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DAMASCIUS ON THE CAUSES OF MATTER: IN PARMENIDEM 1.15.7–14

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2026

Leonida Vanni
Leonida Vanni*
Affiliation:
University of Florence
*
leonida.vanni@kuleuven.be
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Abstract

In In Parmenidem 1.15.7–14, Damascius surveys several principles in a first attempt to determine what is the cause of matter qua matter. This article aims to correct the text and interpretation of these lines adopted in the standard edition of Damascius’ In Parmenidem by Westerink and Combès, by proposing the emendation δύναμιν οὖσαν in line 11; more generally, it seeks to elucidate this intricate passage, which is a largely neglected source for Damascius’ conception of the material layers. In doing so, the article sheds light on his present strategy to address the question, by showing that it involves going through several aspects of the material substrate—that is, various material layers—from the most specific to the most elementary, and taking into consideration the cause of each of them. Moreover, the article clarifies the identity of the various entities that Damascius mentions in the passage. This analysis will thus contribute to the reconstruction of Damascius’ theory of the origin of matter.

Keywords

DamasciusIn Parmenidemmattermaterial layersprinciplesdynamis

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Research Article
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The Classical Quarterly , First View , pp. 1 - 14
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INTRODUCTION

This article aims to clarify some lines of Damascius’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (1.15.7–14), by emending the text and interpretation presented in the standard edition of this work (by L.G. Westerink and J. Combès).Footnote 1 The lines at issue are part of a passage (1.15.7–16.15) in which Damascius investigates the cause(s) of matter; after raising the question of what is the cause of matter qua matter (τί τὸ τῆς ὕλης ὡς ὕλης αἴτιον;, 1.15.7), he mentions as possible answers several principles, each of which brings about a distinct material layer (1.15.7–14). In the subsequent lines, the discussion takes a different turn: Damascius’ previous statements concerning the relations between principles and material layers are, per se, true, but they provide no satisfactory answer to the original question, since the mentioned principles are causes of other entities in addition to matter and, therefore, cannot be the cause of matter in its specificity; but the latter necessarily has some proper cause (1.15.15–16.4). Since all properties derive from the gods, the proper cause of matter qua matter must be identified with a specific divine order, that of the ‘material gods’ (1.16.5–15).Footnote 2 The last part of Damascius’ discussion is lost because of a lacuna in our sole primary manuscript of his In Parmenidem, namely the Marcianus gr. 246 (MS A, ninth century).

As mentioned, I focus here on the first part of this passage (1.15.7–14). To understand these lines, it is necessary to bear in mind some essential features of late Neoplatonic philosophy, of which Damascius was one of the last representatives. The late Neoplatonists conceive of reality as a hierarchical structure in which every entity, from the highest principles to the lowest effect, has a precise position. According to a fundamental law of this system, the causality of a principle reaches farther down the scala naturae than that of the lower ones.Footnote 3 Roughly speaking, the causal activity of each principle after the first one consists in bringing about a ‘property’, broadly construed, which is built upon the more elementary properties produced by the previous principles, and which forms the basis for the less elementary ones; in keeping with the law of causality stated above, the lower a principle is, the less elementary and less widespread is the property that it generates. Of all the properties of any given entity, that which characterizes it most is the most specific (which it receives from the lowest-ranked of its principles). In view of this all, the late Neoplatonic scala naturae has a symmetrical structure: the first principle produces all the subsequent levels of reality, including the very last one, which somehow resembles it in so far as they both lack any positive property; the causal power of the second principle extends as far as the last but one entity, which mirrors it in so far as its essential and most distinctive property derives from that principle; the third principle corresponds to the last but two entity in the scale of reality, and so on (for a visual representation of how the system works, see scheme 2 at the end of this article). To clarify this through an example: of the three principles ‘being’, ‘life’ and ‘intellect’, intellect is the lowest-ranked; correspondingly, the faculty of thinking is a less basic function than living or being, and a less widespread one (there are fewer thinking entities than living or being entities); moreover, there is a correspondence between thinking entities and intellect: just as the latter has being and life, but is distinguished most of all by its connection with the property of thinking (which it brings about), so the former have being and life, but are characterized above all by thought (except for those thinking entities that also possess even more specific properties).

Scheme 1.

The hierarchy of principles (down to the intellective gods) in Damascius’ philosophy.

Scheme 2.

Relations between the principles and the corresponding aspects of matter.

In this framework, for any entity that Damascius mentions, determining its rank in the scale of reality and (if it is not itself a principle) identifying the principle to which it corresponds is far from being a sterile exercise: rather, it means finding out its essential feature and its identity.

1. WESTERINK AND COMBÈS’S TEXT AND INTERPRETATION OF IN PARM. 1.15.7–14

1.1. The interpretation of In Parm. 1.15.7–10

After raising the question about the cause of matter, Damascius suggests a possible answer (1.15.7–10):

[7] τοῦ μὲν γὰρ εἴδους [sc. αἴτιόν ἐστι] τὸ

[8] παράδειγμα ἢ ὁ δημιουργός. ἢ καὶ τῆς ὕλης ἡ ἑκατέρου

[9] θεότης, τοῦ μὲν ὡς κοσμουμένης ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους, τοῦ δὲ

[10] ὡς δεχομένης ἁπλῶς τὸ εἶδος.

For, [the cause] of form [is] the paradigm or the demiurge. Also of matter [is cause] the divinity of each of them: [the divinity] of the latter [is cause of matter] in so far as it is ordered by form, while [the divinity] of the former [is cause of it] in so far as it simply receives the form.

