1. Introduction
The concept of judicial legitimacy has traditionally been approached through a court-centric lens, emphasizing courts as autonomous institutions. This conventional perspective typically focuses on internal factors, such as the role of judicial appointments (see, for example, Bartels and Johnston, Reference Bartels and Johnston2012; Gibson et al., Reference Gibson, Gottfried, Delli Carpini and Jamieson2011; Hansford et al., Reference Hansford, Lucero, Intawan and Robles2024; Woodson, Reference Woodson2024) or on the impact of judicial decisions on legitimacy (see, for example, Bartels and Johnston, Reference Bartels and Johnston2013; Caldeira and Gibson, Reference Caldeira and Gibson1992, pp. 642–5; Gibson, Reference Gibson2024; Gibson et al., Reference Gibson, Caldeira and Spence2003a, p. 359). However, this framework often overlooks how public trust in judicial outcomes is actually formed and sustained.
This article proposes a fundamental reconceptualization: judicial legitimacy cannot be understood as court-generated in isolation. Rather, I introduce the concept of “legitimacy transfer,” the mechanism through which courts inherit legitimacy deficits from investigative agencies, prosecutors, and even post-judicial actors such as pardon boards. Courts operate within a legitimacy chain, a sequence of institutional actors whose credibility and conduct shape whether judicial outcomes will ultimately be perceived as legitimate. This framework acknowledges that public trust in judicial outcomes is influenced by every stage of the legal process, from initial police investigations through prosecutorial decisions and finally to court judgments. Each stage builds upon or potentially undermines the legitimacy established in previous stages. The central insight is this: even a flawlessly reasoned court decision cannot generate robust public confidence when earlier or later stages of the legal process have been compromised.
Using Malaysia’s experience in handling corruption cases after the 2018 dramatic political transition that witnessed the fall of Barisan Nasional, a dominant party that governed Malaysia for almost six decades, as a critical case study, this article demonstrates how pre-judicial processes fundamentally shape public perception of judicial legitimacy. When initial investigations lack thoroughness or prosecutorial decisions appear politically motivated, even well-reasoned court judgments may struggle to maintain public trust. Conversely, when early stages of the legal process demonstrate independence and competence, they create a foundation of legitimacy that strengthens public confidence in judicial outcomes.
Malaysia provides a compelling case for examining judicial legitimacy through a process-based lens for three reasons. First, because of the dual role of Attorney General and Public Prosecutor. Malaysia’s constitutional structure creates a significant tension by vesting both the Attorney General and Public Prosecutor roles in the same individual, as articulated under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. This arrangement fundamentally differs from jurisdictions where these roles are separated to maintain checks and balances. The Attorney General primarily serves as the government’s chief legal advisor, representing the state’s interests and providing counsel to the executive branch. Meanwhile, the Public Prosecutor’s role demands impartiality in pursuing justice through fair and objective prosecution of alleged offenses. When these distinct functions merge in one office, potential conflicts of interest emerge, particularly in cases involving political figures.
Second, Malaysia’s constitutional framework grants the Attorney General cum Public Prosecutor extraordinary discretionary powers with minimal judicial oversight. Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution provides that the Attorney General “shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offense.” This allows the Public Prosecutor to withdraw cases even after courts have established prima facie evidence, as demonstrated in high-profile corruption cases involving political figures.
Third, the Federal Constitution includes a unique power of royal pardon that operates largely outside judicial power. Article 42(1) of the Federal Constitution empowers the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the King) to “grant pardons, reprieves and respites in respect of all offenses.” Significantly, neither the Constitution nor related legislation requires the King or Pardons Board to provide reasoned justifications for clemency decisions. And finally, Malaysia serves as a good illustration of this theoretical framework because of the political shift with the 2018 general election, which ended the 61-year rule of Barisan Nasional and ushered in the Pakatan Harapan coalition. This transition precipitated a wave of high-profile corruption cases against formerly powerful political figures that saw some cases withdrawn or pardons granted to convicted politicians. The perception that the legal process might be influenced by political considerations offers compelling evidence of how pre-judicial and post-judicial processes can undermine public confidence in judicial outcomes, regardless of courts’ own integrity.
The article proceeds in several parts. Section 2 introduces readers to the concept of legitimacy and judicial legitimacy as discussed by political scholars. Section 3 develops a theoretical framework that reconceptualizes judicial legitimacy as a process-based phenomenon where the actions of other actors during the litigation process may impact the legitimacy of the judiciary. Section 4 examines Malaysia’s legal system and presents a detailed analysis of significant corruption cases to illustrate how pre- and post-judicial processes may shape ultimate judicial legitimacy. Finally, it discusses implications for both theory and practice and offers insights for other jurisdictions seeking to strengthen public trust in their legal systems.
2. The concept of judicial legitimacy
According to Justice Stephen Gageler, judicial legitimacy is defined as “the level of public confidence which needs to exist for a competent and impartial judiciary to do its job of deciding controversies according to law without fear or favour” (Gageler, Reference Gageler2023, p. 28). He further added that for a judiciary to be viewed as legitimate, it must first demonstrate actual competence and impartiality, and without these fundamental attributes, any perception of judicial legitimacy is merely superficial and unsustainable, regardless of institutional independence (Gageler, Reference Gageler2023, p. 29).
Scholars have operationalized this concept of judicial legitimacy by distinguishing between diffuse support, i.e., deeper institutional loyalty and trust in the judicial system that persists regardless of agreement with specific decisions and specific support, i.e., public approval based on agreement with particular decisions or outcomes from courts (Caldeira and Gibson, Reference Caldeira and Gibson1992, p. 637; Grosskopf and Mondak, Reference Grosskopf and Mondak1998, p. 641; Murphy and Tanenhaus, Reference Murphy and Tanenhaus1974, p. 1037; Scheb and Lyons, Reference Scheb and Lyons1999, p. 766). Judicial legitimacy has traditionally been conceptualized through a court-centric lens, examining courts as standalone entities within political systems. For example, scholars study the effects of the Dobbs ruling to judicial legitimacy (Gibson, Reference Gibson2024); the effects of Bush v Gore ruling to judicial legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence, Reference Gibson, Caldeira and Spence2003); the effects of political ideology to judicial legitimacy (Badas, Reference Badas2019b; Bartels and Johnston, Reference Bartels and Johnston2013); the effects of judicial legitimacy on unpopular public policies (Badas, Reference Badas2019a; Gibson et al., Reference Gibson, Caldeira and Spence2005); the effects of court’s structure to judicial legitimacy (Appleby and Delaney, Reference Appleby and Delaney2023); the effects of political values to judicial legitimacy (Caldeira and Gibson, Reference Caldeira and Gibson1992); the effects of court rulings in Burwell’s and Sebelius’s case to judicial legitimacy (Badas, Reference Badas2016); the effects of judicial selection to judicial legitimacy (Klein, Reference Klein2018), and the effect of diversity on court bench to judicial legitimacy (Scherer, Reference Scherer2022). These dominant perspectives focusing on courts as standalone entities have shaped scholarly research in understanding judicial legitimacy.
