In this article, I examine how democratic communities interpret the ambiguities of populist orientations to liberal democracy, and how and why these differ across party and country contexts. There is deep uncertainty in both academic and public debates about whether populism is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for liberal democracy. Populist parties, which have become a normal part of political systems in places long seen as strongholds of liberal democracy, mobilize societal divisions between the purportedly ‘pure’ or ordinary people and a ‘corrupt’ or unresponsive elite (Mudde Reference Mudde2004). They call for ‘real democracy’ and claim to want to ‘take back control’ in the name of ‘the people’. In some cases, such calls are responses to concrete democratic deficits and can be emancipatory in intent. In other cases, populists, including those in power, may speak the language of democracy, yet weaken the institutions we usually think of as yardsticks of liberal democratic systems, such as the rule of law, political and media pluralism and commitments to equal citizenship. This ambiguity muddies the waters for those who oppose populist parties under the banner of ‘democratic defence’, especially where electoral success in free and fair elections authenticates claims of democratic legitimacy (Bourne Reference Bourne2023).
Research on the relationship between populism and liberal democracy has advanced understanding of the distinctive contributions of the ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ pillars to contemporary practices of liberal democracy (e.g. Chambers Reference Chambers2024; Galston Reference Galston2018; Moffitt Reference Moffitt2018; Reference Moffitt2020; Mouffe Reference Mouffe2018; Mudde Reference Mudde2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2017; Müller Reference Müller2016; Pappas Reference Pappas2019; Urbinati Reference Urbinati2019). It has also identified important conceptual distinctions useful for understanding different types of populist orientations to liberalism and democracy (Kauth and King Reference Kauth and King2021; Laruelle Reference Laruelle2020; Moffitt Reference Moffitt2020; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2013). Empirical studies have examined the democratic track record of populist parties in government, their role in democratic backsliding, and opposition to populist parties in and out of government mobilizing around themes of democratic defence (e.g. Bourne Reference Bourne2023, Reference Bourne2024a; Levitsky and Loxton Reference Levitsky and Loxton2019; Sajó Reference Sajó2021; Scheppele Reference Scheppele2018; Vittori and Morlino Reference Vittori, Morlino, Albertazzi and Vampa2021). Yet we know little about how democratic communities deal with uncertainty about the democratic credentials of the increasingly powerful populist parties in their midst. Among other things, this shortcoming has implications for our knowledge about the impact of populist parties on democratic political culture, and the resilience of liberal democratic institutions in the face of challengers.
To address this gap, this article makes use of the rich theoretical and conceptual literature on populism, liberalism and democracy to develop a framework for an empirical examination of public justifications by opponents of populist parties in seven European states. It begins by introducing scholarly conceptions of populism as democratic illiberalism, populism as a threat to liberalism and democracy, and anti-populist frames demonizing and delegitimizing populism. After a discussion of theoretical explanations accounting for variation in the mobilization of these opposition frames, the article then turns to discuss data and methods used for a thematic content analysis of critical claims articulated in national newspapers by opponents of nine populist parties: namely, Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz), Law and Justice in Poland, Alternative for Germany, League and Five Star Movement in Italy, Vox and Podemos in Spain, the Sweden Democrats and the Danish People’s Party. Analysis shows that the most commonly used opposition frames were the populism as democratic illiberalism, or the demonizing, delegitimizing anti-populist frames, or both, rather than the more stringent populism as threat to liberal democracy frame. Using data from the V-Dem and V-Party dataset (Coppedge et al. Reference Coppedge2025; Lindberg et al. Reference Lindberg2022), the article then examines whether the prevalence of opposition frames varies for different parties or country contexts depending on party commitments to liberal democracy, degrees of ideological illiberalism or populism, and party-political cues legitimizing either cooperative or confrontational relations with populist parties. From the analysis, the best explanation for the prevalence of the populism as democratic illiberalism frame was populist success in hybrid democracies, while that for the prevalence of the anti-populist frame was ideological illiberalism and the practice of cooperation with populist parties in government. The analysis confirms that deep uncertainty about the consequences of populist success for liberal democratic states persists beyond academia into the public sphere, while the prevalence of anti-populist frame points to the deeply polarizing implications of populist success.
Three opposition frames on populism, liberalism and democracy
The success of populist parties in established democracies, often through free and fair elections, has focused scholarly attention on the separate contributions of liberal and democratic thought to the institutional and normative architecture of contemporary liberal democracy. Three partially overlapping theories of the relationship between populism, liberalism and democracy can be discerned; namely populism as democratic illiberalism, populism as a threat to liberal democracy, and demonizing, delegitimizing anti-populist frames.
Populism as democratic illiberalism
‘Populism as democratic illiberalism’ argues that populism leans too heavily on the democratic – at the expense of the liberal – pillar of liberal democracy. This frame emerges in the work of Margaret Canovan, one of the early theorists of populism. Canovan defines populism as a ‘thin-centred’ ‘ideology of democracy’, which has a ‘characteristic core of concepts that it asserts, prioritizes and decontests – democracy, popular sovereignty, the people understood as a collectivity with a common will and majority rule’ (Reference Canovan, Mény and Surel2002: 33). Populism ‘infuses’ politics ‘with faith in redemption’, promising ‘salvation through politics by pointing the way to a better world’; more specifically through the ideology of democracy ‘promising a better world through the return of power to the people’ (Canovan Reference Canovan, Mény and Surel2002: 31, 25). Nevertheless, Canovan argued, there is an ‘ideological contest between populist and liberal understandings of democracy’, with the latter also ‘charged with redemptive energy’ (Canovan Reference Canovan, Mény and Surel2002: 38). In contrast to populism, the liberal democratic tradition maintains that ‘what democracy is really about is securing universal human rights through the rule of law, so that concepts such as ‘the people’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘majority rules’ must be modified and reinterpreted in light of that central concern’ (Canovan Reference Canovan, Mény and Surel2002: 38). Furthermore, ‘many democrats would call into question [the populist] understanding of democracy as a politics of will and decision rather than accommodation and compromise and its monolithic concept of the people identified with the majority’ (Canovan Reference Canovan, Mény and Surel2002: 37).
Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser have also argued that populism is an illiberal form of ‘democratic extremism’ (Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2017: 82–83). As the authors argue, ‘In its extremist interpretation of majoritarian democracy, [populism] rejects all limitations on the expression of the general will, most notably the constitutional protection of minorities and the independence (from politics, and therefore from democratic control) of key state institutions (e.g. the judiciary, the central bank)’ (Mudde Reference Mudde2004: 561; see also Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2017: 82–83). In addition, by holding that ‘nothing should constrain the “will of the (pure) people”, populism ‘fundamentally rejects the notions of pluralism’ (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2017: 81). Paradoxically, the authors argue, populism simultaneously improves conditions for democratic participation, ‘since it contributes to the mobilization of social groups who feel that their concerns are not being considered by the political establishment’ (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2017: 83). It may also enhance democratic responsiveness and accountability by ‘fostering the implementation of policies preferred by excluded sectors of society’ (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2017: 83). Populism can thus be both a threat and a corrective to liberal democracy (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2013).
Takis Pappas defines populism itself as ‘democratic illiberalism’, in contrast to liberal democracy, and authoritarianism (non-democratic, illiberalism) (Reference Pappas2019: 34). For Pappas, to be populist, a leader, party, movement or governing regime has to meet a criterion of ‘democraticness’, indicated by electoral contestation – or willingness to contest non-violent or non-voter-intimidating elections – and by constitutional legality, or unambiguously demonstrating allegiance or loyalty to parliamentary democracy (Pappas Reference Pappas2019: 36, 38). However, populism is illiberal, Pappas argues, because it fails to acknowledge a plurality of interests, lacks a preference for moderation and consensus and undervalues the rule of law, including minority rights. Instead, populist illiberalism is characterized by singular cleavage, seeing society as an antagonistic duel between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’; adversarial politics, deploying strategies shunning political compromise; and majoritarianism, or a willingness to curb the law and violate minority rights to serve majoritarianism (Pappas Reference Pappas2019: 35, 38).
Populism as threat to liberalism and democracy
In other accounts, populism is best conceived as a threat to liberalism and democracy. It is based on the argument that liberalism and democracy are co-constitutive of modern liberal democracy, or as Stefan Rummens puts it, ‘co-original’ or inseparable dimensions of a ‘regime which aims to preserve and protect individual freedom’ (Reference Rummens, In Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo and Ostiguy2017: 556). As Jan-Werner Müller has argued, political rights such as freedom of speech and assembly, media pluralism and protection of minorities are ‘constitutive of democracy as such’, because a ‘vote can be undemocratic if the opposition can never make its case properly and journalists are prevented from reporting a government’s failures’ (Reference Müller2016: 55). ‘Even for the most minimal definitions of democracy – as a mechanism to ensure peaceful turnovers in power after a process of popular will formation – it is crucial that citizens be well informed about politics; otherwise, governments can hardly be held to account’ (Müller Reference Müller2016: 55). Even constitutional courts are justified not just to protect liberalism and the rule of law, but ‘to protect basic political rights and preserve pluralism in politics and society’, and thus ‘the flourishing of democracy itself’ (Müller Reference Müller2016: 55).
Rather than ‘thoughtless invocations of “illiberal democracy”’, Müller claims, ‘[p]opulists damage democracy as such’ and populism ‘distorts the democratic process’ (Reference Müller2016: 56, 57). In particular, the author argues, ‘the core claim of populism is a … moralized form of anti-pluralism’, which ‘requires a pars pro toto argument and a claim to exclusive representation’ (Müller Reference Müller2016: 20–21; see also Rummens Reference Rummens, In Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo and Ostiguy2017). Populist anti-pluralism leads to claims, when populists are in opposition, that ‘political competitors are just part of the immoral corrupt elite’, that ‘when in government, they will not recognize anything like a legitimate opposition’; and more generally imply ‘that whoever does not really support populist parties might not be part of the proper people to begin with’ (Müller Reference Müller2016: 22). Furthermore, when in power ‘they quickly start tampering with the institutional machinery of democracy in the name of the so-called real people (as opposed to their political opponents, who are automatically deemed traitors to the nation)’ and ‘the supposed authentic national will trumps procedure and delegitimizes all opposition’ (Müller Reference Müller2016: 57).
Delegitimizing and demonizing anti-populist frames
An alternative, critical perspective on populism, liberalism and democracy warns against the ideological mobilization of anti-populist frames (Hamdaoui Reference Hamdaoui2021; Moffitt Reference Moffitt2020; Stavrakakis Reference Stavrakakis2014, Reference Stavrakakis2018: 52). Anti-populist frames overlap with the populism as threat to liberal democracy frame, but they differ in their demonizing and delegitimizing tone. Anti-populist frames put populism in a negative light, often vis-à-vis a reified conception of existing political elites and norms of established liberal democracies integrated into the EU. In this frame, populists are portrayed as ‘abnormal’ or ‘deviant’, although in ways that differ depending on the case. As Yannis Stavrakakis and others have argued, anti-populism is a rhetorical strategy which seeks to delegitimize, discredit, stigmatize and demonize populists, generating a ‘caricature of the populist “enemy”, sometimes in dehumanizing terms’ (Stavrakakis Reference Stavrakakis2018: 53). By ‘vilifying the opponent and reducing them to the “inferior” other’, anti-populism ‘strip[s] them of any morally redeemable quality in the contest of electoral politics’ (Stavrakakis Reference Stavrakakis2018: 53).
