Cultural and social mediation in Taylor

Taylor addresses the problem of the disconnected understanding of the human self. In pre-modern times, human beings understood themselves in relation to the cosmic order. The human self was conceived as a porous self. But in modern times, Taylor observes the disconnected perception of the human self. Self in modernity is a sealed self and a buffered self. The image of the modern self is disengaged (Abbey, Reference Abbey2000, p. 81). Taylor observes that “disengagement is frequently carried out in relation to one’s whole surroundings, natural and social” (Taylor, Reference Taylor2007a, p. 42). Taylor writes, “the modern subject is self-defining, where on previous views the subject is defined in relation to a cosmic order” (Taylor, Reference Taylor1975, p. 6). The self-defining identity of human beings neglects the connexion with the cosmos and nature. Modernity conceived of humans as those who “possessed their own picture of the world within them as well as an endogenous motivation, their own purposes or drives” (Taylor, Reference Taylor1975, p. 539). Reason was bifurcated from the current of life in nature. Jonathan Rowson terms the disenchanted and disengaged world views as the manifestation of a metacrisis arising from a broader civilizational crisis (Rowson, Reference Rowson2021, p. 7). The distorted understanding of the isolated and unsituated liberal self is the metacrisis, an experiential crisis due to the crisis of “sense-making in an increasingly complex natural environment” (Cooley, Shin, Cooley & Avance, Reference Cooley, Shin, Cooley and Avance2023, p. 8).

For Taylor, the disengaged view of nature is related to modernity’s process of objectification of the world. Nature is viewed as static and inert, which can be grasped clearly. “The great invention of the West was that of an immanent order in Nature, whose working could be systematically understood and explained on its own terms” (Taylor, Reference Taylor2007a, p. 15). Nature is reduced to an instrumental role. Nature can be manipulated. The objectified nature, for Taylor, is “not expressive of anything, nor the site of human meanings of any kind, and certainly not ones of crucial significance to ethical life” (Taylor, Reference Taylor2024, p. 31). Instrumental stance towards nature and objectification enable humans’ division from nature. Instrumental rationality leads to ecological irresponsibility (Taylor, Reference Taylor1989, p. 502). Objectification enables humans to control and exploit nature, leading to a blindness of the equilibrium in the ecosystem. Taylor says, “In the effort to control our lives, or control nature, we have destroyed much that is deep and valuable in them. We have been blinded to the importance of equilibria which can be upset, but can’t be created by instrumental rationality” (Taylor, Reference Taylor2007a, p. 317). Instrumental rationality, with an impetus from the growth of positivist science, has been diffused in the modern Western world. Rowson terms the crisis of modernity, which upholds universality, positivism, and unhindered development, as metacrisis. “(M)etacrisis is mostly a metacrisis of modernism — the world of the presumed universality and beneficence of science and reason and progress” (Rowson, Reference Rowson2021, p. 37). Thus, Taylor addresses the concerns of metacrisis by enunciating the problems of instrumental reason in modernity.

For Taylor, human understanding of nature is mediated and interpreted. Though Taylor discusses the capacity of humans for objective representations, he discusses that there is a failure “to acknowledge the conditions of possibility of objective knowledge” (Smith, Reference Smith and Abbey2004, p. 34). For Taylor, humans are self-interpreting animals. As they are self-interpreting, they see the natural environment through culture, tradition and history. As they are self-interpreting, Harmut Rosa observes that for Taylor, “there is no such thing as what they are, independently of how they understand themselves” (Rosa, Reference Rosa1996, p. 40). Taylor goes beyond the dualistic separation of modernity that alienates human subjects from nature. There is an interpretative and culturally mediated understanding of nature. “Taylor argues that our interpretations are a vital ingredient and medium through which knowledge and our understanding of the natural environment is developed” (Lehman, Reference Lehman2015, p. 166). It is not just through the external observation, which is valued in positivist science, that we come to know the nature and the world, but also “through the articulation of personal experience, of our emotions, which we explore through art, or poetry in the widest sense” (Taylor, Reference Taylor2024, p. 6). The specific meanings humans attach to things/ nature are not totally separable from cultural background. A neutral, direct and representative understanding of nature that forgets the background presuppositions can be symptomatic of a sense-making crisis. Thus, as Stein observes, we see a “confusion at the level of understanding the nature of the world” (Stein, Reference Stein2022, p. 8).

