1.3.1 The Energy Policy Tracker

For this Element we utilize the EPT, developed by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) in partnership with the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Oil Change International, Overseas Development Institute, Stockholm Environment Institute, and Columbia University. The EPT covers investments and other relevant policies adopted in thirty-seven countries and the European Union as well as eight multilateral development banks (MDBs) (we focus on countries). The EPT showcases publicly available information on public money commitments for different energy types, and other policies supporting energy production and consumption in the following sectors: resources (e.g., extraction of oil, gas and coal, pipelines as well as restoration of extractive sites), power, buildings, mobility (e.g., airlines, airports, car manufacturing, rail and public transport, and cycling and walking), and other energy-intensive sectors.

The EPT was generated through a bottom-up approach, which involved collecting data on individual policies at an individual country level, and then aggregating them. The database was regularly updated between January 1, 2020, and December 31, 2021. Only new policies or amendments of existing policies were included in the EPT, and the majority of policies represent government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, policies that had been designed before the crisis and introduced as planned after January 1, 2020, were also included. Even though these policies may not be directly linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, the fact that they were introduced despite sociopolitical disruptions and economic downturn is noteworthy. Both the date a policy is announced and when it is passed are registered in the EPT. The amount of funding committed to a policy is tracked, as well as the amount dispersed. However, given the data available at the time of our analysis, we only report funds committed.

Policies in the EPT are classified according to different criteria. One of the key criteria is a policy’s environmental profile that depends on (1) which energy types it benefits, and (2) whether it has any environmental conditionality attached. Throughout the tracker, information is split across five categories: fossil unconditional, fossil conditional, clean unconditional, clean conditional, and other energy (see further Table 2).

Table 2Policy categories

Source: https://www.energypolicytracker.org/methodology/

1.4.1 Renewable Energy

To facilitate an energy transition and achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, renewable energy technologies (e.g., solar, wind, hydro, tidal, and geothermal power) need to be developed and deployed on a large scale. In the IEA’s Net-Zero by 2050 pathway, renewable energy generation needs to triple by 2030 and increase more than eightfold by 2050 (IEA 2021 g). While this is a formidable challenge, the economics are favorable. Costs of renewable energy have fallen by an average of 18 percent annually since 2010 (Carbon Tracker Initiative 2021), undercutting the cheapest fossil fuels in many countries (IEA 2020h; IRENA 2021b). Although costs rose during the pandemic due to increased commodity prices and shipping costs, fossil fuel prices increased faster and thus the cost competitiveness of renewables still increased in this period (IEA 2022c). The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA 2021b) estimates that the 534 gigawatts of renewable energy capacity added since 2010 in emerging economies will reduce electricity generation costs up to $32 billion in 2021. Furthermore, the replacement of 800 gigawatts of coal-fired capacity would save $32 billion annually (IRENA 2021b). As electricity demand increases in emerging economies and new capacity is needed, renewable power generation projects will reduce costs by a minimum of $6 billion annually compared to the cost of adding the same capacity of fossil fuel–fired generation (IRENA 2021b). In addition to economic savings and GHG reductions, replacement of fossil fuels with renewable energy will reduce local air pollution, which in turn has positive impacts for human health and local environmental quality.

1.4.2 Energy Access

The IEA (2020g) defines energy access as “a household having reliable and affordable access to both clean cooking facilities and to electricity, which is considered enough to supply a basic bundle of energy services initially, and then increasing the level of electricity over time to reach the regional average.” Universal energy access is necessary to fulfill both social and economic development, to satisfy needs for health, lighting, cooking, space, comfort, mobility, and communication (Reference Edenhofer, Pichs-Madruga and SokonaEdenhofer et al. 2011). In 2022, 775 million people lacked access to electricity, which was an increase of 20 million people compared with 2021, reversing the downward trend of the previous decade (Reference Cozzi, Wetzel, Tonolo and HyppoliteCozzi et al. 2022). Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the lowest levels of energy access and greatest need for international support.

1.4.3 Low-Carbon Mobility

Redesigning the transport sector is considered vital to global climate change mitigation strategies (US EPA n.d.; IEA 2021f). Transport accounts for 37 percent of CO₂ emissions from end-use sectors and is more reliant on fossil fuels than any other sector (it is responsible for 57 percent of global oil demand) (IEA 2021e). Despite the stringency of COVID-19 lockdowns, which accounted for a 50 percent reduction of global road transport activity at the end of March 2020 and a 75 percent reduction in airline traffic in mid-April 2020 (IEA 2020d), mobility still accounted for 23 percent of energy-related CO₂ emissions at the end of March 2021 (IEA 2021f). The high emissions rate of carbon-intensive transportation in all its forms not only exacerbates climate change but also comes with well-documented risks to human health, as PM 2.5 pollution contributes to poor air quality, which in turn impacts morbidity and mortality rates (IPCC 2014; Reference Mullen and MarsdenMullen and Marsden 2016). Shifting transportation regimes away from a reliance on fossil fuels has benefits that extend beyond GHG emissions reductions. Improving public transit systems likewise improves road safety and increases employment, while also decreasing traffic congestion, urban sprawl, and various forms of noise and air pollution (Reference Banister, Anderton, Bonilla, Givoni and SchwanenBanister et al. 2011; Reference Russo and BoutueilRusso and Boutueil 2011; IPCC 2014).

1.4.4 Energy-Efficient Buildings

The construction and operation of buildings account for 35 percent of global energy use and 15 percent of CO₂ emissions (Global Alliance of Buildings and Construction 2021; IEA 2021d). Direct and indirect emissions from electricity and commercial heat used in buildings rose to 10 GtCO2 in 2019, the highest level ever recorded before dropping to 9Gt in 2020. The rise was driven by improved access to energy in developing countries, greater ownership and use of energy-consuming devices, and rapid growth in floor area. The drop in emissions in 2020 was primarily the result of less activity in the services sector during COVID-19 lockdowns and it is likely that emissions from this sector rebounded in 2021 (IEA 2021d). While space heating is currently responsible for around 45 percent of building-related emissions, energy demand for space cooling has more than tripled since 1990, making it the fastest-growing end use in buildings (Abergel and Delmastro 2020). The average temperature rise that comes with climate change is one of the factors contributing to increasing cooling service demand. There are clear links between building efficiency and inequality as low-income individuals and families are the most likely to live in inefficient homes, leading to higher heating and cooling costs as well as health impacts and reductions in quality of life.

1.4.5 Support for Fossil Fuel–Dependent Communities

While restructuring the energy sector to address climate change is likely to have a net-positive impact on employment, because more jobs will be created in sectors like renewable energy and energy efficiency than will be eliminated in sectors like fossil fuels, it is important to recognize that these shifts will create profound disruptions for affected workers and for communities and regions that are highly dependent on a single industry (UNFCCC Secretariat 2020). New green jobs may not appear at the same time or in the same location as old jobs are lost (UNFCCC Secretariat 2020). There are also understandable concerns from workers that they will be transitioning from unionized, high-paying jobs in the fossil fuel sector into nonunionized workplaces with lower wages and fewer benefits (Reference SahaSaha 2020). Policies in areas like worker retraining and income support are therefore needed to buffer the impacts of the energy transition and minimize human suffering (UNFCCC Secretariat 2020). In addition to lost employment opportunities, decades of resource extraction have left legacies for fossil fuel–dependent communities in terms of ongoing environmental and health impacts. Reclamation of these sites is critical from an environmental perspective as well as to meet health and equity objectives.

2.1.1 Green Keynesianism

According to Keynesian economics, during severe recession or depression, governments should inject money into the economy through public spending to increase demand for goods and services to achieve full employment. Although the COVID-19 recession differs substantially from previous ones, in that it was not induced by a conventional slump in demand or loss of confidence by the private sector, governments have overwhelmingly relied on fiscal measures to address it (Reference O’Callaghan, Yau and HepburnO’Callaghan, Yau, and Hepburn 2022).

Green Keynesianism first emerged as a concept in Germany in the 1990s but was popularized in 2008 when governments around the world re-embraced Keynesian economics to address the GFC/Great Recession (Reference TienhaaraTienhaara 2018). Green Keynesians argue that governments should direct public spending in a manner that will contribute to environmental goals, such as GHG emissions reductions, in addition to economic ones. The extent to which the economic and environmental goals of green stimulus spending are either mutually reinforcing or at odds is the subject of ongoing debate.

