The previous chapters have shown that from the military reforms of Philip II onwards, an increasingly large number of the soldiers active in the royal armies can be conceived of as military wage labourers – men who hired out their labour power under conditions and at a price of their own choosing. This development was most expressly manifested during the Successor Wars, when military wage labour became the dominant form of military service. The growing institutionalization of this type of military service also led to an amelioration of the conditions of service, particularly in terms of remuneration. All this meant the hired soldiers were accorded a relatively high standard of living, in stark contrast to the ‘mercenary’ soldiers of the Archaic and Classical periods, who are thought to have led an uncertain, hand-to-mouth existence, or indeed to the contemporary soldiers serving in the armies of the poleis.
However, the mere existence of wages for service is not in itself indicative of a change in economic structure. Neither are the simple changes in the remuneration levels. For that to have been the case, the soldiers’ labour power ought to have been sold and acquired on a labour market. This chapter will explore the character and nature of the latter, and question whether it was present among military recruitment. Particular attention is given to the conditions for its emergence, and the possible (proxy) markers of its existence. As will be shown, hired soldiers in the royal armies engaged in collective bargaining to ameliorate their conditions of service, a practice which aided the development of market mechanisms within and across the armies – and forced various employers to compete for soldiers’ service. From the time of Alexander’s campaign onwards, an ‘internal labour market’ is shown by soldiers’ competition for career progression and accompanying benefits. The wars of the Successors, by contrast, gave rise to the right conditions for the development of an ‘external labour market’, which operated across the various armies, and was manifested through competition for soldiers’ service and consequent increases in the price of military labour.Footnote 1
5.1 The Concept of the Labour Market
In its most straightforward sense, the concept of the labour market refers to the process by which labour supply and labour demand are pulled together in contractual relations of employment.Footnote 2 As argued by Streeck, the employment relationship is the labour market’s central institution, while the voluntary nature of the wage labour relationship, constituted by the contract, signals the end of ‘feudal servitude’.Footnote 3 Voluntary enlistment in any given labour force, however, requires choice. Thus, the labour market requires ‘the presence of multiple employers who seek to attract wage labourers and enter into employment contracts with them’.Footnote 4 As with other markets, the market for labour exists in both physical and abstract form: the physical market refers to the place in which goods and services are offered for sale and bought; the abstract market, on the other hand, concerns the process that determines the price of goods or services on the basis of the laws of supply and demand.Footnote 5
In the polis, the physical market existed in the form of the agora.Footnote 6 For military labour power, too, physical markets can be recognized in our documented sources, as when in 323, a body of 8,000 men had gathered in search of military employers at Cape Taenarum, presumably at the major sanctuary of Poseidon there.Footnote 7 Physical and abstract markets are tightly connected, and, indeed, at times they overlap,Footnote 8 but it should be borne in mind that the presence of a physical market need not indicate the existence of an abstract market: some authority can fix prices, or these can be determined by social conventions. Thus, the presence of a physical labour market, whether institutionalized or an ad hoc phenomenon, is required for workers and employers to find each other, but its presence is not necessarily evidence for the existence of an abstract labour market, on which prices are set. To ascertain the level of market activity within an economy, we therefore need to find market mechanisms involved in the determination of price, rather than physically gathering to exchange goods.
The labour market is both similar to and fundamentally different from the markets for other commodities or services. Similarities exist in the nature of transactions, which are anonymous and geared towards profit. In other words, a purchaser will strive for a price as low as possible, whereas a seller desires a price as high as possible, without social customs interfering with these aims. The motivations behind a market transaction go beyond the mere acquisition or sale of a given good or commodity and are governed by the desire for profit.
Theoretically, markets for most commodities are self-regulating, meaning that buyers and suppliers automatically provide goods and services when required, at a price deemed acceptable by both parties, but with prices fluctuating in line with supply and demand.Footnote 9 The commodity of labour power, however, differs in so far as its supply is fixed by the available number of labourers and determined by extra-economic factors, such as the workers’ willingness to take on a particular form and terms of employment. While market mechanisms for other commodities can be observed in terms of production increasing in response to demand, for labour and other of the fictitious commodities, they can only be seen in fluctuations of price.Footnote 10 In the short term, the demand for labour power combined with workers’ bargaining power allows for rising wages, economic conditions permitting.Footnote 11 Thus, the development of the market for labour power should normally be indicated by an increase in the price of wages.
In theory, prices are set automatically in line with supply and demand, yet markets are rarely pure or stable enough for a price to be reached that way. The market for labour, in particular, will be constrained by a number of institutions that affect the price-setting mechanisms. In the modern world, these institutions, whether of a legal nature such as laws protecting workers’ positions, or informal considerations such as priorities beyond profit that play a part in the allocation of workers to employers, can affect the price of labour. In addition, the workers’ free status allows them to affect the price of their labour, most successfully through engaging in collective bargaining.Footnote 12 The collective effort by labourers, expressed most aggressively in a collective refusal to work, can influence the price of labour beyond the conditions of supply and demand. In the case of the ancient military, the motivations behind collective action can indicate the presence of profit-driven military service.
Labour markets can exist both internally and externally: the internal labour market refers to market mechanisms occurring within a given employment organization and is characterized by competition among workers for better jobs, and by the employer for the best workers. It is manifested in the presence of career progression based on skill, theoretically incentivized by higher pay, or gains.Footnote 13 External labour markets, by contrast, refer to market exchange of labour power across employment organizations and thus involve multiple employers who compete for the labour power of the same group of workers.Footnote 14 The internal labour market can therefore exist as soon as an organization makes use of free waged labourers who are willing to advance in their career and economically; the external labour market requires competition for those workers from other employers.
