Creating Historical Remembrance in the Formation of the Republican Identity

The way societies confront the memory of the Great War in different ways and the memory politics determined by the ruling elite to shape the post-war societies and identities are significant in understanding how historical remembrance is formed, and this remembrance shapes the perception of “us.” According to Winter, our memories, or the “historical remembrance” that exists in society on a certain subject, are recreated or reconstructed in the process, and in this process of reconstruction, we add emotions, beliefs, and even knowledge to our experiences. “We bias our memories of the past by attributing to them emotions or knowledge we acquired after the event” (Winter Reference Winter2006, 4). Based on this, it is possible to state that the discourse adopted by the Republican elite was significant since they were the mnemonic actors who “invoke myths and symbols of the national past to shape and delimit their societies’ identities, legitimize their power, mobilize electoral support, and exchange power resources” (Malinova Reference Malinova2021, 998). Thus, their interpretation of the recent past was shaped by the impact of the transition from the multi-ethnic, multi-religious Ottoman Empire to the nation-state on those figures.

The figures that wrote the accounts of the Great War would be discussed in this article were undoubtedly influenced by many factors and conveyed the evaluation of this period to their readers. The most important of these factors was certainly being able to navigate between the topics that the single-party Republican regime encouraged to cover, the topics it prohibited from being covered, and the topics it tolerated being covered. In addition, most of these people who wrote about the War had roles they played on behalf of the Ottoman state in the War. For instance, Muhittin Birgen (1885–1959) was the chief editor of the Tanin, the propaganda organ of CUP. Many of them were members of the CUP, and some of them were names very close to the triumvirate who bore all the responsibility of the World War. Arif Cemil (Denker) (1888–1945) was Talat’s personal secretary in Berlin, and Falih Rıfkı (Atay) (1893–1971) served five years for Cemal in Syria when he was the governor of Syria as his personal secretary. Apart from the instinct for self-censorship, these individuals undoubtedly influenced how they would function as a bridge between such a recent past and the present. As much as the past shapes the present, the present also shapes the “national” perception and understanding of the past (Eldem Reference Eldem2019, 76). In this context, it should not be forgotten that while these people were reading the recent past, they were reading the past as the political elites of the Republican regime.

Writing about public memory in Turkey, Özyürek stated that in the first years of the Republic, there was a process based on forgetting rather than remembering. This “administered forgetting” focused on loosening the ties with the Ottoman past and created a new identity with the representation of a past in which this past is tried to be ignored or rearranged (Özyürek Reference Özyürek2007). However, Gürpınar underlined that there were no completely consistent discourses on history, and that one can be proud of the Ottoman heritage, as well as despise the Ottoman ancien régime (Gürpınar Reference Gürpınar2011, 63). In addition, while Danforth emphasized that history was a battleground between pro-Ottoman Islamists and anti-Ottoman Kemalists, he stated that Republican historiography focused on the “Turkishness” in Ottoman achievements and did not completely ignore the Ottoman past (Danforth Reference Danforth2014, 657). Similarly, Sönmez wrote that Kemalist nation-builders adopted a “double discourse” towards the Ottoman past. According to this:

Moving from this discussion on how Ottoman history was evaluated in the young Turkish Republic, it is interesting to observe that the series of articles this article analyses did not deny the past; on the contrary, they directly dealt with this recent past and wanted to give an account of it to their readers. However, while doing this, which issues were strongly underlined and which issues were glossed over were determined by the boundaries set by the Republic between the past and the present. Therefore, observing this narrative will also help us understand the relationship that the Republican elites constructed between historical remembrance and Republican identity. There is a very strong connection between the representation of the past in various fields and identity construction. (Özyürek Reference Özyürek2007, 3) Both the historical remembrance of World War I and the War of Independence in Republican Turkey were elements that made significant contributions to Turkish nationalism in its formation phase.

