Governance

The negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, which placed pre-existing national territorial claims into abeyance, put in place the mechanism for a form of international governance of the Antarctic continent and surrounding Southern Ocean above latitude 60°S. Currently, 54 nations are signatories to the Antarctic Treaty ('Parties'), with the 29 Consultative Parties that have demonstrated substantial research activity in the region eligible to partake in governance decision-making through a consensus model at the normally annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) (Gray & Hughes Reference Gray and Hughes2016) (Fig. 1). The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (signed 1991, entered into force 1998) sets out basic principles for the protection of the Antarctic environment and established the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP), which normally meets annually to provide advice and formulate recommendations to the Parties in connection with the implementation of this Protocol for consideration at the ATCM. However, due to the risks associated with COVID-19, the planned 2020 ATCM and meeting of the CEP, scheduled to convene during the period 25 May–4 June in Helsinki, Finland, were cancelled. The ATCM rules of procedure allow for intersessional consultation and agreed action by the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat (ATS; see para. 46: https://documents.ats.aq/atcm42/ww/ATCM42_ww010_e.pdf); however, it remains to be seen to what degree discussion on the impact of COVID-19 will be undertaken across the Treaty Parties facilitated by virtual rather than face-to-face communication. Taking the broader remit of the Treaty Parties into consideration, the work of the ATCM and CEP will inevitably be delayed to some extent. From an environmental management perspective, revision of existing protected area management plans and designation of new protected areas will be postponed, as will agreement of initiatives to respond to the effects of climate change in Antarctica. Nevertheless, some intersessional work is likely to continue through various ATCM and CEP fora, including the CEP Subsidiary Group on Management Plans and Subsidiary Group on Climate Change Response, in anticipation of the next face-to-face ATCM and CEP meeting, or pending the development of an alternative virtual mechanism for ATCM decision-making.

The Antarctic Treaty is based upon openness and freedom of international scientific investigation and cooperation, including the exchange of scientific personnel between Antarctic expeditions. Furthermore, the Treaty allows Parties to inspect the stations, ships and aircraft of other signatories within the Treaty area, and for designated observers to ‘have complete freedom of access at any time to any and all areas of Antarctica’, although the effectiveness of this system has been questioned (Tamm Reference Tamm2018). The ability to fulfil these actions may be jeopardized by the quarantine procedures made necessary by COVID-19, thereby undermining, albeit temporarily and for sound reasons, some of the founding principles of the Antarctic Treaty System.

The CAMLR Convention was established with the primary objective of conserving living resources in the Southern Ocean, where conservation includes rational use of those resources (www.ccamlr.org). Fishing is intended to be demonstrably sustainable, and each year the Parties to the Convention meet and use available scientific data to set catch limits for each fishery (primarily including toothfish, icefish and krill) within the Southern Ocean, and to agree associated conservation measures. The CAMLR Convention rules of procedure allow for intersessional decision-making (see Rule 7: https://www.ccamlr.org/en/system/files/e-pt3_0.pdf), but the practicalities of agreeing new and updated conservation measures, including those pertaining to catch limits for commercially harvested species, for the coming year in the absence of a physical meeting have yet to be determined.

Impacts upon national operator logistics, science, tourism and the fishing industry

Tourism

After a record number of 74 401 tourist visitors to Antarctica in the 2019–20 summer (IAATO 2020), it will be a challenge for the largely cruise-based tourism industry to operate effectively in 2020–21. Multiple factors will play a role, including potential access restrictions at gateway ports and airports (see Fig. 1), the likelihood of severe ongoing long-haul international travel restrictions and probable lower demand from customers (many of whom are more elderly and therefore demographically more vulnerable to the virus) due to concern over infection risk and difficulties in acquiring medical insurance (Ing et al. Reference Ing, Cocks and Green2020, Liu et al. Reference Liu, Chen, Lin and Han2020). National governments permitting tourism activities in Antarctica may stipulate minimum quarantine or social distancing standards to increase passenger safety, although the physical constraints and economics of providing adequate mitigation, given the structure of typical smaller cruise vessels, and the reliance of the Antarctic cruise industry on small boat supported landings, could be insurmountable or impractical. On King George Island, South Shetland Islands, Chile has facilitated the use of Teniente Rodolfo Marsh Martin Airport by some tour operators as a cruise exchange point, flying visitors in and out of Antarctica using the commercial airline Aerovías DAP, where they join or leave their cruise vessel (Liggett & Stewart Reference Liggett, Stewart, Dodds, Hemmings and Roberts2017). These flights also bring tourists who make a short overnight stay at an established tourist camp on the island. Making this a viable option from a safety perspective during the 2020–21 season may be challenging, while various national operators also utilize the same air link and flights. All of these factors may combine to result in a dramatic short-term decline in the Antarctic tourism industry on a scale comparable to, if not considerably greater and longer lasting than, the 43% drop in visitor numbers following the global economic downturn of 2007–08 (Nicola et al. Reference Nicola, Alsafi, Sohrabi, Kerwan, Al-Jabir and Iosifidis2020) (see Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Tourist visitors to Antarctica (1992–93 to 2019–20) (IAATO 2019, 2020).

