Introduction
The history of efforts suppress apology for fascism provides insights into Italian society. Antifascist legislation of this kind can be a valuable tool for analysing the characteristics, practices and organizational structures of far-right movements. Though not a transparent record of public feeling, legislation reflects the priorities of those who draft and pass it. At the same time, legislation acts as a catalyst for social transformation, reflecting the concerns and values of the ruling class and its electors.
Totalitarianism exposed vulnerabilities in classical liberal systems, prompting questions about democratic states’ ability to counter forces that exploit rights to subvert democracy. The concept of militant democracy emerged, arguing that democracy needs instruments to ensure resilience against those undermining constitutional order (Loewenstein Reference Loewenstein1937). Germany exemplifies institutionalized militant democracy, with its Grundgesetz (Basic Law) allowing bans on unconstitutional parties – as demonstrated by the 1952 ban of the neo-Nazi SRP and the 1956 ban of the communist KPD. The doctrine of wehrhafte Demokratie (militant democracy), developed following the Second World War, remains a key European reference point, though modified to address populism and illiberalism (Möllers Reference Möllers2013).
During the Cold War, militant democracy targeted groups showing nostalgia for totalitarianism. After 1989, this threat seemed to fade as neofascist movements became marginalised and communist parties lost credibility, especially in former Soviet regions. However, the concept resurged at the millennium. The fight against Islamic terrorism led some states to adopt a ‘preventive state’ approach, sometimes violating habeas corpus (Sajó Reference Sajó2006). Additionally, militant democracy gained renewed relevance due to populist parties gaining power in countries such as Hungary, Poland and Turkey, and due to the rise of anti-democratic leaders including Trump and Bolsonaro (Weyland and Madrid Reference Weyland and Madrid2019), spurring new theories (Müller Reference Müller2017) and critiques of militant democracy (Malkopoulou and Kirshner Reference Malkopoulou and Kirshner2019; Rijpkema Reference Rijpkema2018).
The concept of militant democracy has been articulated across interconnected disciplinary strands. Legal and constitutional studies focus on delineating permissible limits of fundamental freedoms, particularly freedom of expression and association. Recent legal scholarship has explored the relationship between pluralism and constitutional defence (Sajó and Uitz Reference Sajó and Uitz2017). In legal theory, research has focused on tools to go beyond positivist legal formalism, revisiting Gustav Radbruch’s formula and arguing that resilience can be boosted by a systemic, militant rule-of-law approach (Sajó Reference Sajó2024).
The legal–constitutional strand of militant democracy scholarship has largely overlooked the cultural dimensions of democratic politics. A complementary historiography emphasises that postwar Italian democracy was not just an institutional arrangement but a contested field shaped by competing memories of the Resistance, fascism’s trauma and transitional uncertainties (Forlenza Reference Forlenza2019; Forlenza and Thomassen Reference Forlenza and Thomassen2016). Forlenza (Reference Forlenza2025) proposed understanding fascism not only as a completed regime but as a political form whose meanings persist and mutate within democratic contexts. Work on political memory and antifascist culture (Focardi Reference Focardi2013; Lebow, Kansteiner and Fogu Reference Lebow, Kansteiner and Fogu2006) and on fascism as political religion and symbolic politics (Gentile Reference Gentile2019; Griffin Reference Griffin1991) further enriches this picture.
This article situates itself at the intersection of these strands, treating the legal record as empirical terrain while attending to the cultural processes through which fascism’s meanings were produced, contested and transformed.
Despite its status as the birthplace of fascism, Italy did not subsequently establish a ‘militant democracy’ after 1945 (see Stolzi Reference Stolzi2007). In Italy, the specific legal prohibition on apologising for fascism was established by the Scelba law (1952) and subsequently by the Mancino law (1993). The purpose of these laws was to combat the glorification of fascism and the incitement of racial hatred. Historiography has paid surprisingly little attention to this topic. Recently, Grippa and Volpini (Reference Grippa and Volpini2025) wrote the first comprehensive history of the Scelba law. The authors reconstruct the history of the crime of ‘apology for fascism’ in Italy, placing it in a perspective that intertwines political, legal and social history. The book offers a diachronic reconstruction of the different phases of the crime of apology for fascism, understood not only as a legal concept but also as a political and cultural device aimed at defining the boundaries of the new republican democracy. Although this work is extraordinarily well documented based on archival sources, it has one major limitation: it does not address the most significant aspect of these laws for Italian society – namely, their social dimension. As a result, the book does not achieve its stated goal of making the crime of glorifying fascism a source of the history of Italian society. This manifests in two ways: first, the authors do not devote sufficient attention to how the protagonists of the judicial initiative changed; and second, and more seriously, they focus solely on the Scelba law and do not consider the Mancino law. As I aim to demonstrate in this article, a history of the crime of glorifying fascism must consider both laws together to grasp their essential value as a historical source: their application, coexistence and succession reveal transformations in fascism’s meaning in Italian society.