According to Eldem;

For this reason, since the relationship established with the CUP represented the oscillation between World War defeat and War of Independence victory for the Republican elite, questioning this relationship requires considering this factor in the construction of Turkish national identity. After the signature of the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918, an immediate amnesia started about war-related issues, particularly about the role played by mainstream intellectuals in the declaration of war. According to this post-war amnesia, the War was declared as the result of the adventurous initiatives of a few individuals at the top of the Young-Turk regime (namely, Cemal, Talat, and Enver) but not supported by many Ottoman intellectuals. In the first years of the Armistice Period, anti-unionism had gained ground. Being called a Unionist began to be used as a serious insult (Aslanmirza Reference Aslanmirza2021, 1482). As a result of this tendency, the aforementioned trials in Istanbul had started. While the national struggle was being organized, at the beginning of the Sivas Congress, all delegates were required to swear that they would not work for the resurrection of the CUP. During this period, there was an effort to prove that both the movement and the actors themselves were not extensions of the CUP. Although the escaped Unionists wrote and published their self-defense, this was not enough to change the anti-Unionist attitude in the early 1920s (Cemal 2024; Talat Reference Talat2021). It was believed that a new government that would not be associated with wartime politics would be better able to negotiate the terms of the agreement.

After the founding of the Republic, a narrative was constructed targeting the former CUP members. This narrative was reckoning with the past without considering that the ruling political elite of the Republic were also significant actors and decision makers during the Second Constitutional Era (1908-1918). (Zürcher Reference Zürcher2010, 108). Thus, this narrative created an old versus new dualism, labeling the defeat in World War I as the responsibility of the Ottoman cadres and celebrating the War of Independence as the work of the new cadres represented by Ankara. In this way, certain pride was provided for Turkish nationalism in its formation period. As an extension of this, according to Turan, World War I has been a more under-researched subject in Turkish historiography compared to the War of Independence. (Turan Reference Turan2014)

Although there was an opposition against Mustafa Kemal organized by former Unionists such as Kara Kemal, Cavid Bey, and Rauf Orbay, they were eliminated from the political scene as a result of their names being mentioned in the assassination attempt against Mustafa Kemal in Izmir in 1926. With the Maintenance of Law and Order Law declared after the Sheikh Said rebellion, the Progressive Republican Party, which was generally associated with the Unionists, was also closed. All forms of political opposition were suppressed until 1927, when Mustafa Kemal delivered the Speech (Zürcher Reference Zürcher2010, 12). And the Speech emerged as the only legitimate historical accounting of the War of Independence during the Single Party Period. Efforts to create an alternative historical remembrance of World War I and the War of Independence were censored. For example, the publishing process of Kazım Karabekir’s İstiklal Harbimiz (Our War of Independence) is quite interesting (Karabekir Reference Karabekir2024). Karabekir, being one of the leading commanders who initiated the War of Independence, prepared a 1,230-page manuscript between 1927 and 1933. It was to be published in 1933, but in the same year, the printing was halted, and the proofs of the book were collected and burned (Zürcher Reference Zürcher2010, 20; Göcek Reference Göçek2015, 57). It was only after the Democrat Party’s election victory in 1950 that this book was published in 1951. Constructing a distance between the CUP and the Republican elite, which remained valid throughout the 1920s, changed when the Unionists and their memories ceased to be an immediate threat to the Kemalist establishment. Especially after various liquidation processes, which are listed above, like the closing of the Progressive Republican Party, took place, the self-confidence of the single-party regime was achieved. In Gürpınar’s words, “they (the Unionists) could be upheld as the abortive precursors of the Kemalists and selfless patriots, albeit utopian and childlike” (Gürpınar Reference Gürpınar2011, 55). Thus, the self-confidence the Single party gained paved the way for publications examining the roles of CUP leaders during the War in the 1930s. With these publications, CUP leaders were given back their lost reputation. This effort to regain reputation lays the foundations of the process that causes issues such as war responsibility to be overshadowed by the concept of state interest in Turkish society in the long run.

The Mnemonic Actors Forming the Historical Remembrance of Unionism

After the foundation of the Republic, the actors who created the dominant discourse about the CUP and the War responsibility formed this narrative through a series of articles published in the leading newspapers of the period. Some of these newspapers were Akşam, Son Posta, Sabah, Milliyet, Yeni Asır. During this period, newspapers were the medium through which the literate elite expressed themselves and attempted to shape politics. In the early Republican history, authors generally expressed their ideas through newspaper series they published, which could later be published as books. (Bilgiç, Reference Bilgiç2017) In this respect, it is meaningful to scan the newspapers to examine how and by whom the accounting of the Great War was made during the Single Party Period.