The discussion below is primarily concerned with the abstract market regulating the price of labour power in the military sphere. We have seen that an increasing number of soldiers in the royal armies enlisted voluntarily but in exchange for remuneration, and they should therefore be conceived of as free wage labourers. Here we will evaluate whether the sale of these soldiers’ labour power occurred on the market, first, by establishing soldiers’ ability and desire to influence the price of their labour, through an assessment of their motivations during instances of upheaval that can be characterized as collective bargaining. Subsequently, internal labour markets will be evaluated in relation to the availability of career progression for all, and the concomitant economic incentives.
5.2 The Miles Economicus?
Naturally, the influence of workers over their terms of service and rates of pay is a crucial ingredient for the development of a labour market. This section asks how far soldiers were indeed able to influence the price offered for their service, and whether they did so with economic motives in mind. It will be argued that instances of military upheaval, often characterized as mutinies, should be seen as instances of collective action, in which soldiers used their collective power, such as refusing to fight or march onwards, to gain improved conditions of service. Although the historiographical sources usually present such upheavals as politically inspired, economic motivations can also be detected. We shall see that, even in the army of Alexander, troops displayed a keen awareness of the collective leverage they could hold. The soldiers in the armies of the Successors and those of the early Hellenistic kingdoms were able to use this power on various occasions to gain improved terms of service, including pay, thereby inevitably pushing the price of military labour upwards.
5.2.1 Mutiny or Collective Action? Upheaval in the Army of Alexander
In the Anabasis, Xenophon describes how the Ten Thousand soldiers hired by Cyrus the Younger in 401 refused to continue the march unless the true purpose of the expedition was revealed to them. When it became known that they were indeed marching against the Great King, Cyrus attempted to appease them with (the promise of) higher pay. Given the difficult situation in which they found themselves – in hostile territory with no access to provisions – the soldiers agreed to continue the march eastwards.Footnote 15 Here, therefore, we see an instance in which an army realized the collective leverage it had over its employer: their position as hired troops allowed for at least the pretence of choice whether or not to continue their service; their employer, in turn, attempted to appease the men’s discontent through the offer of increased wages. The Classical precursor and parallel in the form of Athenian naval crews shows as much: sailors were offered higher wages when deemed more competent, and readily enlisted elsewhere when better prospects were offered.Footnote 16 Thus, while the Ten Thousand did not demand higher pay outright, their collective action led to a promised increase – this was a practice of which the Athenian naval crews seem to have been well aware. In both examples, the soldiers’ attitude was warranted by the fact that they were voluntary troops, and not subject to social or political coercion.
Under Alexander, such incidents occurred on a much larger scale, notably when the army collectively expressed its grievances in 326 at the Hyphasis river, in 324 at Opis, and in 323 at Babylon during the immediate aftermath of Alexander’s death.Footnote 17 Scholarship often characterizes these events in terms of indiscipline, with descriptions ranging from mutiny to military upheaval, yet the propriety of the term ‘mutiny’ can be questioned. Carney, for instance, prefers to see the army as ‘radicalized’, and characterizes the events as ‘quarrels that poisoned the relationship between the king/commander and his troops’.Footnote 18 More recently, Brice has likewise argued that the term ‘mutiny’ does not allow for subtlety of interpretation; instead, he advocates for a more varied terminology in order to allow for gradations of military indiscipline.Footnote 19 However, while critical of the terminology, both scholars continue to analyse these events as acts of insubordination, and operate from the view that soldiers are subject to their commander.
When taking the changing labour relations of Alexander’s army into account, these events can also be read as illustrative of the fact that the relationship between commander and soldier was acquiring an increasingly voluntary nature, and was dependent on negotiation rather than coercion. In considering whether these events constitute acts of military insubordination or in fact point towards the army’s realization of its collective leverage, both the soldiers’ concerns and the proposed solutions ought to be evaluated. These vary significantly across the source record, and a clear distinction can be observed between the so-called Vulgate Sources, reflecting the alleged views of the soldiers, and others.Footnote 20
At the Hyphasis river in 326, the soldiers refused to march further east. Initially unwilling to heed their concerns, Alexander eventually gave in to their demands and turned south.Footnote 21 In Arrian’s account of the negotiation, Alexander’s failed attempt to convince his men constituted a speech riddled with the rhetoric of glory and conquest.Footnote 22 By contrast, Diodorus presents a more pragmatic Alexander, attempting to appease his men through the promise of plunder and further subsidies for the soldiers’ families.Footnote 23 Roisman rightly argues that this was not a mutiny, and instead perceives the event as a power struggle.Footnote 24 However, given the nature of the soldiers’ discontent, and Alexander’s offer as described by Diodorus, this power struggle seems centred on the soldiers’ conditions of employment. In Roisman’s view, Alexander’s failed proposal reveals his fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of his army, which was not composed of ‘typical mercenaries’: exhausted by the campaign, the soldiers could not be enticed simply by the prospect of plunder.Footnote 25 Whether or not ‘typical mercenaries’ would immediately have jumped at this opportunity, the events at the Hyphasis show an army in distress: the offers made by Alexander were not enough, and the soldiers clearly prioritized their return home over additional riches. In this regard, this episode indeed represents a power struggle, between an employer trying to hold on to his workforce, and a group of soldiers ready to walk out on its general, or indeed king.
Similar observations can be made in relation to the dispute at Opis two years later, when the army once more expressed its discontent following the enlistment of local soldiers and the dismissal of veteran troops.Footnote 26 This time, Alexander did not yield, which might explain why scholarship more readily describes this event as a mutiny.Footnote 27 When looking at the reasons for the troops’ dissatisfaction, discrepancies in the various sources can once more be detected.Footnote 28 Diodorus, Plutarch, and Curtius all cite the arrival of the Epigonoi as the main source of discontent;Footnote 29 in Plutarch’s assessment the soldiers felt rejected, while Curtius focuses on the changing nature of Alexander’s monarchy. However, in the accounts provided by both Arrian and Justin, the point of departure for the soldiers’ grievances is the dismissal of the veterans;Footnote 30 Justin then specifies that the soldiers believed dismissal should be based on years of service, rather than age. Obviously, the two concerns are connected, since the arrival of new troops would have warranted the dismissal of more senior forces. However, as pointed out by Carney, the soldiers’ refusal to be dismissed is at odds with the desires expressed at the Hyphasis.Footnote 31 Here, the detail provided by Justin may be of help: if his account is reliable, the commotion at Opis once more stemmed from concerns regarding the conditions of service, in particular the length of time for which soldiers were expected to campaign. Considering the grievances expressed at the Hyphasis, it is tempting to see this as another instance in which the army acted collectively in reaction to proposed changes to the conditions of service.