This article reconstructs media coverage of court cases among non-militant Italians. Legal norms and judicial decisions do not merely reflect society; they help produce meanings and boundaries through which political reality is interpreted and contested (Donati Reference Donati2023; Forlenza Reference Forlenza2019). Similarly, generalist newspapers shaped opinion as much as they recorded it. The category ‘non-militant Italians’ is a heuristic for those whose responses to fascism were not primarily driven by political commitment. Rather than claiming direct access to societal attitudes, this study treats legal and media sources as discourse sites where the meanings of fascism, democracy and legitimate political conduct were produced and contested. Archival sources such as court rulings cannot convey the social perception of a crime; similarly, ideological sources target a limited, politically oriented audience. Generalist newspapers such as La Stampa and Corriere della Sera aim to capture interest from a broad, non-militant audience.Footnote 1 Newspapers’ readers remain less vocal, making them ideal for measuring widespread perceptions of fascism’s danger. Focusing solely on militant antifascists and neofascists risks distorting the problem’s scope for Italian democracy, because politically organised subjects generate visibility. Media coverage of apology helps understand how fascism’s meaning has evolved among citizens holding these ideologies less rigidly. The investigation draws on both court rulings and press coverage to examine changing perceptions of fascism.
The article describes five phases since the Republic’s birth. The first decade was dominated by the fear of fascism’s organisational re-emergence; the Scelba law’s first years were marked by the paradox introduced by the constitutional court’s 1956 ruling, while in the terrorism era (1969–82), the law was sidelined because the threat became most concrete. The 1980s were characterised by a shift from political mobilisation to nostalgic folklore; and finally, the Mancino law inaugurated a new period, which recoded apology for fascism as racial incitement. The article’s argument is not merely that the law evolved, but that the meaning of fascism in Italian democratic culture shifted – and that judicial and media sources help us to track these transformations.
Defending the newborn Republic: law no. 1546 of 1947
In Italy, defending democracy was born with the Republic itself, and arose even before its institution. The armistice clauses (3 September 1943) contained the first laws prohibiting fascism from running the state. These rules concerned the past rather than the future (excluding individuals complicit with the regime from positions in the new bureaucracy), but also provided future indications. However, excluding fascists proved impossible: after 20 years of dictatorship, too many people were compromised, though not equally. The Togliatti amnesty reinstated virtually all fascists – and, paradoxically, former partisans were punished more often than former fascists (Ponzani Reference Ponzani2007). Beyond unpunished, highly compromised individuals,Footnote 2 the fate of ordinary people is notable. At the purge’s end, 1,874 fascists were removed and 671 forced to retire with pensions. However, many appeals were allowed, resulting in almost all retired civil servants being readmitted and most of them being rehired. Evidence of the purge’s ineffectiveness is evident in the ministry of the interior’s firings: of 45,000 employees, only 24 were dismissed (with another 29 officers first removed, then reinstated).Footnote 3 Even for criminals guilty of serious crimes (murder and violence, often with cruelty), the numbers are telling. As reported by the ministry of the interior, on 5 November 1950, only 867 fascists remained in prison following pardons and amnesty, with 176 awaiting trial. After the Scelba law’s approval in June 1952, only 315 people were in jail, all for serious crimes (massacres, murders, aggravated by torture) (La Stampa 1952c).