Environmental impact

Under these unprecedented circumstances, how will a reduced human presence, over the short term at least, affect the Antarctic environment? Antarctic terrestrial ecosystems are simple, comprising mosses, lichens, liverworts and only two species of flowering plant, with the native terrestrial fauna limited to microinvertebrates, protozoa, tardigrades, nematodes, rotifers and only two insect species (Convey Reference Convey2017). Microbial species rapidly become dominant with higher elevation and distance from the coast. The richest terrestrial communities, bird colonies and seal haul-out sites are limited to the 15% (~6000 km²) of the total ice-free area across the continent (~44 000 km²) that is located close to the coast where generally milder climatic conditions are found (Hull & Bergstrom Reference Hull, Bergstrom, Bergstrom, Convey and Huiskes2006, Convey Reference Convey2017, Bokhorst et al. Reference Bokhorst, Convey and Aerts2019). However, it is within this small area that most research stations and tourist visitor sites are found (Brooks et al. Reference Brooks, Jabour, van den Hoff and Bergstrom2019), resulting in direct and ongoing competition between the needs of humans vs those of nature and creating a challenge for effective protection and conservation (Pertierra et al. Reference Pertierra, Hughes, Vega and Olalla-Tárraga2017, Leihy et al. Reference Leihy, Coetzee, Morgan, Raymond, Shaw and Terauds2020).