A particularly influential perspective on judicial legitimacy comes from Richard Fallon, who articulates three distinct but interconnected dimensions: legal, sociological, and moral legitimacy. This comprehensive framework helps clarify how legitimacy operates within judicial institutions. Legal legitimacy, according to Fallon, is grounded in legal norms. He explains that “legal decisions can sometimes be erroneous without thereby becoming illegitimate” (Fallon, Reference Fallon2005, p. 1794). He further provided an example showing that people who believed Bush v Gore decision as illegitimate did not necessarily argue that others should disobey or disregard the decision. Under the legal legitimacy dimension, Fallon further distinguishes sub-types of legal legitimacy which are substantive legal legitimacy and authoritative legal legitimacy. Substantive legal legitimacy refers to the “correctness or reasonableness as a matter of law,” while authoritative legal legitimacy refers to “legally binding character which may depend on standards that allow a larger margin for judicial error” (Fallon, Reference Fallon2005, pp. 1794–5). Sociological legitimacy is when the “relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward” (Fallon, Reference Fallon2005, p. 1795). He argues that some discussions of sociological legitimacy incorrectly assume that when the public complies with legal authority, this automatically proves that authority is legitimate. Another important consideration regarding sociological legitimacy is that the same decisions and institutions can be seen as highly legitimate by some social groups while simultaneously being viewed as illegitimate by other groups. Moral legitimacy on the other hand is a “function of moral justifiability or respect worthiness” (Fallon, Reference Fallon2005, p. 1796). A court decision might follow the law correctly and enjoy wide public approval yet still lack moral legitimacy if it’s fundamentally unjust or ethically wrong. Fallon emphasizes that moral legitimacy helps evaluate whether citizens have genuine obligations to respect judicial authority, based on substantive principles of justice and fairness.
By contrast, a court-centric model treats legitimacy as proceeding mainly from formal trials and judicial pronouncements. Fallon’s framework challenges this narrow view. In reality, courts generate legitimacy through precedent, even when those precedents are wrong. This shows that legitimacy isn’t just about legal correctness. He argues that “a virtual consensus exists that at least some judicial precedents suffice to ground further claims of legitimate judicial authority, even when those precedents were themselves erroneously decided” (Fallon, Reference Fallon2005, p. 1793). This suggests that law becomes authoritative only when people accept it. In the absence of consensus on legal standards, Fallon observes, legitimacy disputes “often cannot be answered except on the basis of partly moral reasoning” (Fallon, Reference Fallon2005, p. 1793). These insights imply that judicial legitimacy is cumulative and process-driven: even a legally correct judgment may lack acceptance if preceding stages were tainted. Any realistic analysis must account for the complex, intertwined relationships between legal rules, social acceptance, and moral principles. This indirectly critiques court-centred models and supports a broader, process-based approach to legitimacy. Fallon further criticizes the current poll-based measures of diffuse support in gauging sociological legitimacy. He mentioned that “the public’s relative lack of attentiveness makes it impossible to gauge the substantive sociological legitimacy—in the strong sense of active endorsement—of controversial methods of constitutional interpretation. If we focus on this concern, we will remain chronically uncertain about judicial legitimacy in the sociological sense—even though other measures, including that of institutional legitimacy (or diffuse support), would often support more affirmative judgments about the Court’s sociological legitimacy” (Fallon, Reference Fallon2005, p. 1830).
To fully understand how judicial legitimacy operates, we must recognize its inherently multi-dimensional nature. While Fallon has outlined the three-part framework of legal, sociological, and moral legitimacy, Dent (Reference Dent2024) has deepened our understanding of how these dimensions interact in complex ways emphasizing that judicial legitimacy must be viewed as a dynamic system rather than in isolation. She argues that during periods of political instability or social tension, courts often become more cautious and self-aware of their role. In such environments, the judiciary may question whether it is the most suitable institution to address certain controversial issues. Nonetheless, it is indeed during these raging periods when a court’s moral authority demands that it remain responsive to pressing issues, rather than withdrawing from them (Haltom and Silverstein, Reference Haltom and Silverstein1987, pp. 38–40). When political systems stumble and good governance breaks down, the judiciary’s responsibility to remain engaged may require the court to take a more proactive leadership role, including providing moral guidance on important issues (Dent, Reference Dent2024, p. 34). In these critical situations, the court’s legal legitimacy may come into direct conflict with its broader moral legitimacy. When judicial decisions consistently fail to align with evolving societal values and collective notions of justice, the court risks undermining not only its moral legitimacy but also its legal legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
This creates what Tara Grove describes as the Supreme Court’s legitimacy dilemma, where the Court sometimes has to choose between making decisions that will be popular with the public versus decisions that strictly follow legal principles, creating a difficult trade-off between these positive and normative legitimacy. Grove argues that in politically challenging moments, these two forms of legitimacy can come into direct conflict, forcing justices to make difficult choices about which to prioritize. This tension becomes particularly acute in high-profile cases where public opinion is deeply divided. The second dilemma Grove identifies is more novel and perhaps more troubling: threats to the Court’s legitimacy that stem not from its decisions but from external threats (Grove, Reference Grove2019, p. 2272). This creates a particularly worrying problem because the Court has little ability to address these challenges through its own actions, as the damage to its legitimacy comes from external political behaviour. This is similar to Dent’s arguments that legitimacy must be assessed by approaching it as a system. According to her, “how the political branches interact with the court and how the court interacts with the political branches is dependent on the level of judicial legitimacy. The assessment of legitimacy thus requires the area of focus to be widened to observe these channels of influence. Within the multi-directional focus, judicial politics will be gauged by the level of legitimacy of each dimension of legitimacy. Legitimacy can only be appropriately assessed by viewing the entire system” (Dent, Reference Dent2024, p. 43).
