Introduction

The rapid development of generative artificial intelligence (AI) and its use for political purposes raises justified concerns about the outcome of sophisticated forms of manipulation that might undermine democratic processes, particularly elections (Muñoz Reference Muñoz2023).

Researchers regularly consider future scenarios in which AI plays a major role, expressing the “fear of what could happen” (Wahl-Jorgensen & Carlson Reference Wahl-Jorgensen and Carlson2021). It draws the attention of policymakers and public opinion to specific threats, helps to imagine what challenges the society will face, but it might also lead to excessive demonization of AI and its incarnations (Yadlin-Segal & Oppenheim Reference Yadlin-Segal and Oppenheim2021).

Deep fakes can be considered a good example of this phenomenon. They can be defined as AI-generated or AI-manipulated audio, image or video content that appreciably resembles existing persons, objects, places or other entities or events and would falsely appear to a person to be authentic or truthful (European Commission 2024). They have found numerous applications in various fields, which may vary from being extremely useful to morally questionable, dangerously harmful or directly illegal (Farid & Schindler Reference Farid and Schindler2020; Pawelec Reference Pawelec2022). This diversity of applications of deep fakes does not allow to qualify them as a bad technology per se (de Ruiter Reference de Ruiter2021), but specific threats stemming from their misuse should not be underestimated, as they have already been effectively employed to discredit and ridicule political opponents, fuel social conflicts, spread hate speech, strengthen gender inequalities or spread disinformation (Chesney & Citron Reference Chesney and Citron2019; Kleemann 2023). The number of malicious applications has led some researchers to develop a dystopian vision of an information or epistemic “apocalypse” that threatens the information environment and society (Schick Reference Schick2020).

One of the key threats analysed in the context of the multiplication of deep fakes in the information space is the possibility of influencing electoral processes, both in the form of enabling the promotion or discrediting of specific candidates, and undermining trust in the elections as such (Chesney & Citron Reference Chesney and Citron2019; Langa Reference Langa2021). The recent years have seen a massive increase in the quality of deep fake technology as well as its “democratization”, that is, its availability for an unlimited audience for little costs. Nowadays almost anyone “can fabricate fake videos that are practically indistinguishable from authentic media” (Westerlund Reference Westerlund2019, p. 39) by using easily accessible, downloadable software that allows for far-reaching interference in the audiovisual content.

Gains in the field of generative AI naturally strengthen the resources available to state and non-state actors, lowering the cost and time needed for creation and propagation of digital disinformation (Maham & Küspert Reference Maham and Küspert2023). Elections are one of the potential targets of malicious activities, which was continuously recognized by many researchers. This study aims to analyse relevant cases of using deep fakes in the context of elections that were reported in 2023. In doing so, the study focuses on three overarching questions:

1. 1. How were deep fakes used in 2023 in the context of elections?

2. 2. Did deep fakes significantly influence the outcome of a particular election?

3. 3. To what extent does the “information apocalypse” narrative reflect the direct impact of deep fakes on election results?

These questions are particularly important for the global super election year 2024, which, due to the number of citizens going to vote, may be symbolically called the “Year of Democracy” (Global Coalition for Tech Justice 2023).

Methodology and limitations of the study

The aim of this study is to verify to what extent dystopian expectations about an “information apocalypse” (Schick Reference Schick2020) fuelled by deep fakes have already materialized exclusively in the context of elections. We decided to limit the scope of the study to elections due to the fact that the main part of the public discourse on deep fakes is dominated specifically by concerns about the elections. The study analyses a non-representative sample of case studies of deep fakes that were reported in eleven countries. These countries (USA, Turkiye, Argentina, Poland, UK, France, India, Bulgaria, Taiwan, Indonesia and Slovakia) were chosen either because they saw an election in 2023 or have ongoing election campaigns.