In his translation, Combès refers τοῦ μέν to the paradigm and τοῦ δέ to the demiurge,Footnote 4 but this interpretation is untenable: of the two mentioned beings, the paradigm (= intelligible intellect [= 2.3])Footnote 5 is the higher ranked and the demiurge (= third intellective intellect [= 4.1.3]) is the lower ranked; of the two mentioned phenomena, the mere reception of the form is prior and more general,Footnote 6 while the ordering of matter is posterior and more specific, and presupposes some pre-existent (traces of) forms in matter. Hence, in the light of the law of causality enunciated in the introduction, the reception of the forms must be ascribed to the paradigm, while the ordering of matter is owed to the demiurge. This is also more consistent with the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Timaeus: after matter has already received some traces of the forms, the demiurge orders it by bestowing on it the forms proper.Footnote 7

1.2. In Parm. 1.15.10–14: the transmitted text and Westerink–Combès’s text

The subsequent lines are rather baffling and will require a more thorough discussion. MS A has the following text:

[10] ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτων ἡ

[11] δύναμις ὡς δύναμις οὖσαν παρήγαγεν, καὶ τὸ πέρας ὡς

[12] πάντων στέρησιν, τὸ δὲ πρὸ πάντων ὡς ἕν. ἢ ὡς ἓν μὲν

[13] τὸ πέρας τῷ ὄντι, ὡς δ’ ἔτι καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἓν ἀπόρρητον ἡ

[14] μία τῶν ὅλων ἄρρητος αἰτία.

Such as it stands, the passage can be translated as follows: ‘Or rather, [we should answer that], before these [sc. the demiurge and the paradigm], potency qua potency produced [matter], as existing/which existed, and limit [produced matter] qua privation of all things, while that which is before all things [produced it] qua one. Or rather, it is limit, in fact, that [produced it] qua one, while the one unspeakable cause of all things [produced it] qua ineffable even beyond the one.’

In the first sentence, the phrase οὖσαν παρήγαγεν is awkward and can hardly be sound as it stands; therefore, the corrector Ax conjecturally emendedFootnote 8 οὖσαν to οὖσα, ἣ. Westerink accepts this correction, which results in the following text:

[10] ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτων ἡ

[11] δύναμις ὡς δύναμις οὖσα, ἣ παρήγαγεν καὶ τὸ πέρας ὡς

[12] πάντων στέρησιν, τὸ δὲ πρὸ πάντων ὡς ἕν κτλ.

This is Combès’s rendering of the whole passage: ‘Ou bien [sc. the cause of matter] c’est antérieurement au paradigme et au démiurge, la puissance qui, en sa qualité de puissance, a produit aussi le limitant conçu comme privation de tout, tandis que, comme un, le limitant est antérieur à tout; ou bien, cette cause, en tant qu’un, c’est le limitant dans sa réalité, et, comme ineffable encore et au-dessus de l’un, c’est l’unique cause indicible des touts.’

This emendation radically changes the meaning of the passage. In MS A’s text, a) in the first clause (up to παρήγαγεν) we have to understand ὕλην as the direct object of παρήγαγεν, and these two words are to be supplied in the subsequent clauses (stretching from καί to στέρησιν; from τὸ δέ to ἕν; from ἢ ὡς to τῷ ὄντι; and from ὡς δ’ ἔτι to αἰτία).

b) Except for δύναμις, all the terms introduced by the adverb ὡς (στέρησιν, ἕν, etc.) agree with the understood direct object ὕλην and indicate which specific aspect of matter is each time being considered.

c) τὸ πέρας is (in both occurrences) a nominative and refers to one of the causes of matter.

d) In lines 8, 10 and 12, ἤ introduces some possible answers to the question about the cause of matter, but there is a slight difference between the first two instances and the last one. Damascius’ statements in lines 8–10 and 10–12 do provide different, and possibly alternative, answers to the original question, but the doctrines they expound are, per se, perfectly compatible: after establishing a relation between a material layer and a principle, Damascius simply moves on to a different, more basic aspect of matter and a different, higher-ranked principle. On the contrary, in lines 12–13 Damascius goes back to some items that he has already discussed (in lines 11–12) and advances an alternative account of their relationship: in lines 11–12, he had ascribed matter’s privative nature to limit, and its unity to ‘that which is before all things’ (i.e. the one); now (lines 12–13) he replaces privation with unity as the effect of limitFootnote 9 and replaces the one with limit as the cause of unity. In the light of these considerations, τῷ ὄντι (line 13) must have a corrective force (‘in fact’, ‘in reality’).

In the emended text (as construed by Combès), a’) in the first clause (up to οὖσα), as well as in the last two (from ἢ ὡς to τῷ ὄντι and from ὡς δ’ ἔτι to αἰτία), τῆς ὕλης αἴτιόν ἐστιν must be supplied from Damascius’ statement of the question in line 7; with τὸ δὲ πρὸ πάντων ὡς ἕν one has to supply merely ἐστιν.

b’) Except for στέρησιν, all the terms introduced by the adverb ὡς agree with the subjects of the sentences,Footnote 10 which refer to the various causes of matter, and indicate in what respect these principles are being considered, that is, in what respect they can be envisaged as causes of matter.

c’) In line 11, τὸ πέρας is an accusative, and is not mentioned as one of the causes of matter.

d’) ἤ in line 12 does not introduce an alternative account of the relationship between the entities mentioned in the previous lines; rather, it has the same function as in its previous instances (lines 8, 10): in other words, Damascius is just moving on to a further property of matter and to its principle. τῷ ὄντι (line 13) cannot therefore have a corrective value; whence Combès’s translation ‘dans sa réalité’.

1.3. Problems with Westerink–Combès’s text

This reconstruction of the text has several problems.

I) A major difficulty is linked with point b’, as a look at the context of the passage shows. Damascius starts with a question about the cause of matter qua matter (τῆς ὕλης ὡς ὕλης, line 7); he first answers by pointing to two beings that can be claimed to cause matter in two different aspects or stages of its existence (τοῦ μὲν ὡς κοσμουμένης ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους, τοῦ δὲ ὡς δεχομένης … τὸ εἶδος, lines 9–10; see above, section 1.1). Then comes the passage under consideration, where Damascius mentions several possible causes of matter. After that, the discussion takes a new turn: ‘These considerations are indeed true, but we are looking for the proper cause of matter, [that is, something that is] cause [of matter] not along with its other products nor as something other, but as matter and nothing else, and of matter only. For each property has a proper principle too, but the one, the limit, the unlimited, the paradigm and the demiurge produce matter along with their other products’ (ἢ ἀληθῆ μὲν ταῦτα, ζητοῦμεν δὲ αἰτίαν τῆς ὕλης ἴδιον, οὐ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ ὡς ἄλλο τι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὕλην μόνην καὶ μόνης τῆς ὕλης αἰτίαν. ἑκάστη γὰρ ἰδιότης ἔχει τινὰ καὶ ἴδιον ἀρχήν, τὸ δὲ ἓν καὶ τὸ πέρας καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὴν ὕλην παράγει, In Parm. 1.15.15–20).