These figures who published series on the Great War and CUP took a direct role in the Committee and participated in the War effort of the Ottoman State. For instance, Arif Cemil (Denker) served as Talat Pasha’s private secretary during the Berlin period, and was an important actor in the promotion of the German-Ottoman alliance during World War I (Özçalık Reference Özçalık2018, 102, 103). In 1933, he wrote the article series İttihat ve Terakkinin Son Günleri (The last days of Committee of Union and Progress) for Akşam, and between 1933 and 1934 he wrote Umumi Harpte Teşkilatı Mahsusa (Special Organization during the Great War) for Vakit. One of the other most significant of these actors was Muhittin Birgen, the chief writer of Tanin newspaper, the mouthpiece publication of the CUP during the Second Constitutional Era. The series of articles he wrote titled İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene (Ten Years in Committee of Union and Progress), which appeared in the Son Posta newspaper between 1936–1939, was crucial in the formation of the narrative about Unionism during the Single Party Era. Ziya Şakir (Soku) (1883-1959) was another publisher of the Second Constitutional Era who wrote on the Great War and the CUP. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın (1875–1957) was also an influential figure, publisher, and politician who was exiled to Malta by the British authorities during the Armistice Period due to his involvement in World War I. He also wrote intensively about Talat after his funeral in Istanbul in 1943. Falih Rıfkı Atay, in addition to his publishing activities during the War, served as Cemal’s private secretary in Syria during the War. Rauf Ahmet (Hotinli) (1875–1952) was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs employee and served in the commission to examine peace issues until the end of the War. In summary, these names who write about recent history in daily newspapers were the people who witnessed these days alongside the ruling elite, and even took part in the propaganda on war-related issues. These names have become important mnemonic actors in creating historical remembrance, not only with their activities during the War but also with the roles they played after the proclamation of the Republic. Figures such as Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Ziya Şakir, and Rauf Ahmet (Hotinli) continued their publishing activities on various platforms. And names such as Muhittin Birgen and Falih Rıfkı Atay took an active role in politics as deputies in the Grand National Assembly, in addition to their publishing activities.

In all of the works to be discussed, without exception, the authors explained their motivation for writing about this period and underlined that it was their responsibility to convey the past “correctly.” Falih Rıfkı Atay, who served Cemal Pasha in Syria for 4 years, in his book Zeytindağı (Mount of Olives), published in 1932, stated that he did not write anything about Syria during the Great War because he had to write only the things he approved of, and during the Armistice period (1918–1923) he had to write only the things he did not like, so he wrote about Syria in 1932 when it became possible to express his own ideas objectively. (Atay Reference Atay2023, 7) In 1930, Rauf Ahmed published a series of articles titled Büyük Harbe Nasıl Girdik? (How did we enter the Great War?), and invited everyone who witnessed the period to write their memories in order to “do their duty to the country” (Rauf Ahmed Reference Ahmed2015, 189). Ziya Şakir, however, stated that the issue of entering the War has remained in the dark for 20 years and that people involved in the subject have distorted the truth, sometimes partially or completely, in order to save themselves from responsibility (Ziya Şakir Reference Şakir2018a, 127). Muhittin Birgen, the former chief editor of Tanin, stated that there was a collective effort to slander the CUP immediately after the War and that the witnesses of the period were obliged to write what they knew (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 761). In summary, after more than a decade had passed since the end of the War in the 1930s, it was time for an accounting for these state elites who held various positions during the War. The single-party regime now felt strong enough to initiate such an inquiry.

What was the Committee of Union and Progress?

The majority of these names who write about the relationship between the World War and the CUP focused on the structure of the CUP, the role it played in Ottoman politics, and the questions of whether it was a political party or an organization that adopted komitacı methods.