Human activity in Antarctica has led to well-documented local environmental impacts, including non-native species introductions (Frenot et al. Reference Frenot, Chown, Whinam, Selkirk, Convey, Skotnici and Bergstrom2005, Hughes et al. Reference Hughes, Pertierra, Molina-Montenegro and Convey2015), major one-off and chronic pollution events (Bargagli Reference Bargagli2005) and destruction of terrestrial and marine habitat (Tin et al. Reference Tin, Fleming, Hughes, Ainley, Convey and Moreno2009). A sudden and substantial reduction in human activity within Antarctica potentially has clear short-term benefits for Antarctic ecosystems. The risk of introduction of non-native species to marine and terrestrial environments will decrease with the reduced arrival of cruise and research vessels and landings of tourist visitors, cargo and national operator personnel (Frenot et al. Reference Frenot, Chown, Whinam, Selkirk, Convey, Skotnici and Bergstrom2005, Chown et al. Reference Chown, Lee, Hughes, Barnes, Barrett and Bergstrom2012, Hughes et al. Reference Hughes, Pertierra, Molina-Montenegro and Convey2015, Convey & Peck Reference Convey and Peck2019, McCarthy et al. Reference McCarthy, Peck, Hughes and Aldridge2019). With many national operators temporarily scaling down or ceasing deep-field activities, the risks of intra- and inter-regional transfer of species will also be reduced (Hughes et al. Reference Hughes, Convey, Pertierra, Vega, Aragón and Ollala-Tárraga2019). However, trampling impacts upon fragile Antarctic soil and vegetation often have long-lasting consequences due to naturally slow recovery rates, so short-term reductions in human activity may have only limited benefits (Tejedo et al. Reference Tejedo, Benayas, Cajiao, Albertos, Lara and Pertierra2016, https://www.environments.aq/emerging-issues/the-impacts-of-trampling-and-ground-disturbances-on-antarctic-soils). The risk of major pollution events resulting from marine incidents should decline with fewer vessels operating in the area (Kennicutt et al. Reference Kennicutt, Sweet, Fraser, Stochton and Culver1991, Aronson et al. Reference Aronson, Thatje, McClintock and Hughes2011), albeit that, should an incident occur, the already limited capacity to mount search and rescue and any required oil spill responses will be diminished further (Filler et al. Reference Filler, Kennicutt, Snape, Sweet, Klein and Fingas2015). With fewer vessels and some summer-only research stations remaining closed, fuel combustion for power generation will decline with a concurrent temporary reduction in local greenhouse gas production and atmospheric pollution (Wolff Reference Wolff1992, Poland et al. Reference Poland, Riddle and Zeeb2003, Amelung & Lamers Reference Amelung and Lamers2007). However, with some stations and facilities remaining unvisited and routine maintenance not being undertaken, the chance of leakage from fuel storage systems may increase, along with other sources of pollution, particularly where existing infrastructure is already aging (Wilkness Reference Wilkness1990, Tin et al. Reference Tin, Fleming, Hughes, Ainley, Convey and Moreno2009, Braun et al. Reference Braun, Hertel, Mustafa, Nordt, Pfeiffer, Peter, Tin, Liggett, Maher and Lamers2014). A further pollution threat concerns the potential for loss, through burial, of fuel drums stored in remote locations to support deep-field activities, some of which need to be raised every 1–2 years (depending upon the snow accumulation rate). Lower research station occupancy will also result in lower volumes of sewage release to the environment, thereby temporarily reducing the release of pollutants, such as trace metals and microplastics, and non-indigenous microorganisms (Connor Reference Connor2008, Power et al. Reference Power, Samuel, Smith, Stark, Gillings and Gordon2016, Reed et al. Reference Reed, Clark, Thompson and Hughes2018, Stark et al. Reference Stark, Conlan, Hughes, Kim and Martins2019, Webb et al. Reference Webb, Hughes, Grand, Lohan and Peck2020). Lower levels of visitation will reduce disturbance of wildlife, which may be particularly relevant in locations where wildlife population declines have been linked to tourism and national operator activity (Pfeiffer Reference Pfeiffer2005, Coetzee & Chown Reference Coetzee and Chown2016, Dunn et al. Reference Dunn, Forcada, Jackson, Waluda, Nichol and Trathan2019, https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/461/publikationen/4424.pdf). Ongoing or planned major infrastructure projects or station redevelopment work may be slowed or postponed, delaying any associated environmental impacts (Antarctica New Zealand 2020b, British Antarctic Survey 2020a, European Polar Board 2020, https://future.usap.gov/what-is-aims/). Limits on field party activity could, in the short term, reduce the rate of expansion of the human footprint within Antarctica, thereby prolonging the integrity of the region's wilderness areas (Hughes et al. Reference Hughes, Fretwell, Rae, Holmes and Fleming2011, Leihy et al. Reference Leihy, Coetzee, Morgan, Raymond, Shaw and Terauds2020).

Keeping SARS-CoV-2 out of Antarctica

Many potential routes exist for the importation of SARS-CoV-2 into Antarctica. Ships are the main means for transport of people and cargo to Antarctica, although many national operator personnel today arrive in Antarctica by air. Estimates of the intensity of shipping activity across fishing, tourism and research sectors suggest there may be ~180 vessels and ≥ 500 voyages in Antarctic waters annually, with a concentration of activity around the northern Antarctica Peninsula and Scotia Arc, where ~50% of Antarctic research stations and most of the established tourist visitors sites are located (see https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Ats/VisitorSiteGuidelines?lang=e) (Fig. 2), as well as the most intense fishery activity (McCarthy et al. Reference McCarthy, Peck, Hughes and Aldridge2019). Once within the Antarctic Treaty area, vessels may resupply or visit several stations and support scientific, logistical or tourism activities at multiple locations, thereby acting as potential dispersal agents for the virus, both into and within Antarctica. Aircraft are used by both national governmental operators and the tourism industry to transport people and high-priority or perishable cargo (such a fresh foods) rapidly to Antarctica, and in relative comfort compared to the often rough and extended ocean crossing by ship. Aircraft operators may experience difficulty accessing Antarctica due to flight restrictions in South America and elsewhere. Aircraft operated by several national operators as well as commercial companies often use a number of established airstrips. In particular, Teniente Rodolfo Marsh Martin Airfield, Fildes Peninsula (Chile), Rothera Research Station, Adelaide Island (UK), Troll Airfield (Norway), Novo Runway (Russian Federation; Antarctic Logistics Centre International (ALCI)) and McMurdo Station (USA) are used as stopping and/or refuelling points as aircraft transit through to other research stations and field locations on the continent; however, this in itself has risk and will need to be managed (Hughes et al. Reference Hughes, Convey, Pertierra, Vega, Aragón and Ollala-Tárraga2019).