So, at the beginning of the passage, Damascius sets out to investigate the cause of matter as such; at the end, he expresses his dissatisfaction with the answers he has given: all the mentioned principles produce matter not as such, but as something else (for example, as formed, as one, etc., whereas matter is not formed by its own nature, nor is being one something peculiar to it). In the lines in between, he mentions some entities that are responsible for the existence of matter, but only in so far as they bring about some non-distinctive attributes of it. Accordingly, throughout these lines Damascius must have been interested in pointing out in what respect these principles can account for the being of matter, that is, in stating for which of the various layers of matter they are responsible; on the contrary, specifying what aspect of the principles is each time being considered would be pointless in our context. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that, as in lines 7, 9, 10 and 16 (2x),Footnote 11 also in lines 11 (2x), 12 (2x) and 13 ὡς should introduce a reference to a specific aspect of matter rather than of its causes. The reconstruction of the passage adopted by Westerink and Combès does not adhere to this reasonable assumption, thus blurring Damascius’ train of thought in the passage.

II) As we have seen, referring the terms introduced by ὡς to the principles rather than to matter involves an inappropriate shift of focus. Even regardless of this, and considering these specifications in themselves, some of them turn out to be perplexing or redundant.

II.1) In line 11, Damascius affirms, according to Westerink and Combès, that potency produces matter ‘en sa qualité de puissance’;Footnote 12 he mentions potency only here in the passage, though, and does so in a generic manner, without hinting at any further distinction in its regard; so, what need is there to highlight that it is being envisaged qua potency? This addition does not clarify the notion of potency, nor is there any reason to stress this particular point.

II.2) The case of lines 11–12 (where, as opposed to the above-discussed instances, the specification introduced by ὡς does not relate, according to Westerink and Combès, to a cause of matter) is even more problematic: any attempt at identifying the entity referred to as ‘limit’ results in unsurpassable difficulties, nor can one see what the point is of mentioning this entity in the present context. In particular, limit here cannot be the first of the unitary principles above being (that which Damascius usually calls ‘the one-all’) [= 1.2], since this is superior to the very first potency and cannot therefore be its product. Nor can it be identified with the first intelligible triad (= the one-being) [= 2.1], since the latter, far from being the privation of all things, pre-contains all determinations. Turning to the lowest levels of reality would not help, since Damascius cannot be thinking of matter (as the phrase πάντων στέρησιν would suggest):Footnote 13 it would be strange of him to refer to matter as ‘limit’,Footnote 14 and senseless to say that ‘the cause of matter … is potency …, which also produced limit’, if limit coincided with matter.

2. SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION OF IN PARM. 1.15.10–14

2.1. My proposal for correcting the text

In view of these difficulties, Westerink and Combès’s reconstruction of the text proves untenable. In emending A’s text, we should keep closer to its original syntax, which does not present such problems: these are mostly due to the introduction of a relative pronoun (ἥ, line 11), which involves an unwelcome rearrangement of the syntax. I therefore propose to abandon Ax’s line of intervention and to change the second δύναμις to δύναμιν, while retaining the transmitted οὖσαν,Footnote 15 which results in the following text:

[10] ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτων ἡ

[11] δύναμις ὡς δύναμιν οὖσαν παρήγαγεν, καὶ τὸ πέρας ὡς

[12] πάντων στέρησιν, τὸ δὲ πρὸ πάντων ὡς ἕν.

Translation: ‘Or rather, [we should answer that], before these [sc. the demiurge and the paradigm], potency produced matter in so far as it is a potency, and limit [produced it] qua privation of all things, while that which is before all things [produced it] qua one’ (the translation of the subsequent lines does not differ from the one that I provided above, pages 3–4).

This intervention restores a logical and consistent structure: in each of the seven segments into which the text of lines 9–14 can be divided, Damascius invariably mentions two elements, that is, a principle of matter and the particular aspect/layer of matter that is caused by that principle; and he regularly proceeds from the most specific to the most elementary material layer and, correspondingly, from the lowest to the highest principleFootnote 16 (for a representation of the content of the passage, see scheme 2 at the end of this article).

The previously discussed problems are thus avoided. It is not necessary to dwell on point (I) any longer; as for point (II.1), any redundancy disappears: in the “ὡς-specification”, Damascius appropriately expresses the correspondence between the principle under discussion and the aspect of matter for which it is responsible—that is to say, he shows that the latter mirrors the former:Footnote 17 matter is a passive potency, just as the principle is an active one. Moreover, the identification of limit (point II.2) no longer poses any problem, as we shall presently see.

The discussion of the passage would indeed not be complete without a few clarifications concerning the identities of the principles that are mentioned. As regards the third principle, potency (ἡ δύναμις) is the intermediate item of the triad ‘father, potency, intellect’ (πατήρ, δύναμις, νοῦς), which originates from the Chaldean Oracles (and which also takes the alternative form of ‘subsistence, potency, act’: ὕπαρξις, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια). The Neoplatonists associate the triad with several levels of reality, so that each of the three terms can refer to more than one entity.Footnote 18 In our passage, there are two possible referents for ‘potency’: on the one hand, in late Neoplatonic philosophy the names ‘father’, ‘potency’ and ‘intellect’ can be applied to the intelligible domain [= 2];Footnote 19 in keeping with this, Combès maintains that the potency mentioned in our passage belongs to the intelligible realm.Footnote 20 On the other hand, the Chaldean names can also refer to the principles that Damascius usually calls, in the De principiis, the one-all [= 1.2], the all-one [= 1.3] and the unified (or its summit) [= 2/2.1], which are the highest instance of the Chaldean triad (although Damascius stresses that this use of the names is not proper and merely analogical).Footnote 21 Hence, ἡ δύναμις in line 11 may indicate the all-one.

