial Guards Infantry Regiment of the Imperial Guards Division. The commander of the 5th Regiment was Colonel Shunsuke Sawamura (沢村駿甫). These men needed to be added to the schedule.
Table 3 Rest day allocation for the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment
Source: War Diaries No. 11, from September 1, 1944 to September 30, 1944 (1) [陣中日誌第11号自昭和17年9月1日至昭和17年9月30日(1)], Ref.C14110600400.
The second case is also from Malaya and involved members of the same Sawamura Detachment of the 5th Regiment. This time, the setting was Johor Province, south of Malaca, and the main actor was the 42nd Independent Motor Vehicles Battalion.Footnote 18 Because the 42nd Battalion was a transport unit, it moved around a lot, and the 1st Company was stationed at Batu Pahat in Johor Province from July 16, 1942. On July 17, the 1st Company was handed the Batu Pahat Garrison Regulations by the Batu Pahat Guard.
These regulations were created on the basis of the Sawamura Detachment Johor Province Station Regulations and the Johor Province Security Plan. The Batu Pahat Garrison Regulations, which applied to troops encamped at or passing through Batu Pahat, obligated the garrison to provide medical patrols along with ordinary patrols. Excursions in groups of two or more people were limited to theaters, “clubs,” and designated restaurants, and there were restrictions on hours (09:00 to 18:00 for soldiers, 09:00 to 21:00 for noncommissioned officers), attire, and a schedule of outing days, as well as the areas servicemen were permitted to go. Internal evidence makes it clear that “clubs” meant comfort stations.
Even though the 1st Company was not listed on the rest day allocation table and had only one designated rest day, it was given a complete set of regulations, including those covering the outing hours and the use of “clubs.” This omission seems to be because the decision to relocate the company to Muar was made as early as July 23, before it was ready to fully discharge garrison duties. But it is clear that even when troops were only temporarily stationed at a facility, they were expected to comply with all of the essential operations covered by the local Station Regulations, and that these operations included comfort stations.
Comfort stations and comfort women on the battlefront at Okidaito Island
Initial situation and the arrival of comfort women
At the eastern end of Okinawa Prefecture lie the Daito Islands, which consist of Kitadaito Island, Minamidaito Island, and Okidaito Island. Kitadaito and Minamidaito are 360 km away from the main island of Okinawa, and Okidaito Island is another 160 km south of Minamidaito Island. On April 24, 1944, the Daito Island Detachment, mainly the 85th Logistics Guards, which protected the Daito Islands, landed on Minamidaito (in July, the 24th Division moved from Manchuria to the Miyako Islands and the Daito Islands, and the 36th Infantry Regiment incorporated the 85th Guards to defend the Daito Islands). The 4th Company, with 221 personnel, was deployed to Okidaito Island.Footnote 19 The garrisoning of the 4th Company depended solely on radio communications and the men and supplies carried by freighters. For this reason, the war diaries of the 4th Company are unusually detailed, including the time, serial number, and summarized content of all the telegrams. In addition to the war diaries, the memoirs of 4th Company Commander Yoshio Morita (森田芳雄) are also useful in understanding the situation on the island.
Okidaito Island, also known as Rasa Island, is a 1.2 km2 isolated island floating in the Pacific Ocean. Although it is currently uninhabited, during the war, workers who mined phosphate for the Rasa Mining Company and their families resided there, as well as a small number of weather station staff and naval personnel.
The Garrison Regulations were created sometime in May 1944, which give some sense of the rules for how soldiers and civilians were expected to behave toward each other in these early months of 1944.Footnote 20 Under the 15th heading, “Recreation Times,” it was stated that there would be no regular holidays for soldiers, but instead passes would be issued on the basis of orders from the company commander. The permissible recreation area was defined as staying within the solid line of the triangle, as shown in Fig. 2. The recreation area was effectively still within the Army “barracks,” since permission from the garrison commander was required to enter and exit. The islanders’ living quarters in the upper left, as well as the weather station in the middle, are drawn outside the recreation area.
Figure 2 : Recreation area of Okidaito Island.
Source: Appendix (附表), Ref. C11110348400.
