Hostname: page-component-89b8bd64d-72crv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-09T02:16:42.641Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Social rights scapegoating

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 August 2023

Adam Chilton*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago Law School, 1111 E 60th St, Chicago, IL 60637, United States
Cristián Eyzaguirre
Affiliation:
University of Chicago Law School, 1111 E 60th St, Chicago, IL 60637, United States
Mila Versteeg
Affiliation:
University of Virginia School of Law, 580 Massie Rd, Charlottesville, VA 22903, United States
*
Corresponding author: Adam Chilton; Email: adamchilton@uchicago.edu
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In Chile, many commentators, academics and political leaders have spent years arguing that the limited nature of the social rights in the national constitution is partially responsible for the country’s economic and social inequality. It is thus unsurprising that changing the scope of the country’s social rights was a major focus of the recently failed constitutional reform effort. However, we argue that the long-running claim that Chile’s social problems were due to the limited nature of social rights can be thought of as social rights scapegoating, by which we mean that commentators blamed outcomes on constitutional rights, even though there is little evidence that countries’ socio-economic outcomes are a product of their social rights.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press