For example, Ziya Şakir stated that although the CUP had been working as a political party for years during the War, the old spirit of komitacılık had not lost its strength. (Ziya Şakir Reference Şakir2018c, 441) In a similar vein, Muhittin Birgen started his article series with the question of whether the CUP was a Komita or an Association. According to him, this question was important because “The first of these are organizations that represent a will that wants to dominate from top to bottom, and the second is an expression of the desires expressed by the masses from bottom to top” (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 81). Birgen stated that the CUP oscillated between these two. It was basically a political party, but when the conditions of the country do not allow it, it takes on a structure that was forced to maintain its komitacı nature. According to Birgen, his was an understandable situation. In his words:

The authors’ identification of the Unionist movement with the rise of Turkishness in the Ottoman State legitimized these komitacı tendencies in the eyes of the authors. According to Birgen, the CUP is “an idealistic move that emerged from the spirit of the Turkish nation” (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 64). According to him, although the movement initially emerged with the Ottomanist ideal, the developments after its establishment led it towards Turkishness, and it was understood that “only the Turkish presence would provide the cement of the Ottoman community” (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 109). According to Birgen, whether it is successful or not, whether it uses dirty methods or not, “it is the collective work of a generation of Turks working for the rise of a Turk who acts as a Turk” (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 758). As a natural consequence of this line of logic, the CUP should be supported because it ultimately serves Turkishness. Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın also stated that the CUP had no choice but to rely on the Turkish element and expressed that the Committee was “a self-defense move born from the spirit of the Turks in difficult times” (Yalçın Reference Yalçın2024, 26). According to Yalçın, with the CUP, Turks began to be able to say that they were Turks. This narrative, adopted in the 1930s, seems to be an extension of lineal Turkish historiography, which considered Turkism as a last resort after the exhaustion of Ottomanism and Islamism policies (Akçura Reference Akçura1976). According to this narrative, the CUP was a political party that could not stand the disadvantaged situation of the Turks within the Empire and adopted Turkism as a last resort, thus regaining the position Turks deserved as the essential element that the state should rest on, and while doing this, it did not hesitate to sometimes use komitacı methods.

The Ottoman State’s entry into the War, together with Germany, was seen as a necessity by all of the authors discussed. However, the manner in which the Ottomans entered the War was a matter of criticism for these writers. All writers, without exception, believed that this declaration of war was a fait accompli prepared by the German General Souchon. The German General attacked the Russian fleet in the Black Sea with an Ottoman ship, dragging the Ottoman Empire into a war for which it was not sufficiently prepared. There were various disagreements about whether the triumvirate was informed about this fait accompli beforehand. Many stated that Enver was aware of this maneuver. But they especially emphasized that Talat had no knowledge of this issue and that he had no choice but to tolerate it after this move (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 201). Rauf Ahmet, who published a 38-part article series about the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the War in 1930, stated that the leaders all agreed that they would not be able to benefit from the alliance with Germany if they hesitated about declaring war (Rauf Ahmed Reference Ahmed2015). The Alliance and Germany’s forcing the Ottoman Empire into war had been the subject of criticism by all writers. In the words of Rauf Ahmet, “The Germans wanted to use the Ottoman Empire like a lemon whose peel was discarded after squeezing it, and they signed the Alliance agreement only after declaring war on Russia” (Rauf Ahmed Reference Ahmed2015, 95).

Although they adopt a critical attitude towards the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the War, the authors did not see any obstacle in adopting the motto that there was no conflict while there was war. According to Birgen, the parliament also adopted this Burgfrieden attitude with “patriotic obedience” and accepted the result (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 235). Birgen, who was Tanin’s chief correspondent during the declaration of war, did not engage in self-criticism regarding the propaganda articles he wrote and stated that “journalists sometimes have to lie” (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 201).

Corruption and Misuse of Power During the Great War

Examples of abuse of power, wrong military decisions, and strategic mistakes during the Great War were the most prevalent topics in these articles. Although the Unionists were seen as patriots who had to take the necessary precautionary measures for the advancement of Turkishness, the authors discussed could not help but mention the examples of mismanagement during the War in their accounts of the 1930s. Although they were criticizing these acts, there was definitely a factor that would excuse the bad management of the Unionists on these issues. These mismanagements were often legitimized with an argument embellished with war conditions and the patriotic nationalist attitudes of the Unionists.