If we apply Fallon’s sociological perspective on legitimacy, when the public perceives prosecutions as having political motivations, even indictments that are technically lawful will appear illegitimate in the eyes of the public. For instance, in Malaysia, the fusion of Attorney General and Public Prosecutor powers has raised concerns that some prosecutions were selective. From Fallon’s standpoint, such concerns undermine the sociological acceptance necessary for legitimacy. In contrast, a prosecution that is transparent can enhance all three: a law-based charging decision that appears fair will strengthen legal legitimacy, build public trust (sociological legitimacy), and satisfy moral notions of justice. Consider a royal pardon given to a corrupt official. While such a pardon might be legally allowed, it can severely damage the moral legitimacy of the outcome. This damage can only be avoided if compelling reasons justify the pardon. Fallon’s model underscores that legitimacy is an ongoing social fact, not a one-time certificate. In practice, this means that post-judicial actions should reinforce, not contradict, the integrity of the process. A pardon issued to an apparently innocent person (or vacated conviction upon new evidence) can enhance all three forms of legitimacy, whereas a pardon seen as cronyism will erode the public’s trust (sociological) and sense of justice (moral), regardless of its legality.
Despite the rich body of literature on judicial legitimacy, a significant gap emerges in how scholars conceptualize the origins and development of legitimacy. Traditional research treats judicial legitimacy as something that begins and ends within courtroom walls. This court-centric model fails to recognize that judicial legitimacy is not manufactured within courts but rather inherited from, and continuously shaped by, the entire legal process. Fallon’s moral legitimacy dimension exposes perhaps the most significant gap in current theorization. Even when a court decision is both technically correct and popular with the public, it can still be morally wrong if it’s unfair or unethical.
These identified limitations in the court-centric approach to judicial legitimacy reveal a critical theoretical gap. While Fallon’s three-dimensional framework illuminates the complex nature of legitimacy, it does not fully account for how legitimacy is constructed through multi-institutional processes extending beyond courtroom walls. Building on Fallon’s insights about sociological, legal, and moral legitimacy, and responding to Grove’s concerns about external threats, this article proposes a process-based theoretical framework that reconceptualizes judicial legitimacy as emerging from the entire chain of legal proceedings. Rather than viewing courts as isolated institutions generating their own legitimacy, this framework recognizes that legitimacy is inherited from, dependent upon, and continuously shaped by pre-judicial investigations, prosecutorial decisions, court judgments, and post-judicial mechanisms. Malaysia’s constitutional structure, with its fusion of Attorney General and Public Prosecutor roles, extraordinary prosecutorial discretion, and unique royal pardon powers, provides an ideal context to examine this process-based legitimacy. By analysing high-profile corruption cases through this lens, we can observe how legitimacy deficits at one stage of the legal process create legitimacy ceilings that constrain courts’ ability to establish trust through their own actions alone. This process-based understanding offers a deeper explanation of judicial legitimacy that extends beyond court-centric approaches and better accounts for public perceptions of justice in complex legal systems.
3. Defining and conceptualizing legitimacy transfer
This article proposes a novel theoretical framework that reconceptualizes judicial legitimacy as a theoretical framework centred on “legitimacy transfer.” Before we theorize the concept of legitimacy transfer, it is important to distinguish this theory from the theory of procedural justice. Procedural justice theory, as extensively developed in legal scholarship, proposes that people evaluate institutions not merely based on decision outcomes but significantly based on the fairness of the processes through which decisions are made (Lind and Tyler, Reference Lind and Tyler1988, p. 3; Tyler, Reference Tyler2000, p.120). According to procedural justice scholarship, when individuals perceive that institutional procedures are fair, they develop greater trust in institutions and greater willingness to comply with institutional authority, even when they disagree with specific outcomes (Tyler, Reference Tyler2007, pp. 27–9; Tyler and Huo, Reference Tyler and Huo2002, pp. 49–57). This insight has profoundly shaped contemporary understanding of institutional legitimacy across multiple domains such as policing (Sunshine and Tyler, Reference Sunshine and Tyler2003), courts (Tyler, Reference Tyler2007), and organizations (Konovsky, Reference Konovsky2000). Tyler establishes that how decisions are made matters more than the outcomes themselves and further lay out four primary factors that people use to evaluate procedural fairness which are: (i) participation (people feel more fairly treated when allowed to present their views, even when their input doesn’t directly influence the outcome the effort to be fair); (ii) neutrality (authorities must be perceived as impartial, making decisions based on facts and rules rather than personal biases); (iii) trustworthiness of authorities (people assess whether authorities are benevolent, caring, and trying to be fair), and (iv) treatment with dignity and respect (recognition of people’s status and treating them with politeness and respect) (Tyler, Reference Tyler2000, pp. 121–2).
While procedural justice theory excellently explains within-institution fairness, it cannot address the cascading effects when prosecutors inherit evidence from compromised investigations or judges receive cases from selective prosecutors. These multi-institutional transmission mechanisms of legitimacy deficits fall outside procedural justice’s analytical scope. It does not address how institutional boundaries create transmission mechanisms for legitimacy problems. The literature treats each institutional stage somewhat independently, missing the cumulative and cascading effects that occur when multiple institutional actors are linked in a single legal process. When prosecutors inherit evidence from compromised investigations, or when judges receive cases from selective prosecutors, procedural justice theory cannot explain these legitimacy problems.
Given procedural justice’s focus on within-institution fairness, traditional scholarship on judicial legitimacy has similarly focused on courts as standalone institutions (Bartels and Johnston, Reference Bartels and Johnston2012; Bartels and Johnston, Reference Bartels and Johnston2013; Caldeira and Gibson, Reference Caldeira and Gibson1992; Gibson et al., Reference Gibson, Caldeira and Spence2003b; Gibson et al., Reference Gibson, Gottfried, Delli Carpini and Jamieson2011; Gibson, Reference Gibson2024; Hansford et al., Reference Hansford, Lucero, Intawan and Robles2024; Woodson, Reference Woodson2024). However, I propose that we must broaden our analytical frame to understand how legitimacy cascades across institutional boundaries; this is where legitimacy transfer operates as a distinct phenomenon. This shift in perspective provides new insights into how public trust in judicial outcomes develops and is maintained. The framework importantly recognizes that judicial legitimacy doesn’t begin at the Court level but rather emerges from a complex chain of legal proceedings and institutions. This insight helps bridge Fallon’s focus on legal legitimacy within judicial decision-making and Grove’s concern with external threats to the Court’s legitimacy. It shows how legitimacy is both inherited from and dependent upon the broader legal system’s functioning. External threats can emerge at multiple points in the legal process, and each stage presents opportunities for external actors to either buttress or undermine judicial legitimacy.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the framework begins by recognizing that judicial legitimacy is constructed through multiple, interconnected stages of the legal process. Each stage from initial investigations through prosecutorial decisions to final court judgments contributes to or detracts from the overall legitimacy of judicial outcomes. This cumulative nature of legitimacy suggests that public trust is not simply a product of what happens in courtrooms, but rather the result of a complex interplay between various legal institutions and processes. Central to this framework is the concept of pre-judicial process and post-judicial process, which encompasses the credibility and independence of investigative processes before and after the cases reach the courts. When initial investigations lack thoroughness or appear politically motivated, it may create legitimacy deficits that even well-reasoned court judgments may struggle to overcome. This novel perspective also emphasizes the role of prosecutor as a crucial intermediate stage between investigations and court proceedings. The theory further recognizes a phase known as post-judicial process that continues to evolve even after court decisions are rendered, particularly in systems where royal pardons or executive clemency exist.