In Parm. 4.119.1–7 supports the latter interpretation. In that passage, Damascius draws a list of properties of the material substrate that closely resembles the one at issue;Footnote 22 in particular, in In Parm. 4.119.3–4 he claims that the pair of properties ‘privation – potentiality (τὸ δυνάμει)’ derives ‘from the first principles’ (ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν). Here, by ‘the first principles’, he unequivocally refers to the one-all [= 1.2] and the all-one [= 1.3]; while he does not spell out which principle is responsible for which property, only the latter is related to the notion of potency: clearly, then, according to In Parm. 4.119.1–7, matter’s potentiality derives from the all-one, while privation must originate from the one-all. In view of the similarity between the two passages, it is tempting to conclude that also in 1.15 the cause of matter’s potentiality must be the all-one.

Also the fact that the principle under discussion is later referred to as ‘the unlimited’ (τὸ ἄπειρον, In Parm. 1.15.18–19)Footnote 23 lends support to this interpretation. The unlimited is the second item of the triad ‘limit, the unlimited/unlimitedness, the mixed’ (τὸ πέρας, τὸ ἄπειρον/ἡ ἀπειρία, τὸ μικτόν), which derives from Plato’s Philebus Footnote 24 and is somewhat analogous to the Chaldean triad;Footnote 25 now, the late Neoplatonists normally use these names to refer to the first principles, that is, Damascius’ one-all, all-one and unified:Footnote 26 ‘the unlimited’, then (and, consequently, potency), indicates the all-one.Footnote 27

The identification of the fourth and fifth principles mentioned in our passage is less problematic: in the light of the considerations above, ‘limit’ must indicate the one-all [= 1.2]; as for ‘that which is before all things’, which produces matter qua one, it is clearly the one itself [= 1.1].Footnote 28 One may be surprised that Damascius distinguishes so sharply the one from the one-all and the all-one, since in the De principiis he treats the last two as aspects or moments of the first (or at least comes very close to that);Footnote 29 here, however (like in many other passages), he is evidently sticking to the traditional late-Neoplatonic account.

Finally, the title ‘the one unspeakable cause of all things’ (lines 13–14) could designate either the one [= 1.1] or the ineffable principle [= 0] that Damascius posits above the one itself. The former hypothesis might seem the more plausible, since, in the De principiis, ἡ μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχή apparently ‘désigne très précisément l’un’;Footnote 30 moreover, given that the one has been replaced by limit as the cause matter’s unity (lines 12–13), we should expect Damascius to find another role for it. On the other hand, that which brings about matter as something ὑπὲρ τὸ ἓν ἀπόρρητον (on this phrase, see section 2.2, point 1) must plainly be such itself, and, in the absence of any qualification, this phrase is more naturally applied to the ineffable than to the one. Furthermore, according to Damascius’ commentary on the Parmenides, what produces the most basic material layer is not the one, but the ineffable.Footnote 31 Further evidence in the same direction comes from the list of material layers presented in In Parm. 4.119.1–7;Footnote 32 the most basic layers are potentiality and privation, which stem from the first principles, unity, and ineffability, which derives from τῆς μιᾶς τῶν ὅλων αἰτίας; as I already mentioned, ‘the first principles’ are the one-all and the all-one, so that unity must derive from the one, and ‘the one cause of all things’, which causes matter as ineffable, can only be the ineffable principle.Footnote 33

The last principle mentioned in our passage is, therefore, the ineffable; if, after limit has been assigned the role of causing matter’s unity, the one is left with no place of its own in the list, this is in keeping with the tendency, which Damascius displays in the De principiis, to avoid any clear-cut distinction between the two.

2.2. Addressing potential difficulties with my emendation

My proposal is, at first glance at least, not free from difficulties (which it shares with the transmitted text).

1) It involves considering the term ἀπόρρητον (line 13) as an accusative and referring the phrase to which it belongs (ὡς … ἔτι καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἓν ἀπόρρητον) to matter (whereas, according to Westerink and Combès, it is a neuter nominative and relates to ἡ μία τῶν ὅλων ἄρρητος αἰτία; cf. above, section 1.2, points b and b’). But how could matter be described as ‘ineffable even beyond the one’?

Nevertheless, the fact that this phrase is used of matter does not entail the unacceptable consequence that Damascius is ranking matter higher than the one. Later in his commentary, Damascius emphasizes that prime matter does not relate to the one, but to something even more radical, the ineffable principle above unity, and he repeatedly stresses that, by virtue of this connection, it is itself not-one and ἀπόρρητον—even more so than the one.Footnote 34 The attribution of this adjective to matter is therefore not problematic. As for the phrase ὑπὲρ τὸ ἕν, it does not mean that matter ranks above the one, but that its degree of ineffability is higher than the one’s (ἔτι καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἓν ἀπόρρητον being virtually equivalent to ἔτι τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπορρητότερον).Footnote 35 Damascius is ultimately trying to convey the analogy of prime matter qua caused to the first principle qua cause of it.

2) A few lines later (1.15.18–20, quoted and translated above, page 5), Damascius refers to five principles as being causes of matter, but not its proper (ἴδιον) cause. This passage is apparently meant to recapitulate, in reverse order, the list of the causes of matter provided in lines 8–14. Nevertheless, the two lists do not seem to tally with each other.

The second list comprises (i) the demiurge, (ii) the paradigm, (iii) the unlimited,Footnote 36 (iv) limit and (v) the one.Footnote 37 As for the first one, Damascius first (lines 7–12) mentions (i) the demiurge, (ii) the paradigm, (iii) potency, (iv) limit and (v) the one; he then (lines 12–14) attributes to limit the function that was previously assigned to the one, and adds ‘the one unspeakable cause of all things’ as the cause of matter qua utterly ineffable. After the first four principles, then, the first list includes (v) the one and (vi) the ineffable—or perhaps, since the one has been replaced by limit, we should just substitute (v) the ineffable for the one. In either case, the list does not square with that of lines 18–20.

The second list (lines 18–20), however, corresponds to the original formulation of the first one (lines 7–12): Damascius is just sticking to this first part of our passage, without taking the subsequent correction into account. This negligence is scarcely surprising: since Damascius is rejecting the approach followed so far as unsatisfactory, the details of the previous discussion are of little interest to him now.