The Drake Passage separates the Antarctic Peninsula from southern South America, and the ~800 km crossing provides the most rapid ship access to the continent, typically taking 2–3 days, while aircraft can access the continent in only a few hours (as little as 1.5 hours from Punta Arenas to King George Island, 4–5 hours to Adelaide Island and 4 hours to Union Glacier) (Bender et al. Reference Bender, Crosbie and Lynch2016). These time periods are considerably shorter than the incubation period of the virus for an infected person, and such flights are shorter than virus viability in the atmosphere or on various surfaces (Asadi et al. Reference Asadi, Bouvier, Wexler and Ristenpart2020, van Doremalen et al. Reference Van Doremalen, Bushmaker, Morris, Holbrook, Gamble and Williamson2020), demonstrating the need for effective quarantine practices of staff for ~14 days prior to Antarctic deployment (Laurer et al. Reference Laurer, Grantz, Bi, Jones, Zheny and Meredith2020).

The Antarctic research community and national operators have considered and implemented, to varying extents, wider biosecurity procedures to prevent the introduction of non-native species to Antarctica (Chown et al. Reference Chown, Lee, Hughes, Barnes, Barrett and Bergstrom2012, https://www.comnap.aq/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Intercontinental-Checklists-2019.pdf) and, to a lesser degree, the anthropogenic dispersal of native and non-native species within the continent (Hughes et al. Reference Hughes, Convey, Pertierra, Vega, Aragón and Ollala-Tárraga2019), although the extent to which these would have any impact on the introduction of viruses is unclear. General consideration has also been given to the prevention of dispersal of animal pathogens between bird colonies and seal haul-out sites (Kerry & Riddle Reference Kerry and Riddle2009, https://documents.ats.aq/ATCM42/WW/ATCM42_WW008_e.pdf). However, the imposition of quarantine measures to prevent the dispersal of human disease within Antarctica had received little international attention prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, representing a major logistical challenge for both national operators and the tourism and fishing industries. National operators are increasingly aware of these issues and are making considerable efforts to plan for the 2020–21 summer season, giving priority to the health of their personnel and visitors and to the Antarctic environment (Antarctica New Zealand 2020a, British Antarctic Survey 2020b).

SARS-CoV-2 may be transmitted via symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals (Nishiura & Kobayashi Reference Nishiura and Kobayashi2020, Yu & Yang Reference Yu and Yang2020), making the use of a 14 day quarantine and testing period prior to travel a sensible precaution to reduce the risk of transmission (Chen et al. Reference Chen, Li, Deng, Huang, Ou and Lin2020). The virus may also be transferred via recently contaminated cargo and food supplies, albeit virus load may be low. Frozen foods are routinely used to provision Antarctic stations; however, coronaviruses in general show considerable stability in a frozen state and may survive for up to 2 years at -20°C, so ensuring adequate quarantine or sterilization practices may not be easily delivered (https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200221-sitrep-32-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=4802d089_2). To safeguard station personnel, individual national operators may also be reluctant to host visits from either other national operators or cruise vessels at their Antarctic and sub-Antarctic research stations, as has been common practice to date (Bender et al. Reference Bender, Crosbie and Lynch2016, Laing & Garrison Reference Laing and Garrison2020, https://www.antarctica.gov.au/news/2020/australian-antarctic-program-precautionary-measures-against-novel-coronavirus). Heritage organizations that normally operate on the continent may not be able to undertake routine maintenance of historic huts, such as those in the Ross Sea region, or be able to provide staff to manage the hut at Port Lockroy (Antarctic Peninsula) (Dunn et al. Reference Dunn, Forcada, Jackson, Waluda, Nichol and Trathan2019, https://nzaht.org/covid-19-update/, https://www.ukaht.org/news/latest-news/what-does-covid-19-mean-for-ukaht-1/). The implications of reduced access to historical and heritage sites may be minimal in the short term, unless urgent building maintenance is required. Nevertheless, a reduction in Antarctic tourist visitation may result in a decline in donations to these organizations, which may have longer-term implications for the conservation of Antarctic heritage.