The army likewise drew on its collective strength to have a say in the immediate aftermath of Alexander’s death.Footnote 32 Without an heir appointed, it fell to the generals to organize the Succession. Perdikkas, the highest-ranking official, proposed to await the birth of Alexander’s child with Rhoxane, in hopes that it would be a boy. Although Perdikkas had the support of the Companions and other high-ranking officials, the infantry, led by Meleager, opposed this decision, and championed the appointment of Alexander’s half-brother, Philip Arrhidaeus.Footnote 33 A violent confrontation ensued, and matters were eventually resolved by appointing both Arrhidaeus and the child, Alexander IV, as joint kings, with Perdikkas acting as regent. The demands were ostensibly political, yet Bosworth argues that the infantry’s support for Arrhidaeus stemmed from their desire to have a king in place as soon as possible, citing the soldiers’ fear of civil war as the motivator.Footnote 34 Yet it is the infantry that acts as the aggressor in the accounts provided by Curtius and Justin,Footnote 35 who both cite more pragmatic reasons for the soldiers’ wish for stability and for the coronation of their champion, such as their perceived entitlement to share in spoils acquired during the campaign.Footnote 36 This episode constitutes a political crisis, but confirms how soldiers could use their collective leverage.
Thus, by conceiving of the army’s structure and organization as a particular set of labour relations, struggles between king and army need not be seen as instances of insubordination. Instead, they may be viewed in light of changing labour relations – in this case, from enforced service with expected obedience to a freer form of military labour in which the soldiers had a say over the terms and conditions under which they served.Footnote 37 The soldiers’ understanding of their collective power, which in these instances was used for both political influence and (inadvertent) economic gain, paved the way for collective negotiation that actively sought the amelioration of conditions of service in later years.
5.2.2 Collective Action in the Armies of the Successors and Hellenistic Kings
Such collective action continues to be attested for later years. Although disputes between soldiers and commanders could take a violent turn in the initial years of Successor rule, negotiations gradually became more institutionalized, to the degree that they may be seen as instances of collective bargaining. Army discontent continues to be framed as political, but basic concerns regarding troops’ conditions of service can often be detected.
For instance, in 321, Triparadeisos was the scene of significant military unrest, resulting in Antipater’s narrow escape from death after his troops turned against him. In the brief account provided by Diodorus, the cause for this upheaval is attributed to Adea-Eurydice, Alexander’s half-sister, who, in her bid for power, stirred up the army against Antipater. In this version, a general assembly is called, and Antipater’s address is sufficient to restore calm to the ranks.Footnote 38 Arrian and Polyaenus, however, present a radically different picture.Footnote 39 In these accounts, the soldiers insisted on their outstanding wages, in a protest sparked by Antipater’s admission that he lacked the required funds.Footnote 40 Adea-Eurydice features in Arrian’s version of events, but is seen as capitalizing on the soldiers’ existing grievances, rather than as instigator.Footnote 41 Thus, in attributing the upheaval to Adea-Eurydice’s intervention, Diodorus connects the episode to wider political concerns regarding the succession and legitimacy of rule; in Arrian and Polyaenus, by contrast, the political argument does not feature, and the troops are merely interested in their pay.
The focus on politics can partially be explained by the vision of the troops as staunchly loyal to the Argead house.Footnote 42 This view is supported by the Successors’ practice of modelling themselves on Alexander.Footnote 43 While such deliberate cultivation of connections to the conqueror undoubtedly had an important role to play in the various Successors’ claims to legitimacy, such association in itself should not be taken as aimed at inspiring soldiers’ loyalty, nor should it be cited as an explanation for military allegiance to a given Successor. For instance, the aforementioned upheaval of 321 and the troops’ willing association with Adea-Eurydice has been explained in relation to her pedigree.Footnote 44 However, as we have seen, her presence in fact provided the troops with the option of a change of employer, and the motivations behind the backlash against Antipater were clearly economic in nature.
Similar reactions can be seen in the defection of Perdikkas’ men to Ptolemy in the same year.Footnote 45 Thus, Diodorus relates Ptolemy’s increase in personal power and additional support to his possession of Alexander’s corpse,Footnote 46 but the change of allegiance was clearly prompted by the troops’ exasperation with Perdikkas’ conduct of the campaign.Footnote 47 The army’s supposed loyalty to the Argead line was, therefore, only part of the reason for their decision on whom to support, and, perhaps, nothing more than a façade. Instead, fair conditions of service had an equally important role to play, and any alleged lack of loyalty ought therefore to be seen in light of the labour relations apparent.