The selection of the 11 countries analysed below is based on the major (general, parliamentary/legislative or presidential) election calendars for 2023 and 2024. Data for election calendars were provided by The Association of World Election Bodies (2023). We identified 85 different relevant elections that met the criteria. In December 2023 we conducted a Google search tools query for generic phrases: “deepfake AND election” and “deep fake AND election”, as well as specific phrases: “deepfake AND {country}” and “deep fake AND {country}”. Reports related to corresponding electoral processes were identified manually and an enhanced search for positive matches was conducted afterwards. The initial search was limited to English and complemented with local media reports, where possible. Two cases (France, UK) were recognized additionally in a way unrelated to the basic query. We were able to reach most of the deep fakes identified, which allowed us to estimate their visibility based on social media entries or media reports. Such data have significant limitations, because they only take into account the main sources of dissemination of AI-generated content.

We excluded all cases of deep fakes if they did not appear in the direct context of a particular election. In 2023 alone, deep fakes were used for political purposes in many countries—Estonia, Germany, Israel, Japan, Serbia, Sudan among others—and they may also subsequently influence voters’ behaviour as well as contribute to the phenomena of undermining trust in information and the media as described in this study. However, none of these cases indicated a direct link to the election processes. We focus on the holistic deep fakes landscape, not ignoring satirical forms or political advertising, which also contribute to negative phenomena mentioned above.

The limitation of the study might be the reliance on media reports in English, which means that cases reported locally might have been omitted and gone undetected. Researching media reports is justified in a view of the “information apocalypse” narrative that stems from journalistic discourse. Our goal is not to cover all deep fakes, as some of them are also shared in limited, often closed circles and do not get media coverage. However, it should be taken into account that they also shape trust in information and the media and may have a cumulative negative impact on the epistemic value of audio and visual content. The likelihood of using deep fakes increases as the time remaining until the election decreases, which means that in the case of the 2024 elections, many deep fakes may be yet to come.

A significant limitation of considerations is the lack of an appropriate methodological framework for measuring the impact of deep fakes on the election results. Deep fakes are part of the disinformation toolset and it seems impossible to precisely determine the limits of their influence. Therefore, we focus on identifying a direct and decisive impact to recognize any correlation.

Narrative on “information apocalypse”

Since 2018, scientists, philosophers and journalists (Schwartz 2018; Rini Reference Rini2020; Schick Reference Schick2020; Toews 2020; Fallis Reference Fallis2021) have been fuelling fears that deep fakes could lead to a so-called “information apocalypse”, which was linked to gradual erosion of public trust in information and the media. These processes were supposed to completely blur the boundaries between what is true and false. Rini (Reference Rini2020) coined the notion of “epistemic backstop” to describe the reduced epistemic value of visual recordings that historically were associated with credible media, even if they could become subject to falsification or alteration (Galston 2020; Fallis Reference Fallis2021; Geddes Reference Geddes2021).

The detailed considerations on the erosion of trust are necessary to understand the effects of deep fakes on our cognitive processes and information space, whereas the use of terms “apocalypse”, “infocalypse” or questioning the epistemic value of recordings as such seem at least problematic. What exactly is an apocalypse? In classical philosophical and literary terms, it refers to destruction, the end of the world or a global catastrophe. The gradual secularization of the term has popularized its use in non-religious contexts (CenSAMM 2021).

Apocalyptic terms have already been used to describe the negative consequences of disinformation and fake news (Stover Reference Stover2018; Eder Reference Eder2019), what might be called “post-truth narrative” (Habgood-Coote Reference Habgood-Coote2023). They have transposed to the discourse about deep fakes, shaping the doomsdays scenarios (Broinowski Reference Broinowski2022). “Infodemic” (“pandemic of information disorders”) was also commonly used after the COVID-19 pandemic that resulted in a wave of disinformation and fake news (Lim Reference Lim2023). Habgood-Coote (Reference Habgood-Coote2023) refers to “epistemic apocalypse”, but he critically assesses apocalyptical predictions, whereas Horvitz (2022) expects that future generations might find themselves in a “post-epistemic world”. These phenomena might also be associated with “reality apathy” that results from constant exposure to misinformation (Schwartz 2018), or questioning the normative claim that seeing means believing (Galston 2020). The latter was intended to express declining trust in information and its carriers and heralded the end of ocularcentrism (Geddes Reference Geddes2021). In contrast, Immerwahr (2023), using Habgood-Coote’s (Reference Habgood-Coote2023) arguments on social verification, argues that we rarely purely rely on our eyes and reasoning stills plays a major role in distinguishing real from fake. This argument may work in the case of content, which is objectively easy to distinguish, but in the case of hyper-realistic audio or visual deep fakes it may not be valid.