Incidentally, accepting Westerink–Combès’s reconstruction of the passage would not put us in a better position with respect to the task of reconciling the two lists. On their interpretation, the first list (lines 7–14) consists of (i) the demiurge, (ii) the paradigm, (iii) potency, (iv) limit and (v) ἡ μία τῶν ὅλων ἄρρητος αἰτία—which phrase, as we saw, must refer to the ineffable. Now, unlike my correction, Westerink’s text entails that there is just one formulation of the first list, and that the one as a principle of matter does not figure in it;Footnote 38 hence, the second list, which mentions the one instead of the ineffable, cannot be reconciled with the first one.

Before leaving the issue of these lists, it should be observed that, in the end, the reader is left with no definite answer to the question of which account of the roles of limit and the one represents Damascius’ considered views (as regards the ineffable, there is no doubt, in the light of other passages,Footnote 39 that he does include it among the causes of matter). On the one hand, as we just saw, in lines 18–20 Damascius restates the original formulation of the first list (with limit and the one as the causes of privation and unity, respectively: lines 11–12), not the corrected version (with limit as the cause of unity: lines 12–13); the former formulation also corresponds to Damascius’ statements in the above-mentioned parallel passage In Parm. 4.119.1–7. On the other hand, it is possible that, in both passages, Damascius presents this account of matter’s causes not because he is fully committed to its accuracy, but only because it aligns with the more ‘conventional’ late-Neoplatonic view of principles, which distinguishes limit from the one; in some respects at least, the revised version of the list arguably keeps closer to Damascius’ treatment of these principles in the De principiis.Footnote 40 Further research is therefore necessary to settle this question.

CONCLUSIONS

In emending the text of the passage, I have brought out Damascius’ strategy in these lines for determining the cause of matter qua matter—a strategy that consists in enumerating various material layers, down to the most elementary one, and considering the cause of each of them as a possible candidate for that role; from this perspective—I have argued—the passage makes better sense both considered in itself and in relation to its broader context. Moreover, I have clarified the identity of the entities that Damascius mentions; by doing so, I hope to have contributed to the understanding of a generally neglected source for his conception of the origin of matter. The results of my analysis are summarized in schemes 1 and 2: the former illustrates Damascius’ hierarchy of principles down to the intellective gods;Footnote 41 the names used in our passage are in bold type. Scheme 2 represents the relations between the mentioned principles and the corresponding aspects of matter; dotted (under)lines refer to Damascius’ account at 1.15.11–12, which he revises in lines 12–13.

Footnotes

*

I thank Concetta Luna for reading an earlier version of this article and providing helpful remarks. Research for this article was made possible by a doctoral fellowship from the Universities of Pisa and Florence and, subsequently, by the generous support of the PRIN Project ‘Ancient Science, Ancient Philosophy (the ASAP Project). The Philosophical Foundation of Sciences’ (Cup B53D23022420006), which funded a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Florence. The article was completed and accepted during this period, prior to my current employment at KU Leuven. The University of Florence also kindly covered the costs of open-access publication.

References

1 L.G. Westerink and J. Combès, Damascius: Commentaire du Parménide de Platon, 4 vols. (Paris, 1997–2003); in citing Damascius’ In Parmenidem, I shall refer to the volume, page and line numbers of this edition. The only other edition (C.-É. Ruelle, Damascii successoris Dubitationes et solutiones de primis principiis, In Platonis Parmenidem [Paris, 1889], 2 vols.) and translation (A.-É. Chaignet, Damascius le diadoque. Problèmes et solutions touchant les premiers principes, 3 vols. [Paris, 1898]) of Damascius’ In Parmenidem, which are both rather unreliable, have been completely superseded by the excellent work of Westerink and Combès.

2 For a brief discussion of this doctrine (in the context of an analysis of Damascius’ doctrine of matter) see G. Van Riel, ‘Damascius on matter’, in T. Bénatouïl, F. Trabattoni and E. Maffi (edd.), Plato, Aristotle, or Both? Dialogues between Platonism and Aristotelianism in Antiquity (Hildesheim, 2011), 189–213, at 205–6.

3 Cf. e.g. Procl. El. theol. 57, 60.

4 Cf. also Westerink–Combès (n. 1), 1.15 nn. 6, 7 (the latter = notes complémentaires [henceforth n. c.], page 119).

5 Here and in the following pages, the numbers in square brackets correspond to those in scheme 1 (page 13).

6 The adverb ἁπλῶς ‘simply’ hints at its being more elementary; the mere reception of the forms by matter must precede their ordering (= the ordering of matter). Cf. also Dam. In Parm. 4.119.1–3 (on which see page 8 and n. 22).

7 The Neoplatonic doctrine of the traces of the forms is based on Tim. 52d4–53b5 (and, more indirectly, on 30a3–5 and 69b3–c2); on Damascius’ conception see In Parm. 4.54.12–13, 69.3–16 (these passages imply that the traces exist before demiurgy), 71.19–22 and Van Riel (n. 2), especially 201–13. Cf. also, on Proclus’ treatment of the traces of the forms, Van Riel (n. 2), 193–4; G. Van Riel, ‘Proclus on matter and physical necessity’, in R. Chiaradonna and F. Trabattoni (edd.), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism (Leiden and Boston, 2009), 231–57, especially at 246–7; C. Luna and A.-P. Segonds, Proclus: Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon (Paris, 2007–21), 4.12 n. 4 (= n. c., pages 259–62). Proclus, too, ascribes the bestowal of the forms on matter to the third intelligible triad (= the paradigm) and the ordering of the forms to the demiurge: see Van Riel (this note [2009]), 251, and Luna and Segonds [this note], 4.12 n. 2 (= n. c., pages 258–9).

8 As explained in the conspectus siglorum of Westerink and Combès, Ax is a corrector distinct from the main scribe of A. Since Westerink, who was in charge of the constitution of the text of the Budé edition, died before its publication, the edition is not provided with a philological introduction analysing and assessing Ax’s interventions on the text. An examination of the latter shows, at any rate, that they are mostly correct, but are confined to small emendations within the reach of a Byzantine reader’s ingenium, whereas they never restore the text in the case of more problematic corruptions. One can conclude—provisionally, but with a good degree of assurance—that Ax corrected the text ope ingenii and was not in a better position to establish Damascius’ text than any modern scholar, as he had no access to any textual source other than A itself; in other words, his corrections have no testimonial value and should be treated as conjectures.