The so-called revolts of 326/5 and 323, during which Greek soldiers who had been settled in Bactria let their discontent plainly be known, form a case in point.Footnote 48 While these episodes have long been described as revolts, they are ripe for reappraisal, and the events of 323 especially ought to be reassessed as disputes concerning the soldiers’ employment. Thus is the view of Iliakis,Footnote 49 who has shown that the first ‘revolt’ constituted an internal squabble among the settlers, while the second instance of upheaval occurred in response to changing terms of service, which the force sent by Perdikkas was meant to negotiate.Footnote 50 However, matters took a turn for the worse when the soldiers did not accept the new conditions. In Iliakis’ view, the ensuing slaughter of an alleged 23,000 Greek soldiers should be interpreted as purely pragmatic:Footnote 51 Perdikkas could not take the risk that they might enlist elsewhere.Footnote 52
Discontent with terms of service and remuneration lay at the heart of the upheaval at Triparadeisos in 321 and in Bactria and would come to feature among soldiers’ concerns in later years. However, in time, the violence that accompanied these episodes became uncharacteristic of negotiations between the Successors and their armies. Instead, the relationship between king and soldier, much like that between king and subject, was characterized by dialogue and negotiation.Footnote 53 An example that clearly illustrates this principle in action is Eumenes of Cardia’s ‘ghost council’, an assembly between king and soldier that was claimed to be overseen by the ghost of Alexander himself:Footnote 54
ἔφη γὰρ Ἀλέξανδρον αὐτῷ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους φανῆναι, καὶ δεῖξαί τινα σκηνὴν κατεσκευασμένην βασιλικῶς καὶ θρόνον ἐν αὐτῇ κείμενον: εἶτα εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐνταῦθα συνεδρεύουσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ χρηματίζουσιν αὐτὸς παρέσται καὶ συνεφάψεται βουλῆς τε πάσης καὶ πράξεως ἀρχομένοις ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, […] [4] καὶ τιθέντες οὕτω σκηνὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ θρόνον Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καταπεφημισμένον ἐκεῖ συνεπορεύοντο βουλευόμενοι περὶ τῶν μεγίστων.
For he said that Alexander had appeared to him in his sleep, and he had shown him a tent that was decorated in royal fashion with a throne standing in it. He had then said that if they held their councils and transacted their business there, he himself would be present and would assist them in every plan and enterprise which they undertook in his name […] [4] So they set up a royal tent and in it a throne dedicated to Alexander, and there they met to deliberate on matters of the highest importance.
Although Eumenes allegedly set up this council after a vision of Alexander had come to him, in reality he did so in response to the wavering support of his elite soldiers.Footnote 55 Deliberate invocation of Alexander might have aided Eumenes’ claim to legitimacy and the support of the Silver Shields especially, but, as Diodorus clarifies, their allegiance was won through Eumenes’ willingness to place himself on an equal footing with them during discussions between general and army.Footnote 56 Despite the superstitious inspiration and conscious invocation of the memory of Alexander, this council clearly served as an institutionalized space for deliberation and negotiation between the general and his men.
Indeed, the Successors’ willingness to engage in dialogue and negotiation regarding the soldiers’ remuneration and terms of service is attested on several occasions. Thus, during the march from Susa in 317, problems between Antigonus and his army are described as follows:
Τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν κακῶν καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς κακοπαθίας ἐν αἰτίαις εἶχε τὸν Ἀντίγονον, ὥστε φωνὰς προΐεσθαι δυσχερεῖς: ἐν ἡμέραις γὰρ τεσσαράκοντα τρισὶ μεγάλοις ἀτυχήμασι περιεπεπτώκεισαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ φιλανθρώπως ὁμιλήσας τοῖς στρατιώταις ὁ Ἀντίγονος καὶ κατασκευασάμενος δαψιλῆ χορηγίαν πάντων τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀνέλαβε τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς κακοπαθίας. [2] Πίθωνα δ᾽ ἐξαπέστειλε κελεύσας περιελθεῖν πᾶσαν τὴν Μηδίαν καὶ συνάγειν ὡς πλείστους ἱππεῖς τε καὶ πολεμιστὰς ἵππους, ἔτι δὲ ὑποζυγίων πλῆθος. [3] τῆς δὲ χώρας ταύτης ἀεὶ τετραπόδων γεμούσης ῥᾳδίως τὸ παραγγελθὲν συντελέσας ὁ Πίθων ἧκεν ἄγων ἱππεῖς μὲν δισχιλίους, ἵππους δὲ σὺν ταῖς κατασκευαῖς πλείους χιλίων, τῶν δ᾽ ὑποζυγίων τοσοῦτον ἀριθμὸν ὥστε δύνασθαι καθοπλίσαι πᾶν τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ προσέτι τάλαντα πεντακόσια τῶν βασιλικῶν χρημάτων. [4] ὁ δ᾽ Ἀντίγονος τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς εἰς τάξεις κατέστησε, τοὺς δ᾽ ἵππους τοῖς ἀπολωλεκόσι διαδοὺς καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὑποζυγίων διαχαρισάμενος ἀνεκτήσατο τὴν παρὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν εὔνοιαν.
But the army, due to protracted bad luck and excessive misery, became critical of Antigonus and spoke ill of him, because in forty days, they had suffered three great disasters. Nonetheless, Antigonus, by sociably mingling with the soldiers and by preparing a copious supply of all provisions, lifted the army from its misery. [2] He sent out Pithon, ordering him to cross all of Media to gather as many cavalry men and war horses as possible, on top of a swarm of pack animals. [3] That land is always filled with four-footers, so Pithon easily fulfilled his mandate, and came back with 2,000 cavalrymen, more than 1,000 horses with armour, a number of pack animals sufficient to supply the whole army, and additionally 500 talents from the royal treasury. [4] Antigonus organized the horsemen into contingents, and by giving the horses to those who had lost theirs and donating the bulk of the pack animals, he won back the goodwill of the soldiers.
According to this passage, the soldiers voiced their concerns and Antigonus responded by increasing the military workforce and by granting further provisions: the incentive that kept the soldiers in line and loyal was therefore economic. Similarly, when campaigning in Gaza, Antigonus offered the army the option to continue the march or to withdraw to Syria. The army opted for the latter course of action, and Antigonus obliged.Footnote 57 On one level, Antigonus can be seen offering his army a say in the military and strategic policy to be followed; however, more importantly, by asking whether the soldiers wanted to march on, Antigonus was also checking their willingness to extend the duration of their service. Sometimes such dialogue is framed as being of a purely political or military nature, but often it can also be interpreted as negotiation concerning the price for and conditions under which the soldiers’ military labour power was to be sold.