Anti-populist frames typically denigrate populists as ‘extremist’, ‘incompetent’ or ‘simplistic' compared to the ‘moderate’, ‘professional’ or ‘rational’ personnel running existing national and international organizations. Summarizing these common points, Soraya Hamdaoui argues:
Anti-populism … revolves around three main axes: the fear and subsequent denunciation of political extremism (physical violence, discrimination, or hate speech), the argument that politics is technical and complex, and the legitimation of the role of political elites over more direct forms of popular sovereignty (regular referenda, citizens’ contribution to the legislative process etc.). Anti-populists consider the populist critique of elites and institutions is a threat to democracy and the economic order. According to them, populist leaders are incompetent or malignant demagogues that will lead countries to disaster by implementing oversimiplistic measures and granting too much decision-making power to laypersons. Indeed, for anti-populists, political and economic issues are too intricate and should be handled by experts rather than the common people or ‘unprepared’ populist leaders. (Hamdaoui Reference Hamdaoui2021: 437)
Many have also observed a pro-EU strand to anti-populism, which often defines populism as a threat to the claimed achievements of the whole postwar European project, of peace, democracy and human rights.
In this article, I ask: Do these scholarly conceptions of the relationship between populism, liberalism and democracy filter into the public justifications for opposing populist parties? There is good reason to think that they might. As I have argued elsewhere, opposition to Europe is best conceived as ‘democratic defence as normal politics’ (Bourne Reference Bourne2024a). Here I argue that while there is no necessary link between a decline in democratic quality and populism, critical claims justifying acts of opposition often problematise populist parties as threats to liberal democratic principles and values. What is less clear is how critical claims align or coalesce with conceptions of populism as democratic illiberalism, populism as a threat to liberal democracy, and demonizing, delegitimizing anti-populist frames. There are also good theoretical reasons for expecting that the invocation of opposition frames will vary across party and country contexts.
Explaining variation in the prevalence of opposition frames
Frame theory conceives of political actors as ‘signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers’ (Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000: 613). Collective action frames ‘help render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action’, not only to mobilize supporters but also to ‘demobilize antagonists’ (Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000: 614). Frame theory proposes that frames are more likely to be effective if they are ‘resonant’, or more specifically credible and salient (Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000: 620). Credible frames are consistent (there is a congruence between articulated beliefs, claims and actions); empirically credible (adherents believe there is a ‘fit between the framings and the events in the world’); and are articulated by speakers credible to adherents (due to ‘status and/or perceived expertise … and/or the organizations they represent’) (Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000: 620–621). Frames are salient if they are central to the beliefs, values and ideas of those they are addressed to; are experientially commensurate (congruent ‘with the personal, everyday experiences of those they are addressed to'); and have narrative fidelity (resonate with the ‘extant [but evolving] stock of meanings, beliefs, ideological, practices, values, myths, narratives’ within a community) (Benford and Snow Reference Benford and Snow2000: 622, 629).
To be empirically credible and experientially commensurate with everyday experiences of their audience, opponents are likely to articulate frames aligned with observable empirical realities. Thus, those openly threatening liberal democratic institutions are more likely to be framed as a threat to liberal democracy than those who are not, and those emphasizing illiberal themes are more likely to be framed as democratically illiberal than those who do not. Several conceptual distinctions from work on hybrid regimes and literatures on populism and liberalism underpin this hypothesis.
According to Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, in competitive authoritarian regimes ‘formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but … incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents’ (Reference Levitsky and Way2010: 5). The opposition may not be outlawed in competitive authoritarianism, but government critics are typically ‘subject to surveillance, harassment and occasional violence; their access to media and finance is limited; electoral and judicial institutions are politicized and deployed against them; and elections are often marred by fraud, intimidation and other abuse’ (Levitsky and Way Reference Levitsky and Way2010: 12; see also Kauth and King Reference Kauth and King2021; Lührmann and Lindberg Reference Lührmann and Lindberg2019). This concept captures cases of governing populist parties which undermine liberal democracy, or parties whose political programmes suggest they would do so if they obtained power. It leads to the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Populist parties establishing hybrid, competitive authoritarian regimes, or proposing to do so, are more likely to be framed with the populism as threat to liberal democracy frame.
Jasper Kauth and Desmond King’s concept of ‘ideological illiberalism’ captures political regimes which remain liberal democracies but develop illiberal policies. Ideological illiberalism aims at ‘demarking who is and who is not a full member of society based on ideological constructions of the societal in- and out-groups’ (Kauth and King Reference Kauth and King2021: 380), such as homosexuals, migrants and ethnic and racial minorities, and ‘break the basic and defining commitments to equal treatment and liberty’ (Kauth and King Reference Kauth and King2021: 383). The concept of ideological illiberalism bears an affinity to Benjamin Moffitt’s concept of ‘illiberal liberals’ used to characterize right-wing populists who adopt the language of liberalism through appeals to gender equality against Islamic traditionalism, or free speech against political correctness, but for illiberal purposes (Reference Moffitt2020: 75–83). It is also similar to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s (Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2013) concept of ‘exclusive’ populism. Associated with right-wing populists in Europe, ‘exclusive populism’ seeks to improve the quality of democratic representation, address the unacknowledged interests of ‘the natives’, but protect the welfare state by excluding outsider groups, especially immigrants, from access to state resources. It leads to the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Ideologically illiberal, or exclusionary, populist parties are more likely to be framed with the populism as democratic illiberalism frame.
In addition, it is plausible to expect that anti-populist frames will be more prevalent where a party’s populist discourse is more salient. Scholars have become increasingly wary of essentialist definitions of populism and sought to develop methods to conceptualize populism as a matter of degree (e.g. Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser2017; Rooduijn and Pauwels Reference Rooduijn and Pauwels2011). This approach helps to account for the fact, as Rogers Brubaker put it, ‘speaking in the name of the people … is a chronic and ubiquitous practice in modern democratic settings’ (Reference Brubaker2017: 357–385). From this perspective, populists can be conceived as those who prioritize appeals to the people against the elite more often than other parties, and populists themselves can be expected to vary in terms of appeals to the people against the elite. This leads to the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Parties exhibiting a high degree of populism are more likely to be framed with the anti-populist frame.