A study published in October 2023 (Twomey et al. Reference Twomey, Ching, Aylett, Quayle, Linehan and Murphy2023, p. 17) suggests that deep fake videos indeed undermine epistemic trust, but the media coverage might “be disproportionate to the threat we are currently facing” and this response might be “creating more distrust and contributing to an epistemic crisis”. Alarmist voices draw attention to certain dangerous phenomena, but they may also foster false belief that an “information apocalypse” is already occurring (Habgood-Coote Reference Habgood-Coote2023), thus contributing to the increasingly negative psychological effects of deep fake technology. In doing so, exaggerated fears about possible effects of deep fake technology in the context of elections might themselves contribute to an “over-pollution” of public discourse on AI and deep fakes.

Our rejection of the doomsday approach is not merely semantic. Shaping appropriate narratives and improving journalistic discourse are not widely recognized as potential countermeasures against deep fakes (Horvitz 2022; Simon et al. Reference Simon, Altay and Mercier2023). A recent study proved this by pointing to the “relatively narrow conceptualization and understanding of deepfakes and their impact on society at large in journalistic discourse” (Weikmann & Lecheler Reference Weikmann and Lecheler2023, p. 13). Excessive concerns may be the result of the speculative nature of predictions and the natural fear of new technologies, which in the past was expressed in the claim that lightbulbs may cause blindness (Murphy et al. Reference Murphy, Ching, Twomey and Linehan2023). Changing the discourse and negating the alarmist–apocalyptic–doomsday narrative is one of the potential steps to slowing down the process of undermining trust in information and the media and preventing an information/epistemic apocalypse.

The implications of the apocalyptic narrative are visible in the public sphere. On the one hand, they shape the discourse, on the other hand, they fuel fear of modern technologies, often leading to their premature demonization (Yadlin-Segal & Oppenheim Reference Yadlin-Segal and Oppenheim2021). It was already proved that regularly repeated warnings contribute to a decrease in trust, excessive scepticism and more frequent marking of real materials as fake (Vaccari & Chadwick Reference Vaccari and Chadwick2020; Twomey et al. Reference Twomey, Ching, Aylett, Quayle, Linehan and Murphy2023). This, in turn, may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy—poorly balanced messages suggesting a complete erosion of the epistemic value of information or their carriers may contribute to erroneous questioning of the veracity of information and recordings.

British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, who himself fell victim to a discrediting deep fake in 2023, indicated that deep fakes “pollute the public information ecosystem” (Gye 2023). These assessments seem to be accurate in the face of the noticeable correlation between the increasing number of deep fakes and the low level of public trust in information and the media (Luminate 2023; Home Security Heroes 2023). In our opinion, giving up the apocalyptic narrative does not have to result in ignoring the problem. We are facing a huge challenge of the reduced epistemic value of recordings that can be empirically measured. In that context, the first signs of the described scenarios are visible. We do not deny that in the worst-case scenario, information/epistemic apocalypse may occur. We decided to check it directly in the context of elections. The currently observed trends evidenced in this study indicate mostly the occurrence of individual cases (with the potential to grow) rather than a mass phenomenon. Fallis (Reference Fallis2021, p. 625) argues that “as deepfakes become more prevalent, it may be epistemically irresponsible to simply believe that what is depicted in a video actually occurred”. A significant weakness of the apocalyptic narrative is the inability to set a clear boundary of information apocalypse and, consequently, difficulties in empirical verification of the thesis.

We argue that a more appropriate term to describe the ongoing process is “pollution of the information environment”. In our opinion, currently it is epistemically irresponsible to simply not believe that what is depicted in a video actually occurred. Only in 11 cases of elections or election campaigns in 2023 were we able to determine the appearance of deep fakes that received media coverage, and only in 2 cases we assume some non-key impact on the results of electoral processes. We have not recorded a significant erosion of democratic elections caused by the occurrence of reported deep fakes, although some phenomena should be a source of justified concern.