Such negotiations between employer and soldiers resurface under the Hellenistic kings. The best example to cite is, of course, the negotiation between Eumenes I and the soldiers stationed in the garrisons of Attaleia and Philetaireia, and the resulting inscribed record of the soldiers’ terms of service.Footnote 58 However, there are several views on the origin of this agreement,Footnote 59 and while most commentators agree that the preserved terms of service were the result of a dispute between Eumenes and his men, some debate exists about the precise nature of the dispute.Footnote 60 The majority of scholars believe that the soldiers had refused their service for four months, which is why the agreement specifically includes the promise that wages would be paid out for that period.Footnote 61 Chaniotis, on the other hand, observes that four months is, in fact, a standard period of time in decrees related to military wages, and should therefore not be seen as exceptional in any way; instead, he argues, the stipulation is in place to ensure the provision of wages for the following four months.Footnote 62
Whether the soldiers engaged in a fully fledged strike, or whether this agreement resulted from ordinary negotiation, remains a matter of interpretation. Although the inscribing on stone of these stipulations is not evidence of a strike, the conciliatory tone throughout the decree indicates that some grievance may have occurred.Footnote 63 The detailed (re)affirmation of the terms of service implies that employment conditions may have been the reason for upheaval, whichever form it took. Nonetheless, soldiers of various divisions rallied together, and mouthpieces were chosen by this collective;Footnote 64 individual oaths were subsequently sworn by Eumenes to these representatives, in addition to the soldiers more generally.Footnote 65 Crucially, the – presumably conscript – ‘unwaged soldiers’ also joined in the oath, and feature in strong contrast to the ‘waged troops’.Footnote 66 The army, supported by its commanders, therefore, acted collectively, thereby cutting across the boundaries traditionally determined by the nature of their service. It has been argued on the basis of this document that Eumenes was a very good employer,Footnote 67 but these soldiers’ insistence that it be inscribed, and copies be set up in four different locations,Footnote 68 perhaps intimates the exact opposite. Nonetheless, the conditions discussed in the decree, which range from the price of supplies to the level of wages and additional benefits, show concerns with remuneration and conditions of service, and reveal once more the willingness to take economic conditions into account.
In effect, soldiers in the royal armies increasingly made use of their collective bargaining power to have their demands met. These demands may have been partially politically motivated. However, for the commander the typical and effective resolution to the disputes was to offer financial rewards. Especially from the Successor Wars onwards, soldiers’ demands became explicitly financial. In this regard, the disputes discussed here indicate that the soldiers were able to contest the terms of their service, and did so out of economic considerations, rather than political allegiance.Footnote 69
5.3 The Internal Labour Market: Pay Grades and Career Progression
Voluntary enlistment, combined with an ability and desire to influence potential gains, naturally spurred the development of market mechanisms in determining the price of military labour. An internal labour market exists within a single employment organization and refers to the process by which employers seek out the best workers from among their labour pool.Footnote 70 In practice and theory, this means that higher-ranking, and normally more skilled positions receive higher remuneration, or else more advantageous conditions of employment. For these positions to be filled in accordance with the envisaged market mechanisms, they need to be open; that is to say, only the worker’s value, and not their background, should be of relevance to the appointment process. Within an army, the internal labour market can therefore be claimed to exist when career progression is open to all soldiers based on merit and skill instead of background, and when such progression is incentivized by increases in pay or better terms of service. The latter would be reflected in differing pay grades for different ranks.
One of the major innovations in the Macedonian army under Philip and Alexander was the opening of military service to all those who were willing by removing the legal and financial constraints that had traditionally been in place. The acceptance of all, furthermore, did not stop at enlistment; even positions of high command were no longer restricted to Macedonian nobility.Footnote 71 As stressed by Ellis, the Macedonian army therefore offered ambitious soldiers a scope for career progression.Footnote 72 The acceptance of non-Macedonians in commanding positions, even in the highest-ranking division of the Companions, is the best illustration of this practice. Sometimes, these non-Macedonian Companions still came from an elite background, as is the case for Stasanor from Cyprus, who likely was a member of the ruling house of Soli and was made a Companion in 332.Footnote 73
Yet more humble backgrounds do not appear to have impeded progress to the highest ranks: thus, Eumenes of Cardia, for instance, who came to the court of Philip at the age of nineteen, is said to have impressed the king enough to have been promoted rapidly to the rank of Companion, and ultimately became a Successor to be reckoned with.Footnote 74 Not much is known about Eumenes’ background, and while this does not preclude an elite background, the acceptance of figures such as Stasanor and Eumenes among the high-ranking divisions indicates that such positions were not necessarily reserved for members of the Macedonian elite.
The mechanisms of promotion as known for the army under Alexander shed further light on skill as the foremost determinant of career progression. In 331, Alexander instituted a military reform which allowed for the appointment of commanders because of merit rather than provenance.Footnote 75 The precise nature of these reforms and the origin of the divisions introduced are still much debated, but what matters here is that they form an instance in which individuals were being promoted on account of their skill set. Curtius describes the episode as follows:
Qui fortissimi iudicati essent singulis militum milibus praefuturi erant – chiliarchas vocabant – tunc primum in hunc numerum copiis distibutis; namque antea quingenariae cohortes fuerant nec fortitudini praemia cesserant.
Those who would be judged to be the bravest were each to command a contingent of 1,000 men – they called them chiliarchs – this being the first time that the troops were divided into that number; for before there had been divisions each comprising 500 men, and awards had not been granted for bravery.