Although it proved impossible to exclude fascists from the new state apparatus, the founding fathers sought to exclude fascism as an ideology from the newborn Republic.Footnote 4 Before the constitution came into force (January 1948), the first law was passed prohibiting the reconstitution of the fascist party (law no. 1546 of 3 December 1947), punishing adherents with imprisonment. This law became the basis for the twelfth transitional and final provision of the constitution, which forbade the reconstitution of the fascist party. It was applied at least 30 times against individuals and parties, and used against newspapers.Footnote 5 Prosecution was mainly ex officio and targeted the crime directly; in only a minority of cases was apology one of the several charges. Most cases went to trial; a few were dropped after detention or charges. The primary concern was the presence of fascism. Most cases involved demonstrations, commemorations and newspapers (La Stampa 1948). First was the April 1948 rally, where journalist Concetto Pettinato, a candidate for the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), was charged due to a speech in Piazza Archimede in Syracuse; in June 1949, similar charges were brought against Edmondo Cione, the ‘Rosenberg of the MSI’, after his speech at the first MSI congress (La Stampa 1949c). Propaganda material was also prosecuted (Zatterin Reference Zatterin1948). In 1948, Vittorio Ambrosini was denounced for hanging posters featuring tricolour flames and the slogan ‘E ora a noi!’ – he was then convicted.
Prosecutors acted independently, and the government and parliament intervened as a united front.Footnote 6 In May 1949, after MSI demonstrations in support of regional elections in Sardinia, the ministry of the interior instructed prefects to disband demonstrations with a nostalgic bent. This stance met with public satisfaction (La Stampa 1949b). When Ferruccio Parri spoke at the trial against Rodolfo Graziani in November 1948, from La Stampa’s front page Vittorio Gorresio said that the ‘true voice of offended, insulted Italy, which entrusted the protection of its dignity to one of its best, most civilised, and noblest men, a champion of the Resistance’, was finally being heard (Gorresio Reference Gorresio1948).
Widely and gently applied: the Scelba law from its birth to the Piazza Fontana massacre
The feeling that Italy needed a new law was sparked by political violence in Rome on 28 January 1950. In the leftist neighbourhood of Garbatella, MSI members tried to sell their newspaper and put up posters. Two trucks of militants arrived and stormed the local Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) headquarters, but were driven back by neighbourhood residents. This neofascist sortie was typical of the early postwar period, with militants armed with clubs, brass knuckles and blunt objects. Police searched the headquarters in Largo Argentina and found materials and weapons. Twenty-nine people were charged, and, on 5 February, the MSI was charged with reconstituting the fascist party (Gorresio Reference Gorresio1950). In October, 16 defendants were tried for apology for fascism and personal violence, but the judge found the charge against MSI – of reconstituting the fascist party – unfounded (La Stampa 1950). This decision initiated the process leading to the Scelba law.
This law marked a new era in the legal protection of democracy against neofascism. Its central innovation was the crime of apology for fascism (article 4), with deliberately light penalties (maximum three years’ imprisonment) to avoid creating martyrs and to target actions rather than opinions. This was both its strength and its main weakness in application.
From the enacting of the Scelba law until the Piazza Fontana massacre (12 December 1969), concern about fascism’s presence remained significant. The first conviction for reconstituting the fascist party came on 13 April 1955, when seven MSI militants were convicted by the Florence court (with sentences from six months to three years, and all deprived of political rights for five years) (La Stampa 1955d),Footnote 7 but the crime of apology for fascism dominated.Footnote 8 Publications, commemorations and demonstrations were of particular concern, especially in the run-up to elections. There were the first two cases of lifting parliamentary immunity for Missini deputies, and numerous rallies were disbanded in flagrante delicto.Footnote 9 One early Scelba law application occurred on 5 October 1952, at Rodolfo Graziani’s villa in Arcinazzo Roma. To commemorate his 1943 Teatro Adriano speech, a hundred people (78 of whom arrived by bus from Milan) wearing military uniforms listened to Graziani’s speech, ate ‘rancio’ (military rations) together, and sang hymns. The event took place in Graziani’s courtyard, visible from the street. Graziani was denounced for apologising and for violating uniform prohibition laws – the military court ordered half his assets confiscated (La Stampa 1952d, 1952e).