Figure 1. Process-based phenomenon
Legitimacy transfer describes the dynamic process through which legitimacy deficits created at one institutional stage of the legal process become structural constraints on subsequent stages. A legitimacy deficit at the investigative stage constrains the prosecutor’s ability to appear independent, regardless of prosecutorial fairness. A legitimacy deficit at the prosecutorial stage constrains the court’s ability to generate public confidence towards the courts, even with procedurally fair trials. These constraints are termed as “legitimacy ceiling,” i.e., the maximum level of public confidence a court can achieve given legitimacy deficits accumulated in prior institutional stages. A legitimacy ceiling constrains what is institutionally possible, not merely what is publicly perceived. Even outstanding judicial performance cannot fully overcome cumulative legitimacy deficits from other actors.
Critically, legitimacy transfer differs from procedural justice in three fundamental ways. First, legitimacy transfer is structural; it describes how institutional constraints cascade across organizational boundaries, independent of whether public opinion recognizes this constraint. Second, legitimacy transfer reveals an asymmetry. Building legitimacy takes consistent efforts across all institutional stages; destroying it requires only a single institutional failure. This asymmetry is particularly acute in high-profile corruption cases, where courts invest considerable legitimacy-building effort that pre- and post-judicial mechanisms can rapidly undermine. Finally, legitimacy transfer is cumulative; legitimacy deficits do not reset between institutional stages.
In adversarial systems like Malaysia, where judges operate as passive arbiters limited in their capacity to independently correct investigative or prosecutorial deficiencies, legitimacy transfer effects are particularly pronounced. Courts cannot easily overcome legitimacy deficits through their own procedurally fair proceedings. This makes adversarial systems structurally vulnerable to legitimacy transfer dynamics as compared to judges in inquisitorial systems.
4. Re-thinking judicial legitimacy: Malaysia experience
In Malaysia’s adversarial system, judges play a role similar to referees, primarily observing the contest between prosecution and defence rather than actively investigating cases. This system stems from the British common law tradition (Wu, Reference Wu1996, pp. 235–7). The key limitation here is that judges must generally work with the evidence presented before them by the parties (van Caenegem, Reference van Caenegem1999, pp.79–81). Unlike in inquisitorial systems (used in countries like France or Germany), judges in adversarial systems like Malaysia cannot typically order their own investigations, call witnesses independently, demand specific pieces of evidence, question witnesses extensively beyond clarification, and conduct independent research into case facts (van Caenegem, Reference van Caenegem1999, pp. 79–81).
This constraint becomes particularly problematic in corruption cases where evidence might be incomplete or complex. If prosecutors fail to present crucial banking documents or witness testimony, judges cannot independently pursue these evidence trails, even if they suspect their importance. For example, it was reported in the local media portal that the High Court Judge had to disregard one of the witness statement with regard to a receipt from his political donations to the accused because the judge believed that the witness had shown bias towards the accused (Anbalagan, Reference Anbalagan2020). In another case involving the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, it was reported that the court had to issue a Discharge Not Amounting to Acquittal (DNAA) in a graft case linked to the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) state fund scandal because there was a long delay in the case due to the prosecution’s failure to provide the defence with crucial documents (Saieed, Reference Saieed2024). This system places enormous responsibility on prosecutors to build comprehensive cases. When prosecution fails to present adequate evidence, judges must often dismiss cases or issue a DNAA, potentially undermining public confidence in the justice system. The judicial role becomes particularly challenging when high-profile cases collapse due to investigative deficiencies that judges can observe but cannot address directly.
Adding to that, the King’s discretionary power to give pardon or executive clemency is another aspect that could affect judicial legitimacy (Barkow, Reference Barkow2009, p. 153; Love, Reference Love2010, p. 1193; Novak, Reference Novak2017, p. 3). The power of pardon in Malaysia is enshrined in Article 42 of the Federal Constitution. What makes this power particularly significant is that it operates independently of the judicial process (Mahmud, Reference Mahmud2024; Strangio, Reference Strangio2024). Though the power is exercised through a Pardon Board, the Constitution does not require the King or the Pardon Board to provide reasons for granting pardons, nor does it specify criteria that must be met. This discretionary power may impact judicial legitimacy. Consider a case where courts have meticulously examined evidence, applied legal principles, and delivered a carefully reasoned judgment. When a pardon overturns this judicial determination without requiring any explanation or justification, it can appear to undermine the court’s authority.
The Malaysian experience with high-profile corruption cases provides compelling evidence for understanding judicial legitimacy as a process-based phenomenon rather than purely court-centric. The handling of cases involving prominent political figures demonstrates how the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), the Public Prosecutor, and the King’s discretion may significantly shape public perceptions of judicial outcomes. This analysis will be based upon three important aspects namely insufficient evidence during investigation, the issue of prosecutorial discretion, and the issue of royal pardon post judicial decision.
The legitimacy of Malaysia’s judiciary has been called into question by some civil society advocates when cases were being discharged due to the lack of prosecutorial evidentiary deficiencies and the apparent selective application of law against political opponents. For example, ALIRAN, one of the civil society movements in Malaysia, had addressed this concern as follows:
In recent years, Malaysia has witnessed an alarming surge in allegations and cases of corruption involving elected officials and politically appointed individuals. These cases often involve staggering sums of money and other valuables…It is also disturbing to see the number of cases against such officials being discontinued or given discharges not amounting to acquittals (DNAA). Public trust in governance and the integrity of democratic institutions is at an all-time low (Menon, Civil Society Activist, Reference Menon2025).
