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President Trump Instructs the Department of War to Start Testing Nuclear Weapons

Part of: AJIL Contemporary Practice of the United States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2026

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Type
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Edited by Jacob Katz Cogan
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 120 , Issue 2 , April 2026 , pp. 403 - 408
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© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Society of International Law

President Donald J. Trump has instructed the Department of War to start testing nuclear weapons “immediately.”Footnote 1 He made the decision, he said, “[b]ecause of other countries[’] testing programs,”Footnote 2 stating: “I don’t wanna be the only country that doesn’t test.”Footnote 3 The president did not specify the countries he was referring to, the tests those countries were conducting, what precipitated his order, or the type of testing he directed. He did indicate, however, that U.S. testing would be done “on an equal basis.”Footnote 4 The administration has not clarified the president’s comments. Considered during the president’s first administration,Footnote 5 resumption of nuclear weapons testing would undercut a moratorium that the United States has adhered to since October 1992 and that all other nuclear weapons states, except North Korea, have abided by since 1998.Footnote 6 It would further disrupt the international regime regulating nuclear weapons, already unstable due to the recent expiration of the last nuclear arms control agreement between Russia and the United States,Footnote 7 Russia’s subversion of Security Council sanctions targeting North Korea’s nuclear program,Footnote 8 Russia’s threat to use tactical nuclear weapons in its war with Ukraine,Footnote 9 Russia’s development of new nuclear weapons-capable delivery systems,Footnote 10 Russia’s withdrawal from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),Footnote 11 China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal,Footnote 12 and the United States’ bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities and the demise of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.Footnote 13

Abstention from nuclear weapons testing by nuclear weapons states stems from unilateral and voluntary moratoria, not formal legal prohibitions.Footnote 14 Each of the five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapons states (NWS)Footnote 15 have adhered to a moratorium on testing since 1996.Footnote 16 The moratoria were to be interim measures, replaced by the binding obligations in the CTBT that was adopted that year.Footnote 17 The treaty never came into force, however.Footnote 18 Still, between the moratoria, the widespread ratification of the CTBT, and regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties,Footnote 19 an informal, global anti-testing norm took shape. India and Pakistan conducted tests in 1998, but both states were immediately condemned by the NWS and the Security Council,Footnote 20 and each quickly announced their own unilateral moratoria.Footnote 21 In the years since, only North Korea has tested—six times to date, most recently in 2017.Footnote 22 In 2016, the NWS jointly “reaffirm[ed] [their] moratoria on nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the CTBT’s entry into force.”Footnote 23 Over the past two decades, the Security Council has reinforced the anti-testing norm by “[c]all[ing] upon all States … to maintain their moratoria,”Footnote 24 repeatedly “condemning” North Korea’s tests, “demanding” that North Korea not conduct additional tests, and sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear weapons activities.Footnote 25

Consensus on the moratoria’s importance and normative applicability elides, though, ambiguity regarding their scope. The United States considers that its moratorium precludes “nuclear explosive tests,” and since 1995 it has clarified that “it adheres to a ‘zero-yield’ standard.”Footnote 26 For the United States, as well as France and the United Kingdom, zero-yield “means that the moratorium covers any nuclear explosive test that is supercritical—that is, which produces a self-sustaining chain reaction.”Footnote 27 But other countries’ understandings of their commitments under their moratoria might be narrower, permitting some types of supercritical tests. (Subcritical tests—those that do not produce a self-sustaining chain reaction—are permitted under any interpretation, and to date the United States has conducted thirty-four such tests, most recently in April 2024.)Footnote 28 The CTBT’s testing prohibition does not clarify what the moratoria might require. The treaty forbids parties from “carry[ing] out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion,” but it does not define the term “nuclear weapon test explosion.”Footnote 29 The type of testing that the moratoria proscribe is therefore uncertain.