In this passage, the soldiers gathered before Alexander, either to put their own case forward or to advocate that of a colleague. On this occasion, awards were made to eight men for exemplary service.Footnote 76 Some more detail on the careers of five of these men is known.Footnote 77 Atarrhias, who took first place, was (at this stage) of mature age but had already distinguished himself during the siege of Halicarnassus.Footnote 78 Later on, he is found in charge of the troops that carried out the arrest of Philotas at Phrada in 330,Footnote 79 and that same year argued for the execution of Alexander Lyncestes, who was under suspicion of Philip’s murder.Footnote 80 Antigenes, who came second, is not heard of again until the battle of Hydaspes, where he commanded an infantry division;Footnote 81 he was sent away from Opis in 324 with Craterus and the veterans.Footnote 82 Craterus, of course, never made it back to Macedonia but lingered in Cilicia, and would eventually play an instrumental role in the killing of Perdikkas.Footnote 83 Finally, Philotas, who came from Augaea in Chalcidice, and Hellanicus are likewise known to have fought in an exemplary manner at Halicarnassus.Footnote 84
Such promotion to a position of command was naturally associated with greater honour and status. Yet monetary incentives were also prompts to aspire to career progression. While evidence on pay grades in the army under Alexander – or, indeed, in other ancient armies – is thin on the ground, a passage from Arrian indicates that there certainly were institutionalized differences in pay according to rank:
δεκαδάρχην μὲν τῆς δεκάδος ἡγεῖσθαι Μακεδόνα καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ διμοιρίτην Μακεδόνα καὶ δεκαστάτηρον, οὕτως ὀνομαζόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς μισθοφορᾶς, ἥντινα μείονα μὲν τοῦ διμοιρίτου, πλείονα δὲ τῶν οὐκ ἐν τιμῇ στρατευομένων ἔφερεν …
A Macedonian ‘Commander of Ten’ led a group of ten men, and beside him a Macedonian ‘Double-Pay Man’, and a ‘Ten-Stater Man’, who was called such on account of his pay, which was less than that of the ‘Double-Pay Man’, but more than what the soldiers not serving in a position of honour received …
As discussed by Holt, it is impossible to infer anything from this passage about the actual level of wages received by each individual.Footnote 85 It does, however, indicate that military status and remuneration had become intertwined to the extent that the nomenclature of these commands was financial in nature. Extrapolating from this passage, it can furthermore be assumed that these differences in pay grades existed across the army. Career progression was therefore economically incentivized and made possible through improved performance.
Of course, not all soldiers in the sizeable armies of Philip and Alexander were hired, and the predominance of coerced military labour and some reliance on traditional models of recruitment and assignment of positions still limited the development of a fully-fledged internal labour market. During the wars of the Successors, however, political circumstances dictated the large-scale enlistment of free military labourers.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the sources on the Successor Wars offer less detail when it comes to the career progression of individuals. Nonetheless, the Successors’ methods of recruitment meant that military service remained open to all. When the background of an individual is unknown, it is difficult to say to what extent the current position attained was based on skill; however, when a soldier was not Macedonian, he was by definition not a member of the Macedonian elite. Non-Macedonians in positions of command are indeed attested in the Successor armies: Phoenix of Tenedos, for instance, served as a cavalry commander for Eumenes, while Athenagoras, a Milesian, was in charge of Ptolemy’s misthophoroi.Footnote 86 Similarly, Myrmidon, an Athenian, emerges as commander of a force of 10,000 Ptolemaic soldiers in Cyprus in 315.Footnote 87 It is possible that Phoenix had already served with Alexander, as many other high-ranking soldiers of the Successors had, but his absence from earlier sources suggests that, if he did, it was not in a position of note. He first appears in the sources as commander of ‘the foreign horse’ at the Battle of the Hellespont in 321 between Eumenes and Craterus.Footnote 88 He remained loyal to Eumenes after Triparadeisos, and when a certain Perdikkas defected with his men, Phoenix is found in charge of the mission to relocate and punish them. He executed the leaders but redistributed the common soldiers among his troops.Footnote 89 After Eumenes’ defeat, Phoenix was made a commander in Antigonus’ army, but defected twice.Footnote 90 Similarly, Athenagoras, a hired soldier from Miletus who climbed the ranks of the Ptolemaic army, was originally sent to Rhodes as a commander of a troop of 500 volunteer forces in 310, but was later appointed ‘commander of the Guard’.Footnote 91 Thus, skills-based career progression continued in the armies of the Successors.
The relative lack of evidence on individuals’ stable military career progression can, of course, be attributed to the tumultuous nature of the Successor Wars and the constantly changing allegiances. As noted, sometimes such changes in allegiance can be explained by political motivations. Eumenes, for instance, did not field Macedonians in the Battle of the Hellespont out of fear that they might defect at the sight of Craterus.Footnote 92 And yet decisions by soldiers to cast their lot in with a different employer were often based on economic considerations, and a desire for career progression, as shown in the case of one of Antigonus’ commanders, Alexander, who deserted in order to obtain a higher-ranking position in the army of Cassander:
ἃ δὴ πυθόμενος ὁ Κάσανδρος ἔπεμψε πρὸς αὐτὸν Πρεπέλαον, ἀξιῶν Ἀντιγόνου μὲν ἀποστῆναι, συμμαχεῖν δ᾽ αὐτῷ γνησίως. τοῦτο δ᾽ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος στρατηγίαν δώσειν ἔφησε πάσης Πελοποννήσου καὶ δυνάμεως ἀποδείξειν κύριον, [4] ἔτι δὲ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν τιμήσειν. ὁ δ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁρῶν αὑτῷ συγχωρούμενον οὗ χάριν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπολέμει πρὸς Κάσανδρον, συμμαχίαν ποιησάμενος ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγὸς Πελοποννήσου.
As soon as Cassander heard of this, he sent Prepelaüs to him (Alexander), expecting him to abandon Antigonus and to openly conclude an alliance with him. If he did this, he said he would give him the command of all the Peloponnesus, make him general of an army, [4] and honour him even more in line with his merits. Alexander, seeing that the benefits for which he had initially made war against Cassander were granted to him, entered the alliance and was appointed general of the Peloponnesus.