Another press statement was also made by the Centre to Combat Corruption and Cronyism as follows:
On 27 November 2024, former Prime Minister Najib Razak and former Treasury Secretary-General Mohd Irwan Serigar Abdullah were granted a discharge not amounting to an acquittal (DNAA) for six criminal breach of trust (CBT) charges involving the misuse of RM6.6 billion in government funds. The High Court granted the DNAA after the prosecution failed to hand over several classified documents required to prepare a defence. The Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (C4 Center) expresses frustration and disappointment at the continued pattern of flawed prosecutions brought against powerful individuals that have resulted in little to no accountability and the loss of public funds. C4 Center calls out several major issues with the case as follows: The need for accountability for procedural failures; Perceptions of political bias are further amplified; The Official Secrets Act (OSA) 1972 severely hinders public sector corruption prosecutions (Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism, 2024).
These statements from civil society voices paint a troubling picture of Malaysia’s anti-corruption efforts and judicial processes. The systemic pattern of high-profile corruption cases ending in DNAAs rather than proper adjudication strikes at the heart of judicial legitimacy. Most concerning is the erosion of public confidence. When citizens witness corruption cases involving vast sums repeatedly collapse due to procedural failings, it fundamentally undermines trust not just in the judiciary, but in the entire system of governance.
4.1. Insufficient evidence
The issue of insufficient evidence in the litigation process gives a significant challenge to judicial legitimacy, particularly in high-profile corruption cases. When prosecutors fail to present compelling evidence that meets the required threshold, courts may be compelled to issue a full acquittal or DNAA. This situation often raises questions about investigative thoroughness and prosecutorial readiness. The issue of lack of evidence that led to an acquittal by court can be seen in the corruption case of the former Chief Minister of Sabah, Musa Aman and Chief Minister of Penang, Lim Guan Eng.
Musa Aman was faced with a total of 46 charges of corruption and money laundering where 30 charges (initially 35 but 5 charges were dropped during initial stage) were brought under Section 11(a) of the Anti-Corruption Act 1997 (now superseded by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009) for allegedly receiving illegal payments totalling RM263 million in connection with timber concessions in Sabah (Karim, Reference Karim2018) and an additional 16 charges of money laundering, involving US$40.3 million under Section 4(1)(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 (BERNAMA, 2019). However, all of these charges were ultimately dropped in June 2020 due to crucial evidentiary gaps (Ong, Reference Ong2020). The media statement made from the Attorney General office mentioned as follows:
Having studied the whole available evidence and upon discussion being held with the prosecution and investigation team, I decided to withdraw all the charges against Tan Sri Musa Aman. In cases of this nature, documentary evidence is vital to prove a case. Documentary evidence from companies and banks which were expected could not be obtained through Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters from Hong Kong. The Department of Justice Hong Kong advised that companies and banks in Hong Kong are only required to keep records for seven (7) years, and it is highly unlikely that neither the banks nor the companies would still have the records. Apart from 3 that, there are witnesses for the prosecution who have passed away, suffered serious medical ailments or are not in Malaysia anymore. This recent development including the aforesaid Affidavit in Support that was filed has caused a situation wherein it is no longer tenable to continue with the prosecution of Tan Sri Musa Aman. This decision is strengthened by a letter dated 22 December 2011 from the Independent Commission Against Corruption Hong Kong stating that their investigation against Tan Sri Musa Aman is complete and on the basis of known facts no further investigative action will be pursued. My decision is taken in accordance with powers exercisable at my discretion under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution (Attorney-General’s Chambers, Malaysia, 2020).
The prosecution encountered two major obstacles: they could not secure key witness testimony from Hong Kong, and they failed to obtain essential documentary evidence from these jurisdictions (Ng, Reference Ng2020). The Attorney General’s explanation highlighted how the inability to secure witnesses and documents from foreign jurisdictions effectively crippled the prosecution’s case. This situation creates a troubling precedent where cases involving cross-border corruption might collapse not due to innocence, but due to investigative limitations.
The decision to drop the case by the prosecutor due to lack of evidence was criticized by a MalaysiaKini reader Hassan (Reference Hassan2020) where he mentioned in the reader column that:
the MACC had a strong case against Musa in 2012 but for the strangest reason, the case had been ordered to be closed.
In cases of high public interest like corruption trials, the court’s legitimacy often rests heavily on public perception of justice being served. When a case fails due to evidentiary issues rather than a clear determination of innocence, it can create a problematic gap between legal justice and public expectations of justice. The public might perceive the court as ineffective or, worse, complicit in allowing powerful figures to escape accountability through technical legal procedures. The adversarial system’s passive role can appear particularly inadequate when dealing with sophisticated financial crimes that cross international borders.
Another notable case in this regard is the case against former Penang Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng and Chairman of Democratic Action Party (DAP) involving allegations of purchase of their house in Penang which is below the market price. In September 2016, Lim Guan Eng faced corruption charges related to two allegations. First, he was charged under Section 23 of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) Act of misusing his position as Chief Minister by approving a land status change from agricultural to residential housing in Southwest Penang. Second, he was charged under Section 165 of the Penal Code for acquiring property at a significantly discounted price—specifically, purchasing a bungalow for RM2.8 million when its actual market value was assessed at RM4.27 million (BERNAMA, 2016). In September 2018, the prosecution withdrew the corruption charges after facing significant challenges in proving their case. Although prosecutors requested a DNAA, the court instead granted Lim Guan Eng a full acquittal, completely clearing him of all charges (Low, Reference Low2018).
There are several critical issues that can be examined from this case. First, the timing was notable, as the discharge occurred three months after his political coalition, Pakatan Harapan won the general election and formed the federal government. Second, the evidentiary issues can create public perception that the wealthy and politically connected can evade justice through jurisdictional complexities. It raises speculation about the quality of evidence produced by the MACC. One of the issues that led the prosecution to withdraw the case is the issue of evidence deterioration through cross-examination (Boo, Reference Boo2018).
Former Chief Justice Hamid’s criticism of the prosecution’s failure to specify which evidence had weakened is particularly significant (Mohamed, Reference Mohamed2018). This lack of transparency about the specific evidentiary deficiencies prevents proper scrutiny of the investigation’s quality. Moreover, Hamid’s point that the prosecution should have explored remedial measures—such as finding new evidence or calling additional witnesses—highlights a concerning passivity in evidence management (Mohamed, Reference Mohamed2018). This raises questions about whether the decision to discontinue prosecution was truly based on evidentiary merit or other considerations. When prosecution witnesses’ testimonies weaken under cross-examination to the point of compromising the entire case, it raises fundamental questions about the initial evidence-gathering process. Were witnesses properly interviewed during investigation? Was their evidence properly corroborated? The apparent ease with which the prosecution’s evidence crumbled under cross-examination suggests either poor quality of initial evidence gathering by investigating authorities, inadequate evaluation of evidence strength before proceeding with charges, and possible political influence in the initial decision to charge despite weak evidence.
