Financial Politics in the United States in the 1890s: The Golden Web by Wyatt Wells describes the battles over monetary policy (gold vs. silver) during the Gilded Age. Although the book focuses most on the American political and economic debate during the 1890s, it also has much useful to say about the international environment and the decades leading up to the main events. Wyatt’s objective is to demonstrate that the battle between gold and silver was fundamental and “constituted a referendum on social and economic change” (p. 274). It presented two distinct paths for Americans: one forward into industrialization, urbanization, and globalization; the other backward to traditional agriculture.

Wells documents the political and ideological movements, their perceptions and motivations, that formed around these two choices. Farmers wanted more money and credit in order to meet the financial demands of regular planting and harvesting. This was especially true for those settlers developing new lands out west. They therefore sought the addition of silver as legal tender, which would provide an enormous reservoir of financial resources. And during the 1870s, farmers found ready allies amongst the miners in the Western states who had discovered fantastic new deposits of silver and were eager to increase demand for it (and hence raise its price). On the side of gold were bankers, businessmen, and industrialists (and many ideological conservatives) who found in gold a reliable and trusted source of value. As long as the US dollar was fixed to gold, then lenders would get paid back in currency worth the same as that which they lent. Neither governments nor dodgy banks could print their way out of financial problems. Therefore, most financial institutions and investors insisted on gold. And since America’s largest trade and investment partners overseas were on the gold standard, adherence to it had become a powerful symbol of trustworthiness. But given the paucity and power of American banks and their deep connections with industry, farmers viewed the two as an alliance of oppressive monopolists. For their part, the financial and business communities (and many ideological conservatives) thought silverites to be backward simpletons or irresponsible deadbeats. Thus, when all factors are combined, the choice of monetary standard (gold vs. silver) became a major political-economic inflection point for America.

For his material, Wells draws upon a mix of primary source archival material and government documents, as well as contemporary reports, articles, and books. He also uses considerable secondary sources, mostly by historians, economists, and political scientists. The result is simultaneously familiar and fresh. On the one hand, this subject is not new. A short list of scholars who have covered it before would include Michael Bordo, Hannah Catherine Davies, Barry Eichengreen, Luca Einaudi, Milton Friedman, Jeffry Frieden, Jerry Markham, Christopher Meissner, Steven Reti, Gretchen Ritter, Richard Timberlake, and myself. Some of these authors are cited in the book; all would be worthwhile reading to those new to the subject. But Wells adds his own interpretation of events as well as novel historical material that makes his book also valuable for the serious business historian. On the other hand, this is probably not a book for novice historians or undergraduate students.

The book is at its best when it notes the pivotal role played by international developments (e.g., German Unification, the Barings Bank Crisis, monetary politics in Britain or France, changes to the world gold and silver supplies). The role of industrial monopolization—a phenomenon particular to the US—is highlighted but, in my opinion, underdeveloped. Wells also downplays the role of populism and other popular historical takes on the era. Rather, Wells’ primary reason for writing this book appears to be to argue that the choice between gold and silver was fundamental, not peripheral to or derivative of other, more important, dynamics. And that the forces of agriculture and silver were too weak (or made too weak a case) to win. He feels this simple fact has gotten short shrift by professional historians, and this well-written book seeks to correct it.