1 Schroeder, Paul, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994], p. vii.Google Scholar

2 Quite naturally the main focus of these nationalist criticisms was Mettemich's refusal to endorse German unification and his insistence that the German states should be incorporated in a federal, decentralized political system. This line of attack, which assumed a high profile in the early twentieth century, was followed most vocally and venomously by von Treitschke, Heinrich in his magisterial—and widely read—History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, 7 vols. (New York: McBride, Nest and Co., 1915–1919)Google Scholar; and the later work of Bibl, Viktor, Metternich: Der Dämon Österreichs (Vienna: J. Gunther, 1936)Google Scholar. For an overview of this dimension of Metternich historiography, see Schroeder, Paul, “Metternich Studies Since 1925,” Journal of Modern History 33 (1961): 237–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Sofka, James R., “Metternich, Jefferson, and the Enlightenment: Statecraft and Political Theory in Early Nineteenth Century Europe and America” (Ph.D. diss. University of Virginia, 1995)Google Scholar, conclusion.

3 Metternich to Hübner, Joseph, 01 26, 1850, cited in Sauvingy, Guillaume de Bertier de, Metternich and His Times (London: Longman and Todd, 1962), p. 31Google Scholar. Metternich to Lieven, Princess Dorothea, 22 12 1818. Mika, Emil, ed., Geist und Herz Verbündet: Metternich's Briefe an die Gräfin Lieven (Vienna: W. Andermann, 1942), p. 87Google Scholar. Rieben, Hans, Prinzipiengrundlage und Diplomatie in Metternichs Europapolitik, 1814–1848 (Aarau: H. R. Sauerlander and Co., 1942), p. 9.Google Scholar

4 For an overview of Metternich's intellectual tastes and erudite salon conversation, the memoirs of George Ticknor, a Harvard law professor who visited Metternich in July 1836, are instructive. Ticknor, George, ed., The Life, Letters, and Journals of George Ticknor, vol. II. (Boston: J. R. Osgood and Co., 1876), chap. 1Google Scholar. The best surveys of Metternich's early life and family background are found in von Srbik, Heinrich Ritter, Metternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch, 3 vols. (Munich and Vienna: 1925–1954], I: 53–96Google Scholar; Kraehe, Enno E., Metternich's German Policy, volume I: The Contest with Napoleon, 1799–1814 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), chap. 1Google Scholar; and McGuigan, Dorothy Gies, Metternich and the Duchess (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975), chap. 2.Google Scholar

5 Metternich reviewed his early education in a letter to the Russian Foreign Minister Karl Robert Nesselrode in 1817. He noted that “at the age of twenty a deep and long-continued research in the Holy Books made me an atheist after the fashion of d'Alembert and Lalande, or a Christian after that of Chateaubriand.” Metternich to Nesselrode, Karl Robert, 20 08 1817. Metternich, Prince Richard, ed., Aus Metternich's nachgelassenen Papieren, 8 vols. (Vienna: W. Braumuller, 1880–1884)Google Scholar. First five volumes translated in English as The Memoirs of Prince Metternich (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1881–1882)Google Scholar. Hereafter I will use NP to refer to the German edition and MM for the English text. This quote from MM, 3: 67–68. Metternich later observed that throughout the 1790s he “diligently attended lectures on Geology, Chemistry, and Physics. Man and his life seemed to me to be objects worthy of study” (MM, 1: 23). He assiduously studied Newton, Kepler, and LaPlace, and the latter's works so impressed him that he carried copies of them in his diplomatic bag throughout his tenure as foreign minister (McGuigan, , Metternich and the Duchess, p. 496)Google Scholar. Srbik maintains that Metternich's scientific training was responsible for his demonstrated “strong impulse to search in the psychological and physical world for universal laws and then test them empirically and experimentally in the factual realm and prove them correct” (Srbik, , “Der Ideengehalt des ‘Metternichischen Systems,’” Historische Zeitschrift 131 [1925]: 243–45).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 For a comparison of Metternich's and Kaunitz's political views and Newtonian method of reasoning, see Rohden, Peter Richard, Die klassische Diplomatie von Kaunitz bis Metternich (Leipzig: Koehler and Ameland, 1939), chaps. 1 and 2Google Scholar. On Kaunitz's legendary “political algebra” and its debt to the Enlightenment, see Dorn, Walter, Competition for Empire 1740–1763 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), pp. 296–300Google Scholar; Szabo, Franz A.J., “Prince Kaunitz and the Balance of Power,” International History Review 1 (1979): 399–408CrossRefGoogle Scholar, as well as Szabo's full-length study of Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 1753–1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).Google Scholar