On July 19, the 4th Company Commander gathered navy officers, the weather station chief, and mining company executives to discuss a defense plan for Okidaito Island and decide on the number of civilians who would serve in the military during the expected battle.Footnote 21 In addition to the men, 10 female workers were designated as “hygiene department assistants” and received first aid training through August 13. Because US military aircraft flew in for the first time and carried out an air attack on September 29, followed by another on October 3, the tension that spread across Okidaito Island continued until mid-October.
But then, between November 1944 and January 1945, some big changes occurred regarding civilians on the island and their interactions with soldiers, all of which were determined by military orders and the availability of ships that the military had requisitioned. These changes began with the arrival of seven Korean comfort women. On November 21, the 4th Company received a telegram from the 36th Regiment, stating that:
A sailing ship will arrive at Daito Island tomorrow morning, carrying seven comfort women (eight people, including a manager) and a set of regulations for the comfort station.
Indeed, at 07:50 on November 23, 8 comfort station personnel set foot on Okidaito Island, along with 12 members of the radio squad. The ship carrying them was loaded with military supplies, such as weapons, ammunition, and food, as well as military orders, as if the eight comfort station personnel were “munitions” needed to fight the US military. Then, many of the “local people,” 61 men and 36 women, left the island on the same ship when it departed at 17:30.
Over the next 2 months, most of the civilians left Okidaito. The 36th Regiment sent two telegrams on November 26, 1944 asking if there were any people requesting evacuation and informing that a naval convoy was scheduled to enter the port on the 28th. On November 27, the 36th Regiment clarified who was eligible, decreeing that “government officials” such as weather station personnel would not be allowed to evacuate. On November 28, the 4th Company reported that 25 men and 9 women had boarded the ship, and then requested that another ship be arranged for the remaining “81 men and 46 women on the civilian side.”Footnote 22 Then, on November 29, the 36th Regiment again announced its policy of withdrawing all personnel other than “personnel necessary for amphibious landings and self-sustaining the army and navy,” such as weather station personnel.
After that, the 36th Regiment’s policy changed several times regarding which remaining islanders would be allowed to evacuate and what duties they were required to perform. On December 2, it was decided that phosphate mining would continue and so related personnel would remain. But, on the 5th, owing to deteriorating transportation conditions, the 36th Regiment ordered mining halted but required that the remaining personnel “engage in military operational preparations” instead.
The decision to evacuate the Mining Company staff was handed down on December 27, as follows:
As a result of the communication between the Ministry of Munitions and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in the central government regarding the disposal of residents on Okidaito Island, the mining of ‘phosphorus’ has been halted. There is no objection to a full-scale evacuation east of Okidaito Island. As soon as the next ship arrives, your unit will provide comprehensive guidance over the full-scale evacuation, excluding those working in the ‘meteorological department’ and the comfort station. (underlining added by author here and in quotes below)
In other words, at the end of December, the decision was finally made for a “full-scale evacuation” of the “residents on Okidaito Island,” but the comfort station and meteorological department workers were explicitly excluded from the plan. The meteorological department refers to the Okidaitojima Weather Station, jurisdictionally under the Central Meteorological Observatory, and these individuals were civilian employees of the Navy.
To put this another way, on December 27, 1944, the 36th Regiment ordered the eight people at the comfort station to remain on Okidaito Island at the battlefront, just as the weather station staff, who were designated as “government officials” in the cables dated November 27 and 29. The eight people at the comfort station were removed from the category of “residents on Okidaito Island” and the “civilian side” when they remained after the November 28 evacuation.
On January 24, 1945, the day after the last evacuees left the island, the 4th Company reported the presence of remaining personnel other than its members. The breakdown included “six Sasebo Naval Yard contractors (electronic exploration staff), nine weather station employees, and eight military comfort station workers.” “Electronic exploration staff” were radar personnel who, similar to weather station employees, were civilian employees of the military.Footnote 23 From January 24 until immediately after the war ended, seven comfort women and one manager stayed on Okidaito Island, along with members of the army, navy, and military civil service. Although the status of the eight comfort station workers was not explicitly mentioned in the war diaries, it is all but impossible to consider them civilians in any normal sense of the word given this context.