For Taylor, social imaginaries of nature are significant. Social imaginaries are the common understandings of ordinary people (Taylor, Reference Taylor2004, p. 23). For Taylor, humans learn and understand the world and nature via social imaginaries. In relation to the social imaginaries, Taylor talks of the cosmic imaginaries. How religious myths and images portray nature becomes important for Taylor. How fables and tales represent nature and other geographic places is significant as the “‘cosmic imaginary’ makes sense of the ways in which the surrounding world figures in our lives” (Taylor, Reference Taylor2007a, p. 323); how nature figures in the cultural images and practices is not to be ignored. Hence, how social imaginaries create a generally shared understanding about nature is to be considered in ecological studies. It is worth mentioning here that, for Regula Kyburz-Graber, environmental problems cannot be taken only as scientific discourse but also as social discourse (Kyburz-Graber, Reference Kyburz-Graber, Stevenson, Brody, Dillon and Wals2013, p. 25). Thus, ecological problems cannot be reduced to positivist science, as social imaginaries of nature serve as the background in grasping nature.

Language plays a significant role in the conception of nature. Language does not just communicate information about nature. Different levels of language have more to offer about nature. Language does not just name or define the things in the world, but also discloses the world/ nature. Language reveals nature. Language gives an experience of connexion. Taylor observes that “our expressions bring about the revelation-and-connection the language of insight yields” (Taylor, Reference Taylor2024, p. 13). Language can alter humans’ relationship with the environment. Thus, we see the influence of language in the understanding of nature.

The social environment is in the background of understanding nature. For Taylor, the relationship with nature is also constructed by the public spheres and civil society (Lehman, Reference Lehman2015, p. 146). How humans relate to the natural world “depends on the social and cultural conditions into which we have been socialized” (Rosa, Reference Rosa2020, p. 6). For Taylor, understanding nature is not individualistic; it is social. Taylor underlines “an ongoing activity of coping with the world, as bodily, social and cultural beings” (Taylor, Reference Taylor, Vanhoozer and Warner2007, p. 60, emphasis mine). Human engagement with nature is by being “inducted into the practices of coping as social ‘games’ or activities” (Taylor, Reference Taylor, Vanhoozer and Warner2007, p. 60). Thus, the social environment cannot be ignored while engaging with the natural environment.

For Taylor, it is essential to conceive that human selves and nature operate and develop — in contrast to the dualistic separation — in an interlinked manner. Humans interact with the world and make it conform to their needs. For Marx, human beings do not begin their relationship with the world on a theoretical plane. They begin by satisfying their needs by eating and drinking. “Man [sic] finds himself in relation to the things of the outside world as a means of satisfying his needs” (Marx, Reference Marx1989, p. 538). Similarly, Taylor writes, “Man can come to see himself in the natural environment by making it over in conformity with his own project” (Taylor, Reference Taylor1975, p. 156). Thus, humans are dependent on nature and are linked to nature. For Taylor, nature also realises itself in being interlinked with humans. Nature is not a static or ordered cosmos but developing and striving. Taylor mentions that “Spinoza’s natura naturans [nature doing as nature does] is seen as in motion, unfolding, seeking its adequate form doing as nature does] is seen as in motion, unfolding, seeking its adequate form” (Taylor, Reference Taylor2024, p. 5). The unfolding and development of nature is linked to the realisation of human beings. “Nature or cosmos can’t reach its final form without our realizing ours” (Taylor, Reference Taylor2024, p. 6). Thus, there is a constitutive relation between the human self and the nature/ world. Rosa observes that Taylor conceives of “reality as being co-constituted in this way, in a mutual movement between subject and world” (Rosa, Reference Rosa2020, p. 50). Capturing the dependence of humans on nature will enable us to grasp their interlink and to come out of the sense-making crisis.