Even though there is no explicit agreement on the moratoria’s coverage, the United States evaluates other states’ adherence based on the zero-yield standard. A uniform approach is necessary, the State Department has argued, because “[a]ny divergences between NWS interpretations or behavior … [could] have significant implications for U.S. national security as well as for international peace and security—especially over time—if one or more NWS were willing to conduct nuclear testing activities that other NWS felt themselves to be precluded from undertaking.”Footnote 30 Divergences might provide, especially if concealed, “a means by which some NWS gain progressive strategic advantage over NWS having more restrictive interpretations or implementation.”Footnote 31

Applying the zero-yield standard, the United States has, since 2019, questioned whether China and Russia have abided by their moratoria. In a report that year, the State Department stated that “some activities in Russia have demonstrated a failure to adhere to the U.S. zero-yield standard, which would prohibit supercritical tests.”Footnote 32 It consequently “assesse[d] that Russia has not adhered to its nuclear testing moratorium.”Footnote 33 In the same report, the Department asserted that “China probably carried out multiple nuclear weapon-related tests or experiments in 2018” and concluded that China’s actions and lack of transparency “raise[d] concerns regarding China’s adherence to its moratorium … judged against the U.S. ‘zero-yield’ standard.”Footnote 34 Successive reports, through 2025, reiterated these conclusions.Footnote 35 China and Russia’s alleged supercritical tests were, it would seem, hydronuclear tests, which have very low nuclear yield and are extremely difficult to detect, even for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s (CTBTO) International Monitoring System.Footnote 36

In light of these assessments, the president’s cryptic directive for the Department of War to resume testing “on an equal basis” is best understood as authorizing such supercritical tests (though not higher-yield explosive tests).Footnote 37 This reading of the president’s remarks aligns with his subsequent comment: “we’re going to test nuclear weapons like other countries do.… Russia’s testing, and China’s testing, but they don’t talk about it.… They—they test way under—underground where people don’t know exactly what’s happening with the test.”Footnote 38 It also aligns with a statement made by a U.S. official at a meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. “For any who question [the president’s] decision,” the official said, “context is important. Since 2019, including in this forum, the United States has raised concerns that Russia and China have not adhered to the zero-yield nuclear test moratorium.”Footnote 39 A social media post by CIA Director John Ratcliffe suggested as well that the president’s authorization of testing was linked to China and Russia’s nonadherence to the zero-yield standard.Footnote 40

The abandonment of the United States’ decades-long, bipartisan backing of the zero-yield standard by engaging in hydronuclear tests would undermine, if not vitiate, the nuclear testing moratoria and would cut against U.S. interests. The United States, which conducted more than one thousand explosive tests prior to its moratorium, is able to maintain the reliability of its nuclear arsenal through subcritical tests, computer simulations, machines, lasers, and the work of tens of thousands of employees, spending about $25 billion per year in “stockpile stewardship.”Footnote 41 Experts say that supercritical testing, regardless of the yield, is not necessary for the United States, even though information could be gleaned from such testing that subcritical tests do not provide.Footnote 42 Chipping away at the testing moratorium would principally advantage states, such as China, India, and Pakistan, that have less experience, knowledge, and data regarding the design and operation of nuclear weapons, as they would likely expand their testing.Footnote 43

Any change in U.S. testing policy will have significant ripple effects, even if a moratorium on high-yield nuclear weapons testing remains. Relaxing the testing moratorium would increase the chances of a nuclear arms race, including the design of new warheads, and it would weaken arguments against testing by non-NPT nuclear weapons states, such as North Korea. More broadly, it would undermine the NPT, as testing would belie the NWS’s commitment in that treaty “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”Footnote 44

Russia and China reacted cautiously to the president’s statement, no doubt due to confusion regarding its precise meaning and U.S. intentions. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said that “[i]t’s hoped that the U.S. will earnestly abide by its obligations under the [CTBT] and its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear testing, and take concrete actions to uphold the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as well as global strategic balance and stability.”Footnote 45 Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a meeting of his security council, “note[d] that Russia has always strictly adhered to its obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and we do not plan to abandon these obligations. At the same time, … if the United States or any other state party to the Treaty was to conduct such tests, Russia would be under obligation to take reciprocal measures.”Footnote 46 He directed his officials to “submit coordinated proposals on the possible first steps focusing on preparations for nuclear weapons tests.”Footnote 47 A spokesperson emphasized that Russia was not resuming testing at this time: “[P]resident [Putin] did not give instructions to begin preparations for testing.… The president instructed that the advisability of beginning preparations for such tests be considered.”Footnote 48

References

1 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Oct. 29, 2025, 9:04 p.m.), at https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115460423936412555 [hereinafter Nuclear Testing Announcement].

2 Id.

3 60 Minutes Overtime, Read the Full Transcript of Norah O’Donnell’s Interview with President Trump Here, CBS News (Nov. 2, 2025), at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/read-full-transcript-norah-odonnell-60-minutes-interview-with-president-trump [hereinafter 60 Minutes Transcript].