As noted in Section 1.1, green sectors like renewable energy generation and building retrofitting are labor-intensive (Reference Pollin, Garrett-Peltier, Heintz and HendricksPollin et al. 2014; Reference Garrett-PeltierGarrett-Peltier 2017; Reference Pollin and ChakrabortyPollin and Chakraborty 2020). Although the labor intensity of projects in these sectors can change over time (e.g., the maintenance requirements for renewable energy installations are relatively minor), research indicates that they can still outperform projects in traditional energy sectors in terms of both direct and indirect job creation (Reference O’Callaghan, Yau and HepburnO’Callaghan, Yau, and Hepburn 2022). While there are legitimate concerns about the quality and longevity of jobs created through government spending and the ability of displaced fossil fuel workers to enter into green sectors, these issues can be addressed through policy (see further Section 2.3.5).

A greater tension exists between the aim of boosting GDP and of addressing environmental issues. From an economic perspective, the performance of green stimulus measures in this regard has been mixed. The IEA (2020e) found that the overall macroeconomic effect of the GFC green stimulus programs was to boost GDP between 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent, which “could be counted as a success” given the severity of the crisis. However, growth impacts varied greatly by spending program. For example, GFC stimulus provided to renewable energy generation is regarded as having succeeded in reducing the cost of renewable energy technologies but having had little impact on GDP (Reference Agrawala, Dussaux and MontiAgrawala, Dussaux, and Monti 2020). From an environmental perspective, the goal of boosting GDP is inherently problematic due to a lack of evidence that economic growth can be decoupled from environmental harm quickly enough to avert the collapse of systems that support human civilization (Reference Hickel and KallisHickel and Kallis 2020). On the other hand, given that growth of certain economic sectors is necessary in the short term, government spending to induce economic recovery is not necessarily incompatible with a longer-term shift to a steady-state economy (Reference FiorinoFiorino 2017; Reference PettiforPettifor 2019).

2.1.2 Green Industrial Policy

In the last decade, there has been renewed interest in policy circles in public investment in green sectors in the absence of an economic crisis and a subset of this known as “green industrial policy” (Reference MecklingMeckling 2021). As Reference Bentley, Lewis and OatleyAllan, Lewis, and Oatley (2021) note, this approach has even been embraced by conservative governments in countries like Britain.

Economist Reference RodrikDani Rodrik (2014) has been a key proponent of green industrial policy, arguing that public investment in green technologies is critical in the transition to a low-carbon economy. He suggests that green technologies are likely to be particularly prone to market failures because they are novel and involve a high level of investor risk. Furthermore, because the true social cost of carbon is not reflected in dirty forms of energy, the private return on investment in green technologies is significantly less than the social return. For these reasons, the private sector will not invest sufficiently in green technologies and so government subsidies and other forms of support are required, at least in the early stages of their development. Reference RodrikRodrick (2014) dismisses the traditional concern that governments are not good at “picking winners” and will consequently waste resources, suggesting that mistakes are inevitable (and are also made by market actors) and what is needed are mechanisms to recognize and correct mistakes. As for the concern that government intervention in the market invites rent-seeking behavior on the part of firms, this can also be overcome with appropriate policy design (Reference RodrikRodrik 2014).

There are a range of policies that governments can adopt under this approach, including providing financial assistance to the private sector through grants, below market loans, tax breaks, investments in research and development (R&D), local content requirements, and procurement policies (Reference Bentley, Lewis and OatleyAllan et al. 2021). As Reference Meckling, Kelsey, Biber and ZysmanMeckling et al. (2015) argue, green industrial policies can build up support for climate policy by increasing the number of actors that feel that they are benefiting from it.

Reference MecklingMeckling (2021) argues that green industrial policy is primarily focused on increasing the competitiveness of a state in the global economy and contributing to economic growth. Given these goals, it is not clear that it will necessarily lead to the environmental outcomes, such as emissions reductions, that have been adopted as global objectives in treaties such as the Paris Agreement.

The notion of a “Green New Deal,” which first emerged in the context of the GFC but was popularized in 2018 by US Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and the Sunrise Movement, is often characterized as “a leftist resurrection of federal industrial policy” (Reference MeyerMeyer 2019). However, Green New Deal proponents appear to be more influenced by climate justice and just transition discourses. They tend to take an intersectional approach and consider issues of race, gender, and economic equity as critical in policy design, something which is less evident in discussions of green industrial policy (Reference Tienhaara and RobinsonTienhaara and Robinson 2022). Reference Bentley, Lewis and OatleyAllan et al. (2021) contend that a critical question for the future of green industrial policy is whether it will reduce inequality or, conversely, exacerbate it.

2.2.1 Climate Justice

While there are many definitions of climate justice, they have all been influenced to some extent by the broader environmental justice literature and movement (Reference David and CollinsSchlosberg and Collins 2014; Reference NewellNewell 2022). The earliest conceptualization of environmental justice was based on a recognition that marginalized communities are most likely to suffer the negative impacts of environmental damage (Reference SchlosbergSchlosberg 2013). Such inequities arose from various forms of discrimination (e.g., based on race, gender, and/or class) (Reference Galgóczi, Räthzel, Stevis and UzzellGalgóczi 2021). Climate justice applies these findings specifically to the issue of climate change, highlighting that the groups most vulnerable to the impacts of a warming planet (poor and marginalized communities in the Global South) are the least responsible for causing it, and conversely, those with prime responsibility (elites based in the Global North) are most insulated from harm (Reference KennerKenner 2019).

While the North–South dimension is core to the concept of climate justice, increasingly scholars also consider inequality within countries and not only the uneven causes/impacts of climate change but also the distributional effects of the policies intended to address it. As Reference Galgóczi, Räthzel, Stevis and UzzellGalgóczi (2021, 542) argues:

A strand of literature specifically focused on energy policy and energy systems has emerged in the last decade (Reference McCauley, Heffron, Stephan and JenkinsMcCauley et al. 2013). Energy justice scholars consider, for example, the distributional injustices that might arise through the siting of energy infrastructure as well as limited access to energy services (Reference Jenkins, McCauley, Heffron, Stephan and RehnerJenkins et al. 2016).

In addition to questions of distributional justice, climate justice and energy justice scholars also consider procedural justice; that is, who is able to participate in decision-making and whether climate policies provide for inclusivity, transparency, and accountability (Reference Jenkins, McCauley, Heffron, Stephan and RehnerJenkins et al. 2016; Initiative for Energy Justice 2019; Reference Siciliano, Wallbott, Urban, Nguyen Dang and LedererSiciliano et al. 2021). Related to this is recognition justice, which is about who is considered a valid participant in climate policy decision-making procedures (Reference NewellNewell 2022).

2.2.2 Just Transition

The concept of a just transition came out of the North American labor movement in the 1970s and is now widely embraced by unions as well as the International Labour Organization (ILO) (Reference Stevis and FelliStevis and Felli 2015). Arguably, it emerged in response to the decline of the social welfare state in the United States and Canada (Reference StevisStevis 2023). While originally centered within unions in the chemicals sector, the just transition is now most associated with fossil fuel industry workers and communities reliant on that industry. At the core of the just transition is the notion of fair burden-sharing (Reference Galgóczi, Räthzel, Stevis and UzzellGalgóczi 2021). In countries where carbon-intensive sectors like fossil fuel extraction are concentrated in specific regions (e.g., the province of Alberta in Canada), a just transition entails job retraining for those active in the sector but also programs to support all those whose livelihood is connected to the industry. In addition to such arrangements, the idea of a just transition also encapsulates the notion that affected workers and communities will be meaningfully engaged in decision-making processes (Reference Santos Ayllón and JenkinsSantos Ayllón and Jenkins 2023).

