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Why do majoritarian systems benefit the right? Income groups and vote choice across different electoral systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2024

Robert Liñeira Open the ORCID record for Robert Liñeira [Opens in a new window]  and
Pedro Riera
Robert Liñeira
Affiliation:
School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
Pedro Riera*
Affiliation:
Department of Social Sciences-Juan March Institute, University Carlos III of Madrid, Spain
*
Corresponding author: Pedro Riera; Email: PRiera@clio.uc3m.es
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Abstract

This research note investigates how the voting behavior of middle-income citizens explains why right-wing parties tend to govern under majoritarian electoral rule. The growing literature that investigates the ideological effects of electoral systems has mostly focused on institutional explanations. However, whether the electoral rules overrepresent parties with some specific ideologies is also a matter of behavior. Building on Iversen and Soskice (2006), we test two arguments. First, middle-income groups are more likely to vote for the right under majoritarian rules because they fear the redistributive consequences of a victory of the left in these contexts. Second, middle-income earners particularly concerned with tax rates are particularly prone to vote differently across electoral systems. Combining survey evidence from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the New Zealand Election Study, we show that the voting behavior of middle-income citizens is indeed responsible for the predominance of the right under majoritarian systems.

Keywords

comparative politicspolitical behaviorrepresentation and electoral systemsvoting behavior

Information

Type
Research Note
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , October 2024 , pp. 857 - 869
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of EPS Academic Ltd

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Footnotes

The original version of this article had incorrect affiliation information. A notice detailing this has been published, and the error rectified on the online pdf and html versions.

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