The human self is engaged with nature through labour. Reconciliation between the human self and nature occurs through labour. Glen Lehman points out that, as bequeathed by Karl Marx, Taylor’s self and nature are constructed by social labour (Lehman, Reference Lehman2015, p. 146). Taylor observes that work reconciles the human self and nature in the Hegelian-Marxian tradition. He writes, “Man [sic] in acting on external nature to serve his purposes, in working, helps to transform it and himself, and to bring both sides towards the eventual reconciliation” (Taylor, Reference Taylor1975, p. 120, emphasis mine). Taylor mentions that, for Marx, humans recognise themselves by putting themselves to work (Taylor, Reference Taylor1975, p. 550). Referring to Hegel, Taylor writes, “Conceptual thinking arises out of the learned ability to transform things. We learn to know the world of material reality and ultimately our own minds, in trying to bend this matter to our design. Conceptual thought grows out of this interchange” (Taylor, Reference Taylor1975, p. 157). In a similar vein, Rosa affirms that human beings in transforming the nature form themselves and thus undergo “adaptive transformation” (Rosa, Reference Rosa2020, p. 23). It is worth noting that Taylor goes beyond the dualistic extremes of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism in the conceptualisation of labour.

Freedom and self-realisation are to be conceived in the context of nature. There is no absolute freedom divorced from the natural environment. Lehman observes that the ideal of the authenticity of Taylor shows the self’s embeddedness in nature (Lehman, Reference Lehman2015, p. 164). The conception of negative liberty could not capture the role of nature and cosmos in the formation of the human self. Taylor’s republican conception of freedom is situated in the socio-political and natural environments. Freedom and self-realisation of human beings are to be imagined in a reconciled relation with nature. However, the reconciliation and resonance between the two is ultimately a forward-looking endeavour.

Political and cultural mediation in Gramsci

For Gramsci, knowledge of nature is human-related. Humans know nature through their experiences in the world. Knowledge of nature is tied to an understanding of human needs. There is no knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Gramsci writes, “We know reality only in relation to man [sic]” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, p. 445). Thinking of nature without relation to human beings would be naïve materialism. Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis goes beyond the natural science and materialist metaphysics understanding of nature. For him, “Objective always means ‘humanly objective’” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, p. 445). As knowledge of objective reality is humanly objective, knowledge of nature is a human construct. Gramsci writes, “Without humanity what would the reality of the universe mean? The whole of science is bound to needs, to life, to the activity of humanity. Without humanity’s activity, which creates all, even scientific, values, what would “objectivity” be? A chaos, i.e. nothing, a void” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci and Boothman1995, p. 292). So for Gramsci, nature cannot be explained in isolation from human consciousness (Ives, Reference Ives2005, p. 464). Gramsci’s conception of language also indicates that human language is “central to the production of meaning and creating the world” (Ives, Reference Ives2004, p. 136). Nature is encountered through “discursive totalities” of human beings (Laclau, Reference Laclau1990, p. 109). Thus, grasping nature involves human concerns. This does not mean that Gramsci subscribes to radical volunteerism.

As in Taylor, for Gramsci, understanding nature is closely tied to culture. There is no direct one-to-one relation between the human self and nature. Gramsci does not highlight the neutral and direct understanding of nature. It is via the mediation of common sense that human beings come to know nature. Appealing to the common sense understanding is important in understanding nature. “Nowhere does he advocate a break from it (common sense), rather a superseding of it, based on a praxis that remains immanent to common sense” (Loftus, Reference Loftus, Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus2013, p. 190). Gramsci wants to begin with common sense and then develop a coherent understanding of nature. “It is a matter therefore of starting with a philosophy which already enjoys, or could enjoy, a certain diffusion, because it is connected to and implicit in practical life, and elaborating it so that it becomes a renewed common sense possessing the coherence and the sinew of individual philosophies” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, p. 330). Gramsci’s common sense enables engagement with non-Western cultures, folk religions and practices that value the conservation of nature. This would not imply glorifying culture. Thus, engaging with the common sense and forming a coherent understanding of nature becomes significant in environmental education.