2.2.3 Our Approach

In our assessment of policies adopted by governments during the pandemic, distributional justice is our primary focus. We aim to assess whether, in addition to aiming to reduce GHGs, governments also aimed to increase the availability and affordability of energy (including through energy-efficient technologies and low-carbon mobilities) for low-income, marginalized and vulnerable communities and/or to create decent jobs for low-skilled workers or workers at risk of unemployment or underemployment in the energy transition. We recognize that procedural justice and recognition justice are also critical. However, given that energy policies adopted during the pandemic are still in the very early stages of development, and the fact that this is primarily a desk-based study, these issues cannot be explored in any depth.

2.3.1 Renewable Energy

The pandemic initially had a negative impact on deployment of renewable energy. In the first half of 2020, global renewable electricity capacity additions were more than 11 percent lower than in the first six months of 2019. However, renewable energy developers accelerated installations when restrictions on economic activities were lifted to make up for delays (IEA 2020a). In 2021, a record-breaking 6 percent addition in renewable capacity occurred despite ongoing supply-chain challenges and continued construction delays associated with the pandemic (IEA 2022c).

Although the progress in increasing renewable energy capacity during the pandemic is welcome, much greater investment in the sector is needed. IRENA estimates that investments of $2 trillion toward renewables and other transition-related technologies are needed between 2021 and 2023 and should grow to $4.5 trillion by 2030. This level of investment would increase renewable power generation five times faster than it has in recent years, allowing for a more rapid phaseout of fossil fuels (IRENA 2020).

Governments invest in renewable energy through a wide variety of policy mechanisms. Fiscal incentives such as feed-in-tariffs, which provide a fixed price to renewable energy providers over a period of time, are particulary popular and have been shown to be effective (Reference LewisLewis 2021). Governments also provide support for R&D in renewable energy generation and storage. Additionally, upgrades and modifications of infrastructure to support renewable energy, particularly electricity grids, are critical and often the responsibility of governments (Reference Seetharaman, Nitin Patwa and GuptaSeetharaman et al. 2019; IEA 2020f).

Investments in renewable energy have the potential to improve energy access, reduce energy poverty, and create employment opportunities (Reference DincerDincer 2000; Reference Edenhofer, Pichs-Madruga and SokonaEdenhofer et al. 2011). These outcomes are more likely when they are targeted to marginalized and underserved communities, particularly remote communities (i.e., not connected to the main electricity grid) that are currently dependent on fossil fuels for energy. Several policies identified in our screening of the EPT fall into this category and are highlighted in Section 3.1. Policies promoting or funding renewable energy projects that are community-led or community-owned are also examined. We acknowledge that there has been a tendency “to assume rather than demonstrate that community projects are more democratic or just” (Reference Van VeelenVan Veelen 2018, 645). Therefore, we stress that this is a preliminary review and more in-depth case studies would be required to assess whether, for example, there were certain societal groups that were excluded or marginalized in the initiatives that we highlight (Reference van Bommel and Höffkenvan Bommel and Höffken 2021).

2.3.2 Energy Access

The COVID-19 pandemic has made the goal of providing universal energy access by 2030 significantly more difficult to achieve. The financial impact of the pandemic has reversed progress on energy access in countries like Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia (IRENA 2021a). It is estimated that the pandemic could increase levels of extreme poverty for an additional 70 million rural people throughout both South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Reference Debucquet, David and VosLaborde Debucquet, Martin, and Vos 2020). Due to the containment measures for the COVID-19 virus, many of those who worked in informal jobs became unemployed and experienced difficulty paying for energy services (Reference Zaman, van Vliet and PoschZaman, van Vliet, and Posch 2021). Approximately 30 million people who previously could afford access to energy are now unable to (IRENA 2021a).

The post-COVID-19 global economic environment will include a long-term recession, as well as increased levels of unemployment as countries work toward restarting their economies (SEforALL 2020), which will contribute further to a decline in energy access. If the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on achieving energy access go ignored, the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) of universal access to affordable, sustainable energy by 2030 (SDG 7) will not be achieved.

Investment into renewable energy generation will have to be around $550–850 billion per year, alongside other investments into electricity networks, to reach universal energy access by 2030, which is significantly higher than the current annual $300 billion investment (IRENA 2021a). In Africa alone, to achieve universal electricity access by 2030, an annual investment of around $29–30 billion in electricity infrastructure is required (SEforALL 2020; Reference Cozzi, Wetzel, Tonolo and HyppoliteCozzi et al. 2022). Least developed countries face the greatest challenges in accessing finance for energy projects (Reference BhattacharyyaBhattacharyya 2013).

Energy infrastructure plans must be socially and culturally inappropriate, taking into consideration community values, especially in rural areas (Reference TarekegneTarekegne 2020). Renewable energy can create more added value when generated locally, especially for rural locations that are not connected to the national grid (Reference KhennasKhennas 2012). Off-grid solutions (see Table 3) should actively be considered for deployment in areas that have lower consumption levels, as they have the potential to provide greater improvements to energy access per dollar spent (Reference Bhattacharyya and PalitBhattacharyya and Palit 2016). However, the pandemic hit the off-grid sector hard; about two-thirds of mini-grid operators and 75 percent of solar home system suppliers were facing critical liquidity challenges during the first phase of the COVID-19 crisis (IEA 2020 g).

Table 3Types of electricity systems and their advantages and disadvantages

Source: Authors (based on Reference Mahapatra and DasappaMahapatra and Dasappa 2012; Reference Alstone, Gershenson and KammenAlstone, Gershenson, and Kammen 2015; Reference Hansen, Brix Pedersen and NygaardHansen, Pedersen, and Nygaard 2015; Reference Williams, Jaramillo, Taneja and Selim UstunWilliams et al. 2015; Reference AdelekeAdeleke 2016; Reference Saule and JenkinsBaurzhan and Jenkins 2016; Reference Bhattacharyya and PalitBhattacharyya and Palit 2016; Reference Kagimu and Selim UstunKagimu and Ustun 2016; Reference Nkiriki and Selim UstunNkiriki and Ustun 2017; Reference Akinyele, Belikov and LevronAkinyele, Belikov, and Levron 2018; IRENA 2021b)

To enhance the deployment of off-grid energy systems, countries will need to engage in land-use reforms and streamlining of regulatory processes that act as barriers to the deployment of electricity systems (Reference Mugisha, Ratemo, Keza and KahveciMugisha et al. 2021). Research indicates that a community-ownership model increases the likelihood of off-grid projects succeeding (Reference Duran and SahinyazanDuran and Sahinyazan 2021).

Only two countries tracked in the EPT – Kenya and Nigeria – lack universal access to electricity and rolled out programs to address this during 2020–1. We describe these programs in Section 3.2.

2.3.3 Low-Carbon Mobility

The pandemic and associated lockdowns necessitated that human mobility be reduced to curb the spread of COVID-19. While this reduced the use of personal vehicles and associated GHG emissions, it also dramatically impacted the use of public transportation such as buses and trains. Public transportation systems remained underutilized even as lockdowns eased, as they were considered a vector of virus transmission (Reference Gutiérrez, Miravet and DomènechGutiérrez, Miravet, and Domènech 2021). As revenue from fare collection plummeted, government support was needed simply to maintain basic transportation services and to keep workers employed (Reference VickermanVickerman 2021). The loss of revenue may, in some cases, result in reduced service into the future and delays in investments in areas such as fleet electrification.

The C40 network of cities has argued that “public transport can play a major role in supporting a green and just economic recovery,” highlighting that public transport networks “enable affordable access to the economic, social and cultural opportunities offered by cities especially for those who cannot afford to own a vehicle” (C40, International Transport Workers’ Federation 2021). Public support for active transportation can also contribute to equity if programs recognize and work to remove barriers that prevent certain groups from participating in cycling and walking (Reference McCullough, Lugo and van StokkumMcCullough, Lugo, and Stokkum 2019; Reference AgyemanAgyeman 2020). Electrically assisted micromobility modes (e.g., e-scooters, e-bikes) can also increase access to active transport, increase the distance that people are willing to commute using active transportation, and help with difficult topographies (Reference KoehlKoehl 2021).

