1. Introduction
As the global climate crisis progresses, the role of agriculture in driving environmental degradation is increasingly recognized. Historically, climate criticism has often focused on highly polluting industries, such as the fossil fuel or transport sectors. However, popular attention has been drawn to the role of agriculture, and particularly livestock, in driving global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,Footnote 1 with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reporting that food emissions contribute between 21% and 37% of total global GHG emissions.Footnote 2 Moreover, agriculture has been cited as a leading driver in ecosystem degradation in forest settings,Footnote 3 water sources,Footnote 4 and beyond.
The European Union's (EU) agricultural sector is no exception, despite the EU's reputation for general leadership in international climate governance.Footnote 5 One report suggests that agriculture is responsible for 10.3% of the EU's GHG emissions, with nearly 70% of those emissions coming from the livestock sector.Footnote 6 These numbers relate only to ‘direct’ emissions, not indirect emissions such as those related to the impact of imported animal foodstuff.Footnote 7 It is reported that about 70% of all the livestock feed protein used in the EU is imported, and only 1.8% of domestic arable land is dedicated to its domestic production.Footnote 8 These agricultural imports, such as soybean for EU livestock feed, cause deforestation impacts globally.Footnote 9 Overall, a significant amount of the emissions produced from deforestation and land use and land-use change (LULUCF) stemming from the EU's agricultural sector are produced beyond EU borders. While specific data on the global climate impact of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is not easily quantifiable, Cuypers and co-authors suggest that for the period from 1990 to 2008, the EU-27 imported almost 36% of all deforestation impacts embodied in crop and livestock products traded between regions.Footnote 10
Despite this significant impact, even beyond EU borders the EU agricultural sector has arguably lagged in its agri-climate governance.Footnote 11 Moreover, legal scholarship on the development of the EU livestock-specific climate governance has been surprisingly sparse.Footnote 12 This article intends to fill this gap, providing a commentary on the development of this agri-climate governance to date, and the extent to which recent developments mark a turning point in the EU approach to agricultural emissions. Because of the predominant impact (though at times, contested)Footnote 13 of livestock production on agricultural emissionsFootnote 14 and disproportionate support historically offered to livestock farming in the EU,Footnote 15 the livestock sector will be used as an example to demonstrate the development of the EU approach over time to governing the climate impacts of its agricultural sector.
This article also provides a case study of one approach to sustainable food systems transformation in rapidly developing and developing regions after their respective ‘livestock revolutions’ (where meat consumption increases following growth in average household incomes and a growing middle classFootnote 16).Footnote 17 Some reports suggest that meat consumption is expected to increase by up to 60% by 2050 from a 2010 baseline.Footnote 18 Despite this, climate solutions promoted for the livestock sector are often predominantly technical,Footnote 19 focusing on the climate efficiency of developing country livestock production rather than taking a full food system approach, which also recognizes demand-side drivers of livestock consumption that are relevant in tackling the path dependency of historical meat production.Footnote 20 Increasingly, scientific studies report a need for these demand-side strategies, such as dietary change, to be introduced in addition to technical solutions to achieve the necessary mitigation levels for the global agricultural sector.Footnote 21 EU law and policy in this area can provide a case study from which other ‘post-livestock revolution’ agricultural sectors can take positive and negative lessons, in a similar vein to other global learning experiences from EU climate innovation in the past, such as emissions trading schemes.Footnote 22 This is particularly important against identified structural difficulties in reducing emissions from the agri-food sector.Footnote 23
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the bases for the EU climate mandate and responsibility for its livestock sector, making reference to both endogenous and exogenous factors driving action for the sector. Section 3 maps the gradual greening evolution in EU agri-climate governance, making specific reference to reforms of the CAPFootnote 24 over time, and newer developments such as the Farm to Fork StrategyFootnote 25 and the EU's new Forest and Ecosystem Risk Commodities (FERCs) Due Diligence Regulation. Section 4 will then benchmark these evolutions against general global efforts in the area, making reference to submitted national climate plans as required by the 2015 Paris Agreement,Footnote 26 in addition to international climate negotiations. Section 5 concludes by summarizing key arguments made and placing the relevance of EU efforts in agri-climate governance in the global food system's landscape for climate change mitigation, and expressing words of caution on the future of EU livestock governance.
2. Establishing the Basis for EU Agri-Climate Action
Before benchmarking and mapping the development of the EU's approach to livestock emissions to date, it is necessary to establish the basis for its mandate to undertake agri-climate governance generally, and any responsibility to enhance the ambition or scope of these efforts, both internally and externally. For the purpose of this article, these bases will be categorized into (i) endogenous bases, and (ii) exogenous bases.
Endogenous bases for EU agri-climate action are first identified in references to core EU legal provisions mandating climate action, including the agricultural sector. Beyond this, EU Member State (MS) preferences to address the climate crisis will also be discussed to highlight the range of endogenous drivers for agri-climate action in the EU. In terms of exogenous bases, international climate obligations and principles will be discussed, including the Paris Agreement and key burden-sharing principles such as the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances (CBDR-RC). Establishing an exact scientific proportioning of the EU's responsibility to reduce its livestock emissions is not the goal of this article.