Diodorus explicitly states that Cassander offered Antigonus what he was trying to achieve through making war against him, namely a generalship. Cassander, furthermore, promised to honour his new general in accordance with his merits. It is not clear whether these honours were financial in nature, but, given the evidence for different pay gradations in the lower ranks, it seems valid to assume a financial incentive was involved. Similarly, Ptolemy, in an attempt to win soldiers to his side during the war against Antigonus in 306, offered commanders a bonus of 1 talent, and 10 minas to ordinary soldiers.Footnote 93 While the latter example records a one-off offer, there is no reason to doubt that it reflected the difference in pay grades as they had existed under Alexander.
The evidence during the later Hellenistic kingdoms is less clear, but the persistence of the labour relations that had developed during the Successor Wars, especially among the various troops who enlisted voluntarily, should have ensured the continuation of internal labour market mechanisms. The agreement between Eumenes I and his soldiers certainly mentions a decorated division referred to as hoi leukinoi (οἱ λεύκινοι), the poplar men’, who were assured of their rations and the retention of their crown.Footnote 94
Soldiers who enlisted in the armies of Philip and Alexander, those of the Successors, and later of the Hellenistic kings clearly need not have been stuck in the same position throughout their career. The documentary record provides good examples of military promotions based on merit; individuals of humble or unknown background holding positions of command can be seen as the products of that system. Alongside increased status, such promotions came with boosted remuneration. That economic incentives were effective can be seen from concerns by the wider body of soldiers regarding their remuneration and terms of service, and their apparent willingness to advance economically. In this regard, the royal armies should indeed be recognized as vehicles of social mobility, in which those who were considered deserving could advance in both military and economic status. At the same time, this system of reward for improvement was core to the rapid military advancements of the period.
5.4 External Labour Markets: Supply, Demand, and the Price of Labour
As outlined above, while internal labour markets function within a single employment organization, external labour markets operate across different employers, with each seeking to acquire labour power from the same pool of labourers. Hence, on a very schematic level, they can be conceived of as a form of auction, with sellers and purchasers of a labour power convening, and the price being set by supply and demand. Changes in the price of labour power should therefore be seen as indicative of the existence of a market mechanism in determining the price.
Within the military context, external labour markets (can) emerge when various commanders compete over the same pool of military labourers. The traditional nature of military recruitment in the Classical Greek world meant that the conditions for the emergence of a military labour market were difficult to achieve; first, because military service predominantly took the form of ‘coerced’ labour, enforced via citizenship, and employers were not required to remunerate service or compete for manpower; and, second, because the so-called ‘mercenaries’, who served freely in exchange for remuneration from the Archaic period onwards, not only did so in small numbers, but also for a limited number of employers. These employers, such as the Sicilian tyrants or the Phokians during the Third Sacred War of 356–346, competed for manpower with the poleis, who had other, potentially more powerful incentives than money to offer to their citizens. Furthermore, both geographically and chronologically, potential employers did not always align. Even during the campaign of Alexander, when soldiers technically had the option of enlisting in the Achaemenid army, only those already in the Near East did so.Footnote 95
The picture changes dramatically, however, with the wars of the Successors. During these wars, powerful competitors, many of whom were appointed kings, as well as a slew of less prominent individuals with similar ambitions, manned their armies almost exclusively with hired troops. Conflict was chiefly concentrated in the Aegean and in Western Asia Minor, while forces recruited by these armies were usually veterans of Alexander, or fresh recruits from Greece: employers therefore vied for the same sources of manpower.
So, what evidence can be drawn on to prove this postulated external military labour market? Except for a small number of conscript troops, the soldiers who manned the armies of the Successors can be said to have done so in the guise of free military labourers: they enlisted with an employer of their own choosing and received remuneration in return. If they changed their minds, they were able to leave. As seen, terms of service indicate that such mobility – of individuals or groups of soldiers – was in any case ensured at the end of soldiers’ service. The continued freedom of enlistment for such men gave them ample leverage in negotiations, and they appear to have readily used this leverage to improve their terms. The voluntary nature of service in the age of the Successors also meant that soldiers had to be enticed to enlist and convinced to remain; financial incentives seem fundamental to both the enlistment and the retention of men.
Both employers and soldiers were aware of this new situation, and offered and responded to improved conditions of service. As we have seen, Eumenes of Cardia’s recruitment of additional forces after having been granted access to the treasury at Cyinda in 318,Footnote 96 as reported by Diodorus, is a telling example: a full 12,000 men are said to have enlisted, and, according to Diodorus, it was the rate of pay offered that tempted them.Footnote 97 Given such response to financial rather than moral incentives, any other Successor in need of troops would therefore have to match, or indeed go beyond, the rates offered by Eumenes.
For the Successors, the offer of higher wages not only became an important method of recruiting additional forces, but also a valuable weapon. It was in fact used to tempt soldiers away from competitors. For instance, the troops who deserted Perdikkas during the disastrous Egyptian campaign in 321 received supplies and other ‘needful things’ from Ptolemy.Footnote 98 In 302, almost 3,000 of Lysimachus’ men went over to Antigonus, who paid the wages still owed to them by Lysimachus, and ‘honoured them with gifts’.Footnote 99 Eumenes, similarly, encouraged Antigonus’ cavalry commander Athenagoras to join him with a bribe.Footnote 100
While in these instances the soldiers are merely rewarded and sustained by their new employer, more clear-cut examples indicate that an active policy of tempting soldiers away from their employers could be adopted. And so, in 316, Antigonus offered the Macedonian soldiers in Eumenes’ army either a grant of land, the promise of a return home with honours and gifts, or ‘appropriate’ posts in his own army.Footnote 101 A year later, when Antigonus was pursuing Eumenes, the latter reportedly persuaded some of Antigonus’ men to change sides, ‘convincing them with money’.Footnote 102 Ptolemy, too, pursued such methods:
Πτολεμαῖος δὲ προκατειληφὼς τοὺς εὐκαιροτάτους τόπους ἀσφαλέσι φυλακαῖς ἀπέστειλέν τινας ἐν τοῖς κοντωτοῖς, παρακελευσάμενος προσπλεῖν πλησίον τῆς ἐκβάσεως καὶ κηρύττειν ὅτι δώσει τοῖς μεταβαλομένοις ἀπ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν ἑκάστοις δύο μνᾶς, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις τάλαντον. [2] γενομένων οὖν τῶν κηρυγμάτων τοιούτων ἐνέπεσέ τις ὁρμὴ πρὸς μετάθεσιν τοῖς μετ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου μισθοφόροις, ἐν οἷς καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων πλείους προθύμους εἶναι συνέβαινε δι᾽ αἰτίας τινὰς εἰς τὸ μεταβολῆς ἐπιθυμεῖν.