The cases of Musa Aman and Lim Guan Eng demonstrate how evidentiary deficiencies in high-profile corruption cases can significantly undermine judicial legitimacy in Malaysia. Both cases highlight a troubling pattern where failures in evidence gathering and presentation force courts into decisions that, while legally sound, may erode public confidence in the judicial system. The inability to secure crucial evidence—whether due to cross-jurisdictional challenges in Musa’s case or weak witness testimony in Lim’s case—raises questions about the investigative capabilities of Malaysia’s anti-corruption bodies. When such high-profile cases collapse due to evidentiary issues, it creates public scepticism about the judiciary’s ability to effectively address corruption, even though the root cause lies in investigative deficiencies rather than judicial process.
Former Chief Justice Hamid demonstrated this when he defended High Court Judge Hadhariah Syed Ismail, who faced criticism for granting full acquittals to Lim (Mohamed, Reference Mohamed2018). As Hamid pointed out, the judge was unfairly blamed for making what was legally the correct decision, despite the underlying investigative shortcomings that led to this outcome. Courts can only make decisions based on the evidence presented before them (Mohamed, Reference Mohamed2018). When investigations fail to gather sufficient admissible evidence, it forces courts to issue a full acquittal or DNAA, potentially creating a perception that the judiciary is unable to address corruption effectively. These cases demonstrate how pre-trial investigation quality directly affects judicial outcomes. The judiciary, despite its independence, can only adjudicate based on the evidence presented, making thorough investigation critical to maintaining judicial legitimacy.
4.2. Issue of prosecutorial discretion
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the Public Prosecutor has been equally significant in shaping judicial legitimacy. A key question arises about the timing of case withdrawals. If a court has already found that there is enough evidence to establish a basic case (a prima facie case) and has asked the defence to present their side, does the Public Prosecutor still have the authority to withdraw the case at this stage? The corruption cases involving the Deputy Prime Minister, Zahid Hamidi, illustrate this dynamic. Interestingly, there are two different cases involving Zahid Hamidi that were dropped by the Public Prosecutor at different stages of the proceedings. The first case involved alleged misuse of funds from his charitable foundation, Yayasan Akalbudi, where the Public Prosecutor decided to withdraw the charges after the court had decided that there is a prima facie case and defence had already been called (Lim, Reference Lim2023). The second case involved charges related to alleged payments he received from Ultra Kirana Sdn Bhd (UKSB), the company that operated the foreign visa system (VLN) while serving as Home Minister, to renew the contract where Public Prosecutor decided to withdraw the appeal at the Court of Appeal (Anbalagan, Reference Anbalagan2024).
In the Yayasan Akalbudi case, Zahid Hamidi faced 47 charges: 12 for criminal breach of trust under Section 409 of the Penal Code, 8 for corruption under Section 16(a)(B) of the MACC Act 2009, and 27 for money laundering under Section 4(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (AMLA) (BERNAMA, 2022a). The withdrawal of charges against Ahmad Zahid Hamidi merits particular attention because it occurred after the High Court had already established a prima facie case. This means the court had determined there was sufficient evidence that, if unrebutted, would warrant a conviction. The prosecution’s decision to withdraw at this advanced stage of proceedings raises several concerns about judicial legitimacy. When we examine the timing, the withdrawal came after Zahid had been ordered to enter his defence, indicating the prosecution had initially presented enough evidence to satisfy the court that the case deserved full consideration. This makes the subsequent withdrawal particularly problematic from a legitimacy perspective. The prosecution effectively negated a judicial finding without presenting any compelling legal justification for the withdrawal.
The Malaysian Bar did file its legal bid to challenge the decision by the Prosecutor to withdraw the case however the legal bid failed because according to the sitting High Court judge Datuk Amarjeet Singh, when the Attorney General makes decisions using their power under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution, these decisions are automatically assumed to be legal and valid unless proven otherwise (Tee, Reference Tee2024). Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution provides that the Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct, or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a Shariah court, a native court, or a court-martial. The constitutional framework, specifically Article 145(3), grants extraordinarily broad discretionary powers to the Attorney General to discontinue proceedings and the presumption of legality, as emphasized by Judge Amarjeet Singh combined with very limited judicial oversight, creates a system where prosecutorial decisions can be made with nearly unchecked authority across all criminal proceedings. This is especially problematic when examining the dual role of the Attorney General, who concurrently serves as the Public Prosecutor. This arrangement, where one person holds both offices, creates an inherent tension between serving as the government’s primary legal advisor and functioning as the nation’s chief prosecutor. The potential impact on independence and objectivity becomes particularly pronounced when handling cases involving government officials or matters of state interest.
The impact on judicial legitimacy operates on multiple levels. First, it potentially undermines the court’s authority by suggesting that prosecutorial discretion can override judicial determinations even at advanced stages of trial. This creates a troubling precedent where prima facie findings might be perceived as meaningless if cases can be withdrawn after such determinations. Furthermore, this situation creates a perception problem regarding the independence of the prosecution from political influence. When charges are withdrawn against prominent political figures after prima facie findings, especially following political realignments, it can create public scepticism about whether legal decisions are being made on purely legal grounds. Even though the withdrawal decision came from the prosecution rather than the judiciary, the public might view the entire legal system as compromised. It might lead to public scepticism about whether any corruption case against politically connected individuals will be pursued based on Attorney General’s discretionary power, regardless of the evidence or judicial findings.
Additionally, when a Public Prosecutor withdraws a case, the court typically records this withdrawal in what’s called the court’s notes of proceedings. These notes document the basic fact of the withdrawal, and any key observations made during that court session. This is different from a full-written judgment that analyses legal principles and explains reasoning in detail. The absence of a requirement for written decisions in withdrawal cases stems from the constitutional powers given to the Public Prosecutor under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. Since these powers are discretionary and come with a presumption of legality, courts generally don’t need to provide extensive written analysis of why they allowed the withdrawal. Without detailed judicial reasoning, it becomes harder for the public and legal community to understand the court’s perspective on these withdrawals. This can be particularly important in cases where the withdrawal occurs after significant court proceedings or where there’s substantial public interest in the case.