Opposition frames may also follow cues from other parties competing with populist parties. As argued above, frame theory proposes that frame resonance is enhanced when articulated by credible speakers. Despite generalized cynicism about political parties, several scholars underline their importance for legitimization of challenger parties like populists. Ostracism, or refusal to cooperate with a populist party in government, parliament or public events on principled grounds, signals its ‘pariah’ status (Downs Reference Downs2012; van Spanje Reference van Spanje2018). Where ostracism is not feasible, such as when populist parties govern, other parties can signal deep disagreement through a refusal to cooperate in parliamentary or other governmental initiatives. In contrast, cooperation in government can help legitimize challenger parties and their policies, especially where a party is accepted as a coalition partner (Bale Reference Bale2003: 74–76; Downs Reference Downs2012). This leads to the hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: Populist parties systematically ostracized, excluded or isolated by other parties are more likely to be framed with the populism as threat to liberal democracy, or anti-populist frames.
Hypothesis 5: Populist parties entering cooperative governing, parliamentary or electoral relationships with other parties are more likely to be framed with the populism as illiberal democracy frame, or other frames unrelated to democratic quality.
Methods and data
Data on critical claims justifying opposition to populist parties draws on a thematic analysis of summaries of initiatives opposing populist parties (IoPPs) collected by contributors to the Populism and Democratic Defence in Europe Project (Carlsberg Foundation, CF20-008, for details see Bourne et al. Reference Bourne2024, and Initiatives Opposing Populist Parties in Europe Dataset, Bourne et al. Reference Bourne2024). Using qualitative content analysis similar to protest event analysis and political claims analysis (e.g. Koopmans and Rucht Reference Koopmans, Rucht, Klandermans and Staggenborg2002: 231; Koopmans and Statham Reference Koopmans and Statham2010; Kreisi et al. Reference Kreisi, Grande, Dolezal, Helbling, Höglinger, Hutter and Wüest2012; Hutter Reference Hutter2014), country specialists collected data from a sample of reports in two major newspapers on the nine populist parties in the study (see Table 1). Cases were selected for a most-different system comparative design, varying in terms of governing status, ideological positioning and degree of populism.
Table 1. Data Sources and Coding Periods for Country Case Studies
Newspapers have advantages and disadvantages as a source of data. There is a selection bias reflecting, among other things, journalistic criteria of newsworthiness (Earl et al. Reference Earl, McCarthy and Soule2004; Koopmans and Statham Reference Koopmans and Statham2010: 58). Newspaper data therefore does not provide a representative sample. Research on protest reporting suggests that acts of opposition targeting populist parties are more likely to be reported if they take place in proximity to news outlets reporting them, if they are sizable, use violence or novel action forms, are sponsored by known organizations, if the police are involved, if counterdemonstrations take place, or if they fit the logic of prevailing news cycles (Earl et al. Reference Earl, McCarthy and Soule2004: 69; Koopmans and Rucht Reference Koopmans, Rucht, Klandermans and Staggenborg2002: 247; McCarthy et al. Reference McCarthy, McPhail and Smith1996). However, compared to other sources, newspapers provide the most comprehensive source of information about a wide variety of opposition acts and are sensitive to ‘contentious politics’, a concept which captures many forms of opposition to populist parties (Earl et al. Reference Earl, McCarthy and Soule2004: 66–67; Hutter Reference Hutter2014: 337; Koopmans and Rucht Reference Koopmans, Rucht, Klandermans and Staggenborg2002: 231; Kreisi et al. Reference Kreisi, Grande, Dolezal, Helbling, Höglinger, Hutter and Wüest2012). It can also be argued that selection bias in newspaper data creates something akin to a relevance sample. As Ruud Koopmans and Dieter Rucht argue, for instance, newspaper data mirrors not ‘reality’ per se, but a ‘constructed reality’ (Reference Koopmans, Rucht, Klandermans and Staggenborg2002: 252). The image of reality filtered by newspapers is what many political elites and mass publics rely on to understand the world, such that ‘protests and other events that remain unreported are simply “non-existent”’ (Koopmans and Rucht Reference Koopmans, Rucht, Klandermans and Staggenborg2002: 252; see also Kreisi et al. Reference Kreisi, Grande, Dolezal, Helbling, Höglinger, Hutter and Wüest2012: 47, 58). As such, newspapers provide the best available source of data suitable for comparing cultures of opposition against populist parties and claim-making articulated in the public sphere.
Data on acts of opposition against populist parties was classified according to a typology of opposition initiatives distinguishing between different actor types on one dimension and tolerant and intolerant modes of engagement on the other (Bourne Reference Bourne2022, Reference Bourne2023). On the actor dimension, public authorities encompassed individuals or organizations empowered by constitutional or ordinary law, or international agreement, to act in the public interest. Within states this includes judicial, legislative and executive branches of government, the bureaucratic apparatus, state agencies and substate authorities (such as regions and local governments). It also includes international organizations with authority delegated by member states (e.g. the EU or Council of Europe), and initiatives of foreign governments. Political parties are typically organizations which ‘seek influence in a state’, mostly by fielding candidates in elections to occupy positions in legislative and executive bodies at various territorial levels (Ware Reference Ware1996). It also includes transnational party federations and European Parliament groups. Civil society actors are private groups or institutions organized by individuals for their own ends, such as lobby and advocacy groups, social movements, businesses, churches, trade unions, cultural associations, and mainstream and social media. Some actors operate transnationally, such as the Catholic Church, human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, and social movements like Occupy, Black Lives Matter or #MeToo. Actor types are often best conceptualized as overlapping fields, a complexity captured in the typology with creation of several overlapping actor categories. The most important is party-controlled public authorities, which includes public authorities, like national governments, local authorities or parliamentary assemblies, formed by members of political parties.