For Gramsci, knowledge of nature is historical. For him, “nature qua nature is an empty category”, and nature receives its value in history (Fontana, Reference Fontana, Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus2013, p. 125). Nature is not a mere objective entity. The sedimentations of the past and the received understandings regarding nature — present in common sense — cannot be ignored. Gramsci writes, “We know reality only in relation to man [sic], and since man [sic] is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity, etc.” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, p. 446). Understanding nature has a historical aspect. When Gramsci mentions “how it (matter) is socially and historically organised for production”, it is an invitation to view nature from socio-historical dimensions (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, p. 465, emphasis mine). In Gramsci, there is an emphasis on the historical production of meaning. For Georg Lukács, knowledge of nature is not absolute. He writes that “I am of the opinion that our knowledge of nature is socially mediated, because its material foundation is socially mediated; and so I remain true to the Marxian formulation of the method of historical materialism: ‘it is social being that determines consciousness’” (Lukács, Reference Lukács2000, p. 106). Thus, nature becomes a social category for Lukács. For Gramsci, nature is a socio-historical category (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci and Boothman1995, p. 292). Peter Ives observes that Gramsci aligns with Max Horkheimer’s refusal to bifurcate nature/ objective reality from history (Ives, Reference Ives2006, p. 143). As in Taylor, for Gramsci, it is significant that nature is understood subjectively, culturally and historically. We can also say that there is a socio-historic component to sense-making that occurs in relation to the environment.

For Gramsci, the human self and nature are actively interwoven. Gramsci writes, “nature and man [sic] are intimately linked, indeed inseparable” (Fontana, Reference Fontana, Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus2013, p. 125). Gramsci opposes the dualism between nature and the self. In his philosophy of praxis, humanity cannot be separated from nature. It is not in isolation that humans grasp the world, but through their activity (Haug, Reference Haug2000, p. 11). For Gramsci, humanity exists “as a subject acting in and through nature” (Fontana, Reference Fontana, Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus2013, p. 136). Humans comprise the natural world. Gramsci brings out the dialectical relation between human beings and nature by saying, “If the environment is the educator, it too must in turn be educated” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, p. 435). Therefore, education cannot be the education of the isolated self, but rather it is actively linked to nature.

For Gramsci, both nature and human beings coevolve through practical acts. Gramsci “seems clear in his refusal to view nature as a realm discrete from human contact; rather, nature and society are co-evolving moments” (Ekers & Loftus, Reference Ekers, Loftus, Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus2013, p. 27). For Gramsci, nature is the coproducer of the human self. It is “through producing nature, humans and their environments co-evolve” (Ekers et al., Reference Ekers, Loftus and Mannc2009, p. 289). The dichotomy between humans and nature is overcome in the practical acts of mutual coproduction between them. Practical acts defy the dualistic outlooks. Walter M. Adamson notes, “(M)en (sic) are both shaped by and shapers of their world” (Adamson, Reference Adamson1980, p. 134). Education may focus on the practical acts, as “it is from everyday acts of producing nature that the fragmented shards of a new conception of the world might emerge” (Loftus, Reference Loftus, Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus2013, p. 193). Thus, humans and nature coevolve through practical acts.