4 Nuclear Testing Announcement, supra note 1.

5 See John Hudson & Paul Sonne, Trump Administration Discussed Conducting First U.S. Nuclear Test in Decades, Wash. Post (May 22, 2020), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-administration-discussed-conducting-first-us-nuclear-test-in-decades/2020/05/22/a805c904-9c5b-11ea-b60c-3be060a4f8e1_story.html.

6 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, at ix (Sept. 2015).

7 See Jacob Katz Cogan, Contemporary Practice of the United Staes, 117 AJIL 500, 522 (2023); Paul Sonne, Kremlin Welcomes Trump’s Blessing of Proposal to Extend Nuclear Caps, N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/06/world/europe/russia-trump-putin-nuclear-caps.html.

8 See David E. Sanger, Why Russia Is Protecting North Korea from Nuclear Monitors, N.Y. Times (Mar. 29, 2024), at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/29/us/politics/russia-north-korea-nuclear-weapons.html.

9 See Anton Troianovski, Russia to Hold Drills on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in New Tensions with West, N.Y. Times (May 6, 2024), at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/06/world/europe/russia-tactical-nuclear-weapons-drills.html; David E. Sanger, For Russia, Nuclear Weapons Are the Ultimate Bargaining Chip, N.Y. Times (Nov. 19, 2024), at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/19/us/politics/russia-nuclear-weapons-ukraine.html.

10 See Nataliya Vasilyeva, Putin Announces Test of Tsunami-Making Nuclear Weapon, N.Y. Times (Oct. 29, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/29/world/europe/russia-missile-poseidon-putin-nuclear-tests.html.

11 See Neil MacFarquhar, Russia Pulled Out of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Here’s What That Means, N.Y. Times (Nov. 2, 2023), at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/02/world/europe/russia-nuclear-test-ban-treaty.html.

12 See Yaroslav Trofimov, The Nuclear-Arms Race Is Now a Three-Way Contest, Wall St. J. (Nov. 16, 2025), at https://www.wsj.com/world/new-nuclear-arms-race-pits-u-s-against-both-russia-and-china-5a96fde8.

13 See Jean Galbraith, United States Bombs Iran’s Nuclear Facilities, 119 AJIL 798 (2025); Steven Erlanger, The Dangerous Stalemate Over Iran’s Nuclear Program, N.Y. Times (Nov. 9, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/09/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-program-israel.html.

14 The United States is a party to treaties that restrict nuclear weapons testing, including banning testing in certain locations, including the atmosphere, under water, Antarctica, outer space, and the Moon. See Antarctic Treaty, Art. I, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 UST 794, 402 UNTS 5778; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 UST 1313, 480 UNTS 43; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Art. IV, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 UST 2410, 610 UNTS 205; Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, July 3, 1974, S. Exec. Doc. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Treaty Doc. 94-25(A) (1976), 13 ILM 906 (1974).

15 The abbreviation “NWS” refers specifically to the five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear weapons states, as defined in that treaty. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Art. IX(3), July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, TIAS No. 6839, 729 UNTS 161 [hereinafter NPT].

16 See Douglas Jehl, Clinton Asks Nuclear Powers to Join Test Ban, N.Y. Times (July 4, 1993), at https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/04/world/clinton-asks-nuclear-powers-to-join-test-ban.html; Craig R. Whitney, France Ending Nuclear Tests That Caused Broad Protests, N.Y. Times (Jan. 30, 1996), at https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/30/world/france-ending-nuclear-tests-that-caused-broad-protests.html; Seth Faison, China Sets Off Nuclear Test, Then Announces Moratorium, N.Y. Times (July 30, 1996), at https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/30/world/china-sets-off-nuclear-test-then-announces-moratorium.html. In the 2018 and 2022 Nuclear Posture Reviews, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to its moratorium. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 63 (Feb. 2018), at https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/18/2002302062/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF [https://perma.cc/5ZZV-GELC]; U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review 18 (2022), at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7MS-7PFZ].

17 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, GA Res. 50/245 (Sept. 10, 1996) [hereinafter CTBT].

18 To date, the CTBT has been ratified by 178 states. As a condition for entry into force, the treaty requires ratification by all forty-four states listed in its Annex 2. Nine Annex 2 states still need to ratify the treaty, including China, Russia, and the United States. See Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Status of Signature and Ratification, at https://www.ctbto.org/our-mission/states-signatories [https://perma.cc/SJ4C-5S7U] [hereinafter CTBT Status]. Russia revoked its ratification in 2023. See MacFarquhar, supra note 11. The United States signed the treaty, but the Senate rejected ratification in 1999. See Eric Schmitt, Senate Kills Test Ban Treaty in Crushing Loss for Clinton, N.Y. Times (Oct. 14, 1999), at https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/101499testban-treaty.html. China also signed the treaty. See CTBT Status, supra note 18.