Operations of the comfort station: food, condoms, cash
The comfort station on Okidaito Island began operating on November 26 and, on that date, all members of the military took a break from 07:30 to 17:00. Its location, at the northern end of the islanders’ living quarters shown in Fig. 2, also served as the living quarters. At first, it seems to have operated as Yoshimi’s Type B station in a very standard manner, but then the gradual breakdown in the military’s capacity to supply its troops—with food, condoms, and money—and the growing physical dangers of life on Okidaito led to changes, all of which demonstrate that this was no private brothel. The women were not only required to perform whatever forms of labor the local commander decreed but were also expected to die alongside the soldiers.
One way that the ambiguity of the comfort women’s status, as neither formal employees of the military nor ordinary civilians, played out was in the procurement of food. The lack of shipping vessels meant looming food shortages. This was already an issue by December 20, 1944, when the 4th Company commander asked how food to the comfort station should be rationed and paid for.
In principle, the food for the comfort station was supposed to be provided by civilians in accordance with the Minamidaito Island Garrison Comfort Station Regulations, that is, the 36th Regiment’s comfort station regulations. But the 4th Company expressed its desire to use its own food stores for “the military comfort station” (軍慰安所) (this was the first time that the term “military comfort station” was used in this correspondence).
The justification was that the arrival of the women was very good for unit morale. The circumstances behind the December 20 telegram can be found in the December 22 Situation Report. In the section on “military discipline,” Morita wrote, “There has been no cause for concern since the establishment of the comfort station,” and then touched on the food situation at the comfort station as follows.
Rations [for the comfort station] are supplied from local ingredients according to the Minamidaito Island Garrison Comfort Station Regulations. On this island, locals other than the army and navy are provided with provisions as company workers. However, regarding the military comfort station, I would like to allocate their rations from the military unit’s food supply. I ask for your guidance.
Then, 3 days later, on December 23, the 36th Regiment sent a reply: Food might be provided at a rate of 33 sen (銭, 0.01 yen) per kg, but the amount was limited to 350 g per person per day. The fact that the food was transferred for a fee shows that the status of the comfort women was distinct from that of military personnel or civilians directly hired by the Army or Navy. However, food was strictly defined as military supplies. There was no way they could have allocated any of it to civilians without explicit permission. Therefore, the expression “military comfort station” should be seen as working as a kind of argument, bypassing the institutional framework of “local supplies.” Neither comfort women nor their manager were treated as pure civilians.
Interestingly, on January 6, 1945, the 85th Guards issued an order prohibiting the provision of rice to comfort women. They adopted the opposite policy to that of the 36th Regiment. The reason for the difference in thinking can be found in the relationship between the 4th Company and the higher-ranking units. According to the Camp Requirements Order, the 4th Company was under the “servitude” (隷下) of the 85th Guards, but was under the “command” (指揮) of the 36th Regiment. Simply put, servitude refers to the state of being subordinated in terms of the normal hierarchy, focusing on the command structure, accounting systems, and issues of camp management such as hygiene. By contrast, command means operational orders, prioritizing effective responses to fast-changing battlefield conditions. In short, the 36th Regiment, which gave priority to combat readiness, approved the provision of food, while the 85th Guards Department advised against it on the basis of accounting principles. (Something similar occurred after defeat. On August 20, the 4th Company asked permission to distribute military uniforms to the weather station and comfort station personnel. On August 28, the 85th Guards responded that supplies could not be formally issued to these individuals but could instead be lent to them.)
Gradually, over the winter and spring of 1945, the conditions of existence for the inhabitants of Okidaito Island became more improvisational, and the institutional lines between civilian and military systems collapsed as military leaders requisitioned more and more of the ever-dwindling resources. First Lieutenant Morita’s memoirs mention some of these developments, beginning with the first moment the women arrived:
On the November ferry, some troublesome cargo (シロモノ)Footnote 24 suddenly arrived. It was seven Korean comfort women who were brought by the manager called Urabe something. Of course, if I had known before they boarded the ship, I would have refused them passage, but now that they have left for the island, there is nothing I could do…
By the way, because there is no cash supply even for the army and navy, there is no money for entertainment. As a result, the comfort station had no business after about two months. In this way, the thing that I was the least comfortable with disappeared of its own accord.