In the second case involving Zahid Hamidi, he faced 33 charges under Section 16(a)(b) of the MACC Act and 7 alternative charges under Section 165 of the Penal Code for allegedly receiving monies when he was the Minister of Home Affairs without consideration from UKSB (PP v Ahmad Zahid bin Hamidi [2022] MLJU 2363). In September 2022, he was acquitted and discharged by the High Court because the High Court found that the oral testimony of the witnesses, as well as the ledger produced by Court, was not sufficient to convict him (PP v Ahmad Zahid bin Hamidi [2022] MLJU 2363, pp. 27–9). In December 2022, the prosecution appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the High Court judge erred when evaluating the prosecution witnesses’ credibility, and they further argued that the judge was wrong to reject evidence about bribe deliveries to Zahid by comparing this case to Rosmah Mansor’s hybrid solar project bribery case (BERNAMA, 2022b). However, in December 2024, the Prosecutor decided to withdraw the appeal on the ground that there was no evidence in the case to show Zahid had ever used his position to award the related contracts and further noted that the contracts were awarded before the respondent even held the position of Home Minister, thus showing he did not abuse power (Abdul Rashid, Reference Abdul Rashid2024).
In analysing the situation, the statement made by the Prosecution office in 2024 contradicts the earlier statement made in 2022, where they mentioned that the High Court judge erred when evaluating the prosecution witnesses’ credibility. Second, the statement that there was no evidence of Zahid using his position to award contracts since they were awarded before his tenure as Home Minister appears to mischaracterize the substance of the original case. A thorough examination of the High Court’s judgment reveals that the case centred not on the initial contract awards, but rather on Zahid’s alleged role in maintaining and extending UKSB’s contracts during his ministerial tenure, coupled with accusations of receiving gratification in exchange for these actions. The apparent disconnect between the original case’s substance and the prosecutor’s reasons for withdrawing the appeal potentially raises concerns about public confidence in the justice system.
While the judiciary itself made its decision based on the evidence presented, the prosecution’s subsequent decision not to appeal may lead some members of the public to question whether the entire legal process truly operates independently of political influence. When the prosecution chooses not to pursue all available legal avenues in high-profile corruption cases, it may create a narrative that undermines public faith in the entire justice system’s ability to address corruption effectively. In the first case, the case was withdrawn when a prima facie case was already established, while in the second case, the prosecutor’s discretion to withdraw appeal raised several concerns. This situation creates a challenging dynamic where the judiciary’s legitimacy might be questioned not because of its own actions, but because of decisions made by other actors in the legal system.
4.3. Issue of royal pardon
Public trust in the judicial system is shaped by both ends of the legal process—not only by pre-judicial actions but also by post-judicial interventions like royal pardons and executive clemency. This can be seen in the case of Najib Razak, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, who was convicted and sentenced to 12 years in prison for corruption related to the 1MDB scandal in 2022 (Dato Seri Najib Razak v PP [2022] MLJU 1939). The judicial process went through multiple levels of courts, with each level affirming the conviction and maintaining the integrity of the legal process. However, in February 2024, it was reported that his jail sentence was halved by a pardons board chaired by the King (REUTERS, 2024). In addition to the partial pardon, the board headed by the King substantially decreased Najib’s fines by 76%—from RM210 million (US$68 million) to RM50 million (US$16 million)—offering no justification for this reduction (Dasey, Reference Dasey2024).
Under Article 42 (1) of the Federal Constitution, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong has power to grant pardons in respect of all offences which have been tried by court-martial and all offences committed in the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan, and Putrajaya. Although the King’s position is primarily ceremonial, the monarch holds discretionary powers to grant clemency to convicted individuals. While political elites receive pardons shortly after conviction, ordinary citizens typically must serve substantial portions of their sentences and demonstrate good behaviour before being considered for similar relief. It might suggest to the public that there are two systems of justice—one for ordinary citizens and another for politically connected individuals. In an interview with the ABC News, a lawyer, Shamini Flint, commented:
…it was a real slap in the face for justice, considering that Malaysians who committed far lesser crimes, like stealing basic necessities to survive during COVID, got absolutely no mercy or compassion, as the prime minister called it… (Dasey, Reference Dasey2024)
The stark contrast between the treatment of high-level corruption and poverty-driven petty crimes reveals fundamental issues in how post-judicial mechanisms affect public trust in the legal system. When pardons are granted selectively to political elites while denying mercy to those who committed minor crimes out of economic necessity, it creates a perception of a two-tier justice system that fundamentally undermines the principle of equality before the law.
The Malaysian Bar challenged the legitimacy of Najib Razak’s reduced sentence by filing a judicial review application in April 2024, arguing that both the jail sentence reduction and fine reduction were unlawful, unconstitutional, and void (Mariem, Reference Mariem2024). However, Justice Ahmad Kamal, in addressing local media, emphasized that the constitutional power to grant pardons rests exclusively within the Malaysian King’s discretion (Mariem, Reference Mariem2024). The pardon process, while constitutional, creates a particular challenge for judicial legitimacy because it operates outside the regular legal framework. While courts make decisions based on evidence and legal principles, Pardons Board issued a decision without any written or verbal reasons. Ramkarpal Singh, who previously served as Deputy Law Minister, demanded transparency from the Pardons Board regarding its decision to commute Najib’s sentence (Dasey, Reference Dasey2024). This disconnect between judicial findings and executive clemency can create public scepticism about the effectiveness of the entire legal system in addressing corruption and becomes particularly sensitive because the courts invested significant resources and credibility in handling these high-profile cases.
Further, in January 2025, there was a controversy regarding a royal addendum which was said to be concealed by Anwar’s regime (Berthelsen, Reference Berthelsen2025). The document revealed that the former King had authorized Najib to serve his remaining sentence under house arrest and effectively freeing him from conventional imprisonment (Berthelsen, Reference Berthelsen2025). The constitutionality of Najib’s house arrest order has been challenged by Malaysian constitutional expert Shad Saleem Faruqi, who points to a crucial legal distinction in the separation of powers (Faruqi, Reference Faruqi2025). According to Faruqi, while the Constitution’s Article 42 grants the Pardons Board clear authority over pardons, reprieves, respites, remissions, suspensions, and commutations, it makes no provision for house arrest arrangements. This power, he explains, is specifically vested in the Minister of Home Affairs through Sections 3 and 5 of the Prisons Act, placing it outside the scope of the King’s constitutional prerogative (Faruqi, Reference Faruqi2025).