Several subtypes from the typology grouped speech-based opposition initiatives, namely public persuasion by public authorities, political persuasion by political parties, as well as challenging speech and communication and appeals for intervention and change by civil society actors (for more details see Bourne Reference Bourne2024b; Bourne et al. Reference Bourne2024). In addition to information about when, where and who undertook opposition initiatives, coders recorded action types, which included condemnation and demonizing discourses. A thematic analysis of short summaries outlining the main critical claims justifying IoPPs in these subcategories, which were translated into English from national languages, was used to identify critical claims keywords. While great care was taken during the translation process to capture and convey contextual nuance, the dataset does not provide sufficiently detailed textual material for discourse analysis. Nevertheless, it does permit a thematic analysis of the core critical claims articulated by opponents in the public sphere, as recorded in national newspapers.
Claims about populist parties in the dataset were analysed using an open coding procedure leading to the classification of claims describing, or alluding to, a populist party, their leader or their actions into 33 general critical claims keywords (see Table 2, below). Up to two critiques were coded for each item. If there were more than two, and populism or populist were among them, then populism was always coded, given our interest in the topic. Where there were more than two critiques, the two most negative critiques related to threats to liberal democracy were coded. For example, unconstitutional is arguably more negative than illegal; and undemocratic is more negative than incompetent or inappropriate. In some cases, our sources were insufficiently detailed and were coded as unclear. The analysis produced 2,347 critical claims across the cases. There were large differences in the critical claims keywords targeting the different populist parties, reflecting broader variation in the number of initiatives in the larger dataset (see Bourne et al. Reference Bourne2024). Data on critical claims ranged from 56 claims for Vox, 78 for Podemos, 80 for the Five Star Movement, 105 for League, 125 for the Danish People’s Party, 174 for Alternative for Germany, 187 for Sweden Democrats, to 620 for Law and Justice and 922 for Fidesz. To compare across cases, data was standardized using percentages for each critical claims keyword for the party.
Table 2. Critical Claims Keywords and Opposition Frames Justifying Opposition against Populist Parties
Note: Weighted percentage is calculated by adding the percentage of each keyword per party divided by total number of parties.
Critical claims keywords and opposition frames
Although the populism as democratic illiberalism, threat to liberal democracy, and the anti-populist frames overlap conceptually in the scholarly literature, they can be distinguished empirically by selecting critical claims keywords that best align with the core features of each frame. That is, keywords criticizing a party’s illiberalism are used to indicate the populism as democratic illiberalism frame, keywords criticizing a party’s undemocratic and authoritarian tendencies are used to indicate the threat to liberal democracy frame, while keywords identified in the existing literature as common tropes of anti-populism are used to indicate the anti-populist frame (see Table 2).
According to this logic, the populism as democratic illiberalism frame groups together critical claims about illiberalism. Such critiques often describe a party which does not respect what Marlene Laruelle calls the ‘classical political liberalism script’ (Reference Laruelle2020: 312) and Michael Freeden calls the core liberal understanding of power as limited and accountable (Reference Freeden2015: 63). This political illiberalism is indicated by direct statements or allusions to the party, its acts or its leaders as illiberal, unconstitutional, illegal, corrupt and politically biased. Critical claims coded as illiberal included claims that the party violated political or civil rights or internationally recognized human rights; undermined the separation of powers (especially judicial independence and the rule of law) or media freedom; was responsible for undue interference in cultural or private life, freedom of expression or civil society; and a failure to respect EU values aligned to political liberalism. Those coded as unconstitutional involved direct statements that a party, or public authorities they controlled, violated the constitution. Critical claims coded as illegal stated, or alluded to, party actions that allegedly or actually broke the law, including EU and international law, while corrupt captured claims that a party or its members acted illegally for private gain. The charge of politically biased referred to statements that those heading or employed by public authorities or state-funded bodies served the interests of a specific populist party rather than the public interest. Another set of critiques address a party’s failure to respect what Laruelle calls the script of ‘cultural liberalism’, which ‘stresses the emancipatory power of individual rights’ in the form of identity rights (Reference Laruelle2020: 312), and Freeden’s fifth layer of liberalism emphasizing societal pluralism (Reference Freeden2015: 50). This cultural illiberalism is indicated by direct statements or allusions to the party, its acts or its leaders as racist, propagating hatred, discriminatory, xenophobic, antisemitic, Islamophobic or intolerant. Critical claims coded as racist, antisemitic, Islamophobic or xenophobic described or alluded to the party as such, while those coded as hatred claimed the party or its actions propagated hatred towards others. Those coded as intolerant described the party as anti-pluralist or as rejecting diversity. Claims coded as discriminatory captured statements that the party supported, implemented or failed to respond to discriminatory treatment against groups and minorities, including people with disabilities, ethnic minorities, women and LGBTQ+ people.
Keywords criticizing a party’s undemocratic and authoritarian tendencies indicate use of the populism as threat to liberal democracy frame, including direct statements or allusions that a party or its actions are undemocratic as well as authoritarian, fascist, Nazi or communist. Critical claims coded as undemocratic included claims the party diminished democratic quality or directly threatened democracy, undermined the integrity of elections, referenda or the ability of opposition parties to hold the government to account. Those coded as authoritarian included claims that a populist party-led government acted like a dictatorship., a totalitarian or tyrannical state, or that the populist party displayed authoritarian tendencies. It also included comparisons to contemporary and historical authoritarian regimes or semi-authoritarian ones (e.g. Putin’s Russia, Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, Belarus, Iran). Claims coded as fascist or Nazi were typically descriptions of parties as such, or claim it was similar or sympathetic to such ideologies. Although relatively rare, claims coded as communist included comparisons with actions of previous communist regimes or contemporary ones such as Cuba, or that in their opposition claimants upheld the legacy of anticommunist resistance.