The comfort station is not commercially viable. However, no ship will return. The poor group of women, who had no choice but to accept whatever happens, were subsequently put to work for the military. If they die, together with the army, they will simply be unlucky individuals who had drawn the short straw.Footnote 25 [underlining added by author]
However, the records of the war diaries and Morita’s memoirs show that these eight people “had drawn the short straw” not because of “bad luck” but because of the Japanese military.
Morita’s statement that the comfort station ceased its normal operation after 2 months because the men had no cash to pay for visits deserves attention here. The war diaries of the 4th Company show that the men had very little designated free time in 1945, which gives it some plausibility. All members had one full day off on December 26, and then in 1945 some shorter respites from 13:00 on January 1, from 14:00 to 19:00 on February 11, and from 07:30 to 17:00 on June 26. Instead, they engaged in “maintenance affairs” (内務実施). In December, four platoons did so on the 4th and 14th, and the entire team carried out these activities on the 17th, 28th, and 30th. From 1945 onward, they seem to have spent Sundays taking care of chores, five times in January, three in February, and none in March when air raids were intense. Then they resumed with “maintenance affairs” (内務実施) in April, five in May, four in June, and two in August.
However, it does not seem that the women were released from the obligation to have sex with the soldiers. While there is no direct evidence that either the rest days or maintenance affairs days involved the use of comfort stations, other records suggested that this activity continued. The 4th Company sent a telegram requesting replenishment of “sanitary sacks” (condoms) and cigarettes on January 8, 1945 during the next resupply.
But the condoms requested on January 8 were not provided (by contrast, it took only 2 days for a January 9 request for resupply of explosives to appear). These goods were also not on board the navy ship that visited the island on January 22. This must have been of real concern because on January 25 the 4th Company asked the noncommissioned officer of the 85th Guards who was on a business trip to the Accounting Department, 32nd Army, the highest military unit in Okinawa, located on the main island of Okinawa, to convey the urgent need for the same two specific goods.
The emergency supplies for our unit in future considerations:
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1. Cigarettes (currently sufficient until the end of January)
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2. Sanitary sacks
Two months after the establishment of the comfort station and 6 weeks after Morita said it had officially closed, the 4th Company commander was clearly still trying to secure condoms.
On March 9, 4th Company sent a telegram to request supplies from a naval convoy scheduled to enter port on March 11. The last of the seven items, starting with cigarettes and matches, was interestingly labeled “comfort station necessities,” without any explanation. At 04:15 on March 11, three fishing boats came ashore. This is the last arrival of goods recorded in the war diaries, corroborated by Morita’s memoirs.Footnote 26 The list of received supplies included 70,000 cigarettes, and according to the camp log dated May 3, the cost was 1,905.40 yen. However, there were no items that could be presumed to be “comfort station necessities,” and condoms did not appear on the list, although we cannot deny the possibility that they arrived but were not recorded.
Another reason to suspect that the soldiers continued to require sexual services from the women was that Morita’s memoirs, which linked the lack of money to the closure of comfort stations, does not quite make sense. If the comfort station actually stopped its operations in late January, it probably was owing to the lack of condoms. Money was not the key issue.
The soldiers seem to have gotten paid their monthly stipends through March and again in May, so they would have had enough cash in their wallets to go to a comfort station long past the date that Morita suggested the Okidaito station had closed. The entire April payroll of 5,551.41 yen was withheld as national defense contributions, meaning that no spending money was distributed to soldiers that month. According to the war diary dated May 3, 1945, there was 9,848.62 yen in the 4th Company’s safe on that date, the same as at the end of March. But by the end of June, there was a deficit of 1,254.2 yen. In other words, this suggests that the soldiers of the 4th Company had received their salary for May 1945 and had enough cash to visit the comfort station. Interestingly, on June 2, the 4th Company commander suggested to the 85th Guards that he be allowed to requisition cash from the comfort station manager to pay the soldiers’ June salaries; the commander proposed repaying him by sending the manager’s family the equivalent amount via a wire transfer. The request was denied.
