Hostname: page-component-89b8bd64d-z2ts4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-07T02:57:26.772Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The coexistence of overestimation and underweighting of rare events and the contingent recency effect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2023

Greg Barron*
Affiliation:
Harvard Business School
Eldad Yechiam
Affiliation:
Technion — Israel Institute of Technology
*
*Address: Greg Barron, Harvard Business School, Baker Library 447, 10 Soldiers Field Rd., Boston, MA 02163. Email: gbarron@hbs.edu.
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Previous research demonstrates overestimation of rare events in judgment tasks, and underweighting of rare events in decisions from experience. The current paper presents three laboratory experiments and a field study that explore this pattern. The results suggest that the overestimation and underweighting pattern can emerge in parallel. Part of the difference between the two tendencies can be explained as a product of a contingent recency effect: Although the estimations reflect negative recency, choice behavior reflects positive recency. A similar pattern is observed in the field study: Immediately following an aversive rare-event (i.e., a suicide bombing) people believe the risk decreases (negative recency) but at the same time exhibit more cautious behavior (positive recency). The rest of the difference is consistent with two well established mechanisms: judgment error and the use of small samples in choice. Implications for the two-stage choice model are discussed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
The authors license this article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors [2009] This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Figure 0

Table 1: Four repeated choice problems and aggregated proportion of R choices reported in Barron and Erev (2003). The notation (v, p) denotes a gamble that provides v with probability p and 0 otherwise.

Figure 1

Figure 1: Mean proportion of R choices in Study 1, mean subjective assessments in trials 51–100, and observed objective probability of the rare outcome in 10 blocks of 10 trials. Objective probability is the observed proportion of trials where the rare outcome was observed, recalculated after each trial.

Figure 2

Table 2: A summary of the aggregate results of Study 1. The number in parenthesis denotes the null hypothesis for the test reported in the text. All t-tests are one-sample tests unless otherwise noted.

Figure 3

Figure 2: Mean proportion of R choices in Study 2, and subjective assessments of the rare outcome’s probability in 40 blocks of 10 trials.

Figure 4

Table 3: A summary of the results of Study 2 aggregated over Gain and Loss conditions. The number in parenthesis denotes the null hypothesis for the test reported in the text. All t-tests are one-sample tests unless otherwise noted.

Figure 5

Table 4: Counts of individuals aggregated choice of R relative to 0.5 in trials 201–400, and subjective probability estimation (SP), relative to 0.15 in Study 2.

Figure 6

Figure 3: Mean proportion of R choices in Study 3, and subjective assessments of the rare outcome’s probability in 40 blocks of 10 trials.

Figure 7

Table 5: A summary of the results of Study 3. The number in parenthesis denotes the null hypothesis for the test reported in the text. All t-tests are one-sample tests unless otherwise noted.

Figure 8

Figure 4: Mean response (on a 1 to 5 scale) to the three questions (on the x-axis) in conditions Choice and Probability. In Condition Choice the responses reflect the relative extent to which the responders felt cautious; in Condition Probability the responses reflect relative magnitude of estimated chance of attack.

Figure 9

Figure 5: Percentage of days where a suicide bombing occurred according to the previous day for the period of September 30, 2000 - August 31, 2002, during the al-aqsa intifada.