Ptolemy, who had already occupied the most strategic places with secure garrisons, sent some men in punts, ordering them to move close to the landing place and to announce that he would pay those who would change sides from Antigonus: two minas to each of the regular soldiers, and a talent to those in a position of command. [2] When this had been announced, a desire to switch sides befell the paid soldiers of Antigonus, and it happened that even many of the commanders among these were eager, for one reason or another, to desire a change.
Diodorus frames such instances in terms of desertion and bribery.Footnote 103 However, the status of the soldiers as free military labourers in pursuit of profit also allows us to read these movements as instances of collective bargaining, in so far as their threat of changing sides forced improvement in the terms of service. Explicit mentions of monetary incentives, furthermore, indicate that instances in which Diodorus refers to gifts, or even rather vague mentions of ‘promises’, can be read in the same light.
Desertion was normally a punishable offence. Some of the soldiers who went over to Ptolemy after he made his offer were captured by Antigonus and tortured.Footnote 104 Nonetheless, leniency was at times shown: for example, when Eumenes’ soldiers had deserted, they were pursued by Phoenix, who executed only the generals, showing clemency to the regular soldiers who re-enlisted.Footnote 105 Antigonus’ actions are said to have been motivated by a desire to set an example, and Phoenix may have spared the soldiers out of pure pragmatism in order to retain numbers. Yet the events surrounding the potential desertion of Athenagoras, Ptolemy’s commander stationed at Rhodes, reveal that generous wages and conditions of service ultimately inspired the most loyalty. Athenagoras, it is reported, received an offer from Demetrius, and pretended to go along with his wishes. At the same time, he disclosed this offer to his superiors. The latter awarded him a crown, as well as a bonus of 5 talents, allegedly ‘in order to inspire goodwill towards the people (of Rhodes) from the other men who were paid soldiers and foreigners’.Footnote 106 These events, qualified as instances of desertion by Diodorus, and at times harshly punished by employers, surely indicate a shift in attitude to military service: soldiers now responded to financial incentives, which employers readily offered. In Rhodes, Athenagoras was aware of this development, and played off two employers against each other.
Such mechanisms are also reflected in the – admittedly sparse – evidence for the level of soldiers’ wages. The literary sources report military expenditure on a vast scale, and this is matched in the Successors’ individual large-scale minting efforts.Footnote 107 These expenses ought not only to be attributed to the increase in the size of armies but also, undoubtedly, to the apparent increase in the price of military labour. The practice of upping the price, recorded most clearly in Eumenes’ recruitment of troops in 318, would have had a knock-on effect, since all other employers had to at least match that price, if not offer more, to recruit sufficient men. The offers made to soldiers to tempt them to leave their current employers, indeed, suggest that the price of military labour became extremely inflated.Footnote 108 The Successors could meet this inflated cost given their ability to draw on the wealth of the former Achaemenid Empire, or further exploitation of conquered land, which translated into their significant minting efforts.Footnote 109
While the available evidence does not allow us to see detailed fluctuations in the price of military labour power in individual Successor armies, comparison with the wages offered to citizen militias reveals that the prices offered by the Successors had increased significantly. An infantryman in the service of Antigonus, for instance, came at the high rate of 20 Attic drachmas a day; in contrast, a third-century soldier on garrison duty in the civic armies of the poleis of Teos and Kyrbissos received 1 drachma a day, and his commander 4.Footnote 110 Similarly, early second-century alliances on Crete indicate that these prices did not change much: the alliance between Hierapytna and Crete stipulates the provision of 2 drachmas a day for a commander and 9 Rhodian obols for a common soldier;Footnote 111 that between Crete and Olous, on the other hand, specifies the provision of 2 Olountian drachmas for a commander, and 3 Rhodian obols.Footnote 112 Even if the attested wages of citizen soldiers only covered rations or other expenses incurred while in service, the difference is vast. Soldiers in the civic armies, however, did not serve voluntarily and had no negotiating power; competition for their service did not exist if the soldiers wanted to stay in their polis community. It can therefore be argued that the high wages awarded by the Successors were the inevitable result of the development of a labour market, in which diverse employers competed over the service of the same group of soldiers, leading to an escalation of the price of their labour.
This chapter set out to question whether military labour was acquired on a labour market, the presence of which is indicated by workers’ ability to influence the price at which their labour is sold, by competition for career progression and accompanying benefits, and by competition between employers for the workers. The analysis of events that are usually seen as mutinies as instances of soldiers’ collective action has shown that soldiers had the ability and desire to influence the conditions under which they served. Although not always explicitly stated, motivations were often of an economic nature, and can thus be taken as indicative of profit-driven behaviour.
The existence of the internal labour market has been assessed in terms of the availability of career progression because of merit and of whether this was accompanied by monetary incentives. The nature of the labour relations indeed gave rise to such internal labour market mechanisms, and in this regard, the armies can be seen as vehicles of social mobility. Finally, we can stress how an external labour market arose during the wars of the Successors, when ongoing conflict and competition between kings as employers led to increasingly high military wages, thereby driving the price of military labour upwards, and ultimately impacting and indeed influencing the economic structure of the world through which these armies of wage labouring soldiers roamed.
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