It does seem that if the comfort station manager had hoped to do well financially on Okidaito back when he arrived in November 1944, he misjudged the possibilities. The author of the Situation Report dated January 12, 1945, mentioned that he felt “some sympathy” for the manager because of “lower profits than on other islands.” While it is possible that “lower profits” directly led to the station closing down, it seems more likely that the barrier to profitability was that the ratio of soldiers to comfort women was much lower than elsewhere. The standard for the 3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment was 1 comfort woman for every 100 soldiers, but even if the navy personnel were included, there were 7 comfort women for only 270 soldiers on Okidaito Island. To generate “standard” profits, the number of soldiers entering the comfort station would have had to increase by about three times.
Treatment of comfort women as conscript labor after civilians were allowed to evacuate
In the end, one of the most powerful arguments to show that the comfort station on Okidaito Island was not a private brothel housing civilians is the fact that they were not allowed to leave the island with the other civilians before the US military landed. In addition, they were assigned an ever-increasing list of additional duties, including the expectation that they sacrifice their lives together with the soldiers they served. In other words, the comfort women on Okidaito Island became conscript workers—forced laborers—for the Army.
First Lieutenant Morita, the 4th Company commander, described his thinking about the civilians on the island in 1944 in ways that were very different from the views he expressed about the Korean comfort women later in the war, when the military situation had deteriorated farther. In his memoirs, he often expressed his gratitude for the cooperation of those who worked for the Mining Company and his pride in evacuating them all. In particular, in the section about “all company members leaving the island,” the following sentence is particularly significant.
In the end, we’ll probably end up fighting on the ground, wielding clubs and carrying bombs, and ending up committing self-destruction (玉砕). To say “they can die all together, along with the army” is not the right path for the commander of this island. Rather, I should evacuate them to a safe area as soon as possible, in recognition of their generous cooperation up until now.Footnote 27
First Lieutenant Morita clearly believed that “the right path for the commander” was to “evacuate civilians to a safe area” without letting them “commit self-destruction.” Despite this, the eight people at the comfort station remained on the island until the military was defeated. Morita pitied “the poor group of women, who had no choice but to accept whatever happens,” but he also thought that “if they die, together with the army, they will simply be unlucky individuals who had drawn the short straw” and made no effort to evacuate them. The details of their treatment from this point on reveal that the true nature of comfort stations was that they were engaged in military operations.
From the beginning of 1945, Okidaito Island was enveloped in a tense atmosphere awaiting the coming battle. The comfort women were also thrown into the midst of this. They were a third kind of frontline personnel, after soldiers and military civil servants.
On January 3, there was an air raid by US military aircraft on the main island of Okinawa before the last evacuation on January 23. Subsequent orders made it clear that, although both the comfort women and mining company employees were described as “local people,” their status was different. The 4th Company issued Operation Order No. 1, ordering the people on Okidaito to shelter in a cave. The next day, Operation Order No. 2, which anticipated the arrival of a US military task force, included items regarding the sleeping quarters of “local people.”
Military comfort station personnel should sleep in the non-commissioned officer’s room in Barracks No. 1 after 22:00 (each person must bring their own bedding).Mining company personnel sleep in their own shelters (those who do not have shelters use Barracks No. 2).
The directive distinguished “barracks” and “shelters.” Then, when Operational Order No. 4 was issued on January 15, Barracks No. 1 was designated as the “military comfort station” and Barracks No. 2 was designated as an evacuation site for “outsiders” (部外者) attached to the mining company.
The image of comfort women caught up in the war in a variety of ways is summarized in Operational Order No. 9 dated February 10, as follows:
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3. Combat preparations will be completed by February 20th and will be gradually reinforced thereafter.
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4. The plan is to connect with the naval forces also. Comfort station personnel (慰安所員) will serve the military’s work …
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11. Sergeant Takarada (宝田) should take command of the comfort station personnel and ensure smooth meal provision.
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12. An Army surgeon should provide hygiene and first aid training to comfort station personnel during working hours.
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13. The comfort station should reside in (起居) Barracks No. 2 for the time being.
Orders regarding business operations will be sent separately.