For Gramsci, the active relationship between humans and the environment is through work. Gramsci writes, “Man [sic] does not enter into relations with the natural world just by being himself [sic] part of the natural world, but actively, by means of work and technique” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, p. 352). Humans derive consciousness of themselves in interaction with nature through work. Looking from the Gramscian lens, Fontana writes, “Man’s interaction with nature mediated through labour and technology initiates the historical process through which humanity achieves consciousness of itself and its manifold relations with the world” (Fontana, Reference Fontana1996, as quoted in Loftus, Reference Loftus, Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus2013). Social relations develop through labour. Humans modify themselves and change the natural environment in the process of work. Gramsci goes beyond the technical organisation of labour and highlights the humanistic side of labour. Gramsci’s concern is that the technical organisation of work must not blind the political, ethical and directive aspects. Gramsci writes, “from technique-as-work one proceeds to technique-as-science and to the humanistic conception of history, without which one remains “specialised” and does not become “directive”” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, p. 10). There is a co-production of humans and nature in labour (Loftus, Reference Loftus, Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus2013, p. 191). It is worth mentioning here that for Lukács, labour is “the mediator of the metabolic interaction between society and nature” (Lukács, Reference Lukács1967, p. xvii). Based on Taylor and Gramsci, we can say that environmental education can pay attention to the reconciliation between humans and nature, which occurs through work.

For Gramsci, the conception of the human self is to be evolved in relation to nature. For him, it is impossible to conceive humans without nature (Loftus, Reference Loftus and Bryant2015, pp. 94 – 97). It would be reductionistic to limit the conception of human beings to the individual level. In Gramsci, humans are an ensemble of social relations and are linked to nature. “Man [sic] is to be conceived as an historical bloc of purely individual and subjective elements and of mass and objective or material elements with which the individual is in an active relationship” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, p. 360). Humans are to be understood in their particular social and natural relations. Individuality can be realised only in proper relations with nature (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, p. 360). Human beings are composed of the natural world. Gramsci writes, “The humanity which is reflected in each individuality is composed of various elements: 1. the individual; 2. other men; 3. the natural world” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, p. 352, emphasis mine). Gramsci makes it clear that the conception of the human self cannot be separated from nature. Gramsci writes, “For the philosophy of praxis, being cannot be separated from thinking, humanity from nature, activity from matter, subject from object” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci and Boothman1995, p. 292, emphasis mine). Thus, Gramsci does not just expose the problematic of dualism of modernity that liberalism endorsed, but brings out the interrelationships. Conceptualising the human self in relation to nature enables us to get rid of the metacrisis of sense-making.

For Gramsci, tracing the problems in the cultural environment regarding nature is essential. Environmental education needs to address the problems in the common sense of the people to have a proper relationship with nature. A philosopher should formulate the problems in this relationship. Gramsci writes, “it is a master-pupil relationship, one between the philosopher and the cultural environment in which he has to work and from which he can draw the necessary problems for formulation and resolution” (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci, Hoareo and Smith1971, pp. 350 – 351). A philosopher’s personality must be in active relation with the changes in their cultural environment. “The task of the Modern Prince is to seek to politicize this and to forge a unity between the fragmented, incoherent world of common sense and a new philosophy” (Loftus, Reference Loftus, Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus2013, p. 190). Critical ecological theories must emerge from common sense, the existing worldviews that are to be made coherent and consistent.

Cultivating sociopolitically mediated self-nature relations in environmental education