7 Metternich to Paul Esterhazy, 7 August 1825 (MM, 4: 222); Srbik, “Ideengehalt,” p. 245; Metternich to Count Ludwig Lebzeltern, 15 December 1819, cited in Bertier, , Metternich and His Times, p. 33.Google Scholar

8 Cited in Stargardter, Steven, Niklas Vogt 1756–1836: A Personality of the Late German Enlightenment and Early Romantic Movement (New York: Garland Publishers, 1991), p. 137Google Scholar. I am indebted to this excellent and original study of Metternich's teacher. In his autobiography Metternich referred to Vogt as “one of my most zealous friends,” even though the two later had serious disagreements over the structure of the German Confederation (MM, 1:11). Indeed, in 1836 the professor would be buried on the estate of his most famous student.

9 Metternich noted later that he was all but oblivious of the French Revolution in the early 1790s, as the bulk of his time was consumed in the laboratory. “I was happy in this scientific circle,” he wrote, “and allowed the Revolution to rage and rave without feeling any call to contend with it” (MM, 1: 23). His only political act in this period was the publication of a short anonymous pamphlet—under the revealing pseudonym “A Friend of Universal Peace”—in 1794 urging the electors of the western German states to defend their lands in the event of a French attack (MM, 1:340–47). On the revolution, see Srbik, , Metternich, 1: 65–96Google Scholar; Kraehe, , German Policy, 1: 10–18Google Scholar; MM, 1: 4–17. For his opinion of and disagreements with Burke and his adherents, see Kissinger, Henry A., A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1815–1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 193–4Google Scholar; NP, 3: 451.

10 On the period 1806–1809, see Srbik, , Metternich, 1: 99–122Google Scholar and Kraehe, , German Policy, vol. I, chaps. 2–4Google Scholar. Metternich's own account of his life in this period is in his Autobiography, but it was written late in life and should be read with a careful eye for details that began to escape his memory. MM, 1: 45–121; Kraehe, , German Policy, 1: 51Google Scholar; cited in McGuigan, , Metternich and the Duchess, p. 39.Google Scholar

11 Kant, , “Idea for a Universal History,” Kant's Political Writings, ed. Reiss, Hans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 47Google Scholar. For an analysis of Kant's idea of universal federalism, see Dupuis, Charles, Le Droit des Gens et les Rapports des Grandes Puissances avec les autrés etats avant le pacta de la Societé des Nations (Paris, 1921)Google Scholar; von Raumer, Kurt, Ewiger Friede: Friedensrufe und Friedenspläne seit der Renaissance (Munich: K. Alber, 1953)Google Scholar; Riley, Patrick, Kant's Political Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), chap. 6Google Scholar; Hurrell, Andrew, “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 16 (1989): 183–205CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a broader view of eighteenth-century ideas on international federalism, see Einaudi, Mario, The Early Rousseau (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), chap. 7Google Scholar; Vaughan, C. E., ed., The Political Writings of Jean—Jacques Rousseau, vol. 1, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 399–435Google Scholar; Hoffmann, Stanley, “Rousseau on War and Peace,” Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 25–51Google Scholar; Anderson, M. S., The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919 (London: Longman, 1993), pp. 204–38Google Scholar; Ruddy, Francis, International Law In The Enlightenment (New York: Oceana Publications, 1975)Google Scholar; Souleyman, E. V., The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century France, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941)Google Scholar; Heater, D., The Idea of European Unity (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).Google Scholar

12 Srbik, , “Ideengehalt,” p. 248.Google Scholar

13 “Peace,” Metternich observed in 1808, “does not exist within a revolutionary situation, and whether Robespierre declares eternal war against the châteaux or Napoleon makes it against the Powers, the tyranny is the same, and the danger is only more general” (Metternich to Stadion, 27 April 1808, MM, 2: 205).

14 On the abortive Prague Conference of July-August 1813, see McGuigan, Metternich and the Duchess, chap. 8 and Kraehe, , German Policy, 1: 181–86Google Scholar. Metternich glosses over this effort in his “Autobiographical Memoir.” No doubt he was unwilling to appear to posterity as an initial opponent of the ultimately successful coalition of 1813 (MM, 1:196–99).