The first of these issues, and the one most sensitively addressed by the authors, was the 1915 deportation law and its implementation. Muhittin Birgen dealt with this issue in only nine pages under the title of Ermenilerin İsyanı (The Revolt of the Armenians) in his published article series, which constitutes a total of 761 pages (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 243–251). He defined this issue as a “delicate issue” and stated that he would approach the issue as a human being, not as a Turk (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 243). Birgen claimed that it was necessary to issue a law of deportation because of the rebellious acts of Armenian gangs in eastern Anatolia. According to Birgen, the rebellion erupted at a time when the memory of the Armenians’ situation during the Balkan Wars was still fresh, which led to bloodshed during its suppression; however, he also acknowledged that the government did not resort to its utmost force to prevent it (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 248). Thereupon, Birgen took up Talat’s defense and stated that the deportation decision should be seen as the Turks’ right to defend themselves and added, “this good-hearted defender of history (Talat Pasha) added the following: Everyone in this world has the right to live, and not the Turk?” (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 249).

While commenting on this issue, Ziya Şakir mentioned that innocent people were also harmed because there was no distinction between guilty and innocent during the deportation (Ziya Şakir Reference Şakir2018b, 268). However, he accused those who blamed Talat of misusing his powers. Şakir claimed that those who were blaming Talat for misuse of power were serving circles that produce propaganda about the Ottoman Empire. For him, blaming Talat “meant coming under the influence of Morgan Tav (Morgenthau)Footnote ³ and his peers” (Ziya Şakir Reference Şakir2018c, 420). Therefore, while Ziya Şakir stated that there was abuse of power during the deportation, he equated pointing out those responsible with spreading propaganda against the Ottoman State.

Apart from those who reproduced the state’s argument about the 1915 deportation law, there were also people who went beyond this argument during the single-party era. The historian Ahmet Refik Altınay was one of these names. “Describing the CUP government as the ‘tyranny of the riffraff’, he recounted in detail the stories of the Armenians who were killed during the ‘deportation disaster’, that is, the “cruel act of Talat (Pasha), in the two books he published in 1919, entitled Two Committees, Two Massacres and On the Roads of the Caucasus” (Sönmez Reference Sönmez2021, 764; Ahmet Refik Reference Refik2016). Altınay’s capacity to create a historical remembrance or shape the already existing historical remembrance about Unionism remained limited due to the disapproving view of the single-party regime towards Altınay. As a matter of fact, Altınay’s post at the Istanbul University was terminated with the liquidation of 1933.

Talat was killed by an Armenian, a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, in Germany in 1921. Talat’s murder by the Armenian conspirator, Tehlieian, in Berlin and his trial in Germany were another topic of Armenian annihilation in the Ottoman State that the authors addressed. According to Yenen, this event and the way it was handled in the Armenian and Turkish societies represented a situation in which the processes of heroization and villainization can be concretely observed for both societies (Yenen Reference Yenen2022). In parallel with this, in the writings evaluated in this article, this murder created aggrievement for Talat. Arif Cemil (Denker) discussed that during the two-day trial of Tehlirian, the issue was evaluated through the Armenian point of view, and the testimony of biased people was consulted (Denker Reference Cemil1992, 157). Talat’s body was brought to İstanbul with a state ceremony in February 1943. He was buried in the Abide-i Hürriyet (Monument of Liberties) in Istanbul, with a funeral ceremony accompanied by leading politicians (Şükrü Saraçoğlu), journalists (Ahmed Emin Yalman), and with a wide public participation (Olson Reference Olson1986, 48). This state ceremony caused a lively debate about Talat to arise again, and attempts were made to restore Talat’s dignity, which was thought to have been lost when he escaped to Germany in 1918. The articles published immediately after this ceremony on Talat constituted a clear example of the process of restoring the lost reputation of the Unionists. For example, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın wrote in his article on the day when Talat’s body was brought to Istanbul:

The book he published with the title Talat Pasha after the funeral was Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s effort to restore Talat’s reputation. In Yalçın’s words, “Talat was the dome stone, cement and foundation of the CUP and thanks to his usefulness, he became the Talat of all of us, the Talat of the country, the Talat of the homeland” (Yalçın Reference Yalçın2024, 77), and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s initiative made Talat a national value again. Apart from the issue of the 1915 deportation law and its misuse, the triumvirate’s personal and arbitrary decisions have been a subject of much criticism in these articles. Among these decisions, the Sarıkamış Disaster was considered by many writers to be the product of Enver’s personal ambitions. Ziya Şakir wrote that thousands of Turkish children were left to rot under those terrible snowdrifts just because of stubbornness and selfishness (Ziya Şakir Reference Şakir2018b, 200). The so-called Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization) and its activities were another topic the authors covered when writing about the Great War. The Special Organisation was both a precursor of an intelligence agency for the Ottoman State and a semi-official, autonomous security structure aiming to protect the state from internal and external threats (Yiğit Reference Yiğit2014, 158). Apart from having the mission to prepare the local Muslim population for guerrilla fighting and raise Muslim political consciousness, the Organization was used by the Triumvirate, especially by Enver, to eliminate domestic political opposition and consolidate dictatorial power. Arif Cemil Denker was also a name that brought the issue to the agenda in the 1930s with his 163-part article series titled Umumi Harpte Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization during the Great War), published in Vakit between November 1933 and April 1934. While Arif Cemil stated providing the Islamic union and the gathering the Turks outside Turkey as the highest aim of this organization (Arif Cemil Reference Cemil2023, 3), he also referred that it at the same time became a militia force that Enver benefited from in order to get upper hand in the internal conflict of the CUP. Enver’s use of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (special organization) as a tool to control civilians throughout the War is shown by Ziya Şakir as another abuse of power (Ziya Şakir Reference Şakir2018c, 235).

The authors also discussed the food scarcity and how the leading CUP members dealt with this problem in a detailed manner. The argument that people starved during the Great War became another issue that the CUP was accused of right after the war. However, articles written on the subject in the 1930s emphasized that wartime food management also served another ideal: to achieve Turkification in trade. In order to turn the issue of war wealth and speculation to the benefit of the Turkish population, the CUP administration created the Ministry of Subsistence and appointed Kara Kemal as its head. However, Kara Kemal’s non-transparent practices, especially in the Istanbul bread market, have been a subject that has been criticized at length. In his series of articles published in 181 chapters in 1937, Mustafa Ragıp Esatlı deals with the corruption that Kara Kemal was involved in, using the policy of Turkification of the economy in the Istanbul subsistence sector, and how this caused divisions under the umbrella of the CUP (Esatlı Reference Esatlı2007). While these criticisms were being made, it was also stated that the claim that the Ministry of Subsistence was starving the people was propaganda (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 316). According to Birgen, this Ministry, founded in the last year of the War, was not enough to solve Istanbul’s food problem (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 235). It was also noted that there was no progress in terms of Turkification. According to Birgen, 90 percent of the War speculators were still Jewish, Greek, and Armenian merchants (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 331).

The policy carried out by the Ottoman Empire in Syria and Arabia throughout the War, and its consequences leading to the Arab revolt, is another subject examined by the writers of this period. Although there were different opinions about the necessity of the climate of fear created by Cemal in the region, a general critical discourse prevails on this subject, but there was an unclear tone in this criticism. Falih Rıfkı Atay complained about the lack of guarantee of personal freedom and property ownership and the arbitrary declaration of laws in Syria, which was ruled by Cemal throughout the War. According to Atay, who served as Cemal’s private secretary during his duration in Syria, Cemal, by taking advantage of the law for Armenian deportation, chose to exile people and families he deemed harmful until the end of the War, and carried out arbitrary practices that victimized many civilians. He also clashed with the soldiers who questioned these decisions and liquidated them (Atay Reference Atay2023, 91). Falih Rıfkı Atay stated that Cemal executed about 40 Arab nationalists without a consensus among the CUP leadership, and that he used execution and exile arbitrarily, leaving an open-ended question as to whether this policy of terror was really necessary (Atay Reference Atay2023, 49). While examining this issue, Ziya Şakir uses an ambiguous language regarding Cemal’s Syrian policy, “We do not answer whether it was necessary for the execution and exile of the most important people carried out by Cemal Pasha, we just continue to follow the course of events” (Ziya Şakir Reference Şakir2018c, 318). It is possible to see a similar ambiguous attitude in Birgen. Birgen stated that Arabs have been applying to Great Powers for autonomy since the Balkan Wars and added, “I do not think that the reasons that would justify violence would be ambiguous” (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 263). Although the necessity of a more intelligently planned Arabian policy is a common point of all writers, they do not completely oppose the policy of violence implemented by Cemal. In the words of Ziya Şakir, “Cemal was not entirely wrong in Syria, but choosing the heads to be severed better could have brought great benefits to the country” (Ziya Şakir Reference Şakir2018c, 653).