However, the Scelba law was designed to suppress political violence by MSI militants, too. In one-third of cases, the law was applied alongside other charges (mainly injury and violence arising from squadrist actions), with many charges brought by public entities (prosecutors’ offices and the government). Nearly as many charges came from private individuals, showing widespread antifascist values.Footnote 10 Recipients were typically MSI militants reviving post-First World War squadrismo. The first action punished occurred on 24 May 1952 in Rome. Following a rally attended by Rodolfo Graziani, MSI militants attacked two buses carrying women from a socialist–communist rally (La Stampa 1952a). A notable example occurred in October 1955, when militants from the Colle Oppio Monti MSI section attacked communist headquarters in Via delle Botteghe Oscure and Piazzale Flaminio, and vandalised the Rinascita bookstore. The squadrism reference was clear: neofascists wore uniforms and chanted traditional squadrist songs (such as ‘All’armi siamo fascisti!’) (La Stampa 1955a, 1955c; Gorresio Reference Gorresio1955).
The law’s application prompted MSI to seek its cancellation through appeals to the constitutional court. The court’s early work addressed democratic tolerance of antidemocratic actors. The court judged four cases together, and its first ruling (5 June 1956) declared the law legitimate but limited its application: an apology must pose a real danger to democracy. The court stated:
[T]he apology of fascism, to assume the character of a crime, must consist not in a laudatory defence, but in an exaltation such as to be able to lead to the reorganisation of the fascist party … It is a matter not of a direct instigation … but of an indirect instigation to commit an act directed at this reorganisation and [one that is] suitable and efficient for that purpose.Footnote 11
The court’s pronouncement was meant to reaffirm that the Scelba law did not punish ideas, but in doing so it made applying the law more difficult. This ruling introduced a structural paradox that runs through the entire subsequent history of the law: apology for fascism can be prosecuted only when it poses a real danger, yet when real danger exists, apology appears secondary to the concrete threat. This paradox shaped judicial behaviour across every decade of the Republic.
This circumscription had a wide-ranging effect. Although there were several trials and convictions, the law was applied loosely. In 1956, Vanni Teodorani, Arnaldo Mussolini’s son-in-law, had amassed a hundred prosecutions for apology for fascism but was never imprisoned (La Stampa 1956b). For example, Gino Maddalena, a 32-year-old factory worker from Turin, attended a mass for Repubblica Sociale Italiana (RSI) soldiers’ bodies brought to Turin from Piedmontese localities at the Association of Relatives of the Fallen and Missing at the RSI’s request. He wore a black shirt. A police commissioner charged him, but the court (president Pogliano, public prosecutor Mancuso, secretary Casatelli) deemed this an administrative matter rather than a crime, resulting in only a fine (La Stampa 1957a).
These attitudes often stemmed from the failure to purge.Footnote 12 On 28 November 1966, Silvio Tavolaro – born in 1900 and president of the court of cassation since 1962 – attended an MSI rally commemorating Alfredo Rocco. He claimed that the invitation did not specify that it was an MSI initiative, adding that he attended because he was friends with the speaker, Gianbattista Madia, an MSI deputy. Tavolaro’s participation sparked protests among parliamentarians, judges and the press, mainly because the event included an open apology for fascism (Guidi Reference Guidi1966; Galante Garrone Reference Galante Garrone1966).
Like a fish needs a bicycle: the Scelba law in the years of terrorism
With the Piazza Fontana massacre, Italy entered a new season of terrorism. Conservative circles, alarmed by the growth of the left, provided ideological and material cover for neofascist groups, enabling coup attempts and a sustained terrorist campaign (Della Porta and Rossi Reference Della Porta and Rossi1984, 59–61). This was a true low-intensity war: according to the most reliable estimates, 351 people were killed and 1,119 wounded in acts variously attributable to terrorism between 1969 and 1982, with 68 per cent killed by neofascist violence operating through massacres.
The danger assumed concrete connotations. Roman salutes, black shirts and nostalgic demonstrations took a back seat to bombs and coups. The Scelba law was no longer the main tool for defending democracy as the threat had changed form, becoming more tangible. Cases tried under this law decreased drastically, and apology was less commonly charged alongside other crimes, not because the threat was distant but because it was too close, and apology was seen as too abstract. The paradox in the constitutional court’s ruling no. 1 seemed to be enacted: an apology should be prosecuted only if it poses a real danger. Yet, if it constitutes an actual danger, an apology is no longer dangerous. This paradox is illustrated in the case involving Francesco Diaco, Giovanni Capello, Renato Balestrieri and Francesco Piacifelli, four MSI militants suspected of throwing a bomb in February 1971 that killed socialist worker Malacaria. The four were released and, in a local newspaper, were shown giving the Roman salute to other MSI militants, greeting them jubilantly. They were charged with apology for fascism but acquitted because their act did not constitute a danger to democracy. The two facts appear connected: because they were absolved of a concretely dangerous action (murdering a political opponent), a potentially dangerous action (the Roman salute) was deemed insignificant (Fata Reference Fata1971).