In facilitating self-nature relations, environmental education must overcome one of the most fundamental crises in modernity: the dualistic-ontological understanding. Besides the self-nature dualism, based on Taylor and Gramsci, we can say that dualisms in the form of culture-nature, mind–body, subject–object, humanities-science, society-nature, psychology-sociology, agency-structure, etc., are to be overcome in education. Extending this list of binaries, we can also say that, for Taylor and Gramsci, the binary of anthropocentrism versus ecocentrism is to be overcome in environmental education. There can be neither an essentialist understanding of nature nor of humans for Taylor and Gramsci. In this line of thought, Ken Dyer and Pam Gunnell argue that “anthropocentrism and biocentrism lie on a continuum” (Dyer & Gunnell, Reference Dyer and Gunnell1993, p. 67). This aligns with Marx and Frederick Engels’ German Ideology, which goes beyond the binary of history/society/politics and nature, by stating that “the nature that preceded human history, is not by any means the nature” (Marx & Engels, Reference Marx and Engels2010, p. 40). It is worth mentioning here that, for Latour, the terms politics and nature do not designate two separate realms of society. The empirical reason is, “Whereas ecology is assimilated to questions concerning nature, in practice it focuses on imbroglios involving sciences, moralities, law and politics” (Latour, Reference Latour2004, p. 231, emphasis mine). As those who are economically marginalised are environmentally and spatially marginalised, and because “A form of economic disequilibrium in the socio-economic system is transmitted as a form of ecological disequilibrium”, there cannot be total disjunction between society and nature (Watts, Reference Watts and Gradus1985, p. 30). For Gramsci, to evolve critical perspectives of the world, the nature-society relation is significant (Wainwright, Reference Wainwright, Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus2013, p. 170). Thus, environmental education has to address the issue of dualisms of various sorts in cultivating self-nature relations.

Secondly, cultural aspects that mediate the self-nature relations are significant in environmental education. Taylor’s concept of social imaginaries — consisting of generally shared background understandings of nature — reinforces the significance of cultural aspects of environmental education, as social imaginaries include myths and stories. Environmental education may not be reduced to positivist sciences and applied sciences. Environmental education can go beyond “culture-free and value-neutral ‘truths’ about nature” (Castree, Reference Castree2014, p. 89). Environmental and experiential/ outdoor education are often struck by the myth of objectivity and fail to recognise the cultural backgrounds that influence human understanding of nature. Environmental education cannot be viewed as a personal affair of individuals with nature, as knowledge of nature is mediated through culture. Noel Castree discusses the “social construction of nature” and notes that there are often forgotten assumptions about nature within a given society. There are “a wide array of shared imaginings, ideas, beliefs, norms, propositions and practices that different people employ in their everyday existence” (Castree, Reference Castree2014, p. xxiii). This would mean that the narrative aspects of nature are significant in education. Environmental education may recognise the value of storytelling practices, which consist of representations of nature. Environmental education may value the religious, cultural and scientific metaphors that bring into focus interrelatedness between humans and the world, as “the physical and cultural worlds are an infinite regress of interlocking levels” (Massumi, Reference Massumi1996, p. 54). Nature fiction can play a significant role in environmental education as stories are easily accessible to the students. Noel Gough acknowledges that “some forms of literary fiction are better suited to mediating human involvement with the world” (Gough, Reference Gough1993, p. 609). Environmental education can value the contribution of cultures to environmental sustainability. Thus, cultural aspects, which play a mediational role in the human-self relations, become significant in environmental education.

Thirdly, being critical of the defective cultural forms and practices is essential in environmental education. Valuing culture does not demand its glorification, paving the way for cultural determinism. Environmental education can pay attention to the “dysfunctional cultural practices” that lead towards environmental degradation (Dickinson, Reference Dickinson2013, p. 329). Environmental education may note that representations of nature in cultural forms are entangled with the human purposes, aims, interests, priorities and values. “(R)representations of nature, be they verbal or visual, on television or in a book, are the products of our values and goals” (Castree, Reference Castree2014, p. 141). Therefore, environmental education can encompass criticism of narratives that depict human domination over nature (Gough, Reference Gough1990, p. 14). It can also be critical of myths and stories that convey purely instrumental value to nature. It can be critical of the myths and metaphorical narratives that stand in favour of “the positivist “scientific detachment” from nature rather than “intractable involvement” in it” (Gough, Reference Gough1991, p. 34). For Dickinson, “How psychological, interpersonal and cultural fracturing promote disconnection” between humans and the environment becomes significant in environmental education (Dickinson, Reference Dickinson2013, p. 328). Environmental expertise and scientific knowledge are to be integrated in the critical engagement with diverse cultures. As for Gramsci, common sense is significant; environmental education can critically appropriate cultural forms and extract the good sense from them (Mayo, Reference Mayo and Maisuria2022, p. 291). Thus, valuing cultural forms and critical engagement with them becomes significant in environmental education.