Keywords identified in the existing literature as common tropes of anti-populism are used to indicate the anti-populist frame demonizing and delegitimizing populists. These tropes describe a party as abnormal or deviant, indicated in keywords extremist, sick or inhuman. Claims the party is extremist used words such as fundamentalist, revolutionary, far right or right-wing extremist, as well as in the case of the Alternative for Germany, calls for the domestic intelligence agency to monitor it as such. Claims the party was sick used words describing nausea, disease, infection and mental illness, while those describing it as inhuman compared the party, its leaders or ideas with some kind of animal or pests, or to troglodytes, trolls or neanderthals. Anti-populist tropes describing populists as ‘poor governors’ are indicated by the keywords incompetent, including words such as absurd, ridiculous, irrational, unscientific, ignorant, unrealistic, factually incorrect and risky. A ‘poor governors’ trope also includes claims of inappropriateness, directly stating or alluding to a party’s unwillingness to respect political norms and conventions, acting in a self-interested manner rather than in the public interest. Anti-populist tropes of the populist as ‘morally irredeemable’ are indicated by claims they are immoral, manipulative and liars. Immorality claims included statements that a party failed to help, protect or empathise with vulnerable people, was inhumane, or in its acts departed from the precepts of religious faith or basic values. Claims the party was manipulative included claims that the party misled in pursuit of personal or party self-interest, propagated fake news, took advantage of crisis, or merely pretended to respect liberal democracy. Anti-populist tropes of the populist as a threat to national prosperity and the European project are indicated by claims the party is unpatriotic or unEuropean. Claims the party was unpatriotic included claims the party failed to pursue national interests or respect shared values, or brought shame to, or put the country in danger, while claims it was unEuropean mostly referred to the belief that the party failed to conform to shared European values, norms, practices, standards or interests.
Keywords not included within these frames are those coded as unclear, where justification of the critique was not elaborated or its meaning was ambiguous, or hard to classify keywords such as unwelcome or anti-workers. It also includes the keyword populist, which captured direct statement that the party was populist or allusions to it, such as comparisons with well-known populist leaders such as the Le Pen family in France. While this could be interpreted as a critical claim, indicating an undesired attribute, noted uncertainty about the relationship between populism, liberalism and democracy, justified excluding it from any of the core opposition frames described above.
As Table 2 shows, critical claims targeting studied populist parties coalesce around the populism as democratic illiberalism (39.1%) and anti-populist frames (33.1%). The populism as threat to liberal democracy frame was deployed far less often (14.9%). Figure 1 shows this general pattern occurs across all actor types, although public authorities and civil society actors were more likely to use critiques aligned with the populism as democratic illiberalism frame, while political parties and party-controlled public authorities were more likely to use critical claims aligned with the anti-populist frame. It is, however, noteworthy that civil society actors, and when not speaking from institutional positions, political parties, often framed populist parties as a threat to liberal democracy.
Figure 1. Prevalence of Opposition Frames by Actor Type (Weighted Percentages). Note: Weighted percentage is calculated by adding the percentage of each keyword per party divided by total number of parties.
Similarly, Figure 2 shows that opposition frames for individual parties largely follow patterns in the aggregate data. In all cases, either the populism as democratic illiberalism or anti-populist frame, and sometimes both, predominated. The populism as threat to liberal democracy frame comes third in all cases, except for Podemos.
Figure 2. Opposition Frames by Populist Parties (Percentage of Claims)
There is, however, relevant variation among the cases. The populism as democratic illiberalism (DL) frame was clearly more prevalent than anti-populist (AP) frame in the case of Law and Justice (53% DL, 27% AP), Fidesz (41% DL, 32% AP) and the Sweden Democrats (37% DL, 22% AP). In contrast, the anti-populist frame was more prevalent in the case of Podemos (59% AP, 15% DL), the Danish People’s Party (46% AP, 32% DL), Five Star Movement (46% AP, 24% DL), Alternative for Germany (42% AP, 16% DL) and League (39% AP, 30% DL). For Vox the two frames were almost equally present (29% AP, 30% DL). How might we explain this variation?
Analysis: variation in opposition frames
Commitments to liberal democracy
As discussed above, opposition frames can be expected to reflect a party’s commitments to liberal democracy, with opponents of populist parties establishing hybrid, competitive authoritarian regimes – or wanting to construct them – more likely to be framed as a threat to liberal democracy (Hypothesis 1). Varying commitments to liberal democracy can be measured using data on regime and party-types from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) and Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) datasets, which are built on expert surveys (Coppedge et al. Reference Coppedge2025; Lindberg et al. Reference Lindberg2022; Lührmann et al. Reference Lührmann, Tannenberg and Lindberg2018: 60). During the period when data on opposition frames targeting the governing Fidesz party was collected (2010–2022), Hungary’s score on the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (v2x_libdem) fell from 0.68 to 0.34 and it is now classed as an electoral autocracy (Coppedge et al. Reference Coppedge2025: 17). In electoral autocracies multiparty elections are held, but fall short of ‘democratic’ standards, because of problems like electoral irregularities and limits on party competition. During the period when data on opposition frames targeting the governing Law and Justice was collected (2015–2019), Poland’s V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index fell rapidly from 0.78 to 0.51, and it was classed as an electoral democracy by 2019 (Coppedge et al. Reference Coppedge2025: 26). Electoral democracies meet the democratic standards required for meaningful elections yet fall short on other measures. In Italy, by contrast, scores on the Liberal Democracy Index remained stable during coding periods, including through Conte I (Five Star Movement and League 2018–2019) and Conte II (Five Star Movement, Democratic Party (DP), Free and Equal (LeU), 2019–2021) governments, with Italy remaining a liberal democracy throughout (Coppedge et al. Reference Coppedge2025: 17). Despite expectations that opponents of populist parties establishing hybrid competitive authoritarian regimes were more likely to be framed with the populism as threat to liberal democracy frame, the populism as democratic illiberalism frame was most prevalent in Hungary and Poland, followed by the anti-populist frame. In Italy, the anti-populist frame was most prevalent.