2.1. Endogenous Bases for EU Agri-Climate Governance
Generally, the EU has a strong internal mandate to address climate change. Following the enactment of the 1986 Single European Act,Footnote 27 common environmental policy was placed within the core competencies of the EU (at the time called the European Community (EC)), with the aims of preserving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, and ensuring rational use of natural resources.Footnote 28 Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)Footnote 29 also required the pursuit of Union measures at the international level to address regional or worldwide environmental problems, in particular combating climate change.Footnote 30 Since then, the EU has aimed to be a ‘leader’ in international climate politics,Footnote 31 with increasing creation and mainstreaming of climate policies over the years.
The EU was the first major economy to submit its national climate plan under the Paris Agreement, and its submission was seen to be one of the most ambitious of all developed country parties.Footnote 32 The EU was on track to meet its 2020 target of a 20% reduction in GHG emissions from 1990 levels, and further commitments have been made as part of the recent European Green Deal (EGD).Footnote 33 Under the EGD, the EU plans to be the first climate-neutral region by 2050, and foresees reducing emissions by at least 55% from 1990 levels, enacting a series of climate action initiatives, including a European Climate Law (to enshrine the 2050 neutrality goal),Footnote 34 a European Climate Pact (to engage society in climate action),Footnote 35 and a 2030 Climate Target Plan (to enshrine the EGD reduction goals).Footnote 36
The EU's current main climate framework for 2030 revolves around three main instruments, some of which are directly relevant for agricultural emissions. Firstly, the 2003 Emissions Trading System (ETS) DirectiveFootnote 37 has created a mandatory cap-and-trade system for prescribed industries in the EU, including the power sector, heavy industry, and domestic aviation (though, notably, excluding the agricultural sector).Footnote 38 The Directive limits emissions by setting EU-wide limits (currently in its 4th Phase, which aligns with the EGD targetsFootnote 39), and companies or ‘installations’ can buy or receive emissions allowances depending on the level of their emissions. The Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR)Footnote 40 is a key part of this climate framework, regulating emissions from sectors not covered by the ETS Directive or from the LULUCF Regulation,Footnote 41 this time including the agricultural sector. Different Annual Emissions Allocations exist for MS depending on their national circumstances, but they all aspire towards overall EU climate goals, including the targets of the EGD.Footnote 42 Lastly, the LULUCF Regulation creates a ‘no debit’ rule for forests, where MS must ensure that emissions from LULUCF are ‘entirely compensated’ by an equivalent removal of carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere from some form of action in the sector.Footnote 43 National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) and national Long Term Strategies (nLTS) are created by MS in line with these policies, as mandated under the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action Regulation.Footnote 44 From this legislative framework, a comprehensive internal mandate for climate action is formed at both EU and MS levels. However, as mentioned, certain components, such as the ETS, exclude emissions from the agricultural sector, such as those from livestock production. As a result, it is necessary to delineate the relevant provisions for climate action in broader EU agricultural policy, namely the CAP.Footnote 45
The CAP was first created after the Second World War to prevent future food shortages and instances of hunger and starvation primarily through price support (with financial support still forming a central part of the CAP today).Footnote 46 In the current TFEU provisions outlining the CAPFootnote 47 there are no specific references to balancing agriculture with broader environmental goals, such as climate change.Footnote 48 The CAP has undergone significant reform over the years, particularly with the 1992 MacSharry reforms, following international recognition of the worldwide trade-distorting impacts of productivistFootnote 49 agricultural policies in the EU on global agricultural commodity prices through its internal minimum price guarantees for farmers.Footnote 50 The most trade-distorting internal supports were gradually reduced through further reform, with increased ‘greening’ of the CAP from 2003 and further reforms in 2013, again seeking to increase its sustainability focus, including addressing climate change.Footnote 51 Nevertheless, the EU agricultural policy continues to be characterized by ‘industrially driven and expansionist agriculture with state support’.Footnote 52
The 2014–20 CAP implementation period was similarly criticized for under-delivering on the EU Commission's arguably ‘post-productivist’Footnote 53 climate aspirations for reform.Footnote 54 The newest CAP reform (with implementation ongoing from January 2023) again sought to increase ‘green ambition’, introducing new architecture and measures, which include obliging each EU MS to demonstrate non-retrogression in its environment and climate action in its national CAP strategic plan.Footnote 55 The intention has been to link measures under the CAP with achieving the EGDFootnote 56 and the new Farm to Fork Strategy.Footnote 57 Most notably, 40% of the new CAP budget must be climate-relevant.Footnote 58 Some concerns have already been reported in a Staff Working Document surrounding the actual climate benefits the new CAP will entail,Footnote 59 in addition to the Commission raising concerns about published draft CAP strategic plans ignoring methane emissions from livestock.Footnote 60 Notwithstanding these reservations, recent reforms of the CAP indicate an increased basis and motivation for addressing climate change and livestock in its agricultural policies, particularly given its productivist history.