Fourthly, socio-political aspects that mediate the self-nature relations become significant in environmental education. Environmental education can situate ecological questions in the socio-political–economic contexts because the environment is deeply embedded in political and social relations. Joseph A. Henderson and Rebecca K. Zarger observe, “Our environmental interactions are socially organized and the result of political processes” (Henderson & Zarger, Reference Henderson and Zarger2017, p. 285). While stating the importance of political economy for ecological sciences, David W. Orr argues that “politics, policy and political philosophy are at the core of environmentalism” (Orr, Reference Orr2024, p. 385). A holistic environmental education cannot avoid human values and socio-political issues (Dyer & Gunnell, Reference Dyer and Gunnell1993, p. 67). So, ecological concerns cannot be narrowed to environmentalist-sustainability discourse, neglecting politics. The climate question is also a question of democracy (Swyngedouw, Reference Swyngedouw2010, p. 229). Environmental education cannot overlook the question of power. The human-nature relationship is mediated by a power relation. Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, historical bloc and war of position tells us that all relations are mediated by power. As every relationship is hegemonic, for Gramsci, we can say that the human-nature relationship is also a relationship of power. As power relations are significant in human-nature relations, environmental education cannot “use nature to abort politics” (Latour, Reference Latour2004, p. 19). Environmental education may recognise how nature and politics/ society are co-evolving, co-producing and entangled in power relations (Loftus, Reference Loftus, Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus2013, p. 178). Understanding the power dynamics involved, environmental education can help us imagine hegemonic alternatives.

Lastly, education has to address the crisis in sense-making. Crisis in sense-making can be called, in other terms, an intelligibility crisis. It is forgotten in environmental education that humans engage with nature as sense-making animals or meaning-making creatures. In metacrisis, for Rowson, there are “underlying processes causing us to gradually lose our bearings in the world” (Rowson, Reference Rowson2021, p. 29). One of the underlying crises of modernity is its disengaged outlook. The disengaged outlook has reduced nature to a material for consumption. While discussing the metacrisis of liberalism, John Milbank and Adrian Pabst observe that nature is reduced to bare material for consumption. They write, “The metacrisis of liberalism consists more specifically in its evermore exposed tendency at once to abstract from reality and yet to reduce everything to its bare materiality” (Milbank & Pabst, Reference Milbank and Pabst2016, p. 3). So there is a challenge in sense-making in the instrumentalised natural environment (Cooley et al., Reference Cooley, Shin, Cooley and Avance2023, p. 8). However, based on Gramsci, we can say that education can concern itself with sense-making, which is anchored in the natural and material conditions, as well as the social environment. As human consciousness is social, and common sense understanding is important for Gramsci in engaging with the sense-making crisis, environmental education can consider the social, historical and political contexts of individuals and their natural environments. For Stein, it becomes essential for education to transform sense-making within the social and political contexts (Stein, Reference Stein2022, p. 13). Environmental education can pay attention to the hegemonic forces and “how they (forces) inhibit and/or facilitate human movement through time–space is necessary for understanding sense-making processes” (Dervin, Reference Dervin, Al-Suqri and Al-Aufi2015, p. 64). A broader conception of the human is essential in education to enable the sense-making process. Sense-making process becomes effective by “the idea of the human, a body-mind-heart-spirit living in a time–space, moving from a past, in a present, to a future, anchored in material conditions; yet at the same time with an assumed capacity to sense-make abstractions, dreams, memories, plans, ambitions, fantasies, stories, pretences that can both transcend time–space and last beyond specific moments in time–space” (Dervin, Reference Dervin1999, p. 730, emphasis mine). Environmental education can contribute to the process of sense-making by moving away from disengaged perceptions of nature and engaging with the socio-political and cultural mediation of human beings in the natural world.