The comfort women on Okidaito Island were responsible for meal provision, that is, cooking, under the command of a sergeant,Footnote 28 and were given first aid training from an army surgeon. They were called “comfort station personnel” and were ordered to reside in Barracks No. 2 and told that whether or not the comfort station would be open for its usual business was to be determined by subsequent orders. This new order to “reside” there implies that they were required to live their entire lives for 24 hours a day in that spot beginning from February 10. Their new living quarters—the 2nd barracks—corresponds to the order to soldiers to be “confined to barracks” (内務班) so to speak. This may have been what Morita meant by “the comfort station had no business,” but for the women the change seems to have simply intensified their conditions of confinement. Comfort women who were made to “serve the military’s work” in this way were nothing but a third unit of the military, after soldiers and military civil servants. This is why army superiors in Okinawa believed that, unlike mining company personnel, “if they die, together with the army, they will simply be unlucky individuals who had drawn the short straw.”Footnote 29
The comfort women and the comfort station were mentioned again in subsequent messages. Operational Order No. 11 of February 17 ordered that the “military comfort station should operate as usual from the next morning.” On March 1, Okidaito Island was hit by naval gunfire from the US military, and on March 2, Operation Order No. 13 was issued stating that “comfort station personnel should reside in the former clothing warehouse next to the headquarters for the time being.” Orders as to where the comfort station should “operate out of” or the women should “reside” had become routine.
Under these difficult conditions, as mentioned above, the 4th Company continued to request replenishment of “comfort station necessities” on its list of supplies. It would be reasonable to assume that the contents included condoms.
War clouds suddenly intensified in late March. On March 26, US forces landed on the Kerama Islands. On March 28, the 4th Company issued four operational orders. In No. 20 at 03:00, caves were assigned to “outsiders,” by then, mainly the navy personnel. Operational Order No. 21 at 10:00 instructed the comfort station personnel to wait in caves 4 and 5 as “preparations for cave combat.” At 18:00, Nos. 22 and 23 were delivered. No. 23 stated, “The military comfort station should be located in Cave 5.” At 21:00, the commander of the 4th Company “assembled the army, navy, and outside leaders” and explained the “ground war guidance policy.” At 08:00 and 18:30 the next day, he gave more information and instructions to this group, including the comfort station manager.
On April 9, the 4th Company issued Operation Order No. 26 when it sighted a US warship. This stated that “the radar, watchtower, weather station and military comfort station should relocate to their designated caves.” This was the last time until the defeat that the terms “comfort station” and “comfort women” appeared in the war diaries. However, Operational Order No. 35 dated June 10 stipulates that “direct guidance shall be given to each platoon leader, radio squad leader, and naval and outside leaders regarding damage prevention.” Clearly, until the end of the Battle of Okinawa, comfort station and comfort women were incorporated into the organization and personnel of the 4th Company at every step of the way. Finally, on August 25, the Commander of the 36th Regiment issued Operational Order No. 32, relieving the troops of operational duty and placing them on security guard duty in accordance with the Garrison Duty Order. The war across the Daito Islands officially ended on that day although the women still could not leave. Although there are no existing records of the comfort women boarding the ship, we know that the 4th Company departed from Okidaito Island on October 14.Footnote 30
Conclusions
This research reconsiders the true nature of Japanese military comfort stations and comfort women. To summarize the discussion in this paper, comfort stations were military facilities, and comfort women were the third unit of the Japanese military after soldiers and direct civilian employees of the Army and Navy. The Japanese military recognized the comfort stations as an essential element of military operations, and institutionalized and formalized their comfort stations by incorporating them into innumerable detailed regulations. The 3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment on the Chinese front positioned them as “a kind of weapon” that adjusted the morale of soldiers and increased their fighting power. These official daily records reveal that they were regularly the subject of operational orders.
The conditions show that the comfort women on Okidaito were definitely enduring a form of wartime sexual slavery. These women were excluded from evacuation and were forced to provide “sexual comfort” as well as cooking, cleaning, and first aid duties in the middle of the fighting. And they were even forced to die alongside the army. The architect of this hell was none other than the Japanese military comfort station system.