Commitments to liberal democracy at the party level can be captured by the V-Party Antipluralism index (v2xpa_antiplural), which measures the extent to which a party lacks commitments to democratic norms prior to elections. It combines variables measuring the degree to which a party respects political opponents and is committed to free and fair elections with multiple parties, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association, respect for minority rights and rejection of political violence. Using this measure, average scores for parties covering the periods when data was collected ranged from a low of 0.1 for Sweden Democrats and 0.2 for Danish People’s Party, 0.22 for Podemos, 0.5 for Five Star Movement, 0.61 for Vox 0.58 for Alternative for Germany 0.75 for Law and Justice, 0.82 for Fidesz and 0.86 for League. Pearson correlation coefficients measuring the relationship between opposition frames and party commitments to liberal democracy showed there was no statistically significant correlation between a party’s Antipluralism Index score and the percentage of critical keywords aligned to the populism as threat to liberal democracy frame (r = −0.10, P = 0.796), the populism as democratic illiberalism frame (r = 0.31, P = 0.413), the anti-populist frame (r = −0.27, P = 0.483) or other critical keyworks (r = −0.06, P = 0.889).
Ideological illiberalism
It may be that more fine-grained measures capturing variation in ideological illiberalism better account for variation in the prevalence of opposition frames. As argued above, populist parties plausibly understood as ideologically illiberal are more likely to be framed using the populism as democratic illiberalism frame (Hypothesis 2). An index of Ideological Illiberalism can be constructed using three equally weighted variables from the V-Party dataset. This index combines variables on the extent to which a party opposes immigration into the country (v2paimmig), its position for or against social equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT+) community, and a party leadership which strongly promotes or opposes the cultural superiority of a specific social group or the nation as a whole (v2paculsup). Parties with low scores on the index indicate a higher degree of ideological illiberalism. Using this measure, average scores for parties covering the periods when data was collected ranged from a high ideological illiberalism score of −3.01 for Vox, −2.76 for League, −2.54 for Law and Justice, −2.28 for the Danish People’s Party, −2.22 for Alternative for Germany and −2.20 for Fidesz, to a lower ideological illiberalism score of −1.11 for Sweden Democrats, −0.18 for Five Star Movement and a positive liberalism score for Podemos of 3.02. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess the relationship between opposition frames and party scores on the Ideological Illiberalism Index. Coefficients for ideological illiberalism and anti-populist frames were statistically significant, positively and highly correlated (r = 0.67, P = 0.047), so that scores indicating a higher degree of illiberalism were associated with higher percentages of keywords aligned with the anti-populism frame. There was no statistically significant correlation between ideological illiberalism and the populism as democratic illiberalism frame (r = −0.52, P = 0.154), the populism as threat to liberal democracy frame (r = 0.15, P = 0.692) or other critical keywords (r = −0.29, P = 0.434).
Degree of populism
Does the degree of populism correlate with the prevalence of the demonizing, delegitimizing anti-populist frame, as expressed in Hypothesis 3? The degree of populism can be measured using the V-Party Populism Index (v2xpa_popul), which measures the extent to which party representatives use populist rhetoric. It combines evaluations of the relative importance of anti-elitist rhetoric and the extent to which party leaders glorify ‘ordinary people' and identify themselves as part of the people. Using this measure, average scores for parties covering the periods when data was collected ranged from 0.63 for the Danish People’s Party, 0.66 for the Five Star Movement, 0.68 for Vox, at the lower end, to 0.78 for League, 0.82 for Fidesz, 0.86 for Sweden Democrats, 0.89 for Alternative for Germany, 0.90 for Podemos and 0.96 for Law and Justice, at the higher end. Correlation coefficients calculated to assess the relationship between the degree of populism and opposition frames showed no statistically significant association between a party’s Populism Index score and the percentage of critical keywords aligned with the anti-populist frame (r = −0.17, P = .659). Nor was there a statistically significant correlation between Populism Index scores and the populism as democratic illiberalism frame (r = 0.17, P = 0.656), the populism as threat to liberal democracy frame (r = −0.23, P = 0.545) or other critical keywords (r = 0.08, P = 0.832).
Party cues, confrontation and cooperation
Variation in the prevalence of opposition frames may also be due to practices of cooperation and confrontation between populist and other competing parties. As argued above, where other parties refuse to cooperate with a populist party, it would be consistent to deploy the populism as threat to liberal democracy or anti-populism frames (Hypothesis 4). Where other parties are willing to cooperate with populists, it is plausible to expect that critiques will deploy the populism as democratic illiberalism frame, or use other frames unrelated to liberal democratic quality (Hypothesis 5). Knowledge of patterns of cooperation and confrontation can be drawn from case studies (e.g. Akkerman et al. Reference Akkerman, Lange and Roodouijn2016; Albertazzi and Vampa Reference Albertazzi and Vampa2021; Bourne Reference Bourne2024a). During the period when data on opposition frames was collected, Alternative for Germany was systematically ostracized by all mainstream parties (Laumond Reference Laumond and Bourne2024). In both Hungary and Poland, the main opposition parties fairly consistently adopted confrontational strategies targeting the Fidesz and Law and Justice governments (Moroska-Bonkiewicz and Domagała Reference Moroska-Bonkiewicz, Domagała and In Bourne2024; Tyszka Reference Tyszka and In Bourne2024). In contrast, League has a long history of participation in coalition governments with other parties (Campo Reference Campo and Bourne2024b) and the data available for Vox covered all but a few entries after the party became a support party for a centre-right coalition government in Andalucia in December 2018 (Campo Reference Campo and Bourne2024b). For the other parties, patterns of confrontation and cooperation were more varied during the coding periods. By November 2001, the Danish People’s Party had become a support party for a right-wing coalition, by July 2015 Podemos had become a support party to governments led by the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) in Aragon and later elsewhere, in June 2018 Five Star Movement formed a coalition government with League and by October 2022, the Sweden Democrats had become a support party for a right-wing coalition (Campo Reference Campo2024a, Reference Campo and Bourne2024b; Nicholaisen Reference Nicholaisen and In Bourne2024a, Reference Nicholaisen and In Bourne2024b).
