Introduction
In 2002, as the global aftermath of the War on Terror began to unfold following the 9/11 attacks, Pankisi Gorge (or Pankisi Valley), a small region in Georgia predominantly inhabited by Kists, suddenly became the forefront of international discourse on counter-terrorism. The American non-profit organization Brookings Institution, for instance, issued a warning that “Al Qaeda forces were also reported to have fled Afghanistan to seek refuge among the Chechen population in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge” (Hill Reference Hill2002). In the same year, the Guardian wrote, citing Russian intelligence sources, “Pakistani, Arab and Pashtun Taliban fighters had recently sought refuge in the rugged Pankisi Gorge in northern Georgia, close to the border with Chechnya. The senior US diplomat in Tbilisi said Washington wanted to train counter-terrorist forces in Georgia to tackle the problem” (The Guardian 2002). Meanwhile, the Washington Post noted, “the U.S. position is unequivocal. President Bush said on March 11 that terrorists working closely with al Qaeda operate in the Pankisi Gorge” (LaFraniere Reference LaFraniere2002). Over the past three decades, despite its peripheral nature, Pankisi and its Kist inhabitants have periodically become the epicenter of Georgian as well as international politics and media. Pankisi Gorge is a small valley in the Akhmeta municipality of the Kakheti region. It is 34 km long and currently inhabited by around 5 thousand to 8 thousand Kists and a few thousand Georgians. Kists are a predominantly Muslim minority in Georgia belonging to the same Vainakh ethnicity as Chechens and Ingush. Within both global media and the Georgian national imagination, Kists and Pankisi Gorge have been depicted as “dangerous,” “uncivilized,” and “radical.” These views have influenced the dominant means of “managing” the Pankisi Valley through securitization.
I argue that securitization has been the dominant paradigm shaping the Georgian state’s approach towards the Pankisi valley, and it has profoundly affected the daily lives of Pankisi’s Kist population, who experience state surveillance, police intimidation practices, violent special operations, and rigorous checks at Georgian borders. In this article, I adopt anthropologist Zoltán Glück’s (Reference Glück2024) proposition to view securitization as a paradigm rooted in colonialist power structures and lingering colonial power asymmetries, in which powers subjugate specific groups both domestically and abroad. I outline colonial and imperialist conditions, which have played a prominent role in shaping Pankisi’s securitization politics: first, Russian colonial attitudes and politics towards the Caucasus, primarily regarding Georgia and Chechnya; and second, Western colonial relations with Muslims, specifically global counterterrorist policies and actions. Finally, Pankisi’s securitization politics are produced by the approaches towards minorities within Georgia that regard minorities as potential threats to the Georgian nation. While Georgian national perspectives towards minorities are not colonial in character, these views are influenced by colonialist and Orientalist understandings of Muslims and ethnic/religious minorities. This paper further delineates how the constant securitization has influenced the everyday lives of Kists and examines the effects of the Georgian state’s security policies on the social landscape of Pankisi.
My research in Pankisi spanned over six years, between 2019 and 2025. During my first visit in 2019, as an employee of a Georgian NGO, I interviewed several Kists with my colleagues as part of our ongoing monitoring in Pankisi. As a researcher and active member of the NGO, I worked closely with and interviewed minority populations, activists, Georgian politicians, bureaucrats, political experts, academics, NGO employees, and teachers. In the next three years, I conducted my fieldwork in the valley in a dual role — as a researcher of the same Georgian NGO and as a PhD student from a Georgian university. In the last three years of my research, I had to leave my previous job in order to do a lengthy in-depth ethnography for my dissertation. Therefore, I solely positioned myself as a PhD student. As anthropologists, our goal is to immerse ourselves in the communities we study, and we utilize knowledge obtained from daily life, day-to-day observations, and informal conversations. I lived with a host family for the duration of seven months between 2021 and 2025. Throughout my fieldwork, I witnessed many unplanned encounters that I found useful for my understanding of Kists. While these experiences shaped my understanding of the Kist community, in this article, I exclusively rely on the material obtained from official interviewsFootnote 1 and refrain from using material I acquired through unofficial conversations and observations. This article further employs critical discourse analysis of dominant understandings of the Pankisi Gorge, Kists, and other Georgian minorities, as circulated in academic papers, NGO documents, policy documents, political speeches, and Georgian social media (specifically, Facebook and Instagram). Overall, I base this paper on more than 150 official, in-depth qualitative interviews and several focus group discussions conducted with Kists, Georgian Azerbaijanis, Georgian Muslims, Georgian decision-makers, politicians, and bureaucrats. To protect anonymity, all of my interlocutors’ names mentioned in the text are pseudonyms.
Conceptualizing the Securitization Paradigm
In social sciences, the scope of analysis on “security” was initially limited to examining military threats between nation-states until the Copenhagen School proposed a new securitization theory framework in the 1990s. The scholars of the Copenhagen School expanded the scope of “security” to encompass political, social, economic, and environmental threats and primarily focused on the process of securitization. While at the time, security was perceived as a response to objective threats, the Copenhagen School scholars asserted that threat and security were not necessarily embedded in objective reality; they were manufactured and constructed by political actors through speech (Wæver Reference Wæver and Lipschutz1995). The securitization process starts by “speech acts” (Wæver Reference Wæver and Lipschutz1995), mere mentioning of “security” and identification of a “threat” by “a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block” or eliminate it (Wæver Reference Wæver and Lipschutz1995, 55). According to this perspective, objective threats do not constitute security issues. Instead, securitization matters are constructed by political declarations of existential danger and acceptance of these declarations by the relevant audience (Williams Reference Williams2003, 513–514). By labelling something as a security issue, political authorities deem it as an existential threat and claim the right to take swift and extraordinary measures in resolving it (Buzan and Wæver Reference Buzan and Wæver2003; Williams Reference Williams2003). This is the process of securitization. Securitization shifts politics from the ordinary to the extraordinary realm and calls for exceptional measures normally impermissible in traditional, democratic political processes (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde Reference Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde1998).
Another important school conceptualizing securitization, referred to as the Paris School, has encouraged a move from focusing on speech acts and rhetoric to concentrating on techniques and practices of securitization (Balzacq Reference Balzacq and Balzacq2011; Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka Reference Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka2015). The Paris School scholars perceive security as an assemblage of various rhetorical and material techniques (Balzacq Reference Balzacq and Balzacq2011, 3). They shift attention from speech acts to include a wide variety of practices, pointing out that “securitization combines the politics of threat design with that of threat management” (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka Reference Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka2015, 495). Additionally, the Paris School did not necessarily distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary politics. They demonstrated that securitization was not always the process characterized by extreme or emergency measures, and it could become part of ordinary affairs.
Anthropologists have also illustrated that in the process of conceptualizing securitization, the Copenhagen School inherently assumed a liberal model of politics to be the dominant template. Therefore, the securitization framework failed to capture many other contexts where ordinary political processes are configured differently (Holbraad and Pedersen Reference Holbraad and Pedersen2012). Furthermore, following Walter Benjamin’s observation that “the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule” (Benjamin 1968, 257), anthropologist Zoltán Glück (Reference Glück2024) demonstrates that security is not part of extraordinary politics and emergency measures. Instead, security is a new conceptual framework of the older power dynamics that have long characterized modernity. Glück argues that, much like the concept of “development,” “security” has become an important mode of governance (Glück Reference Glück2024, 472). Securitization should be understood as a re-imagination and rearrangement of “colonial past in the present” where old colonial dynamics, co-opting both “development” and “colonial” approaches, reproduce and redefine old power relations in a new way, reconfigured as “counterterrorism” politics (Glück Reference Glück2024).