Risk to human health should the COVID-19 pandemic reach Antarctica

Currently, there are no vaccines available against COVID-19 infection, no specific antiviral drugs to treat those infected and only limited treatments available that appear to lessen the effects of the more serious cases or the probability of mortality. Should SARS-CoV-2 be transferred to Antarctica, regional climatic conditions may influence its viability and transmissibility. Some preliminary evidence suggests that lower temperatures and humidities, which are characteristic in Antarctica, may increase the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 (Tobías & Molina Reference Tobías and Molina2020, Wang et al. unpublished data). However, conversely, many microorganisms and viruses are susceptible to damage by ultraviolet (UV) radiation; consequently, high levels of UV radiation in Antarctica, particularly during mid-summer and the period of anthropogenic ozone depletion in the spring, may reduce transmission risk in the outdoor environment (Hughes Reference Hughes2005, Carleton et al. unpublished data, Karapiperis et al. unpublished data, Merow & Urban unpublished data).

In stark contrast to the more mature age demographics of tourist visitors, research and support personnel travelling to Antarctica with national operators are often from lower age groups and are generally subject to rigorous medical screening prior to deployment, making them potentially less susceptible to developing the more severe symptoms of COVID-19 (Davies et al. Reference Davies, Klepac, Liu, Prem, Jit and Eggo2020). Conversely, many personnel typically engage in tiring physical work under demanding environmental conditions with limited access to fresh foods, which may negatively affect their immune system (Tingate et al. Reference Tingate, Lugg, Muller, Stowe and Pierson1997). In particular, mucosal immune suppression has been reported in the early months of an Antarctic expedition (less so during the overwintering period), which is the period of greatest movement of personnel and potential transmission risk (Cameron & Moore Reference Cameron and Moore1968, Gleeson et al. Reference Gleeson, Francis, Lugg, Clancy, Ayton, Reynolds and MacConnell2000). Furthermore, psychological stress and anxiety, possibly exacerbated by concern about the safety of friends and family members from COVID-19 infection in home nations (Laing & Garrison Reference Laing and Garrison2020, https://abcnews.go.com/International/life-antarctica-continent-case-coronavirus/story?id=69716325, http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/54392/1/SR%2057%286%29%2030-31.pdf), may also affect susceptibility to disease (Palinkas & Suedfeld Reference Palinkas and Suedfeld2008, Khandelwal et al. Reference Khandelwal, Bhatia and Mishra2015).

On a typical research station, physical space is at a premium and personnel live in close proximity, sharing bedrooms/bunkrooms and bathroom facilities and eating in communal spaces, making social distancing impractical and providing substantial opportunities for virus transmission. Furthermore, most people infected with SARS-CoV-2 are believed to shed the virus in their faeces, even if they are asymptomatic, so research station sewage systems present a major risk of further virus transmission, with sewage treatment plant technicians being particularly at risk (Gormley et al. Reference Gormley, Aspray and Kelly2020, Zhang et al. Reference Zhang, Wang and Xue2020). Medical facilities vary greatly across research stations and on board vessels (COMNAP 2017), and few if any are equipped with the sophisticated medical equipment, including ventilators, required to treat serious infections, while medical oxygen supplies required to aid those in respiratory distress are generally very limited or not available (Ñamendys-Silva Reference Ñamendys-Silva2020). Currently, serious medical issues normally result in the patient being evacuated from Antarctica. However, this can present extreme logistical challenges (including risk to the personnel involved), require the diversion of resources from other tasks, take considerable time and may be hampered by poor weather conditions, particularly if the person concerned is part of a remote field party or the requirement arises in the Antarctic winter. A limited number of wintering stations, as well as summer field parties, are located at high altitude (≥ 3000 m above sea level) on the polar plateau, where atmospheric pressure may make any lung infections that limit oxygen uptake more serious (COMNAP 2017). Given the rapid rate at which COVID-19 symptoms can develop, dealing with an infection in Antarctica is likely to be a serious and potentially life-threatening issue, particularly as most vessels and smaller research stations do not have doctors or fully trained medical professionals. It may also be difficult to safeguard the health of those providing care, many of whom will not be professional medical practitioners trained in the proper use of personal protective equipment (where available), hand hygiene, aseptic techniques and environmental infection control measures, instead being general station personnel with some additional first aid training (Cheung et al. Reference Cheung, Ho, Cheng, Cham and Lam2020).