The controversy surrounding the house arrest order reveals fundamental challenges to judicial legitimacy within Malaysia’s constitutional framework. Faruqi highlights a critical tension between royal prerogative and statutory powers by questioning whether the King has the constitutional authority to order house arrest. When post-judicial interventions appear to exceed constitutional authority, they can undermine even well-reasoned court decisions. This case demonstrates that maintaining judicial legitimacy requires more than just proper court procedures; it demands that post-judicial interventions respect clear constitutional boundaries and maintain transparent lines of institutional authority. When these boundaries become blurred, it can create lasting damage to public confidence in the justice system’s ability to operate predictably within its constitutional framework.
5. Conclusion
The analysis of Malaysian corruption cases demonstrates that we must fundamentally reconceptualize judicial legitimacy beyond the traditional institution-centric approach. The concept of legitimacy transfer is particularly salient in adversarial systems, where judges serve as passive arbiters rather than active investigators. Unlike in inquisitorial systems, judges in adversarial systems must generally work with evidence presented before them and cannot order their own investigation. Hence, judicial legitimacy becomes constrained by institutional performance in earlier stages of the process.
To show that this framework applies broadly, we can look at how legitimacy transfer works in different types of adversarial systems. In India, the case of Jayalalithaa, the former Tamil Nadu Chief Minister purchased lands of Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation (TANSI), a state government agency, in 1992 at an undervalued price. She was convicted in the lower court but on appeal she was acquitted by the Madras High Court and the Supreme Court on the grounds of lack of evidence. It was reported that the judge notably stated that, though there was strong suspicion about her involvement, there was no legal evidence to prove her guilt (Business Standard, 2013). In stark contrast, the US controversial case of Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) or famously known as Brady violations whereby the accused was convicted because prosecutors actively suppress evidence that could help the accused. Both the Jayalalithaa case and Brady violations involve failures in the prosecutorial handling of evidence; they represent opposite ends of the spectrum in how evidence problems affect judicial outcomes in adversarial systems. Ultimately, both situations underscore the same fundamental weakness of adversarial justice systems whereby judges can only decide based on what is presented to them. In both the Jayalalithaa case (insufficient evidence presented) and Brady violations (evidence suppressed), the structural weakness is identical: judges in adversarial systems cannot independently investigate or correct prosecutorial failures. Whether evidence is absent or concealed, judicial legitimacy suffers from the prosecutorial stage’s legitimacy deficit.
This process-based understanding reveals several critical insights. First, judicial legitimacy does not begin when cases reach the courtroom but is inherited from and dependent upon the credibility of pre-judicial processes. When investigating agencies fail to gather sufficient evidence or when prosecutorial decisions appear politically motivated, even well-reasoned court judgments may struggle to maintain public trust. Second, judicial legitimacy continues to evolve even after court decisions through post-judicial mechanisms like royal pardons, which can potentially undermine carefully constructed judicial authority.
Looking ahead, several crucial areas warrant further research. First, scholars explore whether citizens place different levels of trust in investigating agencies, prosecutors, and courts, and how these varying trust levels interact. This could help identify which parts of the legal process most significantly influence overall public confidence in judicial outcomes. For instance, if public trust in prosecution is low but trust in courts is high, this might suggest different strategies for strengthening system-wide legitimacy than if trust levels were reversed. Rather than treating legitimacy as a single court-centric variable, public trust in the judiciary could be tested into distinct operational components corresponding to each stage of the legal process:
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i. investigative legitimacy—measured through public perceptions of investigation thoroughness and independence;
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ii. prosecutorial legitimacy—assessed via perceptions of transparency and consistency in charging decisions;
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iii. judicial legitimacy—evaluated through traditional measures of legal reasoning and adherence to precedent; and
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iv. post-judicial legitimacy—analysed through public reactions to pardons, sentence reductions, or decisions not to appeal.
By analysing legitimacy at each stage and the transfers between them, this approach captures the cumulative and interactive nature of legitimacy construction that court-centric methodologies miss. To operationalize the “legitimacy ceiling” concept introduced in my theoretical framework, a comparative index could be developed to measure the maximum legitimacy achieved at each stage of the legal process across cases.
Second, to better gauge public perception of judicial legitimacy, future research should specifically examine the relationship between legal literacy and trust in the justice system. This could involve studying how public education about legal processes affects perceptions of judicial outcomes. For example, do citizens who understand the constraints of Malaysia’s adversarial system view DNAA decisions differently from those who don’t? Do people who grasp the distinct roles of MACC, the Public Prosecutor, and the courts evaluate corruption case outcomes differently?
This process-based understanding of judicial legitimacy enriches Fallon’s three-dimensional framework by demonstrating that legal, sociological, and moral legitimacy are not confined to judicial decision-making alone but emerge from complex interactions across the entire legal system. The Malaysian experience reveals how pre-judicial and post-judicial processes create legitimacy interdependencies where deficits in one stage constrain legitimacy at other stages. This insight helps resolve the tension Grove identifies between legal, moral, and sociological legitimacy by showing how they are systemically interconnected rather than existing independently of one another. By examining judicial legitimacy as a process-based phenomenon, this research challenges traditional methodological approaches that isolate court legitimacy from broader legal processes. Future research would benefit from developing integrated measures of legitimacy that capture public perceptions across the entire legal chain rather than focusing solely on court approval ratings. This holistic approach responds to Fallon’s critique of conventional measurement approaches and offers a more comprehensive framework for assessing how legitimacy emerges through institutional interactions.
Ultimately, examining judicial legitimacy as a process-based phenomenon challenges methodological conventions that isolate courts from the broader justice system. Future studies would benefit from developing integrated measures of legitimacy that reflect public perceptions across the full arc of legal proceedings and not just judicial approval ratings. This more holistic approach directly addresses Fallon’s critique of prevailing measurement strategies and provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding how legitimacy is constructed and contested through institutional interaction. Understanding these dynamics could help shape more effective public communication strategies about legal processes and outcomes. It might also inform how legal institutions explain their decisions and limitations to the public, potentially leading to more nuanced and accurate assessments of judicial legitimacy. This reconceptualization of judicial legitimacy as process-based rather than institution-based has profound implications for legal reform efforts. It suggests that strengthening judicial legitimacy requires a holistic approach that addresses the entire chain of legal institutions and processes, rather than focusing solely on court-centric reforms. Only by understanding and enhancing the legitimacy of each stage in the legal process can we build and maintain robust public trust in judicial outcomes.
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