Equally telling are cases where the indictment was for article 1 (reconstitution of the fascist party) rather than article 4 (apology for fascism), which were more numerous in this period than before. Many movements were accused, including the MSI, in a heavily publicised case (Franci Reference Franci1973; Trovati Reference Trovati1973; Casalegno Reference Casalegno1973), yet all but two cases ended without guilty verdicts.Footnote 13 For the MSI, political reasons drove the acquittal as the party was too large to disband without risking public trust in democracy. In other cases, the primary reason was a lack of links to subversive acts at the national level (judgment no. 5204 of 5 December 1977, judgment no. 9121 of 16 March 1978 and judgment no. 1564 of 27 October 1980). This reasoning prevailed in the Spampinato, Lucchino and Alemanno cases: the court of cassation established that reconstitution of the fascist party exists only with real danger – widespread militant presence, use of antidemocratic practices such as violence, and weapons.
In contrast, the convictions of Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale were based on their members’ involvement in violent acts, primarily the Piazza Fontana massacre. Ordine Nuovo was founded in 1956 as a breakaway group from the MSI, accusing it of betraying fascist values, and was reconstituted on 21 December 1969, after deciding to rejoin the MSI. On 2 April 1971, National Secretary Clemente Graziani and 12 others were arrested and indicted.Footnote 14 Except for the 50-year-old director of Noi, the accused were neofascists who had minimal contact with historical fascism, being between 20 and 34 years old. This was the first arrest warrant issued due to reconstitution of the fascist party. The public prosecutor’s indictment statement is revealing: ‘[He is accused of having] organised and directed the fascist movement “Ordine Nuovo”, a movement denigrating democracy and democratic institutions, based on the exaltation of the principles, symbols and methods proper to the dissolved fascist party, devoted to threats and violence as a system of political struggle’ (Guidi Reference Guidi1971). The trial had 42 defendants (Guidi Reference Guidi1973); Ordine Nuovo was found guilty on 21 November 1973 and dissolved by the ministry of the interior (Carbone Reference Carbone1973). The same verdict led to the prosecution of Avanguardia Nazionale, founded in 1959 by MSI dissident Stefano Delle Chiaie, a primary suspect in the Piazza Fontana bombing who fled into hiding. The trial began on 9 January 1974, ending with 31 convictions and dissolution on 5 June 1976 (Carbone Reference Carbone1974; La Stampa 1976).
The Scelba law in the 1980s
The Bologna train station bombing marked the end of an era,Footnote 15 signalling a significant shift in the country. Italian society entered a new, less politicised phase in which political debates and issues were less present and evident in everyday life. This veritable ‘anthropological mutation’ had its roots in the previous decade when changes in economics (Italy’s achieving welfare standards comparable to those of other advanced societies, coinciding with the onset of the crisis of industrial society), society (the discovery of new, individual and non-public lifestyles), communication and culture (new consumer trends, the end of the RAI television monopoly) coalesced. In this changing society, twentieth-century ideologies seemed to be giving way to the ‘Italians’ new philosophy: let’s have fun’, as eloquently stated on the cover of the first 1979 issue of the weekly Panorama.
In this context, apology for fascism was an under-reported crime. Cases plummeted because such acts were less widespread or less widely noticed. This shift is evidenced by public initiatives almost disappearing: authorities moved ex officio only when faced with incidents in which fascism-nostalgic actors sought media attention or when acts were committed before public officials. For example, on the night before liberation day in 1982, Giampaolo Zucca and Amedeo Meloni (24 and 21 years old) hung banners reading ‘April 25th, national mourning not national celebration’ in Piazza CLN in Turin. They tried to replace the square’s name plaque with ‘Piazza Benito Mussolini’. Caught by the police, they were arrested. The investigation also charged Giancarlo Martorana and Alfonso Definis (21 and 26 years old), who hung a banner reading ‘Honour to our [fascist] comrades’ at the Martinetto memorial where Piedmontese Resistance leaders had been shot (La Stampa 1982a, 1982b). Similarly, in 1992, five neo-Nazis were caught painting ‘Skinhead Dux’ on a wall in Rome’s Primavalle neighbourhood (Corbi Reference Corbi1992); they were charged but not convicted.