The dispatch of soldiers from Anatolia for the defense of this region has been a subject criticized by all writers without exception. Falih Rıfkı Atay’s main problematization of the issue was the flow of Anatolian resources to the region: “This energy that went into the air to plant the flag of a country that had not been built in Cairo was never used to make empty Anatolia a rich and prosperous homeland” (Atay Reference Atay2023, 128). He stated that Jerusalem was never truly Ottoman, and that the Ottomans could neither colonize nor nationalize the region (Atay Reference Atay2023, 42). According to Falih Rıfkı, the martyrs here are considered lost in the gamble the Ottomans played in this region. (Atay, Reference Atay2023, 110) Birgen also opposed the use of “tired children of Anatolia” to defend this place and argued that the region’s own people should be used in defense (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 262).

The question of whether a decentralization initiative in the region could prevent the process leading to the Arab revolt has also occupied the writers. Birgen thought that such a decentralized administration could improve things (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 262). However, according to Yalçın although it was imaginable for a strong central government with its prestige never damaged, in the Turkish case it was impossible because in his words “even the Turkish element was trying to tear each other apart. It will mean nothing other than tearing it apart with our own hands" (Yalçın Reference Yalçın2024, 61). Therefore, even if the autonomy that could be given to Arabia was the key to a possible solution for the authors evaluated in this article, the Ottoman state was not able to hold the state together while providing this autonomy.

The nuanced accounts of these writers highlight the tension between moral judgement and political loyalty in interpreting historical events. Although certain authors criticized Unionist policies like the Sarıkamış disaster, the activities of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization), and the suppression of dissent in Syria and Arabia, they often tempered their critiques with justifications rooted in the challenges of war. According to these writings in the 1930s, although the CUP had wrong practices during the War, the CUP’s intentions of trying to give Turkishness its rightful place and the CUP leadership’s reflexes of trying to protect the interests of the state should be enough to ignore these wrong practices.

The End of Union and Progress and the Escape of the Triumvirate

The Triumvirate, Enver, Cemal, and Talat, who ruled the Ottoman State in a dictatorial manner during the Second Constitutional Era, fled to Germany on a German ship after the end of the War. The details of this escape had been a subject widely examined in the articles discussed. The concept of ‘escape’ was an action that did not suit the leaders who represented the state and looked after its interests, despite their mistakes. In short, the secret departure of these leaders was a subject that the writers evaluated in this article could hardly digest. According to Birgen, the fact that people directed their anger towards these leaders at the end of the War and that the leaders were seen as scapegoats was a factor that legitimized their escape (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 537). Both the difficulty of being the recipient of this anger and the burden of being accountable to the occupying forces legitimized escape in Birgen’s eyes. In his words:

What would be the fate of a movement whose leaders fled? The CUP dissolved itself at its last congress on November 5, 1918, and two parties were established that claimed to be the heirs of the CUP: the Renewal Party (Teceddüt Fırkası) and the Ottoman Liberal People’s Party (Osmanlı Hürriyetperver Avam Fırkası) (Zürcher Reference Zürcher2010, 198). The Renewal Party, which was the heir of CUP in terms of inheriting the CUP’s assets, organizational networks, and real estate, was determining the direction of the national struggle to be formed in Anatolia with its 175-article party program (Zürcher Reference Zürcher2010, 200). Although they denied their ties with the CUP, these parties were closed in May 1919 by the order of the Istanbul government on the grounds that they were the direct successors of the CUP. (Altınkaş Reference Altınkaş2022, 149) Although the CUP seemed to have ended with the closure of these parties, as the authors mentioned, the unionist spirit formed the basis of the national struggle movement. According to Birgen, the unionist spirit continued in the national struggle but in a new form. Unionism was dissolving and taking on a new shape by entering a new mold (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 663). Ziya Şakir also agreed that Unionism should live in other forms. In his words;

Moving from this, Unionism should continue as another form in the national struggle movement. This new form should have assumed the old missions of the CUP. These missions, as Birgen described them, were the CUP’s greatest gifts to history: “To teach everyone the love of homeland and nationality and to make people taste the taste of sacrifice” (Birgen Reference Birgen2017, 678).