A final component of the endogenous basis for EU agri-climate governance is individual MS motivation. The Eurobarometer Special Report on Climate Change in 2021 reported that 93% of EU citizens see climate change as a ‘serious problem’, with 78% seeing it as a ‘very serious problem’.Footnote 61 90% of respondents and at least three quarters from each MS agreed that ‘[GHG] emissions should be reduced to a minimum while offsetting the remaining emissions, in order to make the EU economy climate-neutral by 2050’.Footnote 62 Moreover, 57% of respondents said that the EU is responsible for tackling climate change within the region.Footnote 63
With regard to livestock emissions, 31% of respondents reported buying and eating less meat to help in contributing to action against climate change.Footnote 64 However, national attitudes to addressing livestock emissions are more varied. The Commission suggests that:
[most proposed MS CAP strategic plans] ignore the importance of actions to reduce methane emissions from livestock and those with high intensive livestock production do not tackle these emissions at all, which is also reflected in the fact that only 9 out of 28 [plans] set the relevant climate targets for the livestock sector.Footnote 65
By comparison, when the Amazon fires broke out in 2019 (attributed to slash and burn deforestation techniquesFootnote 66), MS were more forthright in their stance against the Brazilian government and its trade relationship with the EU. For example, Austria, France, and Ireland threatened to block the EU-Mercosur AgreementFootnote 67 in the Council of Ministers on account of of Brazil's backstepping in forest protection, particularly with regard to the high-profile fire outbreaks.Footnote 68 These instances highlight that MS motivations are also a relevant factor in considering the internal, endogenous drivers of EU action on livestock emissions. Further exogenous legal bases for EU agri-climate action are discussed in the section below.
2.2. Exogenous Bases for EU Agri-Climate Governance
External factors also provide a basis for the EU's responsibility to address agricultural emissions, including those from livestock. These include (i) international climate change law obligations, and (ii) the EU's moral responsibility to address climate change.
The EU's international climate change obligations
The EU is party to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)Footnote 69 and its additional instruments, including the 2015 Paris Agreement.Footnote 70 The core aim of the Paris Agreement is:
[to hold] the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursu[e] efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.Footnote 71
To meet this target, parties aim to peak global emissions by 2050 (Article 4(1)).Footnote 72 Country signatories self-determine their own nationally determined contributions (NDCs) in the light of the Agreement's legal framework.Footnote 73
Whilst agricultural emissions mitigation is not explicitly mandated by the Paris Agreement,Footnote 74 there is reference to vulnerability of food production and agriculture in the UNFCCC.Footnote 75 While the content of each NDC is self-determined and designed to have some in-built flexibilities for parties,Footnote 76 there is precedent for parties, such as the EU, to include the emissions inventory of their agricultural sector in their NDC.Footnote 77 Moreover, the agricultural sector has increasingly been considered in conference of the parties (COP) decisions, most recently in the Sharm El Sheikh Joint work on the implementation of climate action on agriculture and food securityFootnote 78 at COP-27 in Egypt, as well as its predecessor, the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture.Footnote 79 As a result, it can be said that the EU has a legal obligation to consider the viability of food production in its national climate plans, with increasing likelihood of soft or hard legal obligations to address its livestock emissions following subsequent COP negotiation rounds.
The EU's moral responsibility for agri-climate governance
Beyond this, some see a moral duty for the EU to reduce its global environmental footprint. For example, Durán and Scott derive a moral responsibility for the importation by the EU of forest and ecosystem risk commodities (such as livestock-related commodities, like soy for feed), outlining EU ‘complicity’ in global forest degradation if it remains inactive in addressing the environmental impact of its agricultural consumption.Footnote 80 Similarly, Scott has derived both ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ climate responsibilities for the EU, utilizing Caney's work.Footnote 81 First-order responsibilities address the EU's ‘fair-share’ of the burden in addressing climate change, given their historical and current contribution to global climate impacts.Footnote 82 Second-order responsibilities for the EU go beyond this initial ‘fair-share’, utilizing their relative global market power to induce other actors to comply with their first-order responsibilities and prevent the potential harm of these actors’ inaction.Footnote 83 I have argued elsewhere that the morality-based environmental law principle of CBDR-RC (also enshrined in Article 2(2) of the Paris Agreement) also justifies the EU's need to better govern livestock emissions.Footnote 84 However, the purpose of this section was not to outline these moral arguments in depth, but to flag up further rationales that support the general need for the EU to address the agri-climate impacts of its livestock sector through legal avenues. These moral arguments support the EU in addressing its domestic livestock production and complicity in agriculture-driven environmental degradation beyond its borders, such as deforestation of land for feedstock crops in South America.Footnote 85
3. The Evolution of EU Agri-Climate Governance
Having provided bases for EU-level law and policymaking on agri-climate issues, this section will outline the evolution of the EU's agri-climate law and policies and the extent to which the EU is currently addressing its climate responsibilities for this sector. It will do so by discussing the EU CAP and its reform, in addition to the EU's Farm to Fork Strategy. The EU's new Due Diligence Regulation will also be discussed to address EU complicity in agricultural-driven deforestation beyond its borders.Footnote 86
3.1. The CAP Reforms