15 Metternich to Esterhazy, Paul, 24 08 1821, cited in Bertier, , Metternich and His Times, p. 69Google Scholar. Metternich to Princess Lieven, 6 December 1818 (Mika, , Geist und Herz Verbündet, p. 69Google Scholar; Kraehe, , German Policy, 1: 302).Google Scholar

16 A representative sample of these arguments can be found in Nicholson, Harold, The Congress of Vienna (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946), pp. 38–41Google Scholar; Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored, chap. 4; and Gulick, Edward Vose, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955)Google Scholar. The problem of world order in the post-Vienna era has been subject to close examination in a series of articles in the American Historical Review 97 (1992): 683–735CrossRefGoogle Scholar. These attempt to trace the roots of the balance of power—versus—equilibrium debate and offer new insights into Allied diplomacy in the Congress period. Paul Schroeder's essay, “Did the Vienna System Rest on a Balance of Power?” concludes that it did not, and this idea is echoed in his recent Transformation of European Politics. Enno Kraehe's rejoinder, “A Bipolar Balance of Power,” contends that both Britain and Russia attempted to manipulate combinations in central Europe and that Metternich's diplomacy was centered on securing a pivotal role for Austria against a perceived Russian threat. Robert Jervis, in his essay on “A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert,” uses quantitative modelling to outline the theoretical basis of the Congress system. Wolf Gruner asks “Was There A Reformed Balance of Power System or Cooperative Great Power Hegemony?” and concludes that the system did indeed rest on a multipolar, or pentarchical, balance of power.

17 In taking this position Metternich followed the example set by other leading eighteenth century political philosophers. Many Enlightenment theorists, including Montesquieu, Diderot, Kant, and Holbach, wrote extensively on natural science before turning to political questions. See Piper, William, “Kant's Contact With British Empiricism,” Eighteenth Century Studies 12 (1978/1979): 174–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wade, Ira, The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)Google Scholar; Kors, Alan Charles, d'Holbach's Coterie: An Enlightenment in Paris (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Part IGoogle Scholar; Keohane, Nannerl O., Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), chap. 14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gusdorf, Georges, l'avénement des Sciences humaines au siècle des Lumières, (Paris, 1973)Google Scholar; and Souleyman, Vision of World Peace.

18 Rieben, , Metternichs Europapolitik, p. 14Google Scholar. On this point see the important article by Srbik, , “Metternich's Plan der Neuordnung Europas, 1814–1815,” Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichischen Geschichtsforshung 50 (1936): 109–26Google Scholar. MM, 1: 36–38.

19 It is important to clear up some confusing terminology on the subject of “equilibrium.” The “equilibrium” described by Metternich would in today's literature be referred to as a collective security structure or legal federation. Authors during and after the Congress of Vienna frequently used different terms to describe this order. Castlereagh commonly used “The Alliance” or “Union” to refer to it, whereas the more theoretically minded Friedrich von Gentz preferred “Gleichgewichts”—equilibrium—or “European Union.” All of these are referring to the same architecture of a supranational federation of states regulated by treaty and operating according to the principle of reciprocity rather than the competitive and militaristic system of the balance of power. See below.

20 Metternich to Esterhazy, 7 August 1825 (MM, 4:225). Metternich to Count Anton Apponyi, 2 June 1831 (NP, 5:161).

21 On this point, see Sofka, “Metternich, Jefferson, and the Enlightenment,” Part I, chaps. 3–6.

22 As Friedrich von Gentz, one of Metternich's closest advisers, put it in 1818, “This scheme of things has its inconveniences. But it is certain that, could it be made durable, it would offer the best possible combination to assure the prosperity of peoples, and the maintenance of the peace, which is one of its first prerequisites.” “Considerations on the Political System Now Existing in Europe,” 1818. Full text printed in Walker, Mack, ed., Metternich's Europe (New York: Walker, 1968), p. 72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 MM, 1: 36. He added that “since an isolated state no longer exists, and is found only in the annals of the heathen world, or in the abstractions of so—called philosophers, we must always view the society of nations as the essential condition of the modern world.” Metternich's emphasis. The reference to “philosophers” is, no doubt, directed against Hobbes's state of nature.