Municipalities have significant involvement in enabling and encouraging public and active modes of transport. The notion of the “eco-city” gained popularity in the wake of the pandemic as a means for municipalities to take a holistic approach to transitioning mobility systems. Broadly, the goal of an eco-city is to:

Generally, eco-cities center around low-carbon discourses, “green-smart” technological innovation, and accessibility to transport for all peoples (Reference Joss, Cowley and TomozeiuJoss, Cowley, and Tomozeiu 2013; Reference Meine Pieter vanvan Dijk 2015). However, it should be noted that the concept of the eco-city has also been subject to thorough critique, with some scholars questioning whether the concept provides more than a “technological fix” (Reference Joss, Cowley and TomozeiuJoss, Cowley, and Tomozeiu 2013; Reference CaprottiCaprotti 2014). One eco-city program is captured in the EPT and is discussed in Section 3.3.

In addition to public and active modes of transportation, a switch from internal combustion engine vehicles to EVs is widely considered to be an essential part of the transition to low-carbon mobility. While there is now a technology and cost breakthrough for EV and battery production, these technologies are still largely confined to wealthier markets (Reference HendersonHenderson 2020; Reference Dolšak and PrakashDolšak and Prakash 2022).

Consumer subsidies have been a popular method to increase the uptake of EVs (Reference O’Callaghan and MurdockO’Callaghan and Murdock 2021). During 2020, EV registrations increased by 41 percent, despite the overall 16 percent drop in global car sales, with approximately 3 million electric cars sold globally in 2020 (IEA 2021b). In 2021, sales of EVs doubled from the previous year to a new record of 6.6 million (IEA 2022b), which was again surpassed in 2022 with 10 million units sold (IEA 2023). The IEA attributes this resilience to an increased number of consumer subsidies that governments used to continue to incentivize EV sales during the pandemic, citing a global increase of $14 billion in government spending for electric car sales in 2020 and more than double that in 2021 (IEA 2021b, 2022b).

It is important to recognize that EV subsidies primarily benefit high-income earners (Reference Ku and GrahamKu and Graham 2022) although there have been efforts in some jurisdictions to target subsidies to low-income earners (California’s program is discussed in Section 3.3) (Reference LinnLinn 2022). Targeted subsidies make economic sense because a rebate or grant is more likely to influence a low-income earner’s decision to purchase an EV (wealthier households are more likely to be “free riders” who would have purchased an EV in the absence of a subsidy) (Reference DeShazo and Di FilippoDeShazo and Di Filippo 2021). Low-income earners also tend to drive older, less-efficient cars; getting these cars off the road will have a greater impact on emissions while also promoting upward mobility for low-income households that will save on fuel costs and vehicle repairs (Reference Bauer, Hsu and LutseyBauer, Hsu, and Lutsey 2021; Reference AounAoun 2022). In addition to targeted subsidies, making purchases of used EVs eligible for rebates can also significantly increase the number of potential beneficiaries of a program (Reference DeShazo and Di FilippoDeShazo and Di Filippo 2021).

Increased investment is also needed for improving and expanding charging infrastructure to ensure not only that are there available electric chargers for an increased number of EVs, but also that the electric grid itself is decarbonized (IEA 2021 g). However, equity issues can arise if infrastructure is unevenly distributed, leading to “urban charging deserts” in some neighborhoods (often those where racial minorities are dominant) or if gentrification occurs in areas where charging stations are concentrated (Reference HendersonHenderson 2020; Reference Jing, Qiu, Liu, Pan and MauzerallLiang et al. 2023). The private sector also lacks incentives to invest in charging infrastructure in remote areas, and active public sector involvement is needed to ensure that these areas are not neglected (Reference MoerenhoutMoerenhout 2021).

While there is no doubt that electric mobility will play a key role in the energy transition, there are several environmental and justice concerns associated with mass uptake of personal EVs. Scholars have noted that promotion of mass uptake of EVs locks in car-focused urban design and limits space available for public and active modes of transportation (Reference HendersonHenderson 2020). There are also concerns associated with the resource extraction that is required for EV batteries, which could be limited through efforts to increase use of public transportation and limit car dependency (Reference Hund, La Porta, Fabregas, Laing and DrexhageHund et al. 2020; Reference Riofrancos, Kendall and DayemoRiofrancos et al. 2023).

2.3.4 Energy-Efficient Buildings

In late 2020, the Global Alliance of Buildings and Construction (2020) called the global COVID-19 pandemic an opportunity for a “paradigm shift” in the buildings sector through recovery package measures to promote building decarbonization. This is not the first crisis to have been viewed as an opportunity to improve the energy efficiency of buildings. When proposals for green stimulus measures were circulated in 2008 and 2009 in the wake of the GFC, there appeared to be one point of agreement between proposal authors: increasing the energy efficiency of buildings was a “low-hanging fruit” that was ripe and ready to be picked (Green New Deal Group 2008; UNEP 2009). The fact that this fruit remained available for picking in 2020 indicates that the opportunity presented by the GFC was not seized; although there certainly were some investments in building efficiency made by governments, they were small compared to what was needed (Reference TienhaaraTienhaara 2018).

Renovating existing buildings can be a relatively cheap way to create significant energy savings and emission reductions. Examples of energy efficiency measures in buildings include sealing gaps, installing insulation, and upgrading windows with double- or triple-glazed panes. Investments in these areas can “offer an ongoing stream of cost savings that [are] generally far greater than the value of the initial investment” (Reference BrownleeBrownlee 2013; Reference Hoicka, Parker and AndreyHoicka, Parker, and Andrey 2014). Minor or one-off retrofits are cost-effective and practical options in many contexts (see Table 4). However, the most substantial GHG reductions occur through deep energy retrofits. Deep energy retrofits are high cost, high impact changes of the entire building structure (Sustainable Buildings Canada 2021). This class of building retrofits reduces the structure’s energy use by 30–50 percent (IEA 2020b). Additionally, retrofits can prepare buildings to support increased renewable energy, resilient microgrids, and EVs. Retrofits are also beneficial because keeping older buildings for longer means avoiding the substantial emissions associated with construction.

Table 4Types of building energy efficiency retrofits

Source: Sustainable Buildings Canada 2021

There are several barriers to the voluntary adoption of energy efficiency measures in buildings. Private actors have tended to view investments in energy-efficient buildings as risky and inconvenient (Reference Baldoni, Coderoni, D’Orazio, Di Giuseppe and EspostiBaldoni et al. 2019). The retrofitting of existing buildings requires a high upfront cost for investors, which pays off in the long run rather than short term, through benefits like reduced overall energy expenditure (Reference Baldoni, Coderoni, D’Orazio, Di Giuseppe and EspostiBaldoni et al. 2019). There are also information barriers; many building owners are simply unaware of potential cost savings associated with energy efficiency measures (Reference CalderCalder 2020). Additionally, for many owners there is uncertainty about whether they will own or live in a building long enough to collect a return on the investment (Reference BrownleeBrownlee 2013). In the rental market, there is a conflict of interest between the owner who would have to make the investment and the occupier who would often reap the rewards through lower energy costs (Reference EconomidouEconomidou 2018). Finally, fluctuations in the cost of electricity and fossil fuels can affect the cost–benefit analysis of building upgrades (Reference PersramPersram 2011). These barriers can be reduced with public investments, for example through grants and loans.

If designed well, building energy efficiency policies can reduce both GHG emissions and energy poverty, which is closely connected to health and social inequality (Reference Boemi and PapadopoulosBoemi and Papadopoulos 2019). Energy poverty can lead to respiratory and cardiovascular problems, and preventable deaths in winter or during periods of extreme heat. High heating and cooling expenditures disproportionately impact populations at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum. Reference Braubach and FerrandBraubach and Ferrand (2013, 331) make the case that lower-income households are “three times more vulnerable to indoor cold than the other households.” Low-income residences are also the least likely to be upgraded in the absence of government support (Reference Kantamneni and HaleyKantamneni and Haley 2022). This is because low-income households lack the necessary upfront capital to invest in retrofits. Additionally, a focus on low-income households in government programs is likely to reduce free rider effects (public funds going to households that would have made investments anyway) and rebound effects (recipients of energy efficiency improvements increase energy use and offset the savings) (Reference Lee, Kung and OwenLee, Kung, and Owen 2011).