As mentioned, since 1992 the CAP has increasingly been ‘greened’ and has attempted to address the environmental impact of EU agricultural production (and issues with overproduction stemming from its historical productivist model).Footnote 87 Following the Agenda 2000 reforms, CAP payments were provided in a Two Pillar format: one for direct income support for farmers (Pillar 1), and the second for voluntary rural development measures that were co-financed by MS (Pillar 2).Footnote 88
Following further reforms in 2003, direct farm payments were largely decoupled from production.Footnote 89 In 2013, reforms of direct income support to farmers became conditional on meeting compulsory ‘greening measures’,Footnote 90 such as measures relating to crop diversification requirements, ecological focus areas, and permanent grassland maintenance, in addition to cross-compliance rules, including statutory management requirements (SMR), such as complianceFootnote 91 with the 1991 Nitrates Directive.Footnote 92
None of these compulsory greening measures addressed the main driver of agricultural emissions in the EU: enteric fermentation (the digestive process of certain livestock that produces methane gas). Moreover, sizeable livestock farmer pay-outs existed under the CAP, including voluntary coupled support – or, in other words, payments that are linked to baselines of protection for the specific production of agricultural products.Footnote 93 Generally, these payments have gradually reduced in number as the CAP has been reformed. However, even after this further supposed ‘green’ reform in 2013, payments for animal products were still sizeable.Footnote 94 The impact of this support on levels of livestock production has been criticized, with one study in 2014 suggesting that the removal of this coupled support for the cattle sector would have reduced production in the beef sector by 2.5% and by 0.7% in the dairy sector.Footnote 95
Similarly, voluntary agri-environment-climate ‘rural development measures’Footnote 96 under Pillar 2, designed to support commitments beyond minimum mandatory CAP standards, were found to fall short in their climate ambition.Footnote 97 Rural development programmes that existed for livestock production frequently focused on improving animal welfare, or modernizing farms to improve efficiency, whereas programmes targeting reducing livestock emissions were minimal.Footnote 98 Moreover, there was no obligation for farmers to undertake rural development climate measures, and, in fact, it is reported that only 17% of funding taken up under these rural development programmes from 2014 to 2020 were for ‘agri-environment-climate’ measures, specifically.Footnote 99
Overall, it is perhaps unsurprising that reported emissions removals during this CAP implementation period were underwhelming.Footnote 100 Against a backdrop of post-War agricultural productivism in the EU, the minimal integration of climate concerns into the CAP was not sufficient in reversing the path dependency of EU support for emissions-intensive agricultural commodities, such as livestock. In fact, a 2017 study for the EU Agri-Committee reported that dairy farmers were dependent on CAP payments for about 70% of their income, while for beef farms this share was more than 100%.Footnote 101 Beyond the core provisions of the CAP, financial support was provided for the EU livestock sector on an ongoing basis to ensure its viability, including a number of exceptional aid packages in 2015 to 2016, which were largely implemented to insulate the EU dairy sector from global milk price drops.Footnote 102
While farmer livelihood protection is a core objective of the CAP,Footnote 103 the minimal climate improvements of previous CAP reforms arguably led to an increased prioritization of climate action in the most recent CAP reform negotiations.
As part of the most recent CAP reform, a ‘new Green Architecture’ for the CAP was introduced.Footnote 104 This new framework contains a number of elements intended to contribute towards better livestock emissions reduction in the EU. Firstly, a new ‘delivery mode’ for environmental commitments under the CAP began in 2023, with a greater shift towards ‘results-orientation’ than was previously the case under the CAP.Footnote 105 In CAP ‘Strategic Plans’ (CSPs), MS are required to plan and implement all chosen CAP interventions according to their national/regional needs and aligned to the nine CAP specific objectives. The first round of draft CSPs has now been published, and the Commission has sent observation letters on their contents where necessary.Footnote 106
A number of the new CAP specific objectives cover environmental and climate issues. These include, notably, ‘contribut[ing] to climate change mitigation and adaptation … as well as to promote sustainable energy’.Footnote 107 Additionally, a condition of the new CAP Strategic Planning approach is the requirement for MS to demonstrate a higher level of ambition for the environment and climate under the CAP 2021–27 period than is currently set.Footnote 108
A new Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (PMEF) was created to assess how the CSPs are contributing to the CAP general and specific objectives and the overall performance of the policy.Footnote 109 Under this PMEF, an annual review process takes place between the MS managing authority and the Commission. The Commission has to approve the CSP on the basis that the plan meets all EU requirements and is in line with the provisions of the relevant CAP regulations.Footnote 110 Under this process, managing authorities must also submit an annual performance report to the Commission on the implementation of their CSP.Footnote 111 A monitoring committee consisting of national stakeholders is also made responsible for MS implementation of CSPs, including the attainment of targets set out in their plans.Footnote 112 CAP objectives, including those related to the environment and climate, are also accompanied by a common output, result and impact indicators that are intended to be used to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the CSPs, including reductions in livestock emissions.Footnote 113
A key new feature of the new Green Architecture that is expected to be included in CSPs is the eco-scheme concept. This is a new opt-in instrument designed to reward farmers who choose to go ‘one step further’ in terms of environmental care and climate action – in other words, beyond the new enhanced conditionality requirements included in Annex 3 of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation.Footnote 114 Eco-schemes are voluntary in nature and do not replace these enhanced conditionality requirements or agri-environment-climate measures under Pillar 2 of the CAP.