24 Rieben, , Metternichs Europapolitik, p. 14Google Scholar. Naturally this state of affairs worked to Austria's advantage. However, it was equally beneficial to the other powers. This appeal to self—interest through cosmopolitan principles was one of the chief arguments Metternich used to persuade the other states to endorse this formula. As Kraehe notes, Metternich was convinced that “Austria's welfare was linked far more clearly to the European equilibrium than to any local advantages she might salvage in the form of territorial aggrandizement” (German Policy, 1: 29Google Scholar). If Austria's interests alone motivated Metternich's policies, it is arguable that he would not have pursued as ambitious or idealistic a design as this to provide for general peace. Rather, he could have employed the more expedient and direct tactic of forming a special alliance with Britain, France, or Russia in order to create an external guarantee of Austria's security, as Kaunitz did throughout the late eighteenth century. This idea, however, was rejected by Metternich on the grounds that it marked a continuation, rather than a departure, of the eighteenth century system of coalition diplomacy which in his view was responsible for much of the disarray and militarism of the past six decades. See below.

25 Kant's vision of international federalism was predicated upon the idea that the domestic institutions of the constituent states should be modelled along similar federalist theory. On the domestic side of Kant's theory of “perpetual peace,” see Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, chaps 4–5; Saner, Hans, Kant's Political Thought: Its Origins and Development (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), chaps. 8–11Google Scholar; and Henrich, Dieter, “Kant on the Meaning of Rational Action in the State,” in Kant's Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy, ed. Beiner, Ronald and Booth, William James (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993)Google Scholar. I argue that Metternich shared this view, although space here does not permit an extended evaluation of this theory. On Metternich's attempt to create a federal constitution for Italy, Germany, and the Habsburg Monarchy as a whole, see Sofka, “Metternich, Jefferson, and the Enlightenment,” Part I, chap. 5; and Haas, Arthur G.Metternich, Reorganization, and Nationality, 1813–1818: A Study of Foresight and Frustration in the Rebuilding of the Austrian Empire (Wiesbaden: F. Skiner, 1963).Google Scholar

26 Kann, Robert A., “Metternich: A Reappraisal of His Impact on International Relations,” Journal of Modern History 32 (1960): 333–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar. He argued that in adopting this position Metternich presaged Woodrow Wilson's formula for the collective security structure of the League of Nations by over a century.

27 “I have struck out from my customary diplomatic vocabulary the use of the words legitimacy and divine right,” Metternich wrote in 1837. “The words legitimate and legitimacy express an idea which is in my opinion more easily grasped by minds unaccustomed to serious discussion if it is represented by the word right. Legitimacy as a noun is used to qualify the right of succession to the throne; the same word, used as an adjective, can be applied to anything. One is the legitimate owner of a house or whatever it may be, and in the same way it expresses the idea of legal right⃜ The idea and the word right fulfills its duty much better in this respect than do those of legitimacy and divine right” (Metternich to Apponyi, , 22 01 1837, cited in Bertier, , Metternich and His Times p. 37Google Scholar). Emphasis Metternich's. His mockery of the conservatives—“minds unaccustomed to serious discussion”—is obvious. Compare this with Henry Kissinger's discussion of the term “legitimacy” in A World Restored, chap. 11. Kissinger argues that Metternich did indeed understand this concept in universal and normative terms, but provides little evidence to support this case and does not compare it to Kant's idea of “legitimate” right, the sense in which Metternich interpreted it.

28 Srbik, , “Ideengehalt,” p. 250Google Scholar. Schmalz, Hans, Versuche einer gesamteuropäische Organisation, 1815–1820 (Aarau, 1940), p. 13Google Scholar; Metternich to Tsar Alexander, January [undated] 1823 (MM, 3: 672).

29 Gulick, , Europe's Classical Balance of Power, p. 112Google Scholar. Unfortunately he bases this view entirely on the contentious Saxony issue at the Congress of Vienna in December 1814. Metternich's proposed alliance with Britain and France against Russia and Prussia on this issue has frequently been invoked as evocative of balance of power thinking (see Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, chap. 9). Yet it is doubtful whether Metternich would have followed through with this idea. Modern research by Kraehe and Schroeder places this question in a more appropriate setting: that Metternich was perhaps using the mechanisms of the old balance-of-power model in order to achieve a higher end: creating and preserving a general peace not just in Germany but also in Europe as a whole. Kraehe, , Metternich's German Policy, vol. 2: The Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), chap. 10Google Scholar; Schroeder, , Transformation of European Politics, pp. 523–38Google Scholar. Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, fails to take heed of these overarching ambitions and treats the Saxony affair as a purely dynastic dispute. The interests involved at the Congress were, however, indisputably greater.

30 See Kraehe, “A Bipolar Balance of Power,” for this argument. This thesis also animates his two volumes on Metternich's German policy. As he notes in volume I, “The balance of power, Metternich sensed, is not primarily a doctrine but a condition, which exists when the various states, each pursuing its selfish interests, reach mutually recognized points of diminishing returns” (p. 255).