Should instances of COVID-19 infection become apparent at an Antarctic research station, the typical geographical isolation of stations and the limited and well-controlled number of transport routes between them mean that isolation and quarantine measures could, in most cases, be rapidly and effectively applied (Pertierra et al. Reference Pertierra, Hughes, Vega and Olalla-Tárraga2017, Hughes et al. Reference Hughes, Convey, Pertierra, Vega, Aragón and Ollala-Tárraga2019). Similarly, an outbreak aboard ship should be easily contained within the vessel. However, in areas where there are clusters of stations and frequent exchange of personnel, such as the South Shetland Islands, Larsemann Hills and parts of Victoria Land, quarantine measures may be more difficult to enforce (Laing & Garrison Reference Laing and Garrison2020). For example, the Chilean Eduardo Frei Montalva Station and the Russian Federation's Bellingshausen Station on Fildes Peninsula are directly adjacent to one another, five other stations are located in the immediate vicinity around Maxwell Bay and the area is a transport hub for personnel travelling on to other stations as well as national operator and cruise vessels. In this case, internationally agreed and enforced quarantine practices will be required to prevent virus spread following an outbreak (COMNAP 2017). Difficulties may be further exacerbated where airstrip infrastructure is used by more than one nation. Examples include the Teniente Rodolfo Marsh Martin Aerodrome on Fildes Peninsula, operated by Chile (which is used by multiple nations including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the UK, Uruguay and the commercial airline Aerovías DAP from Chile), and Rothera Research Station, which is used by aircraft from the UK, the USA, Canada (charter for Italy, the USA and other nations), Germany, China and Chile, or the Williams Field airfield near McMurdo Station, Southern Victoria Land, which is operated by the USA and also used by the Canadian charter operator, New Zealand and, occasionally, Italian, Korean, British and Australian logistics. Should a case of COVID-19 become evident at a research station, one response might be the evacuation of that person and other (if not all) personnel on that station from the continent as rapidly as possible. However, finding a gateway port that will accept a number of infected personnel, or those suspected of infection, could be problematic. Furthermore, the most rapid route off the continent may entail air transport via other stations and/or the use of ships, probably involving assistance from other operators, which may generate substantial risks of further infection. More generally, it remains to be seen how necessary quarantine measures may affect the ability of national operators to provide and engage with emergency search and rescue operations. In particular, the relative prioritization of quarantine and search and rescue is not clear.