By focusing on counterterrorism as a central mode of analysis, Glück’s framing can be employed to challenge the inclination to view Eastern Europe and post-Soviet space as inherently more prone to securitizing minorities and representing the Western world as a model alternative. For example, philosopher Will Kymlicka differentiates the approach to minority nationalism in Western countries and Eastern and Central European countries. He argues that in the West, minority nationalism and minority claims are evaluated in terms of justice, while in Eastern and Central Europe, they are judged in terms of security (Kymlicka Reference Kymlicka, May, Modood and Squires2004). The author maintains that in Eastern and Central Europe, states consider minority claims to pose a threat that could “threaten the existence or territorial integrity of the state” (Kymlicka Reference Kymlicka, May, Modood and Squires2004, 145). In Kymlicka’s views, Eastern Europe brings forth a different understanding of the historic injustice, where the majority is represented as a group that has historically been oppressed by the minority. He explains, “it is typically the majority that feels that it has been the victim of oppression, often at the hands of their minorities, acting in collaboration with foreign enemies … minorities are seen (rightly or wrongly) as allies or collaborators with external powers that have historically oppressed the majority group” (Kymlicka Reference Kymlicka, May, Modood and Squires2004, 155). In Kymlicka’s text, this is juxtaposed by Western countries that envision an accommodation of a fair approach to majority as well as to minority groups, where the historic injustice concerns minorities and seeks to rectify the historical injustices inflicted by the majority on minorities.
While Kymlicka recognized the danger and pitfalls of viewing minority groups as “threats,” he failed to perceive security itself as a manifestation of power relations inherently embedded in colonial and imperialist politics and ideas, which were enabled and solidified by the Western campaign of the Global War on Terror. As Arun Kundnani illuminates, for the West, after 9/11, Muslim bodies and identities have become a major terrain for international and domestic politics and control (Kundnani Reference Kundnani2014). Jocelyne Cesari has also argued that as the War on Terror emerged, in Western countries, Muslims came to be perceived with suspicion and labelled as “foreign enemies,” which led to lower access to “legal and social rights and privileges” (Cesari Reference Cesari2012, 431). She demonstrated that while the orientalization of Muslims is not a novel undertaking in the West (Said Reference Said1978), after 9/11, Muslims have been increasingly perceived as enemies both domestically in the West and beyond its borders. As a consequence, Muslims have been facing heightened political scrutiny and surveillance.
Securitization of Islam entails the rise of anti-Islamic rhetoric and restrictions on Islamic religious practices (Cesari Reference Cesari2012). This is not at all surprising since Western history is rooted in imperialism and colonialism. In the Western international media, certain groups, especially Muslims, have often been represented as culturally homogenous and less civilized people, whose lives are primarily determined by religion, which often obfuscates the complex historical and political conditions (Said Reference Said1978; Reference Said1981). This has created a popular, distorted image of certain groups and especially of Muslims worldwide. Moreover, since the 2010s and 2020s, the rising popularity of alt-right rhetoric and policies in Western countries has led to limiting the political rights of minorities and restricting the mobilization of arguments about historical injustice. These developments are pointing to the fact that Eastern European countries do not inherently lack democratic values that the West retains. By centering Muslim populations, security can be seen as an omnipotent principle of governing, a new form of old colonial relations, where old colonial powers reconfigure themselves in the new paradigm of security (Glück Reference Glück2024).Footnote 2 The War on Terror justified the securitization of Muslim groups in global security politics, in the West and beyond, and even legitimized different forms of state violence.
In Georgia, as it will be demonstrated in the next section, the United States was actively involved in developing securitization perceptions of Kists in Pankisi as part of the global counter-terrorism campaign. Yet, it is critical to take seriously other centers of imperialist and colonial ambitions beyond the Western world. Securitization of Kists originated from another reconfiguration of colonial relations — between Russia and its historical orient — Caucasus. In other words, securitization of Pankisi is an compelling example of a brief common objective that was pursued by both the Russian Federation and the United States, notwithstanding their competing strategies of constructing and handling this “threat.” Pankisi is a peculiar case because it exposes how the involvement of the Russian Federation and Western countries for the common goal entrenched a specific understanding of “security threat” regarding Kists, the threat of “potential terrorism.” Moreover, the securitization was also built on existing ideas and politics towards ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia.
Creation of Pankisi as a Terrorist Threat
In the Russian imagination, Vainakhs have been perceived as dangerous subjects throughout the centuries. In the 19th century, since Vainakhs were Muslims and they fought alongside Shamil against the Russian empire, they were regarded as unreliable and violent “savages” (Jersild Reference Jersild, Brower and Lazzerini1997; Ram Reference Ram1999). In the Russian empire, administrators and educated Russians used the labelling “savages” of mountaineers and Muslims “to imply something less than human, fit for either exile or military destruction” (Jersild Reference Jersild, Brower and Lazzerini1997, 103). Before the October Revolution of 1917, the North Caucasus nations, governed by the Russian empire, recognized the downfall of the Russian monarchy but sought to distance themselves from both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Instead, The North Caucasus nations held a congress and established an independent Mountainous Republic of the North Caucasus in March 1917. However, in 1919, the Mensheviks, led by General Denikin, and supported by Britain and France, started attacks in the North Caucasus. Moreover, by 1920, the Bolshevik factions had also strengthened their influence (Khangoshvili Reference Khangoshvili2024, 53–58) and subsequently the Soviet regime was established in the North Caucasus. In the Soviet Union, the colonial perceptions persisted, and Chechens were frequently called “bandits” or “traitors” (Dudaeva Reference Alla and Lekiashvili2010), characterizations that justified the deportation of Chechen and Ingush people during the Second World War.
Unlike the Russian empire, in the 20th century, in the Georgian imaginary, Pankisi Kists were reliable allies. Historically, in the Georgian language, until the 17th and 18th centuries, the term Kist signified Chechen and Ingush (Vainakh/Veinakh) people in general (Margoshvili 2002, 19). Nowadays, the term is reserved to indicate the Vainakh people who have resided in Georgia, specifically, in the Pankisi Gorge, for two centuries. The Kist and Georgian ethnographers have maintained that the customs of Georgian mountainous tribes closely resembled Chechen and Ingush traditions, and there were many examples of cross-migration and small-scale assimilation over the centuries between these communities (Mamisimedishvili Reference Mamisimedishvili1997, 15–20; Margoshvili 2002, 21–26). In the 19th century, political, economic, and religious conditions made the living conditions of Chechens difficult in their homeland (Mamisimedishvili Reference Mamisimedishvili1997, 14–15). On the other hand, by the 18th century, Pankisi was uninhabited by Georgians, who had been driven away by Dagestani tribes, and the valley was deserted until the Vainakhs started migrating to Pankisi (Margoshvili 2002, 31; Khangoshvili Reference Khangoshvili2015, 15). There were several waves of the Kist migration to Pankisi in the 19th century. During the second wave of Vainakh migration in the middle of the 19th century, Vainakhs settled in the valley with the involvement of the local Georgian noblemen (Mamisimedishvili Reference Mamisimedishvili1997; Margoshvili 2002; Khangoshvili Reference Khangoshvili2015). Initially, many Kist families practised Islam, while others practised Christianity or local forms of religiosity, often described as paganism (Margoshvili Reference Leila2002, 177). By the 20th century, however, most villages in the Pankisi valley were predominantly Muslim.