31 See Schroeder, “Did the Vienna System Rest on a Balance of Power?” for this argument. His earlier work, “The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?” Review of International Studies 15 (1989): 135–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar, makes a similar case but with greater theoretical vigor. It is important to note that Schroeder's view of Metternich has evolved with further research. In an earlier study, he dismissed Metternich's post-Vienna diplomacy as devoid of any theoretical program or practical goal “other than to prevent change” (Metternich's Diplomacy at its Zenith, 1820–1823, [Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962], p. 243).Google Scholar

32 Rieben, , Metternichs Europapolitik, pp. 37–55.Google Scholar

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34 See Metternich's explicit—and vigorous—condemnation of it in MM, 1: 37–9.

35 See Rohden, Klassische Diplomatie, chaps. 1–2, conclusion.

36 Kraehe, , German Policy, 1: 255.Google Scholar

37 For this reason Metternich, upon taking over the Foreign Ministry in 1809, leaned heavily for advice on younger theoreticians such as Friedrich von Gentz, who were educated in the same tradition as he and shared his new approach to the international system. Significantly, Gentz was a student of Kant's at Königsberg and proofread his Critique of Judgment. Although he later became influenced by the romantic and historicist conservatism of Burke, Gentz began his career as a Kantian federalist who applauded Metternich's early efforts to make the conference system operational. See Forsyth, Murray, “The Old European States—System: Gentz versus Hauterive,” The Historical Journal 23 (1980): 521–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Friedrich von Gentz: An Assessment,” Studies in History and Politics 2 (1981–1982): 127–55Google Scholar; Sweet, Paul, Friedrich von Gentz (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1941)Google Scholar; Mann, Golo, Secretary of Europe: The Life of Friedrich von Gentz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946).Google Scholar

38 As Srbik argues, to Metternich “the state was not an end in itself like the pure Machtstaat, but is bound to the others through the eternal moral order and the idea of justice” (“Ideengehalt,” p. 250).

39 Rieben, , Metternich's Europapolitik, pp. 13–4Google Scholar; Metternich to Kaiser Franz, 17 August 1819. Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna: Staatskanzlei: Vortraäge, 1819. Carton 219, fol. 31–4. These documents were used with the gracious permission of Professor Enno E. Kraehe of the University of Virginia. MM, 1: 37.

40 Cited in Srbik, , “Ideengehalt,” p. 247.Google Scholar

41 This incident is best discussed by Kraehe, in German Policy, 2: 284–98.Google Scholar

42 Phillips, Walter Alison, The Confederation of Europe: A Study of the European Alliance, 1813–1823 as an Experiment in the International Organization of Peace (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1914), p. 9Google Scholar. This highly original work was unfortunately eclipsed by the First World War. Phillips's articles in the influential Cambridge Modern History, ed. Acton, Lord, made the same argument. See volume X, The Restoration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907), chap. 1Google Scholar. These essays were influential on the succeeding generation of Metternich scholars such as Srbik, and were the first serious attempts to remove Metternich from the “reactionary” camp where he was unceremoniously placed by Treitschke. Schmalz's Versuche einer gesamteuropäische Organisation makes a similar case and is heavily indebted to Phillips's work.

43 Metternich to Tsar Alexander, January [undated] 1823. MM, 3:672; Forsyth, , “Old European States-System,” p. 525.Google Scholar

44 Kant, “Idea for a Universal History,” Reiss, , Kant's Political Writings, p. 48Google Scholar. On the concept of collective security as a model for international politics, see Aron, Peace and War, part 4, chap. 23; Bull, Anarchical Society, part 2, chap. 6; Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, chap. 12; Hoffmann, , “International Systems and International Law,” Janus and Minerva, pp. 149–77.Google Scholar

45 Metternich to Nesselrode, August 20, 1817. MM, 3: 70.

46 Metternich to Philip von Neumann, 31 October 1832. NP, 5: 384. Castlereagh to Liverpool, 11 November 1814. PRO: F.O.92., v. 141. This excellent series of papers is in the microfilm set of “Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh From the Continent, 1814–1822,” published by the Public Record Office, London. Castlereagh's emphasis. Note that Castlereagh did not use the more common—and misunderstood—eighteenth-century phrase of a “balance” of forces or power. On Talleyrand's view of the equilibrium, see Ferrero, Guglielmo, The Reconstruction of Europe: Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941).Google Scholar

47 Srbik, , “Ideengehalt,” p. 258.Google Scholar

48 Metternich to Prince Paul Esterhazy, 5 March 1821 (cited in Bertier, , Metternich and His Times p. 68Google Scholar).

49 Castlereagh's State Paper of 5 May 1820 (cited in Barnes, Thomas G., ed., Nationalism, Industrialization, and Democracy 1815–1914: A Documentary History of Modern Europe, 3 vols. [New York: Little, Brown, 1980], 3: 12Google Scholar. Castlereagh's emphasis).