Finally, two other facts show that concrete danger (an indispensable element for applying the Scelba law since the first constitutional court ruling) was not perceived in these acts. First, the law was rarely applied together with others. When it was, it seldom accompanied violent crimes – unlike in the previous decade. The case in Samarate, Varese, in February 1993, is an exception. On Valentine’s day, four young skinheads attacked Farouque Joulame, a flower vendor in the town centre. The attack occurred in daylight, with many witnesses present. Investigations revealed apologetic material in the attackers’ homes. They were charged with voluntary injury and apology for fascism (La Stampa 1993a).
Moreover, in almost all cases, charges were pressed but never went to trial. When cases did go to trial, they ended in acquittals. One example is the movement Fascismo e Libertà (PDS), founded on 25 July 1991, whose best-known exponents included former RSI soldier Giorgio Pisanò. In 1991, the Vercelli section of the PDS denounced Giuseppe Martorana for papering the city with fascism-apologetic leaflets. In February of the following year, the same happened with Giannetto Bordin, 62-year-old vice president of the National Union of Fighters of the RSI, for hanging large posters in Novara and Castelletto Ticino with the fascist symbol and inscriptions such as ‘Neither communism nor capitalism, history did not stop in Piazzale Loreto’, ‘Mussolini wins’ and ‘Away from the Leagues and against partyocracy’. Although the ministry of the interior did not approve its symbol for the 1992 political elections, the court acquitted the party and its members of charges of apology and reconstituting the fascist party (Caradonna Reference Caradonna1991; La Stampa – Vercelli 1991; Adnkronos 1992; La Stampa – Novara 1993; Calderoni Reference Calderoni2002).
The prosecution of apology for fascism consisted of disconnected episodes with virtually no national impact, and the impression is mainly of a shift from politics to folklore: demonstrations were replaced by kitsch objects (La Stampa 1986).Footnote 16 The case of Giorgio Almirante, denounced by the Piedmont network of historical institutes of the Resistance in 1986 for stating at the Teatro Lirico in Milan that the ‘emblems of the Partisan bands’ were ‘thievery and murder’, is unique. Election rallies, demonstrations and commemorations no longer ended in court. Instead, medallions, jerseys and music tapes did, often with effects more grotesque than frightening. In March 1985, after a five-a-side football tournament at the Palazzo a Vela in Turin, players of the winning team, Armando Picchi from Nichelino, received medals with Mussolini’s profile on one side and ‘Better to live one day as a lion than 100 years as a sheep’ on the other. The medal’s nature was noticed later, causing minor controversy (La Stampa 1983). The regional soccer committee chairman tried to dismiss it as a misunderstanding, saying that the medals were part of a series on prominent historical people without the intention to vindicate fascism.
This market was not insignificant: it testifies that fascism continued to exert fascination for certain social segments, and that neofascism adapted to consumer culture rather than disappearing. By the mid-1990s, the signs of a thriving pop culture of right-wing extremism were unmistakable. For example, as early as 1984, ANPI (National Association Partisans of Italy) denounced Giovanni Taranto because T-shirts with Hitler’s profile and the dates of Nazi attacks were sold in two of his stores in downtown Turin (La Stampa 1984). Then, in 1992, Codacons (an umbrella organisation of associations for defending the environment and the rights of users and consumers) and the Lega Ambiente Nazionale filed a charge with the Milan public prosecutor’s office against television commercials advertising a Christmas box set entitled ‘Tecnobalilla’ because it contained music praising the fascist period, images of people making the Roman salute, and other symbolism typical of the ventennio (ANSA 1992).
The Mancino law and a paradigm shift: from fascism to racism
In 1993, a new chapter began in the history of legislation against apology for fascism: on 25 June, law no. 205, known as the Mancino law, was passed. This was the conversion into law of a decree law from April of the same year containing ‘urgent measures in the area of racial, ethnic and religious discrimination’.