9 Damascius does not specify whether limit causes matter as one besides producing it as privation of all things, or the former function of limit substitutes the latter (which would imply that he abandons the idea of ascribing matter’s privative nature to a superior principle). The second option is more likely since in all the other cases there is a one-to-one correspondence between the principles and the properties of matter.

10 In line 13, ἀπόρρητον must be understood as a neuter nominative that forms the predicative complement of a feminine noun.

11 Cf. also 1.16.8 τῆς ὕλης ὡς ὕλης ἐργάται (‘producers of matter qua matter’).

12 Incidentally, ὡς δύναμις οὖσα does not seem a natural way to convey the meaning ‘en sa qualité de puissance’ in Greek; I would rather expect Damascius to say simply ὡς δύναμις.

13 This seems to be Combès’s interpretation: with reference to potency, which has just been mentioned in line 11, he remarks that ‘rien n’échappe à sa fécondité, même pas la privation de tout (i.e. la matière)’ (Westerink–Combès [n. 1], 1.15 n. 8 [= n. c., page 119]).

14 Note that, in Proclus’ exhaustive list of all the instances of limit throughout the scala naturae (In Parm. 6.1121.22–1123.19 Luna–Segonds [= 1121.18–1123.15 Steel]), no place is reserved for matter: the lowest entity that Proclus mentions is enmattered form (as Combès himself points out: Westerink–Combès [n. 1], 1.15 n. 8 [= n. c., page 120]).

15 δυνάμει οὖσαν (‘is in potency’) is also possible; cf. (in a partly different context, though) Proclus, Theol. Plat. 3.8, page 34.7–8.

16 Save, logically enough, when he suggests replacing the one with limit as the cause of matter qua one (lines 12–13).

17 In the case of limit producing matter qua privation, the relation between the two elements might seem more extrinsic, but it is in line with what Damascius says elsewhere (In Parm. 4.119.1–7, on which see page 8).

18 On the Chaldean triad, see H. Seng, Un livre sacré de l’antiquité tardive: les Oracles Chaldaïques (Turnhout, 2016), 42–7. On its treatment on the part of Neoplatonists, see R. Majercik, ‘Chaldean triads in Neoplatonic exegesis: some reconsiderations’, CQ 51 (2001), 265–96, at 266–78; also M. Abbate, ‘Significato e funzione della triade οὐσία – δύναμις – ἐνέργεια nel neoplatonismo greco pagano’, in R. de Filippis and E.S. Mainoldi (edd.), La triade dell’Essere. Essenza – Potenza – Atto nel pensiero tardo-antico, medievale e rinascimentale (Turnhout, 2022), 79–95. On Damascius’ treatment of the triad (or its alternative formulation) or of some of its items, see J. Combès, ‘Ὕπαρξις et Ὑπόστασις chez Damascius’, in F. Romano and D.P. Taormina (edd.), Hyparxis e hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo. Atti del I Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo (Florence, 1994), 131–47 (reprinted in J. Combès, Études néoplatoniciennes [Grenoble, 19962], 327–49); J. Dillon, ‘Some aspects of Damascius’ treatment of the notion of dynamis’, in F. Romano and R.L. Cardullo (edd.), Dunamis nel Neoplatonismo. Atti del II Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo (Florence, 1996), 139–48 (reprinted in J. Dillon, The Great Tradition. Further Studies in the Development of Platonism and Early Christianity [Ashgate, 1997], ch. XXII); I. Grimaldi, ‘Ὕπαρξις, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια in relazione all’Unificato. La triade neoplatonica nel De primis principiis di Damascio’, in R. de Filippis and E.S. Mainoldi (edd.), La triade dell’Essere. Essenza – Potenza – Atto nel pensiero tardo-antico, medievale e rinascimentale (Turnhout, 2022), 121–39; on Damascius’ conception of potency cf. also J. Trouillard, ‘La notion de δύναμις chez Damascios’, REG 85 (1972), 353–63.

19 On this application of the triad in a ‘heno-ontological’ context, as Combès puts it, see Combès (n. 18), 134, 138–41 and Grimaldi (n. 18), passim.

20 Cf. his note ad loc. in Westerink–Combès (n. 1), 1.15 n. 8 (= n. c., pages 119–20). Combès’s interpretation is not totally clear to me: on the one hand, he writes that this potency ‘est la puissance de l’un de la triade supreme des intelligibles, cf. Proclus, Théol. Plat., III 24, page 84.14–26’; in this chapter, Proclus discusses the structure of the first intelligible triad [= 2.1] (which is composed of 2.1.1 one, 2.1.2 potency and 2.1.3 being; on this further subdivision of the triad, cf. n. 41); as Proclus states (page 85.9–16), this triad corresponds to Parm. 142b5–c7. Combès then goes on to say that the potency at issue ‘corresponds au prédicat de la totalité (Parm., 142c 7–d 9)’; now, late Neoplatonists associated this predicate with the second intelligible triad [= 2.2] (cf. e.g. Theol. Plat. 3.25). It is difficult to reconcile Combès’s quoted statements: the former implies that the potency under discussion is the second element of the first intelligible triad [= 2.1.2], whereas the latter intimates that it coincides with the second intelligible triad [= 2.2].

21 See Procl. In Parm. 7.1151.27–9 L.-S. (= 1151.21–3 St.), with the note ad loc. by Luna–Segonds (n. 7), 7.30 n. 4 (= n. c., pages 321–2); Dam. Princ. 1.118.9–15; 2.36.2–7, 71.1–24 (with the note by L.G. Westerink and J. Combès, Damascius: Traité des premiers principes [Paris, 1986–91], 2.71 n. 1 [= n. c., pages 246–7]); 3.114.23–115.13 (especially 115.12–13), 148.11–14, 153.13–154.24 (with the note by Westerink–Combès, 3.153 n. 2 [= n. c., page 224]); Combès (n. 18), 133–7; Dillon (n. 18), 141, 145–6; Grimaldi (n. 18), 122, 126–7, 137–8. More specifically, for the identification of the all-one (or its Proclean analogue) with ἡ δύναμις, cf. also Procl. El. theol. 92; Theol. Plat. 3.8, pages 31.18–32.5; Dam. Princ. 1.118.9–15; 2.20.5–7, 24.9–11, 213.22–4; 3.151.10–11.