The Kist dialect of the Noxchi language (referred to as Noxchin/Nokhchin muatt) is subtly different from its Chechen and Ingush counterparts, and it also utilizes Georgian words in its everyday use. Because of its regional specificities, in Pankisi, the language is also referred to as Kisturi in Georgian or Kistii muatt (Kist language) in Noxchi. Pankisi Kists predominantly self-identify as Kists. I have had lengthy discussions with numerous of my interlocutors about the Kist identity and the differences they experience while encountering Chechens from Chechnya. Yet, several of my interlocutors consistently referred to their ethnicity as Chechen or Vainakh and generally, my interlocutors considered Chechnya as their historic homeland. Several of my informants displayed symbols of Chechnya in their cars, in their homes, and on their Facebook or WhatsApp profiles and many Kists used all three identifications of Chechen, Vainakh, and Kist. In the official census, Kists were not classified as a separate ethnic group until the 2002 General Census of the Georgian Population (Broers Reference Broers2008, 277). Soviet Politics of nationality created and solidified the perception of ethnic minorities in terms of “non-titular” or “unentitled” nationals (Kaiser Reference Kaiser, Clair.2022) living in lands of the “entitled” or “titular” ethnic majority (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1996, 23–54). Therefore, Kists in Pankisi were regarded as “unentitled” nationals in the Republic of Georgia. In the Soviet Union, the Kist nationality had appeared in the early drafts of the 1926 census (Kaiser 2022, 38). Yet, in the final version of the census, the Kist nationality is not even indicated as a separate category. Despite these affiliations and classifications, the Kist identity is also intertwined with the Georgian identity. Kists feel a deep attachment to the Pankisi gorge and to Georgia in general. Most Kists that I have encountered through my research pride themselves as a historically important ethnic group in Georgia, who have continuously fought against the enemies of the Georgian Kingdom.
Pankisi Kists assisted with the Georgian insurgency against the USSR between 1922 and 1924. One of the most prominent Georgian Anti-Soviet guerrilla commanders, Kakutsa Cholokashvili, found reliable collaborators among Pankisi Kists who supported him in the 1923 and 1924 rebellions. Pankisi’s villages became some of the first centers for planning and executing insurgencies. Furthermore, Kists formed a significant part of Cholokashvili’s guerrilla groups. After his failed attempt at insurgency in 1923, Cholokashvili fled to Chechnya and tried to unite with Chechen fighters, but later he had to leave the Caucasus for Europe (Khangoshvili Reference Khangoshvili2024, 60–62). In 1944, when Chechen and Ingush people were exiled from the North Caucasus to Kazakhstan and Siberia for “traitor” accusations, Georgian communistsFootnote 3 interrupted the deportation of Kists alongside them, arguing that Kists had been a trustworthy community and had nothing to do with the traitor allegations that other Vainakhs were being prosecuted for. My ethnically Georgian interlocutors, who were employed in high positions of law enforcement in the Soviet Union, had recalled that they perceived Pankisi as a peaceful region of Georgia until the 1990s, maintaining that until Georgian independence, Kists were almost fully integrated into the Georgian society, and at the time, Pankisi had not yet acquired a notorious reputation. These perceptions transformed when the Soviet Union collapsed, Georgian ethno-religious nationalism flourished, and the war started in Chechnya in 1994. In Pankisi, the first and second wars in Chechnya inspired many Kists to take arms and fight for Chechen independence in the North Caucasus.
As the second war broke out in Chechnya in 1999, thousands of Chechen refugees started entering Georgia,Footnote 4 and the majority of them settled in the Pankisi gorge. The war in Chechnya drew in many Muslims from all over the world to fight for the independence of Chechnya, and many of them entered Georgia alongside the refugees to recover, recuperate, plan for future actions, or, in some cases, take advantage of the chaotic times. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, civil wars, struggles for power, and economic collapse had destabilized the entire country of Georgia, and especially the border regions. Crime and violence became rampant; thieves-in-law and crime gangs became powerful. Georgian drug cartels and criminals also took advantage of the valley’s newly found notorious reputation and often shielded themselves there. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, within Georgia, Pankisi became the region known for drug smuggling and kidnapping where various inter-ethnic crime groups operated.
In 2000, instead of directly coping with criminals, the Georgian state made a decision to close off the entire Pankisi valley and introduce passport control at so-called “bloc-posts” where the Georgian army officers were stationed. This action made it seem as if Georgia needed protection from all Kists, many of whom had considered themselves to be patriotic Georgian citizens, not much different from other Georgian nationals. My close interlocutors pointed out that this was one of the first instances that made them feel like outsiders in their own country. By placing a control police, the Georgian state marked everyone residing in Pankisi as homogeneous and dangerous. These actions displayed that their goal was not to protect local Kists and the war refugees from criminals, but to protect the rest of Georgia from all Pankisi residents. However, despite these initial securitization practices, the Georgian state at the time vehemently denied claims of the Russian Federation that Pankisi was a place of terrorism. Georgia was immersed in violence, and Pankisi was one of the areas heavily affected by the violence and crime. This form of securitization was different from what was yet to come.
The Russian state had justified the second war in Chechnya as a war against terrorists (Williams Reference Williams2015; Barkaia and Janelidze Reference Barkaia and Barbara2018). Labelling an act of terrorism is a normative and political process that determines who is framed as the victim, who turns into the perpetrator, and whose claims become illegitimate (Bhatia Reference Bhatia2005). The “terrorist” labelling often simplifies and glosses over the political circumstances and processes. Furthermore, this framing presents violent acts as completely irrational or driven by blind faith, skewing the power dynamics between the sides, completely reversing them, or erasing opportunities to reveal more complex political processes. Until her assassination in 2006, Anna Politkovskaya had recounted the war crimes and many violations that the Russian state had committed in Chechnya. She had systematically demonstrated that the Russian army was killing and torturing civilians and soldiers, looting and terrorizing the Chechen population, shelling civilians, including children (Politkovskaya Reference Politkovskaya, Burry and Tulchinsky2003). Despite this reality, the Russian state has consistently painted a different picture, where the Russian army officers and Russians were presented as victims and Chechens were represented as the sole perpetrators.