50 That is why Talleyrand was so insistent that the phrase “law of nations” be inserted into the declaration announcing the opening of the Congress of Vienna on 1 November 1814. Ferrero, , Talleyrand, pp. 164–65.Google Scholar

51 Metternich, upon reading this part of Canning's speech of 12 December 1826, which was intended as a blatant repudiation of his idea of a European League, stated that “it comes close to delirium.” Metternich to Count Heinrich Bombelles, 8 January 1827 (cited in Bertier, , Metternich and His Times, p. 9Google Scholar).

52 Metternich to Lebzeltern, , 10 01 1822, cited in Bertier, , Metternich and His Times, p. 144Google Scholar. Metternich's emphasis.

53 On Metternich's four conceptions of the Alliance, see Bertier, , Metternich and His Times; “Sainte-Alliance et Alliance dans les conceptions de Metternich,” Revue Historique 233 (1960): pp. 249–75Google Scholar; Metternich to Esterhazy, 7 August 1825. MM, 4: 225–26.

54 In reviewing the nature of these deliberations, Metternich used mathematical notation to illustrate the difference between his view of French integration and that proposed by Alexander. The formula he outlined succinctly captures the basis of his thinking on a European collective security system:

55 Ferrero, , Talleyrand, p. 167Google Scholar; Metternich to Apponyi, , 12 04 1847 (cited in Bertier, , Metternich and His Times, p. 152).Google Scholar

56 On this idea and its origins, see Dupuis, Droit des Gens, chap. 3; Schmalz, Versuche einer gesamteuropäische Organisation; Forsyth, “Old European States-System”; and Mann, Secretary of Europe. Metternich put the question bluntly in 1823: “Must European politics be subjected to a representative diplomatic system? Would the most delicate problems be settled by meetings of 40 or 50 Minister-Delegates, independent of each other, voting by a show of hands, reaching, by means of a majority that would often be problematical or inadmissible, decisions on matters which an intimate meeting of 3 or 4 governments, experienced in prudence, barely manage to settle satisfactorily?” Metternich's Comments on the Circular Despatch of the Württemberg Cabinet, 2 January 1823 (NP, 4: 30–31).

57 MM, 1: 37. On Castlereagh's role, see Webster, C. K., The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812–1822, 2 vols., (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1925–1931), 2: 29–73Google Scholar; Hinsley, , Power and the Pursuit of Peace, pp. 200–12.Google Scholar

58 As he noted later in life, “For a conference of Powers to be of use, it is in the first place necessary that the object of the meeting should be precisely defined⃜Next, it needs to be well organized, for without this, meetings quickly turn into real anarchy.” Metternich to Apponyi, 25 January 1832 (cited in Bertier, , Metternich and His Times, p. 121Google Scholar. Metternich's emphasis).

59 Metternich to (addressee unknown), 10 January 1821 (MM, 3: 480–81).

60 Kant made this point in “Perpetual Peace” (1795). Reiss, , Kant's Political Writings, pp. 108–14.Google Scholar

61 On the collapse of this system, see Sofka, “Metternich, Jefferson, and the Enlightenment,” Part I, chap. 3.

62 Srbik, , Metternich, 2: 559.Google Scholar

63 Castlereagh to Stewart, Charles, 19 01 1821. Text of letter in Webster, Castlereagh, 2: 600.Google Scholar

64 It should also be noted that Metternich conceived of international politics in truly global terms, and frequently commented on the rise of the United States and its effect on Europe. He noted to Kaiser Franz during the Latin American revolts in 1819 that “for Europe there remains nothing more to do than to watch the fire [in Latin America] burn, the results of which must necessarily strengthen the power of the United North American States to an incalculable extent. As things stand now and in the foreseeable future, America can in five years get to where it otherwise would have taken two centuries.” He was, with the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine four years later, proven quite right. Metternich to Kaiser Franz, 24 August 1819 (HHSA: St.V, Carton 219, folio 153–4).

65 See Schroeder, , Transformation of European Politics, pp. 579–81.Google Scholar