Racism and skinheads had become widespread in many European countries since the Berlin Wall’s collapse. These trends were caused by globalisation, with the economy shifting to the tertiary sector, accompanied by the relocation of production and migration from the global South and East. In this context, nationalist sentiments grew, and many right-wing parties shifted their agendas toward identity-oriented issues. Such shifts occurred in Italy, where transformations were more traumatic due to the collapse of post-Second World War parties, submerged by the tangentopoli corruption scandal. In this context of transformations that produced anxiety and disorientation, the radical right built consensus by proposing strong identities, easily identifiable both positively and negatively.
The brutal violence that was erupting called for a new law. On 15 April 1993, Mohideen Nowfer, a leader of the Federation of Foreign Communities who had faced threats, was attacked at home by neo-Nazis. They tortured him, branded a swastika on his face, and attempted to set fire to him and his home (Masci Reference Masci1993; Zaccaria Reference Zaccaria1993). Minister Mancino immediately announced an ad hoc decree law that had enormous consequences for crimes prosecuted under the Scelba law (La Stampa 1993b).
Since then, the law against apology for fascism has been set aside and largely replaced by the Mancino law. Until the mid-2010s, about half of some 30 cases concerned the Scelba law, but almost only Mancino law violations went to trial. This law is also invoked when the glorification of fascism prevails, as in the complaint and €10,000 fine against Paolo Di Canio, a Lazio striker, for celebrating his goal with a Roman salute during the derby (Bruzzone Reference Bruzzone2005; Buccheri Reference Buccheri2005).
Such an association was sometimes facilitated by defendants who referenced Nazism more than fascism. This tendency appeared in the case of the Sturmabteilung association, linked to the MSI National Right party. Members paraded in uniforms that evoked Nazi brown shirts (wearing ochre shirts, black ties and pennants) and had pictures taken while giving the Roman salute. On 18 and 28 September 2009, the group organised two ‘black patrols’ (Martirano Reference Martirano2009). The association had been preparing since the summer to utilise the Maroni decree (law no. 38 of 23 April 2009), which established the possibility of forming ‘associations of volunteers for urban security’ (Senesi Reference Senesi2009). These first initiatives, which were met with ridicule and indignation,Footnote 17 were followed by a third on 9 October 2009, when agents of the Direzione Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali (DIGOS) interrupted them. Officials identified five people, including Maria Antonietta Cannizzaro, then president and wife of Gaetano Saya, former president of the Italian Nationalist Party (Focarete Reference Focarete2009). The patrols continued and, using the Dipartimento di Studi Strategici Antiterrorism (founded on 26 March 2004), Saya proposed recruiting a national guard and convened an assembly in Genoa in September 2011. The anti-racial discrimination office of the ministry of equal opportunities investigated Saya for content on his website (getanosaya.org), which was later blacked out: ‘only those who are compatriots can be citizens of the state. Only those of Italian blood can be compatriots’, calling immigrants ‘the new barbarians’ and homosexuals ‘pederasts, perverts, faggots, [and] poofs’ (Corriere della Sera 2011b). Gaetano Saya and his wife were sentenced to 11 and 8 months’ imprisonment, respectively (La Repubblica 2012). The appellate court (11 December 2015) reduced the sentence (seven months in jail and a €400 fine), and the court of cassation (ruling no. 10569 of 26 January 2021) converted it to a €3,000 fine plus court costs.
However, prosecutors leaned towards the Mancino law even when the link between apology for fascism and racism was not obvious. There is a clear reason for this preference: it became the only effective legislation for condemning the apology for fascism. Cases applying the Scelba law almost always ended in acquittals, with the court of cassation upholding such judgments. The cases of demonstrations commemorating Sergio Ramelli, Enrico Pedenovi and Carlo Borsani exemplify this tendency.Footnote 18 These demonstrations had been held for years but gained nationwide visibility in the 2010s due to increased participation and publicity (as with other gatherings, especially commemorations in Acca Larenzia) by groups such as Casa Pound, Forza Nuova and Lealtà e Azione. These far-right groups posted photos and videos on social media to challenge the authorities and to proselytise by showing their supporter numbers.Footnote 19 The court of cassation acquitted defendants involved in demonstrations organised in 2014 (no. 11038 of 2 March 2016), 2015 (no. 8108 of 14 December 2017) and 2016 (no. 28298 of 7 June 2017). The militants were charged under the Scelba law.