22 Damascius mentions the following properties of the material substrate (all of which he conceptually strips away from it, except for the last one): (0) life; (1) form; (2) the inharmonious trace (of form); (3) potentiality (τὸ δυνάμει) and (4) privation (τὴν στέρησιν)—which are best regarded as two distinct layers, although he introduces them together; (5) unity; (6) ineffability. The aspects of matter that Damascius mentions in our passage are (1) its being ordered by form; (2) the mere possession of form; (3) potency (stemming from potency as a principle); (4) privation (deriving from limit); (5) unity; (6) ineffability. The similarities between the two passages are striking; true, in 1.15 Damascius ultimately suggests considering limit as the cause of unity, so that privation is possibly to be removed from the list; but, in any case, the two lists almost overlap. (The mere possession of form is equivalent to the possession of mere traces of the forms.)

23 On this passage, see section 2.2, point 2.

24 Cf. 23c9–d1 and, for the designation of the second item as ἀπειρία, 16c10.

25 In particular, the correspondence between the notions of ἄπειρον/ἀπειρία and δύναμις (which is not confined to a single, definite level of reality) can be inferred e.g. from Procl. El. theol. 92, page 82.23–9 Dodds; Theol. Plat. 3.8, page 32.2–7; 21, page 73.19–21; 26, page 92.15–20; Dam. Princ. 2.2.15–18, 4.24–5.4, 10.3–12; 3.109.16–110.6, 114.23–115.13, 116.6–9, 148.5–14, 153.23–154.2; cf. E.R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology (Oxford, 19632), 246–7 (on the connection of the unlimited with δύναμις in Proclus); Westerink–Combès (n. 21), 1.129 n. 3 (= n. c., pages 173–4); P. Soulier, ‘La puissance de l’Infinité première dans les Éléments de théologie’, in G. Aubry, L. Brisson, P. Hoffmann and L. Lavaud (edd.), Relire les Éléments de théologie de Proclus. Réceptions, interprétations antiques et modernes (Paris, 2021), 221–50 (on the relation between these two notions in the Elements of Theology); N. Spanu, Proclus and the Chaldean Oracles. A Study on Proclean Exegesis, with a Translation and Commentary of Proclus’ Treatise on Chaldean Philosophy (London and New York, 2021), 19, 24, 29–30 (mostly with regard to Proclus).

26 This is the canonical understanding of the Philebus triad among late Neoplatonists: cf. e.g. Procl. El. theol. 92, on which see, besides Dodds’s commentary (n. 25) ad loc., 246–8, Soulier (n. 25), 241–3; Theol. Plat. 3 κεφ. 8, page 2.6–8; 3.8, page 32.2–7; 3.26, page 92.1–3; Dam. Princ. 3.148.8–14. For an overview of the Neoplatonic treatment of limit and the unlimited see G. Van Riel, Damascius: Commentaire sur le Philèbe de Platon (Paris, 2008), xxxii–lxviii (on the standard late Neoplatonic view, cf. also A. Linguiti, L’ultimo platonismo greco. Principi e conoscenza [Florence, 1990], 75–87).

27 To be precise, like ‘father’, ‘potency’ and ‘intellect’, the names ‘limit’, ‘unlimited’ and ‘mixed’ could theoretically refer also to the elements that constitute each of the three intelligible triads, for a total of nine (even though they are generally not employed to refer to the three intelligible triads themselves): cf. Procl. Theol. Plat. 3.21, page 73.16–21 (more generally, limit and the unlimited are elements of all ‘beings’, in a broad sense: cf. Theol. Plat. 3.10, pages 41.16–42.26, especially 41.20–2, 42.16–18, 23–6). In fact, according to Van Riel, Damascius ultimately favours this interpretation of limit and the unlimited in the Philebus (G. Van Riel, ‘“N’essayons pas de compter l’intelligible sur les doigts”. Damascius et les principes de la limite et de l’illimité’, PhilosAnt 2 [2002], 199–219, at 217; cf. also Van Riel [n. 26], lx–lxiii); none the less, as Van Riel acknowledges, Damascius does accept ‘limit’ and ‘the unlimited’ as names for the first principles, even if he underlines that they have only ‘une signification métaphorique dans l’herméneutique de la réalité la plus élevée’ (Van Riel [this note], 213, and cf. 212). Since, in the absence of any qualification or contextual hint, these names cannot be used to identify any of the constituents of the intelligible triads, in our passage τὸ ἄπειρον must refer to the all-one. This is the case also in several other passages by Damascius: sometimes, he is just sticking to others’ terminology (cf. e.g. Princ. 2.18.8–9); in other cases, however, he is developing or expounding his own conception of the principles (cf. e.g. Princ. 2.22.1–3; 28.3–4 [in a zetetic context]; 31.15; 32.23–33.6; cf. also 26.7–8 and, in a plausible conjecture by Westerink, 26.12–14; 3.114.26–115.9; 130.5–8).

28 On the one as being (τὸ) πρὸ πάντων cf. e.g. Procl. El. theol. 21, page 24.29–30 Dodds; Dam. Princ. 1.60.16–18, 21–3, 67.16–18, 97.21–3, 98.1–4, 100.11–12.

29 The exact relation between these principles in Damascius’ philosophy is controversial: see J. Greig, The First Principle in Late Neoplatonism: A Study of the One’s Causality in Proclus and Damascius (Leiden and Boston, 2021), 275.

30 Westerink–Combès (n. 21), 1.103 n. 4 (= n. c., page 167); cf. also Westerink–Combès (n. 1), 2.32 n. 1 (= n. c., page 119) and V. Napoli, Ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνός. Il principio totalmente ineffabile tra dialettica ed esegesi in Damascio (Catania and Palermo, 2008), 336–8 (Napoli, however, ultimately identifies ἡ μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχή in the commentary on the seventh hypothesis of the Parmenides with the ineffable; cf. loc. cit. in n. 31).

31 On prime matter as the ineffable offspring of the ineffable, see Dam. In Parm. 4.68.8–69.2, 69.19–21, 72.3–8, 77.18–21; Van Riel (n. 2), 197–201; Greig (n. 29), 302–4; Napoli (n. 30), 421–71, passim (especially 439–44); on prime matter as ineffable, cf. also In Parm. 4.71.8, 13, 17, 18, 19, 72.1, 76.5, 78.8, 115.4–7, 117.3, 8–9.