In due time, especially after the refugees started entering Georgia in large numbers, Pankisi became increasingly linked with terrorism (Dvali Reference Dvali2003). Many Chechen fighters originated from the valley or healed their wounds in Pankisi, and Russian officials had repeated attempts to label Pankisi as a terrorist hub (Devdariani Reference Devdariani2003; Kekelidze Reference Kekelidze2007). Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov referred to Pankisi as “mini-Afghanistan” (Peuch Reference Peuch2002) and suggested that Bin Laden might be hiding there (McGregor Reference McGregor2005). The Russian state was willing to launch large counter-terrorist operations in Pankisi; the Russian Federation had even attempted to pressure the Georgian state into stationing the Russian army in Pankisi (Radio T’avisup’leba 2002), but the Georgian state declined these offers (Bushyhead Reference Bushyhead2022). According to the Russian claims, the Russian state could effectively guarantee the elimination of terrorists in the valley. However, Georgian officials recognized that this was a prominent strategy of Russia to expand its imperialist influence and exert control beyond its national borders. In 2002, NBC News reported that Russia was even “threatening war on the neighboring republic of Georgia — and seeking the blessing of the world community for military action. … [Russia] accused Georgia of harboring Chechen rebels and terrorists, saying the nation had violated the United Nations’ anti-terrorism resolutions and warned Russia would act unless Georgia quelled the threat” (Federico-O’Murchu Reference Federico-O’Murchu2003).
After the attack on the World Trade Center, Russia’s claims of terrorists operating in Pankisi were taken more seriously by the Western Countries, specifically the US, and soon Pankisi became a field of geopolitical speculations, controversies, and paranoia in the Western media (Nodia Reference Nodia, Coppieters and Legvold2005; Manning Reference Manning2009; Barkaia and Janelidze Reference Barkaia and Barbara2018). The Pankisi Gorge became a place marked on the international map and within Georgia as a dangerous place populated not just by criminals, but also by rogue fighters and terrorists. While the Georgian state officials had previously denied the claims of terrorism, after the Western concerns, they deemed Georgia’s periphery as a “threat” and started speaking about terrorists residing in the Pankisi valley. Russia and the US seemed united in their perceptions and goals to exterminate “terrorist threats” in the margins of Georgia. However, these two powers had different approaches to the issue. In response to Russia’s military action threats to Georgia, in 2002, BBC News was detailing that “while the US will continue to support Georgia’s territorial integrity to the hilt, it too would probably like to see tough action in Pankisi” (Mulvey Reference Mulvey2002). Unlike the direct invasion threats from Russia, the USA approached the issue from another perspective. The USA pressured Georgia to start the Georgian Train and Equip Program (GTEP) in 2002. In this program, American special forces troops trained and coached Georgian military (Nodia Reference Nodia, Coppieters and Legvold2005, 60; US Department of State 2003) using special tactics to eliminate terrorism (Bushyhead Reference Bushyhead2022). The US Department of State issued the report on the GTEP program, stating, “This program implements President Bush’s decision to respond to the Government of Georgia’s request for assistance to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities and address the situation in the Pankisi Gorge. This effort will complement other counter-terrorism efforts around the globe and will increase stability in the Caucasus” (US Department of Defense 2002). In other words, GTEP was created specifically for counterterrorist operations in Pankisi gorge. Bushyhead (Reference Bushyhead2022) argues that, initially, Georgia perceived GTEP as an opportunity to create a solid base for overall stabilization within Georgia. At the time, the Georgian state was dominated by extreme violence and high rates of crime, and these were the issues that the Georgian state officials wanted to resolve.
Despite having a seemingly similar goal, the Russian state did not respond positively to the notion of US troops training Georgian soldiers and being stationed in Georgia (Bushyhead Reference Bushyhead2022). In 2002, in collaboration with Georgian law enforcement, US troops started a large security operation in Georgia against terrorism. Moreover, the GTEP program was the start of Georgian forces being involved in the Global War on Terror operations. For example, Georgian troops participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003 until 2008, and they joined the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and became one of the largest contributors to NATO missions in Afghanistan (Shoshiashvili Reference Shoshiashvili2023).
In Georgia, these processes created the image of Pankisi as a terrorist danger zone. This was a new way of viewing Kists — brought forward by the claims of the Russian Federation and the War on Terror in the late 1990s and early 2000s. While the valley had been riddled by crime in the 1990s (much like many other regions of Georgia after its independence), Pankisi became the first location in the country where the counterterrorist policies started to be practised in the early 2000s. Nowadays, this paradigm dominates the policies and practices of the Georgian state and provides justification for close surveillance, and control of the Kist population. After a few dozen Kist and Chechen men from Pankisi fought in Syria in 2012–2017 (many of whom saw the Syrian war as a continuation of the Chechen war against Russia), Pankisi has been increasingly linked to ISIS, which further strengthened and perpetuated the understanding of Kists and their links to terrorism.
Securitization of Minorities in Georgia
Securitization of Pankisi was a consequence of colonial perceptions towards Caucasians and Muslims by Russia and the Western world. However, Pankisi’s securitization in Georgia also evolved from the local politics towards minority groups. According to the dominant views in Georgia, ethnic and religious minorities are often perceived as backward, less civilized groups of people who need to be controlled because their national loyalties lie beyond Georgia. These understandings are partially rooted in the Soviet policies of “entitled” and “unentitled” nationals. Moreover, this Soviet policy and the civilization discourse has its deeper roots in Orientalism, specifically in Russian Orientalism. The Russian Empire treated Caucasians as savages and, often with the help of the local elites, created civilizational missions and launched military attacks in the Caucasus region (Jersild Reference Jersild2002). Soviet nationalism and Russian Orientalism existed not only in the register of speech enactments or ideologies and perceptions, but they also had large political aims and ramifications. Despite these proclivities, initially, Kists did not belong to the minority groups that faced these attitudes in Soviet Georgia (with a few exceptions). Orientalist and reluctant views regarding Kists became prominent after Georgian independence.
This outcome was assisted by the history of the ethno-political conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia throughout the 35 years of Georgian independence. These conflicts largely shaped the fear of potential separatism in other regions of Georgia. Generally, in Georgia, political actors view inter-ethnic relations as a matter of national security since the problem of violated territorial integrity is entrenched in the minds of the decision-makers. Neither politicians nor institutions have been able to break out of this pattern: ethnic minorities are often viewed as fundamentally different entities; at times, even a responsibility of the “respective kin-states” beyond the borders of Georgia. These views and practices have been co-opted and even cultivated by various political regimes, despite their differences. First president of the newly independent Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1991–1992) and his allies popularized ethno-religious nationalism that had roots in the Soviet Union’s understanding of “titular” nations and nationalism. According to the ethno-religious nationalist views, the Georgian state, first and foremost, belonged to ethnically Georgian Orthodox Christians; minorities were merely seen as guests (Shavtvaladze Reference Shavtvaladze2018). Antony Smith has argued that while both territorial (meaning civic nationalism) and ethnic nationalisms can be exclusionary, ethnic nationalism inherently functions by creating a “us” and “them” binary and boundary (Smith Reference Smith1994, 188–189). Ethnic nationalism operates by claiming a common ancestry with a group of people; “those who claim to such ancestry and origins are true members of the nation-to-be; others who reside among us are guests or strangers” (Smith Reference Smith1994, 192). Gamsakhurdia’s understanding of the Georgian nation not only excluded minorities, but he also perceived them as a threat and a problem for Georgia.