Eco-schemes are fully financed by the EU (under Pillar 1) and therefore do not necessitate match funding from MS (unlike Pillar 2 rural development measures, which require national or regional co-financing).Footnote 115 To be supported by eco-schemes, agricultural practices should (i) cover activities related to climate, environment, animal welfare, and antimicrobial resistance; (ii) be defined on the basis of the needs and priorities identified at national/regional levels in their CSPs; and (iii) their level of ambition has to go beyond the requirements and obligations set by ‘new, enhanced conditionality’ to contribute towards reaching the EGD targets.Footnote 116
In a guidance document from the Commission about potential types of action or programme that could be funded as an eco-scheme, measures to mitigate emissions from enteric fermentation were included – the first explicit reference to the potential role of reducing emissions for enteric fermentation to achieve livestock emissions reductions in CAP documents.Footnote 117
However, as mentioned, some concerns have already been raised by the Commission with regard to the published draft CSPs. For example, variance has been noted across the draft reports and, still, the livestock sector appears to dominate the use of voluntary coupled support, as in previous CAP periods.Footnote 118 Most worryingly, the Commission highlights that the proposed plans largely ignore the importance of reducing methane emissions from livestock, despite the intended focus of the reform to address climate change.Footnote 119 These are only draft plans, and there is the opportunity (and, indeed, obligation) for MS to revise them in the light of the Commission's comments.Footnote 120 Despite the stated climate ambitions of the reform, historical path dependencies of past CAP periods characterized by protection of the livestock sector remain visible.Footnote 121
3.2. The Farm to Fork Strategy
The EU's Farm to Fork Strategy aims to make EU food systems ‘fair, healthy and environmentally friendly’.Footnote 122 The Strategy is a new integrated and comprehensive approach to EU food systems, covering broad areas of EU policy relevant to food systems, such as agricultural policy, environmental policy, and consumer protection.
The Strategy is in its early stages of implementation,Footnote 123 but some plans related to production or supply side improvements in livestock production have been articulated in the Strategy. For example, the Commission states it will:
facilitate the placing on the market of sustainable and innovative feed additives … [and] examine EU rules to reduce dependency on critical feed materials (e.g. soya grown on deforested land) by fostering EU-grown plant proteins as well as alternative feed materials such as insects, marine feed stocks (e.g. algae) and by-products from the bio-economy (e.g. fish waste).Footnote 124
These plans pick up on some of the shortcomings identified in analysis and critique of the previous CAP iteration, such as a lack of incentives to grow sustainable feedstock domestically.Footnote 125 A number of preliminary developments have been made in this respect, including the EU's first approval of a feed additive to reduce the methane emissions produced by cattle,Footnote 126 and the new Due Diligence RegulationFootnote 127 analyzed in Section 3.3 below.
Emissions reduction strategies under the Farm to Fork Strategy also focus on integrating public health concerns and the concept of ‘sustainable diets’ with emissions mitigation. For example, the Strategy references the role of ‘sustainable diets’ in achieving climate goals in the EU.Footnote 128 It highlights that the average intake of red meat in the EU exceeds recommendations, and consumption of healthy alternatives are below the level they should be.Footnote 129 Obesity rates in the EU are emphasized, and a more plant-based diet with less red and processed meat is highlighted as not only capable of reducing risks of life-threatening diseases (such as cardiovascular disease and cancer), but also having environmental benefits.Footnote 130
The Strategy suggests a number of pathways for achieving this sustainable and healthy diet synergy, including through the provision of clear information to make it easier for consumers to choose healthy and sustainable diets that will benefit health and quality of life.Footnote 131 The Commission will propose harmonized mandatory front-of-pack nutrition labelling,Footnote 132 and will consider proposing the extension of compulsory origin indications for certain products.Footnote 133 The Commission will also seek to harmonize voluntary green claims in the food sector and to create a sustainable labelling framework that covers the nutritional, climate, environmental, and social characteristics of food products.Footnote 134 Other measures relating to more sustainable public procurement, and reviewing the sustainability of EU school schemes,Footnote 135 are also provided for.Footnote 136 Lastly, the Commission proposes to use tax incentives to make food systems more sustainable and encourage consumers to choose sustainable and healthy diets.Footnote 137 So far, the European Parliament has voted in favour of enabling MS to introduce a 0% value added tax (VAT) rate for healthy and sustainable food, such as fruits and vegetables.Footnote 138 It also highlights that EU taxes should aim to ensure that the prices of different foods reflect their true costs, including environmental externalities such as GHG emissions.Footnote 139