32 Cf. n. 22.

33 Similarly, ἡ μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχή is used of the ineffable in In Parm. 4.115.13–14.

34 See n. 31.

35 The transition from the original meaning of ὑπέρ (= ‘over’) to the meaning ‘more, above, beyond’ is easy to understand (cf. A. Hilhorst, Sémitismes et latinismes dans le Pasteur d’Hermas [Nijmegen, 1976], 89: ‘La préposition ὑπέρ peut indiquer le dépassement d’une limite et ainsi prendre plus ou moins le sense de “plus que”’). In particular, 1) ὑπέρ + acc. can be used virtually as an equivalent of μᾶλλον ἤ, as I surmise is the case in our passage; so far as I can see, this construction mostly occurs when something is being compared with all the other members of its category (e.g. in phrases like ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὑπὲρ ἅπαντας, etc.), but it is also found in other contexts. 1.1) This use of the preposition (which is, in general, not very common) is more frequent in combination with verbs: cf. Dam. Princ. 3.146.3–6 αὗται αἱ ὅλαι τρεῖς οἷον μονάδες οὐ διεστήξονται ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων …, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν μονάδα πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡνωμένην ἐκεῖναι πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἑνωθήσονται (‘these three quasi-monads as a whole will not be separate from each other …, but they will be united with each other beyond every monad united with itself’ [transl. Ahbel-Rappe, slightly modified]; the sense is: ‘they will be more united with each other than every monad is with itself’); cf. also Diod. Sic. 5.72.1; Ach. Tat. Leuc. Clit. 4.19.1; Hdn. Hist. 3.14.2; [Luc.] Dem. Enc. 25. 1.2) Nevertheless, this use of ὑπέρ + acc. is found with adjectives/adverbs too (although more rarely): cf. Philostr. Imag. 1.26.3 ταύτας [sc. τὰς βοῦς] … τὰς χρυσόκερως καὶ ὑπὲρ χιόνα λευκάς (‘these [sc. cattle] with golden horns and whiter than snow’); Diod. Sic. 1.90.2; Luc. Peregr. 34; [Luc.] Macr. 5 (with a participle having adjectival force); Ael. VH 12.1 (if ὑπὲρ τὰς γυναῖκας is connected with βασιλικῶς). In addition, note other comparable uses of ὑπέρ + acc. 2) this phrase can (rarely) be combined with a comparative (instead of a positive) adjective, to express the second member of the comparison (in such cases, it is simply equivalent to ἤ): see e.g. Thuc. 6.16.2. Less significantly for our present purposes, the ‘comparative’ ὑπέρ, in all of the forms mentioned, is fairly common in the idiosyncratic Biblical Greek, where it is to be regarded as a Semitism (see Hilhorst [this note], 91; F. Blass and A. Debrunner, Grammatik der neutestamentlichen Griechisch, bearbeitet von F. Rehkopf [Göttingen, 198416], 148–9, §185.3; M. Johannessohn, Der Gebrauch der Kasus und der Präpositionen in der Septuaginta. Teil 1 [Kirchhain, 1910], 45; M. Johannessohn, Der Gebrauch der Präpositionen in der Septuaginta [Berlin, 1926] [= Mitteilungen des Septuaginta-Unternehmens der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Bd. 3, Heft 3, 165–388], 219). 3) In some cases, ὑπέρ + acc. is equivalent to a comparative followed by the second member of the comparison (= μᾶλλον + adjective + ἤ), as in Hdt. 8.140β.2 and Philostr. Vit. Apoll. 2.15. On these uses of ὑπέρ + acc. to express comparisons, see F. Krebs, Die Präpositionen bei Polybius (Würzburg, 1882), 43; O. Schwab, Historische Syntax der griechischen Comparation in der klassischen Litteratur. II Heft: des besonderen Teiles II. Abschnitt (Würzburg, 1894), 109–10; U. Ursing, Studien zur griechischen Fabel (Lund, 1930), 48–9; Hilhorst [this note], 89–94, especially 89–90 (most of the examples above are taken from these studies).

36 The unlimited = potency = the all-one (cf. above, pages 8–9 and n. 25).

37 I have reported the items of the second list in reverse order, so as to facilitate the comparison with the first one.

38 On the assumption that ἡ μία τῶν ὅλων ἄρρητος αἰτία in lines 13–14 means the one, the last item of the first list is (v) the one (regardless of whether one adopts Westerink–Combès’s or my text), and there is full agreement between the first and the second list; as we saw, however (pages 9–10), this hypothesis is implausible.

39 See n. 31.

40 Cf. section 2.1, page 10.

41 Each of these principles brings about a distinct material layer, but these layers are not all equally significant, so that Damascius mentions only some. — My list is not exhaustive: first, it does not include the gods below the intellective realm. Second, it mentions only some of the names/properties associated with each principle (I chose some of the most distinctive or frequent ones—many of which stem from the exegesis of the Parmenides—without aiming for systematicity). Third, a more detailed list would also mention, for each of the triads of the transcendent gods, the single elements that constitute it—for example, the first intelligible triad is formed by 2.1.1 limit (≠ 1.2) or the one (≠ 1.1) or the father (≠ 1.2), 2.1.2 the unlimited (≠ 1.3) or potency (≠ 1.3), and 2.1.3 the mixed or the paternal intellect. In the interest of space, these items are not mentioned here, except for the constituents of the first intellective triad (4.1.1–3), the distinction of which is of special importance. For more complete schemes of the late Neoplatonic hierarchy of principles, see Westerink–Combès (n. 1), 1.xxxiii–xxxvii; J. Opsomer, ‘To find the maker and father. Proclus’ exegesis of Plato Tim. 28C3-5’, EPlaton 2 (2006), 261–83, at 281–2 (my starting point); P. d’Hoine and M. Martijn (edd.), All from One. A Guide to Proclus (Oxford, 2017), Appendix I—with the caveat that all these studies reproduce Proclus’ system, which, although similar, is not identical to Damascius’.

Figure 0

Scheme 1. The hierarchy of principles (down to the intellective gods) in Damascius’ philosophy.

Figure 1

Scheme 2. Relations between the principles and the corresponding aspects of matter.