Eduard Shevardnadze’s governance (1992–2003) was not as outwardly exclusionary. However, it did very little to include minorities in the Georgian imaginary. Ethnic nationalist understandings of the Georgian nation have been somewhat challenged while the United National Movement and Mikheil Saakashvili (2003–2012) were in power, and the ruling party attempted to produce civic nationalist sentiments, even simplifying the procedure of naturalization for certain groups (such as, for the Russo-Chechen war refugees). However, as demonstrated by Julie George, while Saakashvili’s speeches might have indicated a broader form of nationalism to include minorities, his anti-corruption policies disproportionally targeted minority areas, worsened the livelihoods of the vulnerable minority population and disproportionally discriminated against them (George Reference George2008). Moreover, through collaborations with the US, Saakashvili’s regime implemented the War on Terror strategies in Georgia, which targeted religious minorities, specifically Muslims. Securitization has been a dominant mode of politics for the Georgian Dream (2012 – present) government as well. While the Georgian Dream initially adopted several laws to protect minorities (Shavtvaladze Reference Shavtvaladze2018), the party has also participated in supporting the groups and satellite parties that harbored anti-minority rhetoric and persecuted them. Furthermore, Georgian Dream’s state apparatus in Georgia’s regions indicated the continuation of security policies towards minorities. Georgian Dream strengthened and sophisticated the surveillance mechanisms implemented by Saakashvili.
After the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia unfolded, the National Security Concept of Georgia was passed in 2011, mostly citing terrorist acts from Russia as the primary reason for concern. In the policy document, other terrorist threats were sparsely mentioned (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2011). However, in 2019, after the change of the government in 2012, the new National Strategy of Georgia on the Fight Against Terrorism report largely concentrates on resolving threats of Georgian citizens joining terrorist organizations (State Security Service of Georgia 2019). In the document, Pankisi is not mentioned even once; however, by the examples used in the document, an informed reader will easily understand that the document is predominantly speaking about Kists. In the document, it is outlined: “Individuals involved in terrorism and extremism belong to certain ethnic and/or religious groups; however, the state of Georgia deems it unacceptable to link specific religion and/or ethnicity, nationality to terrorism and/or extremism” (State Security Service of Georgia 2019, 12). Despite this claim, the data obtained from my fieldwork exposes that Kists are systematically securitized. Securitization practices mark and target the whole Kist community as a potential threat.
Internal power dynamics have largely shaped the securitization practices of the Georgian state. In state-building policies, security constitutes the center-periphery divide and gives rise to or reinforces socio-territorial hierarchies and power asymmetries (Bonacker Reference Bonacker2018). Security demarcates the center as a site of authority and protection. Moreover, the periphery becomes securitized, perceived as “threatening” or “disloyal,” “violent,” or “unstable,” the characterizations that justify the increased state control (Bonacker Reference Bonacker2018). This establishes or cements colonization mimicry (Bhabha Reference Bhabha1984), where certain marginal populations are subordinated within a state (Bonacker Reference Bonacker2018) and solidifies a hierarchy over peripheries and minority populations.
Georgian scholars and academics have also contributed to securitized perceptions of Pankisi and have almost exclusively focused on reproducing these understandings. To name a few, in 2005, Georgian scholar Ghia Nodia argued that while the power of the Georgian state had never been openly challenged in Pankisi, it still posed a security threat to pull Georgia into the conflict with Russia because terrorists took refuge in the Pankisi valley (Nodia Reference Nodia, Coppieters and Legvold2005, 39-40). Melikishvili and Kharshiladze titled their field research “Researchers in the Zone of Latent Conflict” (2003). George Sanikidze, despite his detailed understanding of Sufi Islam in Pankisi, contributed to dividing Pankisi residents to “good” and “dangerous” Muslims and interpreting new religious movements in Pankisi as dangerous (Sanikidze Reference Sanikidze and Yuama2007). However, in 2019, Barkaia and Janelidze (Reference Barkaia and Barbara2018) thoroughly challenged the dominant paradigm and recognized the state and international politics towards Pankisi as securitization.
The overview of the recent history of Georgia reveals how colonial mimicry contributed to the perpetual securitization of ethnic and religious minorities. The national trauma of wars and the unwillingness of different Georgian governments to fundamentally rethink and genuinely dismantle the orientalist or security paradigms towards minorities sustained and upheld this system. Because of the overarching proclivity to securitization, Orientalism and development also remain dominant ways of viewing minorities within Georgia. Such views assist in creating and amplifying the justifications for securitization politics. These discourses regard ethnic minorities as “uneducated” or “backward.” As argued by Glück (Reference Glück2024), securitization and development discourses are closely intertwined, as security politics are built on already existent power relations and perceptions, reimagined as security threats. Ideas of “development” view certain groups or spaces as “undeveloped” and “uncivilized” in need of development and civilization. The Global War on Terrorism endorsed and cultivated these perceptions towards Muslims. Moreover, as argued above, the Russian Federation had constantly insisted on viewing Pankisi as a place of potential threat. As a result, various axes came together to shape the securitization strategies towards Kists that inflicted violence and control measures on Pankisi. These policies and practices have deeply affected the Pankisi Valley and its population. I will explore these effects in the following sections.
Securitization Practices of the Georgian State
Violence and Promise of Violence
Scholars of the Copenhagen School have discussed that in the liberal democratic model of politics, securitization indicates that there is an “existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde Reference Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde1998, 24). “Security” takes politics beyond the established norms and frameworks (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde Reference Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde1998, 23) of liberal democracy by maintaining that the threat requires an extreme response. Under the guise of targeting dangerous issues, groups and populations, securitization justifies the use of violence or violation of rights that otherwise should be protected under liberal democracy. In Georgia, where declared aspirations of the Georgian government had been that of the liberal democracy, at least until the spring of 2024, securitization of various issues and groups gave the state authorities space and justification for using violence, surveillance and excessive control over diverse groups. Anthropologist Paul Manning has detailed that in the 2000s, the Georgian state, governed by the United National Movement, monopolized and justified violence against its citizens by initially testing it in Pankisi. He demonstrated that the state violence was originally used against the Kist population, who were labelled as “inherently violent” because of their Muslim identity and supposed connections to Al-Qaeda, before these practices moved to other groups in central parts of Georgia (Manning Reference Manning2009, 23–24). The Georgia Train and Equip Program, financed by the US government, trained the Georgian soldiers who were involved in the violent special operation in Pankisi that Manning discusses. The author argues that the War on Terror in Georgia and globally, legitimized and normalized state violence and allowed the state to rationalize its brutality against its citizens, and as a result, against any group that the state considered violent (Manning Reference Manning2009). This approach continues to operate after the Georgian Dream came to power.
Since the 2000s, every single government of Georgia has conducted violent special operations against Kists in and outside of Pankisi and murdered numerous Kist men. The special operations have been justified as counter-terrorism operations without producing satisfactory evidence to support these claims. Interestingly, the 2012 Lapankuri special operation, where Georgian state forces killed several Kist men, was a defining moment that turned the Pankisi valley against the United National Movement. Georgian government officials claimed that the murdered men were terrorists. However, Kists doubted these official claims. The Georgian state officials barred Kists to mourn the murdered family and community members according to the Islamic and local customs. In general, the majority of Kists usually vote in favor of the party already in charge of the government. Yet, in the 2012 parliament elections, many Kists refused to collaborate with the United National Movement and voted in favor of the opposition – Georgian Dream.