While already facing some criticism and concern,Footnote 140 the Farm to Fork strategy provides details on the types of agri-environmental policy to be monitored in internal policymaking in the coming years to target the emissions impact of both livestock production and consumption in the EU. In addition to this package of measures, external policies are also being introduced to address the EU's responsibility for its forestry footprint for agriculture globally, for example, through the EU Due Diligence Regulation.Footnote 141
3.3. The EU Due Diligence Regulation
A new Regulation has been introduced in the EU mandating due diligence requirements for FERC traders placing these goods on the EU market.Footnote 142 The content of the Regulation has the potential to mitigate the EU's external forest footprint, as its scope includes soy for feedstock imported into the EU market, in addition to other FERCs, such as cattle.Footnote 143
Drawing inspirationFootnote 144 from the timber-focused Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Regulation,Footnote 145 the new Due Diligence Regulation requires all companies selling FERCs (including soy and beef) on the EU market to complete due diligence to demonstrate that these goods have not been illegally grown or harvested, or caused any forest degradation or deforestation.Footnote 146 Companies must complete varying levels of due diligence depending on the risk rating attached to different producer countries, based on deforestation data verified through satellite monitoring,Footnote 147 producer country legal frameworks, countries’ deforestation pledges, and bilateral agreements between the EU and third countries.Footnote 148 Existing certification or other third-party verified schemes can be used as a source of information in only the risk assessment procedure and cannot be used as a substitute for the operator's responsibility to conduct due diligence, with sanctions existing for companies that are found to be selling illegal or forest-degrading products.Footnote 149
As with other proposals and strategies outlined in this article, the success of the Regulation will depend on its implementation.Footnote 150 Nonetheless, it is encouraging that the regulatory gap surrounding agricultural imports under the CAP and the EU's broader agri-environmental regime has attempted to be addressed so directly by EU policymakers. Moreover, the EU's full responsibility for climate change is better addressed through this recognition and action being taken on forest-related emissions stemming from its agricultural consumption beyond its borders.
Having provided numerous examples of where the EU has sought to make its agricultural policies more climate-friendly, the following section benchmarks this agri-climate governance evolution – highlighting the disconnect between EU policies on paper and the practical reality of fundamentally restructuring EU food systems.
4. Benchmarking EU Agri-Climate Governance
Despite the inefficiencies noted above, the EU approach to addressing livestock emissions may be argued to be comparatively innovative with regard to (i) technical solutions, and (ii) taking a food system approach. The EU position will be benchmarked against that of other global actors by relying on existing studies, such as that from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),Footnote 151 while noting the methodological limitations of these studies.Footnote 152
4.1. Technical Solutions
Technical livestock solutions are measures to reduce the emissions intensity of production on the supply side, including altering feedstock composition to reduce emissions from enteric fermentation or using more efficient dual-utilization cattle breeds. For the purpose of this benchmarking exercise, looking to international-level commitments for the agricultural sector provides useful insight into the general level of livestock-focused climate solutions pledged at the global level.Footnote 153 The UNFCCC regime utilizes production-based emissions accounting,Footnote 154 meaning that the implementation of technical livestock solutions in a producer state could contribute to its climate change mitigation targets.
Previous analysis of submitted NDCs indicates that generally livestock-focused climate commitments are sparse, particularly from developed country parties to the UNFCCC.Footnote 155 In the first round of NDCs submitted after the Paris Agreement's entry into force, the FAO reports that 148 of the 165 Paris parties included agriculture in their mitigation contributionsFootnote 156 under their initial NDCs (71%, 88%, and 98% of developing countries, economies in transition, and developed countries, respectively).Footnote 157 Of the 69 NDCs that mentioned livestock, 19 highlighted concrete measures referring to ‘feed management’ (10 parties) and ‘breeding management’ (5 parties); while 15 parties referred to ‘manure management’.Footnote 158 The FAO states that 54% of parties did not expand beyond simply including agriculture in their economy-wide emissions target to create more targeted mitigation policies, such as those for national livestock sectors.Footnote 159 Moreover, no developed country party was reported to refer to livestock in their first NDC and none of the largest global agricultural emitters included agricultural sector-specific contributions in their first submitted pledges.Footnote 160
The coverage of the livestock sector in NDCs has arguably improved as awareness and political interest in addressing the impact of the livestock sector on the climate has increased. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) analyzed updated NDCs following a similar methodology to the FAO,Footnote 161 reporting that 63 updated NDCs have mitigation measures that explicitly consider livestock, a 133% increase from 27 on previous NDCs.Footnote 162 This increase is promising, though other areas of agri-environmental governance are still gaining more traction – despite the disproportionate impact of livestock on the production of GHG emissions. For example, the WWF reports that 101 updated NDCs include adaptation measures for agriculture – over 60% more than those that have mitigation measures that explicitly consider livestock in their NDCs.Footnote 163