In addition to reducing energy poverty and emissions, investing in energy-efficient buildings has significant potential for skilled job creation, particularly given the low barriers to entry into the retrofit industry (UNFCCC Secretariat 2020). According to Reference Max, Patadia and KammenWei, Patadia, and Kammen (2010), energy efficiency investment “offers a high payoff in induced jobs.” Reference Garrett-PeltierGarrett-Peltier (2017) estimates that for every $1 million invested, 7.72 full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs in energy efficiency are created, versus 2.65 FTE jobs in the fossil fuel industry. Importantly, building energy efficiency jobs are not limited geographically and can therefore provide much needed employment opportunities in rural areas and small towns (Reference HaleyHaley 2020). A just transition also requires that attention be paid to ensuring that these jobs have good work conditions and pay well.

2.3.5 Support for Fossil Fuel–Dependent Communities

Although the COVID-19 economic crisis differs from previous crises in important ways (Reference CohanCohan 2020; International Labour Organization 2020), it has, nevertheless, led to increased unemployment, which has in turn exacerbated economic and social inequality (International Labour Organization 2021). A total of 255-million FTE jobs (assuming a 48-hour working week) or 8.8 percent of global working hours were lost in 2020 relative to the fourth quarter of 2019 (International Labour Organization 2021). Working hours rebounded in 2021, but deteriorated again in early 2022, even though most workplace closures had, by that time, ended (International Labour Organization 2022).

As noted in Section 1, many carbon-intensive sectors were hit hard by the pandemic. The price of oil collapsed in 2020 and so too did employment in the sector. In the United States, about 107,000 oil and gas workers were laid off between March and August 2020 (Reference Dickson, Tilghman, Bonny, Hardin and MittalDickson et al. 2020). However, even prior to 2019, workers in the sector were vulnerable to fluctuations in the oil price and to increased automation (Reference SahaSaha 2020). In the long term, the increasing cost competitiveness of renewable energy coupled with government-imposed limits on extraction should lead to a contraction of the fossil fuel industry and associated loss of jobs in the sector.

Providing (re)training support to workers, in the form of subsidized or free education and relevant work experience, is key to a green and just recovery, even if it alone will not address all issues related to employment disruptions. Although much of the emphasis is put on retraining/upskilling fossil fuel workers to work in emerging green sectors, a just transition should also consider other workers who are indirectly impacted by a loss of economic activity in an area when an industry shuts down (Reference GassGass 2021).

Experts argue that worker retraining cannot be left in the hands of corporations. As Ana Guerra, National Chapter Director of Iron & Earth (a not-for-profit worker-led organization in Canada) notes, “There has to be some sort of regulatory system in place … because otherwise … How far can a corporation go? It will go towards what their shareholders say” (interview with Ana Guerra, 2021). There are government and nonprofit organizations that were operating prior to the COVID-19 pandemic that focus on helping workers transition into jobs in the renewable energy sector. For example, Skills Development Scotland (Scotland’s national job agency since 2008) was able to retrain and upskill more than 3,000 fossil fuel employees from 2016 to 2019 in partnership with Scotland’s energy task force. Iron & Earth has been involved in oil and gas worker retraining in Canada since 2015. However, greater investment on the part of many governments is needed. David Coyne from Skills Development Scotland argues the government simply “hasn’t fully understood the scale of investment that’s going to be required to help people reskill and upskill and nor have they fully understood the pace at which we may need to move” (interview with David Coyne, 2021). Iron & Earth estimates that retraining a single worker can cost about CAD10,000 ($7957) (interview with Ana Guerra, 2021).

In addition to greater investment in retraining, it is also critical that programs and policies reflect the gendered dimensions of the transition (International Labour Organization 2015; UNFCCC Secretariat 2020; Just Transition Initiative 2021), particularly considering the severe impacts that the pandemic has had on women. Attention should also be given to issues such as worker safety, fair wages, and respect for workers’ rights (International Labour Organization 2015; UNFCCC Secretariat 2020; Just Transition Initiative 2021). In developing worker (re)training policies, governments should provide opportunities for meaningful participation from impacted workers communities (Reference StanfordStanford 2021) and representation from Indigenous peoples (interview with Ana Guerra, 2021). Ultimately, policies and programs will vary by country as they will have to be designed to address the specific needs of workers in very different contexts (International Labour Organization 2015; UNFCCC Secretariat 2020).

Reclamation of mines and oil and gas wells is also a critical justice issue for fossil fuel–dependent communities. In addition to the environmental and health benefits associated with cleaning up oil and gas wells and coal mines, such activities can also create employment opportunities (Reference Raimi, Nerurkar and BordoffRaimi, Nerurkar, and Bordoff 2020; Reference BoettnerBoettner 2021). If locals, including former oil and gas workers and miners, are given priority access to these jobs, it contributes further to the achievement of a just transition (Reference FrenchFrench 2020). Moreover, site restoration can make land available for new community amenities and developments, including renewable energy projects.

Idle and abandoned/orphaned oil and gas wells can leak gas, oil, saline water, and other fluids (Reference Kang, Brandt and ZhengKang et al. 2021), which in turn can “contribute to local adverse environmental and human health effects from soil and groundwater contamination” (Reference Vanessa and WalkerAlboiu and Walker 2019, 1). Abandoned wells also leak large amounts of methane – a potent GHG – into the atmosphere (Reference BoettnerBoettner 2021). Methane leaks also risk explosions occurring (Reference BoettnerBoettner 2021; Reference Kang, Brandt and ZhengKang et al. 2021). Plugging wells can eliminate some of these risks, but full restoration would also involve site decontamination and revegetation (Reference BoettnerBoettner 2021). Oil and gas wells are located in both residential (often low-income and racially marginalized communities, see Reference MernitMernit 2021) and rural areas. Inactive, aging wells have been a large burden for farmers, who often do not have the option to refuse wells on their property (CBC Radio 2020).

Abandoned coal mines also present serious harm to human health and the environment. Many abandoned coal mines emit acid mine drainage that can have “long-term devastating impacts on groundwater, community water supplies, rivers, streams, and aquatic life” (GroundWater Protection Council n.d.).

The pandemic and downturn in the oil, gas, and coal industries has potentially made it harder to ensure that reclamation is paid for by companies. For example, across Canada and the United States there were at least 116,245 oil and gas wells that were operated by companies that were filing for bankruptcy in the first half of 2020 (Reference Kang, Brandt and ZhengKang et al. 2021). This suggests a role for governments in the form of targeted recovery policies.

3.1.1 Remote Communities

Several investments in Canada were directed to bringing renewable energy to remote Indigenous communities that are not connected to the main North American electrical grid and are largely reliant on diesel power generation, which is both expensive (as diesel must be shipped in at high cost) and has negative impacts on local health and the environment (Pembina Institute 2020). In 2021, the federal budget included CAD76.4 million ($57 million) earmarked over three years to build capacity for local renewable energy projects in First Nations, Inuit, and Métis communities and to support feasibility assessment and planning for hydroelectric projects and grid extensions. The government also invested CAD40.5 million ($30.2 million) in the Clarke Lake Geothermal Development Project, which is a wholly owned and Indigenous-led project to build a commercially viable geothermal electricity production facility that can produce between 7 and 15 megawatts and power up to 14,000 households (Natural Resources Canada 2021a). Finally, several community-led projects in the Northwest Territories and Yukon were funded through the Clean Energy for Rural and Remote Communities program, a program that predates the pandemic (Natural Resources Canada 2022). Yukon’s government also funded a number of community-based renewable energy projects in its 2020–1 budget (Government of Yukon 2021). In total, the investments for remote communities amounted to $121 million out of a total of $3.3 billion (3.7 percent) for clean conditional and unconditional power generation policies in Canada in the period 2020–1. However, it should also be noted that an unspecified amount of the $1.8 billion allocated to clean power in the Canada Infrastructure Bank Growth Plan (to be delivered through public-private partnerships) is also expected to benefit remote Indigenous communities.