Virus transmission to Antarctic wildlife

Antarctica is well known for its charismatic wildlife, including penguins and seals, which often congregate in densely packed colonies, and there is a general concern about transfer of disease to Antarctic wildlife (Kerry & Riddle Reference Kerry and Riddle2009). Animal mass mortality events due to disease are little documented within Antarctica, and current knowledge of pathogens and diseases in wildlife is limited (Barbosa & Palacios Reference Barbosa and Palacios2009, Grimaldi et al. Reference Grimaldi, Seddon, Lyver, Nakagawa and Tompkins2015). Within the Antarctic region, evidence for several commonly pathogenic viruses has been recorded in avifauna (e.g. influenza virus A, Newcastle disease virus) and marine mammals (e.g. sealpox virus and canine distemper virus) (for an overview, see https://www.environments.aq/information-summaries/antarctic-wildlife-diseases). The zoonotic origins of many coronaviruses (including SARS-CoV-2) are thought to be from bats, the natural reservoir host, where they are generally non-pathogenic; however, pathogenicity may occur following transmission to a new host species, including humans (Zhou et al. Reference Zhou, Yang, Wang, Hu, Zhang and Zhang2020). Coronaviruses have been isolated from a variety of infected birds, mammals and other vertebrates, including cats, cows, dogs, ducks, ferrets, lions, mice, mink, pangolins, pigs, tigers, turkeys and some snake species, with a subset of these exhibiting disease symptoms, but the extent of the intermediate host range for SARS-CoV-2 has yet to be determined (Opriessnig & Huang Reference Opriessnig and Huang2020, Ye et al. Reference Ye, Yuan, Yuen, Fung, Chan and Jin2020, Reference Leroy, Ar Gouilh and Brugère-PicouxLeroy et al. in press). The potential for zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from humans to Antarctic wildlife, which could result in rapid spread within colonies and even animal mass mortality events, is a cause for concern. However, the ability of this virus to jump the species barrier to Antarctic wildlife, via humans or other species, and the likelihood of disease symptoms developing are as yet unknown (Goumenou et al. Reference Goumenou, Spandidos and Tsatsakis2020, Leroy et al. in press). Some Antarctic species, including skuas, gulls and fur seals, migrate from Antarctica to places, such as southern South America, where there are already high COVID-19 infection rates in human populations and contaminated water sources, and they could act as a further route for infection in populations within Antarctica. Should humans on research stations become infected, released sewage may contain the virus, thereby providing a further mechanism for infection of wildlife in the vicinity (Smith & Riddle Reference Smith, Riddle, Kerry and Riddle2009, Stark et al. Reference Stark, Conlan, Hughes, Kim and Martins2019).

A recent report examined the likelihood of reverse zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from humans to Antarctica wildlife (Barbosa et al. unpublished data). Given the lack of information available concerning the potential for infection of Antarctic species, the authors advocate use of the precautionary principle and propose a set of guidelines to reduce the risk of reverse zoonotic transmission of the virus from humans to Antarctic wildlife (Barbosa et al. unpublished data).

Considerations for the longer term

Here, we have considered predominantly the short-term impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic upon Antarctica. The unprecedented nature of this worldwide heath crisis means that predicting how global society will adapt and respond is extremely difficult. Given that activity in Antarctica is almost entirely dictated and driven by priorities within individual nations and the rapid rate at which those priorities are changing, the future range and extent of human activities in Antarctica are difficult to predict. What is not in doubt is the high cost of conducting Antarctic research. With the global economy under considerable strain and many new calls on national resources, the funding of Antarctic research may appear to be a relative luxury. However, this perspective overlooks the critical nature of Antarctic research in our understanding of globally important ongoing issues including climate change and sea-level rise (ITGC 2020). While COVID-19 is resulting in global upheaval, the threats presented by global environmental change over the coming decades may be considerably more severe (IPCC 2019). A priority for the Antarctic community will be to communicate the importance of Antarctic research to national governments in order to ensure ongoing investment. Since sealers first set foot on the continent 200 years ago, Antarctica has tested the resilience, determination and ingenuity of those who seek to go there. COVID-19 is an additional challenge that must be effectively managed to ensure science of global relevance is maintained. Nevertheless, a forced reduction in research activity on the continent itself may provide an opportunity for scientists to further analyse some of the many existing datasets collected prior to the pandemic, thereby increasing scientific knowledge without further associated environmental impact in Antarctica, although this can only be a ‘stop gap’ or short-term mitigation measure for the scientific community. It may also create an opportunity for researchers to reflect on the status of existing scientific knowledge and how it can be best communicated to policymakers in order to elicit appropriate action - an issue of particular and urgent relevance with regard to climate change (Knutti Reference Knutti2019).

One potentially positive outcome of the pandemic, which is not exclusive to Antarctica, has been the need to explore and implement practical methods to hold international discussions and meetings, particularly in light of the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with travel (e.g. Blackman et al. Reference Blackman, Bruder, Burdon, Convey, Funk and Jähnig2020). SCAR, COMNAP and CCAMLR have all held at least some of their normal meetings via various virtual meeting platforms, while the ATCM and CEP have continued using existing online platforms hosted by the ATS (www.ats.aq). However, this is part of a separate and wider ongoing debate, with the efficacy of such approaches being far from resolved. For example, SCAR's rules of procedure (https://www.scar.org/library/governance/5118-rules-of-proc-may18/), underlying its consensus decision-making process, currently demand that its Delegates' meetings take place in person, but there has been some delay in the agreement of a virtual decision-making process by all member nations.