19 See Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Art. 1(a), Feb. 14, 1967, 634 UNTS 281; South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Art. 6, Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 UNTS 177; Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Art. 3, Dec. 15, 1995, 1981 UNTS 129; African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Art. 5, Apr. 11, 1996, 35 ILM 698; Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, Art. 5, Sept. 8, 2006, 2970 UNTS 91.

20 See Letter Dated 5 June 1998 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1998/473 (June 5, 1998); SC Res. 1172 (1998).

21 See UN Doc. A/53/PV.12, at 13 (Sept. 23, 1998) (statement of Prime Minister of Pakistan Mohammad Nawaz Sharif); Statement by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Parliament on 27 May, 1998, World Aff.: J. Int’l Issues, at 174 (July–Sept. 1998).

22 See Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Is No Longer Bound by Nuclear Test Moratorium, Kim Says, N.Y. Times (Dec. 31, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/31/world/asia/north-korea-kim-speech.html.

23 Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Nuclear-Weapon States (Sept. 15, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/09/261993.htm [https://perma.cc/8C7J-PC4Z].

24 SC Res. 2310, para. 4 (2016) (emphasis removed).

25 See SC Res. 1718 (2006); SC Res. 1874 (2009); SC Res. 2087 (2013); SC Res. 2094 (2013); SC Res. 2270 (2016); SC Res. 2321 (2016); SC Res. 2371 (2017); SC Res. 2375 (2017); SC Res. 2397 (2017).

26 U.S. Dep’t of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments 48 (June 2020), at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-Adherence-to-and-Compliance-with-Arms-Control-Nonproliferation-and-Disarmament-Agreements-and-Commitments-Compliance-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/782J-JU5H] [hereinafter 2020 Report].

27 Id. State Department reports have used slightly different language from year-to-year to describe the moratorium’s coverage of supercritical tests. The 2019 report defined the moratorium as covering “any test that produces a self-sustaining, supercritical chain reaction of any kind.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments 39 (Aug. 2019), at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Compliance-Report-2019-August-19-Unclassified-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HSZ8-NG9Z] [hereinafter 2019 Report]. The 2021 report stated that “nuclear explosive” tests covered by the moratorium include “tests that are supercritical, i.e., that involve a limited multiplying fission chain reaction resulting in the release of nuclear fission energy, whether driven by high explosives or assembled by other means such as a gun assembly.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments 40 (Apr. 2021), at https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2021-Adherence-to-and-Compliance-With-Arms-Control-Nonproliferation-and-Disarmament-Agreements-and-Commitments.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ4U-9KW3] [hereinafter 2021 Report]. The 2022 report stated that “the U.S. moratorium covers nuclear explosive tests that are supercritical, regardless of the level of nuclear yield produced.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments 28 (Apr. 2022), at https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/2022-Adherence-to-and-Compliance-with-Arms-Control-Nonproliferation-and-Disarmament-Agreements-and-Commitments-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8694-8V66] [hereinafter 2022 Report].

28 See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Press Release, NNSA Completes Subcritical Experiment at PULSE Facility in Nevada (May 16, 2024), at https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-completes-subcritical-experiment-pulse-facility-nevada [https://perma.cc/PN6B-TLE3].

29 CTBT, supra note 17, Art. 1(1). The United States argues that “[a] thorough review of the history of the Treaty negotiation process, as well as statements by world leaders and the negotiators of the agreement, shows that all states understand and accept the CTBT as a ‘zero-yield’ treaty.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, Scope of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (2013), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/212166.htm [https://perma.cc/6R3W-NG5F].

30 2020 Report, supra note 26, at 48.

31 Id. at 49.

32 2019 Report, supra note 27, at 40.

33 Id.; see also Julian E. Barnes & William J. Broad, Russia Has Restarted Low-Yield Nuclear Tests, U.S. Believes, N.Y. Times (May 29, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/us/politics/russia-nuclear-tests.html.

34 2019 Report, supra note 27, at 39; see also Michael R. Gordon, Possible Chinese Nuclear Testing Stirs U.S. Concern, Wall St. J. (Apr. 15, 2020), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/possible-chinese-nuclear-testing-stirs-u-s-concern-11586970435; William J. Broad, Chris Buckley & Jonathan Corum, China Quietly Rebuilds Secretive Base for Nuclear Tests, N.Y. Times (Jan. 9, 2024), at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/20/science/china-nuclear-tests-lop-nur.html.