When soldiers were on the front lines facing the enemy, their actions were strictly regulated both in time and space. Even after a battle was over, counterintelligence remained the top priority. Ikuhiko Hata and his successors “imagined” that civilian brothels opened in these war zones, as comfort stations, where soldiers could freely enter. Such a scenario might have been possible at a garrison during peacetime, but it was impossible during wartime, when using a comfort station was transformed into an “official” action backed by various regulations. Soldiers did retain the choice not to go to a comfort station.
Whenever I come across the arguments of historical revisionists, I am reminded of the famous fable of “the blind men and an elephant.” They brandish a “contract” similar to a treasured sword, which proves that military comfort stations were brothels. Indeed, the personnel requirements of the comfort women and the manager, and the contract that binds both, were necessary and sufficient conditions for a peacetime brothel. In relatively safe metropolises such as Singapore, the contracts may have structured actual circumstances.Footnote 31 However, in the special environment of the battlefield, it was just one relevant fact, and focusing on these legal rules misjudges the essence of controls.
As far as we can see from the war diaries, the establishment and operation of the comfort stations show a highly consistent pattern. The comfort stations were opened in conjunction with the process of building garrisons and security after operations, and the use of comfort stations were systematically coordinated with soldiers’ holidays and outings. The system also applied to troops temporarily stationed somewhere near a station. This pattern was the core of the comfort station system that ran from the Sino-Japanese War to the Asia-Pacific War.
This comfort station system was backed by two institutional frameworks. The entry of military personnel to comfort stations was regulated on the basis of a combination of the Camp Requirements Order, the Army Internal Affairs Manual, and the Garrison Duty Order. The existence of comfort stations located close to battlefields was given official status by amending the Field Canteen Regulations. What supported the establishment of comfort stations and the actions of the soldiers who entered there was none other than the Japanese Army’s laws and regulations.
The postwar Japanese government confirmed this view regarding the status of comfort women. On April 26, 1968, at the Social Labor Committee of the House of Representatives, Hirotsugu Sanemoto (実本博次), head of the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s Relief Bureau, stated that there was no direct employment relationship between comfort women and the military.
In order to be granted facilities, lodging, etc. on the battlefield, one must have some kind of status, so it is best to give the women the status of unpaid military civilian (無給の軍属) and provide them with lodging and other facilities. This was the actual situation.Footnote 32
Some defined status is necessary for the military to provide anything on the battlefield, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare describes it as an “unpaid military civilian.” If you want to associate comfort stations with brothels, then the comfort stations should be called “military” brothels rather than “civilian” brothels. The fact that the labor of these women was unpaid, of course, also supports the argument that this was forced labor.
In the 1990s, the issue of comfort women, which had been kept under wraps for a long time, burst out into the open. In August 1993, the Japanese government issued the Kono Statement acknowledging the military’s “involvement.” Soon, historical revisionists argued that the Japanese government was not responsible because the comfort stations were nothing more than private brothels. But as is well known, in 2015, even former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could not deny the Kono Statement and retained the acknowledgment of military “involvement” as the official position of the Japanese government. I am confident that, the more deeply we research these official daily war records, the more evidence we will find of that involvement.
War diaries can continue to reveal the nature of Japanese military actions without the direct testimony of victims. As many of the women are no longer living or are near the end of their lives, this task of in-depth documentary analysis is even more urgent.
Another task is to facilitate international comparison. Ikuhiko Hata insists that both the Allied Powers and South Korea created comfort stations. If comfort stations are a common occurrence in wars, we should explore these international comparisons both to eradicate the root causes and to warn the future. The investigation into the perpetration of the Japanese military comfort station system will undoubtedly provide valuable foundations for this task.
Competing interests
The author has no competing interests to declare.
Author Biography
Jongmoon Ha currently serves as a professor in the Department of Japanese Studies at Hanshin University in Korea. His specialty is modern Japanese history, and his recent interests include wartime labor policies, the Emperor system, the Japanese military’s “comfort women,” colonialism, and Asianism. He served as a prosecutor for the Korean side at the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, held in Tokyo, Japan in December 2000. In January 2023, he published The Japanese Military Comfort Stations through the Japanese Army’s War Diaries in Korea and is currently preparing a Japanese translation.
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