However, after the Georgian Dream came to power, violent operations did not cease. One of the latest violent operations in Pankisi took place in 2017. In December of 2017, the Georgian Dream government conducted a special operation in Pankisi and arrested several men for charges of connection to terrorism. The same night, during the arrest attempt, Special Forces killed a young Kist man, Temirlan Machalikashvili, in his bed. Georgian state institutions and representatives declared Machalikashvili a dangerous terrorist; however, the ongoing investigation that was supposed to determine Machalikashvili’s connections to terrorism was closed in 2020 without producing definite results (Social Justice Centre 2020). Even without problematizing the politics of terrorist labelling at large, the official claims of Machalikashvili’s connection to terrorism are widely disputed within Pankisi and in Georgia.
While observing practices of the Georgian government, it is apparent that police force and violence are usually seen as a viable option for the state to resolve disagreements and protests in the valley. The prominent example of this approach is demonstrated by the events surrounding the construction of a new Hydropower plant (HPP), Khadori 3. Early morning of April 21, 2019, police forces entered Pankisi valley to protect the construction materials of a new HPP Khadori 3. The construction of a new HPP was a controversial issue among Kists. Many of them were against building a new HPP project, protesting and criticizing this initiative for several months. A few days before these events, Georgian ministers had visited Pankisi and promised Kists that the government would be in a dialogue with the local population regarding the project, and the construction would only begin after consultations with the local villagers. Despite these promises, police forces showed up in Pankisi without any warning to the local population. The goal of police forces was to oversee the initial process of a new HPP construction. After Kists saw a large number of police cars approaching the valley, they engaged in spontaneous physical confrontations that severely escalated numerous times during the day. My close interlocutor, Akhmed, witnessed these events first-hand. He said, “Most people did not expect that the special forces would be coming. … The population took it badly that they [special forces] entered early morning, at dawn. This is the time when special operations take place.”
Among several of my interlocutors, the image of a large number of police cars entering the valley brought traumatic memories of special operations that had taken place in Pankisi in the past. My interviewees recounted that this sight emotionally affected and distressed them. The mobilization of large numbers of law enforcement officers and armored vehicles awakened old traumas among the locals and reminded them of the unjust treatment of Kists. “I thought that a war had started in the valley,” one of my interviewees remembered. Personal accounts of witnesses demonstrate that an affective mix of hopelessness, rage, and anger took over them, and they went outside to physically resist. The protest was spontaneous and unplanned. Kist protestors used stones and sticks found near the river, where the police were mobilized and clashed with the police. The anger and feelings of injustice urged people of Pankisi to fight against the police with their bare hands, sticks, and stones. Even young students and elderly women engaged in a physical altercation and threw stones and sticks. Akhmed recalls the altercations by remembering, “The special force guys cursed us, mentioned something like ‘your mother’. They kept saying, ‘Kists are not men enough, come and show us if you are men enough.’ Half of the valley has seen the Chechnya war. They do not wish war; they do not wish blood. …The elders tried to assuage and stop others.” According to my interlocutors, the physical resistance on that day was a response to the “strong psychological and physical violence carried out against us [Kists].”
Fifty-five people were injured in the physical confrontation on that day. Pankisi residents had held protests long before April 21st to resist the construction of the dam, but the protests did not turn violent until April 21st, when affective feelings took over the Kist spectators. After the altercations, state officials engaged in lengthy negotiations with Kists and ultimately decided to terminate building of the HPP until the local population was overwhelmingly in agreement with the project. For several years, rumors have circulated about the renewed construction of the HPP, but the project has not been carried out yet. Years later, some of my interlocutors even joked, “This was the day Kists demonstrated that we do not have bombs, but sticks and stones.” This episode is an important insight into the government’s approach towards Kists. Securitization of Kists is not limited to viewing them as threats for potential terrorism. Rather, violence was also seen as a justified measure to suppress protests. Instead of conversation and negotiation about potential infrastructural projects, the government saw violence (or rather, a threat of violence) in the form of police and special forces cars as a viable option to silence the critical voices of Pankisi. This episode also serves as a small insight into the effects of securitization – reflections from Kists demonstrate that special operations have inflicted deep-seated traumas and fears of violence.
Furthermore, securitization also justifies withholding information from the public in the name of upholding public and national safety. Secrecy is both an outcome and an instrument of securization. Hence, it is hard, if not downright impossible, to uncover detailed security policies of the Georgian government that target Kists. The task has become especially arduous since the creation of the State Security Services of Georgia as a separate institution in 2015. The creation of the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) in its current form raised concerns about its mandate, scope, and potential abuses of power (Barkaia and Janelidze Reference Barkaia and Barbara2018). “Special divisions of SSSG are authorized to use special means of surveillance, among them physical violence, special measures, and firearms” (Barkaia and Janelidze Reference Barkaia and Barbara2018, 80). Since SSSG claims that the information about the agency’s activities is sensitive, it can easily legitimize concealing information about its institutional practices and policies from public access. Therefore, researchers have to mine the information about securitization practices from the Kist population who encounter these practices in their daily lives.
For example, interlocutors implicated Georgian authorities in the process of actively swaying public opinion in undemocratic ways over new developmental projects in Pankisi. In the years following the 2019 clash, police repeatedly questioned Kists that most vocally resisted the building of a new dam, threatened them, intimidated them, and tried to influence their opinions in favor of a new HPP. My close interlocutor, who was an active voice against the HPPs, remembers many attempts of intimidation practices used against him and others who resisted the HPPs: “So many people were sent to me to silence us. Even went to my supervisor at work. It was mostly Security Service people, and also locals who were going around and asking everyone to silence me. Even violence was used against me from the Kist supporters of the HPPs.” The HPP proponents who physically assaulted him are active collaborators and supporters of the Georgian Dream.
In 2019, instead of constructing an HPP, the Georgian government started to build a new police station near the location where the 2019 altercation took place. Building a new, large police station in Pankisi, a small valley of only a few thousand residents, where crime rates have been lower than the national average, and another police station is already functioning, is also a demonstration that the Kist population should be controlled, first and foremost, by security measures.
Everyday Securitization Practices
There are other, everyday ways of securitization of Kists. The State Security Service of Georgia makes decisions in the areas where, under normal circumstances, other entities and institutions should operate: for example, instead of the border police, the Security Service decides the border crossing issues regarding Kists and Chechens. The State Security Service of Georgia is also responsible for overseeing naturalization of citizenship processes for Kists instead of the president’s office. To exert further control, the Georgian State denies citizenship to Kists and Chechens who do not currently hold Georgian citizenship. The state either bureaucratically makes it impossible to obtain citizenship or automatically rejects citizenship for the Kist and Chechen applicants. The cause for this refusal is listed as “Security Reasons” without further explanation, no matter of whether the applicant is a child or an adult. Some Kists have tried to pursue justice by litigation, but these attempts have been in vain. However, the lawsuits have revealed that it is indeed the State Security Services that creates barriers for obtaining citizenship. This makes my interlocutors feel that the state is continuing to mark the whole community as a threat since all the major decisions fall under the aforementioned security services.