35 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments 28 (Apr. 2025), at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Arms-Control-Treaty-Compliance-Report_Final-Accessible.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP8D-KLYQ]; U.S. Dep’t of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments 19 (Apr. 2024), at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/2024-Arms-Control-Treaty-Compliance-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AWR-MPFS]; U.S. Dep’t of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments 18 (Apr. 2023), at https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/APR23-2023-Treaty-Compliance-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF9M-NPBV]; 2022 Report, supra note 27, at 28–29; 2021 Report, supra note 27, at 40–41; 2020 Report, supra note 26, at 49–51.

36 See William J. Broad, The Forgotten Nuclear Weapon Tests That Trump May Seek to Revive, N.Y. Times (Nov. 24, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/24/science/hydro-nuclear-testing-trump.html.

37 Nuclear Testing Announcement, supra note 1. Some suggested that the president was referring to testing missile delivery systems, perhaps because the Department of War, to whom the president directed his order, is responsible for those systems (the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration is responsible for ensuring the reliability of nuclear weapons, including though testing) and perhaps because Russia publicized the successful operation new delivery systems in the days before the president’s announcement. Such missile tests, though, are not subject to the moratorium, and the United States conducts missile tests routinely. See, e.g., Vandenberg Space Force Base Press Release, GT 254: AFGSC Validates Reliability, Readiness of ICBM Force with Minuteman III Test Launch (Nov. 5, 2025), at https://www.vandenberg.spaceforce.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4328255/gt-254-afgsc-validates-reliability-readiness-of-icbm-force-with-minuteman-iii-t [https://perma.cc/B366-DZ9B]. A statement by Secretary of Energy Chris Wright suggested another possibility: “I think the tests we’re talking about right now are system tests…. These are not nuclear explosions. These are what we call non-critical explosions.” US Not Planning Nuclear Explosions at This Time, Energy Secretary Says, Reuters (Nov. 3, 2025), at https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-not-planning-nuclear-explosions-this-time-energy-secretary-says-2025-11-02.

38 60 Minutes Transcript, supra note 3.

39 Stephanie Liechtenstein, US Official Defends Trump’s Nuclear Test Comments by Citing Mounting Risks from Other States, AP (Dec. 18, 2025), at https://apnews.com/article/nuclear-testing-russia-china-ctbt-north-korea-2a579544cadd0e70d8eff1c4ea285756.

40 See John Ratcliffe (@CIADirector), X (Nov. 3, 2025, 4:24 p.m.), at https://x.com/CIADirector/status/1985458126770888930; see also Tom Cotton (@SenTomCotton), X (Nov. 3, 2025, 6: 51 p.m.), at https://x.com/SenTomCotton/status/1985494966693470214.

41 See Managing an Arsenal Without Nuclear Testing: An Interview with Jill Hruby of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, Arms Control Today (Dec. 2023), at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-12/interviews/managing-arsenal-without-nuclear-testing-interview-jill-hruby-us-national [hereinafter Hruby Interview]; William J. Broad, Testing America’s Nuclear Bombs: What to Know, N.Y. Times (Oct. 30, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/30/science/us-nuclear-weapons-atomic-bombs.html.

42 See Hruby Interview, supra note 41; Siegfried Hecker, Lessons from Los Alamos: America Has the Most to Lose from Restarting Nuclear Testing, For. Aff. (Nov. 26, 2025), at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/lessons-alamos.

43 See David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Trump’s Call to Resume Nuclear Testing After Decades Revives a Cold War Debate, N.Y. Times (Oct. 30, 2025), at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/30/us/politics/trump-nuclear-testing-cold-war.html; Hecker, supra note 42.

44 NPT, supra note 15, Art. VI.

45 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Press Release, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference (Nov. 3, 2025), at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202511/t20251103_11746024.html [https://perma.cc/CE4N-8C8W].

46 President of Russia Press Release, Meeting with Permanent Members of the Security Council (Nov. 5, 2025), at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78403 [https://perma.cc/9TSA-Z2NU].

47 Id.

48 Putin Instructs Not to Prepare Nuclear Tests, But to Study Their Feasibility — Kremlin, TASS (Nov. 5, 2025), at https://tass.com/politics/2039673.