Deep fakes in the context of elections—query of selected cases

Consequences for the election processes

According to estimations, the number of deep fakes posted online has tripled in 2023 compared to 2022, while the number of audio deep fakes is eight times higher (Ulmer & Tong 2023). This shows a certain trend, but it is mainly quantitative in nature and does not refer directly to the power of deep fakes to influence election processes. Even the increase in individual cases does not necessarily translate into a decisive impact on voting behaviour. This impact is extremely difficult, if possible at all, to be measured. Deep fakes are part of the disinformation landscape and should be analysed as a contributing factor. The threats and risks of deep fakes for elections should also be considered in the context of undermining trust in the election process as well as in information, truth, facts, authenticity and the media. This is particularly important in view of the year 2024. According to the Integrity Institute (2023), the major elections in 2024 will directly affect 3.65 billion people worldwide (Harbath & Khizanishvili 2023).

The USA and Argentina seem unique due to the extensive use of deep fakes, as evidenced by the number of reported cases, but not necessarily due to their quality or persuasive potential. In our opinion, a breakthrough should primarily be seen in the mere fact of using specific technology in the context of elections and not in its direct consequences. Some countries have had their “first deep fake moments” (Bristow 2023) in 2023, whereas others have become the stage for tests that may lead to the widespread use of this technology for electoral purposes in the future. However, this absolutely does not allow us to indicate that the information environment has been flooded with deep fakes on a global scale or to draw conclusions that an “information apocalypse” is already taking place. This does not mean, however, that the epistemic value of audio and visual materials remains the same.

Although we believe that 2023 has not brought any “breakthrough-deep fakes” so far, it is worth noting cases in which deep fakes could have an impact on the election results. Two cases described above deserve special attention.

In Turkiye one of the candidates was practically forced to withdraw from the presidential race and faced severe reputational consequences. It could contribute to the new distribution of votes. Using deep porn against Muharrem İnce was adapted to local conditions and the candidate’s life situation. His withdrawal was a clear confirmation of the effectiveness of a “deep porn strategy”.

The consequences of the campaign implemented in Slovakia are difficult to estimate. Analysis of the poll results shows slight fluctuations in favour of SMER, while the attacked Progresívne Slovensko did not record any significant declines in the last days of the election campaign. Deviations of 1 percentage point might be treated as an element of statistical error (Politico 2023), but they can also be seen as decisive points allowing for the formation of a government coalition due to the tight race between the two leading parties.

In both cases, the strategies implemented by the attackers are of key importance. The attacks were executed in the last days of the election campaigns, which shortened the reaction time and partly prevented necessary debunking. Therefore, we can point to the use of the classic “decisional checkpoints” defined as the short time preceding the election when “irrevocable decisions are made, and during which the circulation of false information therefore may have irremediable effects” (Chesney & Citron Reference Chesney and Citron2019). The campaigns in Turkiye and Slovakia might possibly pave the way for future uses of this strategy.

According to a poll conducted in August 2023, “more than 70% of citizens in the UK and Germany who did understand AI and deepfake technology say they are concerned about the threat such technology poses to elections” (Luminate 2023). The Home Security Heroes (2023) conducted a similar survey in the USA in the context of the presidential election in 2024. As much as 77% of respondents have encountered deep fake content related to political candidates and, unsurprisingly, 74.7% of the participants expressed their concern about the potential impact of deep fakes on the upcoming election.

It is safe to conclude that there is a huge potential for psychological influence in deep fake technology. In fact, voters’ perceptions and fears about deep fakes might lead to situations where malign actors do not necessarily need to use a deep fake, but simply invoke the possibility that a certain piece of information might be a deep fake. There are several examples where such claims have already influenced politics or social processes. In late 2018, the military launched a coup d’état in Gabon because rumours spread that a video message of then-president Ali Bongo was actually a deep fake and the president himself was dead (Delcker 2019).

All surveys mentioned above clearly support the claim that notwithstanding the actual impact deep fakes have had on elections so far, voters and politicians alike perceive them as a threat. Over 40% of respondents of a study in the USA indicated a sense of scepticism or a sense of being misled or misinformed, which translates into more frequent questioning of the authenticity of displayed materials and an active search for confirmation of their veracity (Home Security Heroes 2023). A recent study (Ahmed Reference Ahmed2023) suggests that exposure to deep fakes is correlated to social media news scepticism. This partly fits into the “apocalyptic” narrative, but the scale of this phenomenon is still limited, as we do not see the erosion of democratic processes or complete questioning of media authenticity. In this sense, ocularcentrism still seems to be prevalent.