With regard to technical livestock solutions, the EU has made promising developments compared with developed economies with similar productivist agricultural models. For example, the provision of measures relating to enteric fermentation in the Commission's guidance for creating eco-schemes in the new CAP implementation period demonstrates an avenue for the intensity of production of livestock emissions to be addressed.Footnote 164 Moreover, the EU Commission has linked the EU's overall methane strategy with the CAP and Farm to Fork.Footnote 165 The Commission states it will also encourage MS to include methane reduction schemes in their strategic plans for the CAP.Footnote 166 It has highlighted effective ways of reducing the intensity of emissions from enteric fermentation, such as improving the health and fertility of the herds, improving animal diets (mix of feed materials), using feed additives, and improving feeding techniques.Footnote 167 The methane strategy also exemplifies the Farm to Fork Strategy's ‘novel approaches to feeding’ as an avenue to reducing methane emissions, such as fostering EU-grown plant proteins as well as alternative feed materials such as insects, marine feedstocks (for example, algae), and by-products from the bio-economy (for example, fish waste).Footnote 168
These fledgling policies in the EU relating to technical livestock solutions are still under development and their impact is therefore not yet secured. Nevertheless, the evolution of existing EU agricultural policies (such as the CAP) in addition to newer developments in agri-climate governance (such as Farm to Fork) demonstrates the EU's ongoing drive to meet its technical climate responsibilities for the livestock sector – particularly against a historical backdrop of inaction for the sector highlighted in the FAO analysis of NDCs.
4.2. Food Systems Approach
The EU's ambition to address its climate responsibilities related to the livestock sector is particularly clear in its recognition of the need for a ‘food systems approach’ to tackling livestock emissions. A food systems approach refers to an approach that ‘analyses the relationships between the different parts of the food system and the outcomes of activities within the system in socio-economic and environmental/climate terms’.Footnote 169 The concept of a ‘food system’ has rapidly evolved away from simplistic consideration of producers and consumers. A newer and more ‘holistic’ concept of a food system is one that:
integrates all the elements (environment, people, inputs, processes, infrastructures, institutions, etc.) and activities that relate to the production, processing, distribution, preparation and consumption of food, and the output of these activities, including socio-economic and environmental outcomes.Footnote 170
In relation to the livestock sector, a food systems approach extends beyond technical solutions to livestock emissions (such as feed additives) to include broader socio-economic drivers of these emissions (such as diet or food waste).Footnote 171 In particular, this approach includes healthiness and sustainability, thereby promoting less resource-intensive (and more nutritious) consumption in the EU.Footnote 172
EU policies such as Farm to Fork or its new Due Diligence Regulation are particularly focused on the demand-side of EU agricultural consumption – whether that be related to diet or EU imports. The EU's Farm to Fork Strategy incorporates this food system approach, making reference to food sustainability labelling schemes, rethinking biases in CAP pay-out programmes for more resource-intensive dietary components, and reducing tax on healthy dietary components.Footnote 173 With regard to recognizing the role of EU consumption of agricultural goods in driving emissions from deforestation in third countries, the EU's new Due Diligence Regulation for FERCs begins to address the sustainability of EU agricultural supply chains and consumption of livestock goods, such as soy for feedstock.Footnote 174
This food systems approach to tackling sustainable diets in these ways is a particular aspect of EU agri-climate governance that benchmarks it as a more ambitious future global actor for livestock emissions mitigation. At COP-27, during the negotiation of the Sharm El Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security,Footnote 175 the EU pushed for a food systems approach to the Decision.Footnote 176 Carbon Brief noted that taking this ‘whole food systems approach’ was a key dividing element between countries that already have language around food systems in their domestic policies, such as the EU's Farm to Fork Strategy, against countries that were either unclear or reluctant to talk about aspects such as consumption and diets. This divisiveness was attributed to tensions around the implied reductions in meat consumption required from this approach, in addition to a ‘lack of clarity’ surrounding food systems language.Footnote 177 Some developing regions also viewed the inclusion of ‘whole food systems’ language as an implied curtailing of domestic agricultural expansion in the Decision's mandate.Footnote 178 In the end, the food systems approach language was deleted from the text.Footnote 179 However, the EU negotiating stance demonstrates its aspiration for global alignment with its own policies, such as Farm to Fork, that take a fuller food systems approach to tackling livestock emissions.