Additionally, Kists face severe problems at the Georgian border while leaving and entering the country. From dozens of first-person accounts, it becomes apparent that many Kists are extensively checked and occasionally questioned for several hours. Despite being Georgian citizens, some Kists are verbally threatened that they will not be allowed entry to Georgia. Moreover, the Kists and Chechens who no longer hold Georgian citizenship are frequently refused entry to the country despite having been born or spending the majority of their lives in Georgia. The reason for the denial of entry is often unspecified, and the decision for refusal is made by the Special Security Service of Georgia. These accounts expose that visible Muslim religious markers, along with the border patrol’s knowledge of Kist surnamesFootnote 5 or appearances, target Kists and Chechens in high numbers.
For years, my close Kist interlocutor Sumaya’s husband Magamed frequently travelled to Europe without experiencing extensive checks and troubles at the border. For an untrained eye, Magamed does not look particularly Muslim, and his surname is not a popular Kist surname. During his numerous journeys, Magamed only faced a random check just once. However, when he travelled to Europe with his wife, who is a hijabi woman, the Georgian border patrol stopped and extensively questioned the couple. Sumaya recalls, “I have never felt so humiliated. They were saying, ‘We know you do not have money, show us money, show us the proof that you have money’. We showed them that we had money with us. They repeatedly asked, ‘Why are you travelling to Europe?’ They [Border Patrol] communicated with someone on the phone, probably the Security Service. It was a horrific experience.”
Gia, a Kist man who was closely affiliated with the Georgian Dream, also faced troubles at the Georgian border. Gia was also stopped and extensively questioned by the Georgian border patrol before travelling abroad. He recalls, “I did not want to mention the Georgian Dream … until I had to. Then they let me go. … It [border crossing] is one of the biggest problems for Kists. I tried to raise this issue with the authorities, and they have promised help. … My close relative was recently denied entry to Georgia; she no longer has Georgian citizenship, but her passport is from the EU. She was not allowed into her country. This [border crossing] is a huge problem for Kists.”
Kist interlocutors also recounted their experiences of being frequently identified, stopped, randomly checked, and searched by the police on the streets of Tbilisi. Some of my informants even recalled instances where, upon verifying that these men are from Pankisi, police officers loudly stated that they were searching for bombs and even mentioned the word “terrorism.” The police officers did not provide any reason or proof for their checks to my Kist interlocutors. Some of my male informants specifically asked me to be very careful mentioning their names publicly and in my writings, to avoid further questioning and trouble.
My interlocutors were also pointing out the role of the Georgian government in the creation or continuation of internal conflicts in Pankisi, arguing that religious tensions between Salafis and Sufis in Pankisi became a focal point of instrumentalization by the Georgian government. Several informants blamed the United National Movement, the former ruling party of Georgia; others implicated the Georgian Dream, and the rest of them argued that both of these parties were responsible for manufacturing or manipulating internal contentions. Sufi Islam in Pankisi has a local form and is tightly intertwined with the Kist traditional addat and customs. In general, older generations of Kists practice Sufism. Salafi Islam (often deemed as Wahhabism in and beyond Pankisi) is a newer movement that appeared in Pankisi in the 1990s. Predominantly, a younger generation of Kists practice Salafism, however, many older men also attend Friday prayers in Salafi mosques.Footnote 6 In the mid-2000s, Georgian officials representing the United National Movement, including then president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, declared Salafis as extremists (Barkaia and Janelidze Reference Barkaia and Barbara2018) and considered Sufi Islam as a more acceptable and mild form of the religion.
This rhetoric reflected the discourses on War on Terror politics in the West, where governments and institutions determined certain groups of Muslims practicing more acceptable form of Islam than others (Kundnani Reference Kundnani2014), dividing Muslims into “good Muslims” and “bad Muslims” (Mamdani Reference Mahmood2004). Yet, unless “good Muslims” proved otherwise, all Muslims were considered “bad Muslims” complicit or in support of terrorism (Mamdani Reference Mahmood2004). Throughout the years, different governments of Georgia strengthened various groups within Pankisi in exchange for their loyalty and produced division in the valley. Generally, Sufi Islam was declared as a more acceptable form of Islam for the Georgian state, and Salafism has been marked as “radical Islam.” Politicians and academics (for example, see Sanikidze Reference Sanikidze and Yuama2007) maintained that Salafism would necessarily drive Kists to radicalization. This process has divided Kists into less and more dangerous individuals and groups. Counterintuitively, however, at different times, the Georgian state also collaborated with powerful groups of Kist Salafi men, such as during elections and under tumultuous political circumstances. Therefore, these alliances between the government and different religious groups have remained inconsistent and precarious.
The Georgian state has also employed a vast surveillance network in Pankisi, and Kists get closely scrutinized by the Security Service. By surveilling Kists in and outside of Pankisi, the Security Service tries to hinder activities that are deemed “dangerous,” for example, controlling and limiting the use of Ichkerian flags, the flags that have been used in the de facto independent Chechen republic from 1991. These practices are once again a continuation of the belief that minorities in Georgia pose a threat to the Georgian state. To bring forth an example, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Chechen wars also resurfaced in public discourse in the Georgian media. Once seen as anti-terrorist efforts by Russia, they became examples of the devastation Russia could bring. Kists took an active role in remembrance of the wars in Georgian oppositional media, and many of them prominently used symbols such as the flag of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Kists drew the flags on bus stops in Pankisi, but they were repeatedly removed and repainted by the local police. Activists also suspected interference from the State Security Service when a printing company refused to fulfil an order of Ickherian flags, citing sudden shortages. Kist activists believed that their conversation was accessed by the Security Service, and the distribution of Ichkerian flags was intercepted by the agency. These incidents can be an indication that the security services closely monitor activities in Pankisi, and Kists’ connection to Ichkeria immediately raises concern. At the same time, since security measures involve secrecy, those who are surveilled or have their rights limited do not get clarity on the issues of why or how their lives will be affected.
Counter-Narrating the State
While this article has demonstrated that the State Security Service of Georgia and police forces are the main bodies that make decisions concerning Kists, this section will briefly show that the community navigates and manoeuvres these limitations in various ways. During my fieldwork in Pankisi, Kists frequently questioned whether surveillance of Kists achieve actual security for the citizens of Georgia and beyond. For example, my interlocutors recalled that several mothers and relatives of the men who fought in the ISIS had warned the Georgian authorities ahead of time that their sons and family members had decided to join the war in Syria. However, despite warnings, these men and young boys were not stopped at the Georgian border. These instances have made many Kists suspicious of the motivations of the Georgian state and the Security Services. Since the Georgian government seems to have close control and surveillance over the Kist community, my closest interlocutors voiced concerns, whether the Georgian government at the time wanted the presence of Kists in Syria to further undermine the whole community or secure additional funding for counterterrorist policies.
Moreover, Kists often raised their suspicions about the assassination attempt of a Kist man, Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, who was a Russo-Georgian war veteran and had participated in the Chechen wars. The assassination attempt took place in 2015 in Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital. Before Khangoshvili was assassinated in Germany by a Russian spy, Russians were also suspected of carrying out the initial assassination attempt that took place in Georgia. It seemed that Georgian law enforcement had access to photos of perpetrators, yet the suspects left Georgian borders without facing any issues. My interlocutors questioned how the Russian assassins, attempting a murder of a Georgian citizen, easily crossed the border while Kists, Georgian citizens or Georgian-born individuals, get severely checked and humiliated. When Georgian state officials utter the word “security,” whose security are they speaking about? It becomes clear that security does not mean security for the Georgian minorities, but instead, it is a protection from minorities in Georgia.