Australia also made two investments in renewable energy in remote communities in 2021. The government allocated AUD19.3 million ($13.4 million) over three years to develop a renewable energy microgrid in the Daintree Rainforest in Far North Queensland. An additional AUD30 million ($21 million) was invested in the Northern Territory’s Katherine-Darwin Interconnected System big battery project and microgrid rollout. The project is expected to displace more than 4 million liters of diesel fuel that are consumed in the region each year (Reference BridgeBridge 2022). A sum of AUD15 million ($10.5 million) was allocated to the deployment of renewable energy microgrids in remote Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory. The other AUD15 million ($10.5 million) was invested in a 35 MW battery energy storage system to support the Darwin-to-Katherine grid as more households install rooftop solar (Reference CarrollCarroll 2021). These investments amounted to only 1.4 percent of the total spending on clean power generation policies in Australia over 2020–1.

3.1.2 Community-Led and Community-Owned

Spain stands out in the EPT as having an emphasis on citizen participation in renewable energy production. The concept of “energy communities” was introduced in the EU in the Clean Energy for all Europeans legislation in 2019. The EU now has rules to “enable active consumer participation, individually or through citizen energy communities,” in renewable energy generation, consumption, sharing and selling, as well as energy storage (European Commission n.d.). In line with this, in 2020, a Royal Decree-Law in Spain was issued that recognizes renewable energy communities as “autonomous legal entities that provide open and voluntary participation” and regulates energy self-consumption in these communities. This framework has allowed renewable energy communities to flourish in the country (Reference Castillo SánchezCastillo Sánchez 2021).

In the Basque Energy Transition and Climate Change Plan (2021–4, €10.1/$11.5 million) there is discussion of both “citizen energy generation cooperatives,” which are designed to “satisfy their own consumption in municipalities in the Basque Country,” and promoting other “individual and collective self-consumption projects.” The Valencian Community has also allocated aid in 2020 (€550,00/$627,854) and 2021 (€2/$2.3 million) to promote self-consumption in renewable energy communities. For the government of the Valencian Community, local energy communities are considered a “key” element in the transition, since they pursue not only economic ends but also “promote citizen participation, the use of local supply chains and provide employment opportunities, maintaining the value of energy generation within the local population”(“Energy Policy Tracker” 2022). In Navarra, a pilot solar project aimed at collective self-consumption will supply a neighborhood located within a radius of 500 meters of the project (€180,000/$205,480). A “citizen community of renewable energy” will be formed, which will be a group of legally constituted users, with voluntary and open participation, which can develop actions for the generation, distribution, supply and consumption of energy, and the provision of different energy services to members (Government of Navarra 2020; “Energy Policy Tracker” 2022).

Outside of Spain, in 2020, New York State allocated $10.6 million to help underserved and disadvantaged communities to access solar energy as part of New York’s Social Energy Equity Framework (Reference StateNew York State 2020). In 2021, an additional $52.5 million was allocated for community solar projects to serve up to 50,000 low-to-moderate-income households, affordable housing providers, and facilities serving disadvantaged communities (Reference StateNew York State 2021). These investments comprised 19 percent of the total $332 million that New York State invested in clean power generation in 2020–1.

In Nova Scotia, Canada, a Shared Solar Program was launched in 2021 aimed at reducing barriers to solar adoption for communities and businesses. Under the program, municipalities, First Nation bands, co-ops, and not-for-profits can create community solar gardens. Those renting an apartment can adopt solar energy through a shared ownership or subscription model (Government of Nova Scotia 2021).

Finally, in 2020, Scotland injected £4.5 million ($5.6 million) into the existing Community and Renewable Energy Scheme for local renewable projects (Government of Scotland 2020a). The government has set a target for 2 GW of energy to be produced by community and locally owned energy by 2030.

3.2.1 Kenya

Approximately, 72 percent of Kenya’s population lives in rural areas (World Bank n.d.). As of 2020, 71.4 percent of the population in Kenya had access to electricity, which is a dramatic increase from 2010, when it was only 19.2 percent of the population (World Bank n.d.). However, only 62.7 percent of the rural population has access compared to 94 percent of the urban population. Approximately 13 million people in Kenya continue to lack access to electricity (SEforALL 2020). Kenya has ambitious energy access plans and has set a target to achieve universal electrification by 2022. To achieve this, 5.7 million households will need to be connected to grids, at an estimated cost of $2.3 billion of public investment and $458 million of private investment (Ministry of Energy 2018). Kenya has made immense progress throughout the past decade, expanding electricity access, while at the same time substantially increasing renewable energy production, which now constitutes 78 percent of electricity in Kenya (Ministry of Energy 2021).

Extending the main grid into remote areas is very expensive, so there is an emphasis in Kenya on mini-grid technologies, which are more cost-effective (Reference Nkiriki and Selim UstunNkiriki and Ustun 2017; Reference Blimpo and Cosgrove-DaviesBlimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 2019). It has been found that most rural populations without access to electricity will be better serviced with mini-grids or stand-alone systems (Reference Kagimu and Selim UstunKagimu and Ustun 2016).

During the first two years of the pandemic, Kenya had two programs related to energy access. The first, in 2020, involved $4.6 million in credit from the World Bank to provide short-term loans and other forms of financing to off-grid solar companies to enable them to buy stocks of home solar systems and clean cooking stoves (Reference MwirigiMwirigi 2020).

In 2021, Kenya launched a project to electrify twenty-two villages through mini-grids in rural Busia County in Northwest Kenya (Reference TakouleuTakouleu 2021). The mini-grids will incorporate battery backup and range in size from 100 to 60 kWp, with the goal to “expand access to clean, reliable solar power in rural areas [and] pilot delivery of street lighting, water pumping, purification, and appliance financing to ensure that [all] communities and businesses can … maximize the health, security, and economic benefits of clean renewable power” (Reference TakouleuTakouleu 2021). To continue the expansion, a total of $8 million will be required to create 7,000 electricity connections with prepaid solar electricity (InfraCo Africa 2021). A sum of $4.2 million is being provided by InfraCo Africa, and $3.8 million is being provided by the Green Mini-Grid Facility (Reference TakouleuTakouleu 2021). The project has also received a $235,000 grant from the Private Infrastructure Development Group, which funds InfraCo Africa, to support the various building initiatives and technical studies required for the project. The project is being implemented by Rural Village Energy Solutions (RVE.SOL), a for-profit social entrepreneurship. Although the company’s system works on a pay-as-you-go model, they are committed to connecting all households in the communities that they work in, regardless of income (interviews with Lameck Odidah and Stephen Nakholi, 2021).

3.2.2 Nigeria

Nigeria is one of the most populated countries in the world and has the largest economy in Africa, with high levels of poverty and low levels of electricity access (Reference Ogbonnaya, Abeykoon, Damo and TuranOgbonnaya et al. 2019). About 85 million Nigerians lack access to electricity (World Bank 2021). As of 2020, 83.9 percent of the urban population and only 24.6 percent of the rural population in Nigeria had access to electricity (World Bank n.d.). It is estimated that Nigeria would have to connect between 500,000 and 800,000 households to the main grid on an annual basis between 2018 and 2030 to achieve SDG 7 (Reference OdinOdin 2018).

Nigeria as a country has access to an abundance of both renewable and nonrenewable energy resources (Reference Nwozor, Oshewolo, Owoeye and OkiduNwozor et al. 2021). However, oil remains dominant: around 70 percent of centralized electricity generation is fossil fuel based, with the remaining 30 percent coming from hydro (Reference Akinyele, Belikov and LevronAkinyele, Belikov, and Levron 2018). The government has been working for decades to expand access with renewable energy, utilizing various policy initiatives. In 2015, the National Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Policy created a framework for both on-grid and off-grid solutions (Reference Emodi and Ekene EbeleEmodi and Ebele 2016). The National Renewable Action Plan was developed to further the goals laid out in the framework. It included objectives to increase the share of on-grid renewable energy, improve cookstoves, and expand biodiesel (Reference Nwozor, Oshewolo, Owoeye and OkiduNwozor et al. 2021). Unfortunately, the implementation of these policies has been slow.

Around 60 percent of Nigeria’s citizens cannot access the national power grid, making off-grid systems an attractive option to facilitate economic growth and development (Reference Akinyele and RayuduAkinyele and Rayudu 2016). Many of the current mini-grids in use throughout Nigeria are powered from renewable sources, most commonly solar PV (Reference Ekpe and Bassey UmohEkpe and Umoh 2019). As of 2018, there were thirty operating hybrid-solar mini-grids in Nigeria, utilized for the purposes of street lighting, community water pumping, and energy supply to community halls, households, schools, and health centers (Reference Akinyele, Belikov and LevronAkinyele et al. 2018).