Beyond this, looking to NDCs and their inclusion of strategies such as dietary change as a benchmark for EU agri-climate governance, the EU can, once again, be seen to be ambitious in addressing dietary change in an innovative food systems approach to livestock emissions. The WWF analysis of updated NDC submissions saw a general increase in consideration of post-harvest demand-side mitigation policies, such as reducing food waste. For example, 36 updated NDCs consider post-harvest food measures; a 71% increase compared with 21 previous NDCs was reported.Footnote 180 Nineteen updated NDCs consider food waste reduction, compared with only three parties in their previous NDCs.Footnote 181 This being said, according to the WWF analysis, only five NDCs made reference to dietary change as a potential post-harvest emissions solution – largely from developing countries using diet as an adaptation strategy, rather than developed countries that typically consume more meat per capita.Footnote 182
The COP negotiations surrounding dietary change for the Sharm el Sheikh decision demonstrate the contentious nature of these types of policy. Unsurprisingly, few countries are keen to address the ‘hot potato’ of dietary change in their national strategies for fear of political backlash.Footnote 183 While it is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the depths of all states’ climate and diet-related policies, the EU's active creation and promotion of a full food systems approach that includes dietary change demonstrates the exceptional nature of the EU's intended approach to agri-climate governance.
5. Conclusion: Possibilities and Caution
This article has demonstrated the development of the EU approach over time to governing the climate impacts of its agricultural sector, using the livestock sector as a case study on account of its historical financial support from the EU and its climate impact. Firstly, the bases for the EU's climate responsibility were outlined. This included endogenous bases, such as the EU's internal climate mandate and the desire of EU MS to address climate issues, in addition to exogenous bases, such as international climate law obligations and broader moral arguments relating to the EU's climate responsibility. The recent evolutions in EU agri-climate governance were then outlined, including the increasing inclusion of climate considerations in the CAP, the development of the Farm to Fork Strategy, and the introduction of the new EU Due Diligence Regulation, which could tackle the sustainability of the EU's agricultural supply chains from deforestation risk areas. The EU's agri-climate governance for its livestock sector was then benchmarked against other global actors, making references to analysis of international climate plans and negotiations. From this analysis, it was determined that the EU was somewhat ‘ahead of the curve’ in terms of its design of newer agri-climate policies, such as the CAP, the Farm to Fork Strategy, and the new Due Diligence Regulation. This was the case for the EU mandating technical livestock solutions in these policies, in addition to more innovative and comprehensive food systems approaches to tackling livestock emissions to address its climate responsibility for the sector. However, this benchmarking exercise of the EU's agri-climate governance of its livestock sector is complicated by the fact that the majority of these policies are still under development. Potential risks include, firstly, that CAP plans from MS are falling short of the Commission's expectations for national livestock sectors, and progress on Farm to Fork promises has been slow.Footnote 184 Secondly, the accessibility of reliable due diligence over long supply chains can be difficult to secure, particularly in regions such as South America where domestic environmental forms of protection have been eroded under past administrations.Footnote 185
This points at general issues with trying to recalibrate food systems, both at the domestic level and globally.Footnote 186 Agricultural sectors are important mainstays in the EU and particularly in developing regions.Footnote 187 Moreover, dietary change is an issue that trickles down to the kitchen table, constrained by cultural and economic barriers to change.Footnote 188 Against a backdrop of strong agricultural tradition in the EU and powerful agricultural lobbies both in the EU and in hotspot regions for livestock production,Footnote 189 there are broader factors that complicate the implementation of these systematic changes.Footnote 190 Throughout the evolution of EU agri-climate governance, the structural path dependency of EU financial support for its livestock sector has been longstanding, and hampering efforts for EU agri-climate reform. Recent farmer protests throughout Europe only highlight the contention and resistance that structural shifts in EU agricultural policy will meet.Footnote 191 The significant concessions since made by the Commission in response to these protests yet again show the willingness of EU policy makers to weaken environmental ambition to maintain the agricultural status quo.Footnote 192
Nevertheless, with anticipated slightly downward trends of meat consumption by European citizensFootnote 193 and concerns for climate change on the rise, there is arguably no better time for EU agri-environmental policies to broach the transition towards a global sustainable diet head-on with concurrent public health benefits. As a shift in EU rhetoric and climate responsibility surrounding the agricultural sector is being witnessed, increased attention should be paid to the EU and its positionality in global agri-climate policy-making trends.
This article suggests that EU efforts such as the Due Diligence Regulation can provide an example of the wide range of rulemaking for environmentally damaging commodities that exists in policymakers’ ‘toolkits’ for addressing livestock emissions. In this sense, policymaking attempts by the EU in this area provide case studies of policies for the global agricultural economies to learn from – whether positively or negatively – in a similar vein to the global learning experience of emissions trading schemes.Footnote 194 Moreover, the EU as a developed region, with comparatively higher levels of consumption of ‘luxury’ dietary components such as meat, provides a useful case study of how more sustainable food systems could be approached globally when rapidly industrializing countries undergo the livestock revolution. Increasingly, high consumption of emissions-intensive components is likely to form the greatest challenges in reducing agricultural emissions in the future, because of the complex need to restructure food systems. As a result, despite its fledgling status, EU policymaking in this area is a valuable focus of study to monitor in the future – both for its successes and failures – against the backdrop of its productivist history.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Joanne Scott, Maria Lee, Neha Jain, and Jolene Lin for their previous comments on a broader chapter from my PhD thesis, which formed the basis for this article. Thank you also to the anonymous TEL peer reviewers for their constructive feedback.
Funding statement
Not applicable.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
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