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Debunking Biased Thinkers (Including Ourselves)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2015

NATHAN BALLANTYNE
NATHAN BALLANTYNE*
Affiliation:
FORDHAM UNIVERSITYn.ballantyne@gmail.com
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Abstract:

Most of what we believe comes to us from the word of others, but we do not always believe what we are told. We often reject thinkers’ reports by attributing biases to them. We may call this debunking. In this essay, I consider how debunking might work and then examine whether, and how often, it can help to preserve rational belief in the face of disagreement.

Keywords

epistemologysocial epistemologyskepticismsources of knowledge and justificationphilosophy of psychology

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Articles
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Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , Spring 2015 , pp. 141 - 162
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2015 

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