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Nigeria developed a ₦2.3 trillion ($5.6 billion) Economic Sustainability Plan in March 2020 (Government of Nigeria 2020). A sum of N$500 billion ($1.2 million) of this went to the Solar Power Naija Plan (Government of Nigeria 2020). The World Bank and African Finance Development Bank Group have provided a further $765 million in funding. The Solar Power Naija Plan aims to create 5 million solar connections, 250,000 jobs, and impact up to 25 million beneficiaries. As in Kenya, the program is not focused on public provision of electricity, but instead on creating a favorable environment for the private sector to do so (interview with Suleiman Babamanu, 2021). Businesses involved in the project must have at least 70 percent local ownership (SEforALL 2021). Businesses must also demonstrate that they have a plan to source materials from local suppliers (interview with representative of SEforALL, 2021). The focus on localization of the solar power supply chain to develop local manufacturing industries is considered to be one of the most innovative aspects of the Solar Power Naija Plan (ibid) and could, if it is ambitious in scale and ultimately successful, “inspire confidence in the government which would hopefully lead to more investments in those areas” (interview with Chukwumerije Okereke, 2021). However, there is a concern that the emphasis on local production could slow the rollout of the plan and, if the quality of the products is not high, this could damage public confidence in the green transition (interviews with SEforALL and Chukwumerije Okereke, 2021).

The Solar Power Naija Plan may help to overcome one of the major barriers to the deployment of solar PV in Nigeria: the cost. Although these systems can be very cost-effective over time, the upfront cost (up to $400 for an 80 W system) of a solar home system in rural sub-Saharan Africa is too high for many households (Reference Hassan, Morse and LeachHassan, Morse, and Leach 2020). It remains to be seen whether other barriers will be overcome. For example, there are technological issues to deal with; the capacity of a typical solar home system used in sub-Saharan Africa is also only in the 10–100 W range. Unsurprisingly, many households surveyed both in Federal Capital Territory and Lagos State in Nigeria are unsatisfied with this power capacity, especially in terms of the amount of light provided and the limitations on using a solar system to power appliances (Reference Hassan, Morse and LeachHassan et al. 2020). Another barrier to the adoption of solar home systems in Nigeria is higher than average system failure rates: a solar electricity system’s life span should range from twenty to twenty-five years (Reference Akinyele, Belikov and LevronAkinyele et al. 2018), but in Nigeria, they commonly fail within two to three years of installation due to poor maintenance (Reference AdelekeAdeleke 2016).

3.3.1 United States

Descriptions from the US government of the public transit investments in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law include numerous references to underserved and marginalized communities. However, in many cases, it is simply assumed that improving transit will benefit these communities because they are more likely to use transit. One program that was specifically targeted to improving equity is the All Stations Accessibility Program, established with $1.75 billion to help finance upgrades to rail transportation that would make them more accessible to people with disabilities, including those who use wheelchairs (Federal Transit Administration 2021). Funding for the preexisting Tribal Transit Program, which supports public transit projects that will meet the growing needs of rural and tribal communities, was also increased (US Department of Transportation 2022).

3.3.2 California

In September 2021, the Governor of California Guy Newson announced a package of over $15 billion in climate measures, including $3.9 billion directed to Zero-Emission Vehicle programs. Funding for 1,000 zero-emission drayage trucks, 1,000 zero-emission school buses and 1,000 transit buses, along with associated charging infrastructure, with projects that “benefit disadvantaged communities” getting priority (State of California 2021). Additionally, funding was directed to the Clean Vehicle Rebate Program (CVRP), which provides up to $4,500 toward the purchase of eligible plug-in hybrid, battery electric, or fuel cell EVs for residents that “meet income requirements” (California Air Resources Board n.d.). An additional $2,500 is available to individuals with household incomes of less than or equal to 400 percent of the federal poverty level. The rebate could also be stacked with the preexisting Clean Vehicle Assistance Program that has a stated objective to prioritize “communities that are disproportionately impacted by pollution,” which “often includes low-income communities and communities of color” (Clean Vehicle Assistance Program n.d.), although this program ran out of funds in 2021. Another program – Clean Cars For All – provides up to $9,500 toward an EV to owners of vehicles older than 2005 if they turn over that vehicle (California Air Resources Board n.d.).

Although these programs have equity criteria, concerns have been raised about how accessible they are to those with the greatest need and the CVRP has not “had significant success reaching residents in priority communities” (Reference DeShazo and Di FilippoDeShazo and Di Filippo 2021). For example, it is only possible to apply for the CVRP after purchasing a car, while most low-income buyers need assistance to afford a down payment (Reference AounAoun 2022). The rebate is also not available for purchases of used vehicles. Experts have recommended changes in these aspects as well as increasing the rebate and lowering the income cap (Reference DeShazo and Di FilippoDeShazo and Di Filippo 2021).

3.3.3 New Jersey, United States

Transportation is the most polluting sector in New Jersey. It emits nearly half of the state’s GHG emissions and is the largest contributor of local air pollution that causes a host of health threats. Low-income and minority populations are disproportionately burdened by air pollution from transportation because they tend to live along transportation corridors (Reference DavisDavis 2021).

In February 2021, Governor Phil Murphy announced an investment of more than $100 million (drawn from proceeds from the New Jersey’s participation in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and its prosecution of Volkswagen for cheating on vehicle emission testing) in transportation projects. The governor also established the Office of Climate Action and the Green Economy which would prioritize “equity and environmental justice.” Projects funded within the $100 million package included $9 million in grants for local government electrification of garbage and delivery trucks; $13 million in grants for electric school and shuttle buses in low- and moderate-income communities; $5 million in grants for equitable mobility projects that will bring electric vehicle ride hailing and charging stations to four New Jersey towns and cities; $15 million for electric public buses; and $36 million for electrification of medium- and heavy-duty equipment in port and industrial areas to reduce diesel and black carbon emissions in “environmental justice communities” (New Jersey Office of the Governor 2021). In terms of charging infrastructure, it is notable that grants were made available to encourage installation in multiunit dwellings, with “overburdened communities” eligible for larger grants (New Jersey Board of Public Utilities 2021). A law was also passed requiring multifamily developments with more than five units to reserve 15 percent of parking spaces to be made ready for a charging station and for these to be installed within six years (New Jersey Department of Community Affairs 2021).

In addition to the $36 million investment, in December 2021, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection adopted the Advanced Clean Trucks rule, first developed in California, which requires manufacturers to sell an increasing number of zero-emission trucks in New Jersey beginning in 2025, with 40–75 percent of new truck sales required to be zero-emission by 2035 (Environmental Defense Fund 2021). The rule is considered particularly important for reducing health risks from pollution from diesel trucks for lower-income families and marginalized communities living near freight corridors, ports, bus depots, and Newark airport (Environmental Defense Fund n.d.). However, environmental justice advocates are pushing for the state to also adopt stricter emissions standards to reduce pollution levels faster (Reference TigueTigue 2022).

3.3.4 Medellín, Colombia

Medellín’s eco-city project, led by Mayor Daniel Quintero, seemingly takes a holistic, structural approach to transitioning the city’s mobility systems to low-carbon transport, by emphasizing electrified public transit and increased bicycle and walking pathways. The project aims to “cut carbon emissions by 20 percent, electrify all public transport by 2030, expand bike lanes by 50 percent, and double the number of public transport lines” (Reference GlatskyGlatsky 2021). The initiative is based on existing green infrastructure: in January 2021, Medellín opened new electric charging stations for its sixty-nine electric busses (Reference GlatskyGlatsky 2021); it also already boasts a city-led, award-winning “green corridor” project which planted trees along streets to cool the city down (Reference MoloneyMoloney 2021). Another part of the eco-city project is to source its electric buses domestically, rather than continuing to purchase them from China (Reference GlatskyGlatsky 2021).

The eco-city project appears to aim to fundamentally restructure how individuals move, rather than emphasizing private forms of green transit. The city website states that it hopes to “Establish the foundations of the ecological transition to direct Medellín to a future of sustainability, where the full enjoyment of the right to the city, the dignified habitability of its inhabitants and the functional and harmonious integration of rural areas is guaranteed through the recognition and access to the rights of rural people” (City of Medellín 2020).