Nevertheless, the sheer number of deep fakes makes it more difficult to separate truth from fake, which creates new challenges for recipients. CBS alone rejected around 900 videos that were allegedly presenting events in the Gaza Strip in autumn 2023, which forced the media company to announce an increase in manpower to counteract “the deep fake pandemic” (Lebovic 2023). Again, this fits into the dystopian narrative of an “information apocalypse”, but the media countermeasures constituted an effective barrier, although they require additional expenditure and resources.

This does not mean that the epistemic value of information remains the same. The aforementioned increase in the number of deep fakes gradually increases the uncertainty among recipients, which may be particularly important in critical moments. Numerous images that appeared in the media and presented real recordings of the war in the Gaza Strip were dismissed by online commentators as fakes (Bedingfield 2023). In October 2023, heavily contested online debates with millions of participants spun around an image presented by the Israeli government which depicted innocent children as victims of the terrorist attack. Online users accused the Israeli government of deep faking the image and cited deep fake detection software as evidence. Yet, the picture was genuine and the mere insinuation of the government employing deep fake technology was used as a propaganda weapon (Maiberg 2023a).

In the cases described above it is not so much about deep fakes themselves that are at the core of the problem, but rather the fear and uncertainty, whether a piece of information might be a deep fake or not. This is one of the correct indications of the information apocalypse narrative, which is already confirmed. The mere existence of high-quality deep fake technology can be used as a weapon of information warfare and propaganda. This demonstrates that the disruptive potential of deep fakes does not necessarily root in their ability to persuade audiences of their messages. Instead, perceived psychological threats, fear, uncertainty and the inability to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic content, between fact and fake, may be enough to exert influence and manipulate, especially if fears are fuelled by unreliable reports and society does not develop protective mechanisms. However, the degree of intensity of these processes allows us to distinguish them from the extreme vision of an information apocalypse without disregarding the threats and simultaneously challenging two contradictory narratives that emerged.

The first of them creates the belief that an “information apocalypse” is coming, which in our opinion is mainly rooted in journalistic discourse. The increase in the number of deep fakes reported in 2023, and the case studies described above, should obviously be seen as a warning signal, but none of the analysed campaigns heralds the collapse of the election’s integrity. Much more difficult to measure are the consequences of uncertainty about the authenticity of the media and the decline in trust in news.

The second narrative tends to underestimate the problem in contrast to doomsday scenarios (Economist 2023; Habgood,-Coote, 2023; Immerwahr 2023; Simon et al. Reference Simon, Altay and Mercier2023). Some experts doubt that the potential of deep fakes is large enough to completely change the outcome of the election that finds an outlet in statements like: “We still have not one convincing case of a deepfake making any difference whatsoever in politics.” (Economist 2023). One can only partially agree with such an opinion, as the level of impact and harmfulness might be graded. Even if there has not been a “breakthrough-deep fake” so far, we should not automatically assume that individual cases of deep fakes have not had any influence on elections and the political process. Although fears about the impact of generative AI on misinformation might be indeed partly overblown (Simon et al. Reference Simon, Altay and Mercier2023), one should not be overly optimistic in assuming that a “breakthrough-deep fake” will not occur in future. These two narratives in regard to deep fakes will interpenetrate, contributing to additional information chaos.

Another consequence of the growing number of deep fakes might be the growing interest in using deep fake technology for political advertising. It is a powerful tool, as it already allows to change many characteristic features of candidates and minimize or completely eliminate deficits of their performances. With the help of deep fake technology, candidates may appear more appealing, younger, better-looking, more energetic, can speak to many audiences at the same time, in different languages and customize their messages for each voter personally. The ongoing experiments with speech translation and personalized messages may set new standards in political advertising, the consequences of which cannot be clearly assessed in technological, legal, or ethical terms. These problems, however, are still understudied and do not show enough recognition.