Analysis of data recoded to differentiate between periods before and after the point at which at least some other parties were willing to cooperate with studied populist parties shows some changes in the prevalence of opposition frames. As Figure 3 shows, there was a small difference in the prevalence of the populism as democratic illiberalism frame, which was higher on average for cases where party political competitors were united in a confrontational strategy against populists (30% on average), compared to where at least some political parties were willing to cooperate with populists in government (28% on average). There was a larger difference in the prevalence of the anti-populist frame, which was on average higher for cases where at least some political parties were willing to cooperate with populists in government (42% on average), compared to cases where party political competitors were united in a confrontational strategy against populists (38% on average). Figure 4 shows a similar pattern for parties that transitioned from outsiders that were subject to confrontational strategies by other parties, to insiders invited into governing roles as either support parties or coalition partners. For the populist parties transitioning from outsiders to governing insiders in our study, the prevalence of anti-populist frames increased from an average of 41% to 46% for periods after they had taken on governing roles, while the populism as threat to liberal democracy frame decreased from an average of 19% to 16%. The populism as democratic illiberalism frame and other critical claims were more stable.
Figure 3. Confrontational and Cooperative Party Strategies and the Prevalence of Opposition Frames: Aggregate Data
Figure 4. Transitioners and Prevalence of Opposition Frames (Danish People’s Party, Podemos, Five Star Movement and Sweden
Conclusion
This article has examined how democratic communities interpret the ambiguities of populist orientations to liberal democracy, and how and why this differs across party and country contexts. It does so by examining ideational frames justifying opposition to populist parties in seven European countries, and variation in terms of governing status, commitments to liberal democracy, degree of populism and patterns of conflict and cooperation. Analysis showed that while the populism as threat to democracy frame was articulated in justifications of opposition in the public sphere in all cases, the populism as democratic illiberalism and the delegitimizing, demonizing anti-populist frames were more prevalent. One or other of the populism as democratic illiberalism or anti-populist frames, or both, were most prevalent for all cases (see Figure 2) and dominated opposition frames articulated by all types of opposition actors (see Figure 1).
While the populism as democratic illiberalism frame was observed in all cases, it dominated opposition frames targeting Fidesz and Law and Justice, and the Sweden Democrats. The best explanation for the prevalence of this frame emerging from the analysis was hybrid democratic–authoritarian regimes established in Hungary and Poland. Although it was expected that rapid autocratization would lead opponents to interpret their political reality through the threat to liberal democracy frame (Hypothesis 1), it is also plausible to explain the predominance of the democratic liberalism frame in Hungary and Poland as an attempt to articulate credible arguments capturing a political reality where competitive elections still permit alternation in power despite democratic backsliding. In the case of the Sweden Democrats, it could be argued that the party’s low score on the V-Party Antipluralism Index, which was lowest of all the cases studied, combined with scores indicating (moderate) illiberalism on the Ideological illiberalism Index makes the populism as democratic illiberalism frame the most credible opposition frame. Beyond the Swedish case, however, there was no evidence that low scores on the Antipluralism Index, or scores indicating illiberalism on the Ideological Illiberalism Index were related to the prevalence of the populism as democratic illiberalism frame.
The demonizing, delegitimizing anti-populist frame was more prevalent in the other cases, namely that of Podemos, the Danish People’s Party, Five Star Movement, Alternative for Germany and League, while for Vox it was almost equally as important as the populism as democratic illiberalism frame. Despite expectations (Hypothesis 3), there was no evidence that the prevalence of the anti-populist frame varied in line with V-Party data on degrees of populism. Rather, an explanation for the prevalence of this frame that emerged from the analysis was that anti-populism was related to ideological illiberalism. That is, scores indicating a higher degree of illiberalism were positively associated with higher percentages on critical keywords aligned with the anti-populist frame. Although it was expected that scores indicating illiberalism on the Ideological Illiberalism Index would align with the populism as democratic illiberalism frame (Hypothesis 2), it is plausible to explain the observed relationship between ideological illiberalism and the anti-populist frame as an expression of deep disagreement on populist cultural illiberalism. That is, the demonizing, delegitimizing tone of the anti-populist frame is likely to reflect broader social polarization on one or other of the issues captured by the Ideological Illiberalism Index. This is clearest for right-wing populist parties mobilizing on nationalist issues, promoting stricter immigration policies, and in some cases against social equality of LGBTQ+ people. In the case of the Five Star Movement, this may reflect support for a strict anti-immigrant agenda in government. The case of Podemos is as an outlier among these parties, which despite occupying the most liberal position on the Ideological Illiberalism Index, had the highest percentage of critical claims aligning with the anti-populist frame. For Podemos, the prevalence of the anti-populist frame rested heavily on the critical claim the party was incompetent, including claims its policies were unrealistic, utopian and naive.
A second explanation for the prevalence of the anti-populist frame emerging from the analysis relates to practices of competing parties, particularly whether at least some salient parties were willing to cooperate with populist parties. Despite the expectation that cooperation with other salient parties would legitimize populist parties and favour use of the populism as illiberal democracy frame (Hypothesis 5), the analysis showed that anti-populist frames were more prevalent when other parties were willing to cooperate with populist parties. This suggests that ideological illiberalism in populist discourse, and the decision of other parties to cooperate with rather than ostracize populist parties, may affect political culture in liberal democracies by contributing to polarization. Insofar as polarization undermines the ability of democratic communities to negotiate and accommodate differing political projects, the prevalence of anti-populist frames in liberal democratic political cultures may undermine the resilience of democratic institutions in the face of challengers.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Gianfranco Baldini and Hugo Canihac for their comments on earlier versions of this article.
Financial support
The research is financed by the Carlsberg Foundation CF20-008.
Open access