In contrast, cases applying the Mancino law typically end in convictions upheld by the court of cassation. This application mainly targets hooligans who do the Roman salute or wear fascist symbols at sports competitions, a trend that emerged in the 2000s as the most common case type. The first such ruling by the court of cassation came on 10 July 2007 (ruling no. 37390). It confirmed the sentence against a sports fan who waved a flag bearing the symbol of the RSI for propagating ‘ideas based on national and ethnic superiority or hatred’. The Roman salute is condemned similarly. On 17 June 2009 (judgment no. 25184), the court of cassation upheld a Hellas Verona fan’s conviction because ‘the “Roman salute” … is a gesture that incites racial hatred, that is, that borders on incitement to violence’. The same applies to clothing with fascist symbols. On 4 June 2013 (judgment no. 39860), the court upheld Christian Pianizze’s conviction: arrested during a brawl on 25 October 2007, he wore a sweatshirt with the slogan ‘Believe Obey Fight’.
Recently, however, the court of cassation gave the Scelba law a new lease of life. In 2023, ruling on another commemoration of Ramelli, the court held that a unified interpretation was necessary to avoid precisely this dissimilarity in judgments depending on which legislation was applied (ruling no. 38686). This led to the 17 April 2024, ruling (no. 16153), in which, in a joint session, the supreme court stated that both laws can be applied depending on the context.Footnote 20 This gave the Scelba law a new chance at effectiveness, at least theoretically.
Conclusion
The history of repressing apologies for fascism tells us a great deal about Italian society. These laws are a mirror of far-right movements’ characteristics and practices; enacted at specific moments, they reveal which concerns have become salient enough to demand legal remedy and how those in power understood democracy’s vulnerabilities.
Tracing the application of these laws reveals distinct phases in the meaning of fascism within Italian democratic culture. In the first Republican decade, the main concern was organisational re-emergence: prosecutors and the press saw demonstrations, commemorations and propaganda as signs of a returning threat, and law no. 1546/1947 was applied with confidence. The Scelba law (1952) codified and paradoxically limited this vigilance: requiring that an apology pose a ‘real danger to democracy’, the constitutional court’s 1956 ruling made prosecution more difficult. Vanni Teodorani’s case, with over a hundred prosecutions and no imprisonment, illustrates the impunity this interpretive loosening produced. The terrorism years sharpened this paradox: when neofascist groups planted bombs and planned coups, apology for fascism was too abstract a charge to pursue, while its symbolic manifestations (e.g. the Roman salute) were deemed insufficiently dangerous. The convictions of Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale were based on members’ participation in violent acts, confirming that courts acted only when fascism manifested beyond symbolism. The 1980s brought another shift: from politics to folklore. Medals with Mussolini’s profile, T-shirts with Hitler’s image and Christmas sets with fascist music replaced rallies and squadrismo as prosecution targets. Courts consistently found insufficient danger; the law became a moral-symbolic tool rather than an effective sanction. The Mancino law (1993) displaced rather than resolved this: by recoding apology for fascism as racial incitement, it provided statutory tools for specific cases, while the deeper issue of fascism as a political threat was set aside. The court of cassation’s recent joint-session ruling (no. 16153/2024) seeks a broader interpretive scope for both laws, though whether judicial practice will follow is uncertain.
The persistent gap between legal provision and judicial application (evident from 1956 to the 2010s acquittals) suggests that legislation alone cannot sustain a robust democratic culture capable of recognising its vulnerabilities. As Forlenza (Reference Forlenza2025) argues, fascism’s meanings in democratic contexts are not fixed but continuously produced and contested; any adequate legal response must engage with this instability rather than presuming a stable, self-evident referent.
Forty years ago, Bobbio (Reference Bobbio1984) defined democracy as majority rule combined with certain rights and the rule of law. Democracy survives by evolving beyond its limits rather than stagnating. Solutions to current challenges lie in this intersection of form and substance.
Acknowledgements
This article was written with the support of the ERC Project F-WORD, GA 101042882.
Marco Bernardi is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Turin. His main research interests are legacy, memory, and public use of the history of fascism.
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