Furthermore, Kists also counter-narrate the official discourse of the Georgian state in other forms. In fact, in their interviews, Pankisi Kists initiated and offered the framework of the securitization to scholars and NGO workers to describe their own experiences in Pankisi. My interlocutors also openly reject the “terrorist” labelling. My new acquaintances frequently started interviews or conversations by declaring, “We are not terrorists.” Other times, they mentioned the fact that Pankisi has some of the lowest crime rates in Georgia. Kists counter-narrate and refute the framings that have been offered to describe them for several decades. After the murder of Temirlan Machalikashvili in 2017, his family and especially his father, have refused to accept the labelling of a “terrorist” and made it their goal to defy these allegations and seek justice. For several years, the Machalikashvili family protested unfair treatment of their son by camping out in front of the parliament for months at a time, teaming up with oppositional leaders to amplify their voices, seeking the help of well-reputed NGOs for litigation, appealing to the European Court of Human Rights, and refusing the dehumanizing label of a “terrorist.” While the government has neither changed its stance nor conducted a proper investigation, the family has convinced a significant portion of the Georgian population of the innocence of Temirlan. The majority of the Georgian population in and outside of Pankisi considers Temirlan to be one of the innocent victims of the current Georgian government, who was either targeted by mistake in place of someone else or deliberately killed violently to instill fear in the Kist population. This approach does not rethink the paradigmatic framing of terrorism and securitization at large. However, the family managed to create a deeply humanizing and empathetic lens of viewing Kists, which has challenged a lot of Orientalist and colonial understandings of Kists in certain groups of the Georgian population.
However, Temirlan’s death has manifested in distress and anxiety among other Kist young men. Many of them are convinced that they could be the next target of the state, even if they have never been involved in any “suspicious” activities. As my interlocutor Magamed, told me once, “Most young people here think that at any moment the state can make you a terrorist. We always feel that. The state will call you a terrorist, and nobody will listen to you then. If anybody tries to listen to you, then they listen so that they can refute whatever you’ll have to say.” Magamed has explained that the terrorist labelling is a final sentence – those who are labelled as terrorists are immediately silenced and lose their humanity without an opportunity to defend themselves. The sentiment reverberates by a young Kist schoolboy, who, after the 2019 altercation with the police forces, heard the online comments calling Kists savages, and responded, “They better call me a savage than a terrorist”. This phrase uttered by a young boy expressed the decades-long dehumanization that Kists have endured and its effect on the community, when a young man would rather accept another Orientalizing term of a “savage” rather than a completely dehumanizing one of a “terrorist.”
Security Service keeps a close watch on those who criticize Georgian state policies and creates additional barriers for them. In Georgia, in general, activities of ethnic and religious minorities that are not outright loyal to the government are frequently considered as acts against the entire Georgian state. Yet, Kists claim that they criticize the Georgian government precisely because they are practising their democratic involvement and citizenship. The phrase “no Kist will go against Georgia, their own country” has been echoed by my Kist interlocutors of different ages, genders and political or religious beliefs. As it was recounted to me, when the negotiations started about the HPP in Pankisi, then prime minister of Georgia aggressively entered the room, telling the appointed group of Kists, “What do you want? How can I speak to you?” My interlocutor, a Kist negotiator, responded, “You should speak to us as proper citizens of Georgia.” Therefore, the Kist resistance against the HPP plants should also be regarded as a part of citizenship processes, instead of being viewed as actions against the Georgian nation. Resistance does not always produce desired results, however. While Kists navigate certain barriers, challenge their marginality and sometimes physically push back, economic conditions and political pressure have driven out a significant number of Kists abroad to escape the marginality in Georgia. Countless young, vocal Kists who were active in the community have left the country.
Conclusion
In 2023 and 2024, my interlocutor Akhmed and I travelled on several transect walks and drives. We went through the meandering paths of the Pankisi villages and visited tourist spots while discussing everyday life in Pankisi. On these walks, Akhmed recounted his experiences as a Kist Muslim man in Georgia and beyond. He voiced his concerns about the political conditions of Georgia and reflected on the inner divisions within Pankisi. In the warm and lush spring of 2023, Akhmed shared a thought that he later reiterated in many forms. He said, “[In Pankisi] people are so divided, taking different sides. … In this valley there are only 8-9 villages, why do you think there is so much division? I think it is deliberate. It suits them, that’s why. It has political aims.” I inquired who are the external powers that create division. Initially, Akhmed did not openly articulate who disrupts the life in Pankisi, he believed that if he said too much or if his name was mentioned anywhere police would start asking him a lot of questions, make his life unnecessarily difficult. Yet, he hinted that there were various larger powers that orchestrated major and minor events in Pankisi. He said, “Pankisi is a playing field; until this country [Georgia] becomes [completely] independent this will continue. Our state makes you lose trust. … All of this has political aims. I have no idea what they need the valley for but they must have grand plans.” In the later interactions, Akhmed mentioned the Georgian state, the Russian Federation and Western countries among the large players causing distress in the valley.
This account of Akhmed subverts the common perceptions about the Kist community. Instead of dangerous masterminds causing trouble for larger powers, Akhmed thinks that Kists are pawns used for various geopolitical aims. In Akhmed’s understanding, this peripheral, marginal place is an important playing field, where the larger powers: the Georgian state, the Russian State, and Western countries clash against one another or collaborate, depending on their strategies. This, in turn, leaves the community divided and wounded. These understandings could be exaggerated, yet the core of these views rings true. As this article demonstrated, securitization of Pankisi is a result of colonial encounters of Russia-Caucasus relations, the West’s policies of War on Terror against Muslims and inner colonial mimicry, which instills inner hierarchy towards minorities within Georgia. Geopolitical events and powers have intimately shaped the Georgian and international politics towards Kists and they informed politics that influence the everyday lives of the community. Securitization practices of Pankisi are expressed by violent special operations in the valley, close surveillance, scrutiny and intimidation of the community, rigorous checks of Kists at Georgian borders. Securitization politics do not go unchallenged by Kists. Pankisi residents employ various everyday strategies and tactics to navigate the social and spatial terrains of marginality and counter-narrate the dominant framings. Yet, the dominant politics leave deep scars and trauma in the Pankisi community, and it is crucial to turn the focus onto the people affected by securitization.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my Kist host family and dear interlocutors in Pankisi and beyond. I am grateful to professors of anthropology at Ilia State University: Florian Mühlfried, Mariam Darchiashvili, Tamta Khalvashi, Keti Gurchiani, Elene Gavashelishvili, Nuka Abakelia. I am thankful for the feedback and insights provided by Professors Bruce Grant, Julie George and Maia Barkaia, lawyer Keti Chutlashvili, fellow PhD students, especially Esma Berikishvili and Tamta Mikeladze. Finally, I would like to thank my partner Sraman Sircar for his insightful comments on all my writings.
Financial support
This research was made possible with the help of Heinrich Böll Stiftung scholarship and CEES Fellowship at the University of Zurich.
Disclosure
None.
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