However, there has been significant opposition to the project from current and former city council members, including one from the “left-leaning Green Alliance party” (Reference GlatskyGlatsky 2021). This opposition stems primarily from the fact that Medellín’s city council cut its environmental budget earlier in 2021, making its claims for an “eco-city” seem suspect and unrealistic (Reference GlatskyGlatsky 2021). Environmental activists in Medellín are also wary of the project, given that Medellín’s city council has undergone significant membership changes recently, wherein politicians with the requisite environmental knowledge to implement an “eco-city” project have been replaced with Quintero’s political allies (Reference GlatskyGlatsky 2021). One interviewee pointed out that there has been significant political overhaul that will likely impact the viability of this type of initiative, stating that there were originally “a lot of people in the mayor’s administration who … were really knowledgeable and had experience … [but have been] replaced by people that … didn’t have any expertise” (interview with Genevieve Reference GlatskyGlatsky, 2021).

Ultimately, Medellín’s eco-city initiative is still in its initial phases, and it is unclear whether it will bring about the type of structural changes to mobility systems that are needed for a green and just recovery.

3.4.1 Canada

In 2017, space heating accounted for 63 percent of Canada’s GHG emissions from buildings (NRCAN 2019). Heating and cooling of buildings accounts for 17 percent of Canada’s total GHG emissions (Energy and Mines Ministers’ Conference and Natural Resources Canada 2017).

To address building efficiency, the federal government launched the Canada Greener Homes Grant in May 2021. This retrofit program targeted toward homeowners has a budget of CAD2.6 billion ($1.8 billion) over seven years. Homeowners can access a maximum of CAD600 ($477) as a reimbursement for home energy audits and up to CAD5000 ($3,976) in reimbursement for eligible retrofits (Natural Resources Canada 2021b). This program has been critiqued as being likely to only incentivize one-off retrofits rather than deep retrofits and to be primarily taken up by middle and upper-income households.

The 2021 budget also allocated CAD778.7 million ($619 million) annually for a total of five years in interest-free loans for deep retrofits worth up to CAD40,000 ($31,812). Brendan Haley, Policy Director at Efficiency Canada, estimates that deep energy retrofits in Canada range from CAD40,000 to 100,000 ($31,812–$79,530) (interview, 2021) and that this program is therefore not likely to strongly incentivize such efforts. The loan program includes a dedicated stream for low-income homeowners and rentals, including not-for-profit and low-income housing. However, according to Tom-Pierre Frappé-Sénéclauze, the Director for Buildings and Urban Solutions at the Pembina Institute, the loan program still essentially targets upper-middle-class households who had previously considered retrofitting their home, and so is not accessible to households with less spending capacity (interview, 2021). Upper-middle-class property owners are more than likely to already have access to low interest rate financing from their bank or credit union (Reference Frappé-SénéclauzeFrappé-Sénéclauze 2021). Reference HaleyHaley (2020) concurs, noting that “Lower income Canadians will either not qualify or will be reluctant to participate due to already high levels of personal debt.”

There are also geographic inequalities that have been taken into consideration in the design of the Greener Home Grant program, but possibly not sufficiently. The program includes specific funding for northern and off-grid communities. Normally, homeowners must prove that they own and primarily reside in the building receiving the grant; however, in the territories, Nunavik, Nunatsiavut, and off-grid communities, the criteria differ (NRCAN 2021). Indigenous people represent most of the population in Northern Canada, and constantly see challenges in the realm of adequate housing (Reference Nicol, Segel-Brown and Mohamed AhmedNicol, Segel-Brown, and Mohamed Ahmed 2021). The Canada Greener Homes Grant makes an exception to the primary residence criteria in order to allow Indigenous governments to access the grant. However, challenges remain, particularly with booking the home energy evaluations that must be completed prior to any retrofits. The Northwest Territories, for example, only has one company that conducts home energy evaluations (Reference WhitehouseWhitehouse 2021). In 2021, the wait time to receive an evaluation there was between six months to a year (Reference WhitehouseWhitehouse 2021).

3.4.2 New Zealand

In May 2020, the Government of New Zealand announced a NZD56 million ($37 million) boost to an existing insulation and heating program called Warmer Kiwi Homes. The Energy and Resources Minister Megan Woods made an explicit connection to the pandemic, noting that “insulation and heating helps to prevent respiratory illness” and also highlighted that the program was targeted to help “the most vulnerable people in our communities” (Government of New Zealand 2020a). The program was initially launched in 2018, with NZD142.5 million ($93.4 million) allocated over four years. To be eligible for a grant, homeowners either needed to have a Community Services Card or lived in an area identified as low-income. Low-income areas are determined using the New Zealand Deprivation Index. The original aim was to insulate or install a heater in 52,000 houses but the bump in funding allows for 9,000 additional houses; the grants now cover 90 percent of the cost of getting insulation or a heater installed (up from the previous 67 percent), with the grant for heaters capped at NZD3000 ($1,966).

In a study of 127 households that received an energy-efficient heat pump in the program, 82 percent said their house was much more comfortable or more comfortable after having received it and the proportion of households that reported ever having restricted heating due to cost fell from 80 percent to 21 percent (Reference Fyfe, Grimes, Minehan and TaptiklisFyfe et al. 2022).

3.4.3 United Kingdom

Several policies in the United Kingdom are relevant to this discussion. One that is directly focused on low-income households is the Social Housing Decarbonisation Fund, which began in 2020–1 as a £50 million ($63 million) demonstration project. There are approximately 4.0 million social homes in England (17 percent of all homes). Social housing is generally more efficient than other types of homes in England, but it still accounts for around 23 percent of households experiencing energy poverty (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 2021). The Social Housing Decarbonisation Fund was established to help social housing landlords improve the least energy-efficient rented social homes. In the demonstration phase, over 2,300 homes were improved and at least 1,300 local jobs were supported. A further £179 million ($225 million) in funding was provided for Wave 1 of the program in 2020–1 and £800 million ($1 billion) has been confirmed for Wave 2, which will run for three years from 2022 (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 2022). The funds will be directed to upgrades of 50,000 households in social housing with insulation, heat pumps, and solar panels. The government expects to help households in England and Scotland save up to £450 ($566) a year on their energy bills and to support around 8,000 green jobs annually.

The largest programs launched in the United Kingdom during the pandemic to address building energy efficiency were the £1 billion ($1.3 billion) for local authority retrofitting schemes and the £2 billion ($2.5 billion) Green Homes Grant to retrofit private homes, introduced in the July 2020 Plan for Jobs. A sum of £1.5 billion ($1.9 billion) of the Green Homes program was to be dispersed through a voucher system that households could apply for directly, while the remaining £500 million ($629 million) went to a Local Authority Delivery program focused on low-income households (social housing tenants and low-income families) (Committee of Public Accounts 2021; Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 2021). The vouchers could cover up to two-thirds of the cost of a variety of low-carbon heating options or energy efficiency improvements. The government aimed to make 650,000 homes more energy efficient, save households up to £300 ($377) a year on their bills, cut carbon by more than half a megatonne per year, and support around 140,000 green jobs. The Green Homes Grant started in September but by February 2021, only around 22,000 vouchers had been issued, and fewer than 3,000 installations had been completed. The scheme was scrapped in March 2021. Of the total spending (£264 million/$332 million) by March 2021, £211 million ($265 million) flowed to low-income households (Reference Hinson and AdcockHinson and Adcock 2021).

The main flaw in the program was that it provided a very short window (six months) for vouchers to be used and the retrofit industry simply did not have capacity to complete such a large volume of installations, so applicants were unable to find an approved contractor (Hodgkin and Sasse 2021). The prioritization of the stimulus effect of a short program that could provide a significant economic boost was at the expense of workers, many of whom suffered from the scheme because they invested time and money in accreditation only then to see the program canceled (Climate Change Committee 2021). Following the end of the program, a government committee advised that short-term programs are not suitable either to create jobs and support the industry or to achieve net-zero targets and that what is needed is a “stable, long-term plan” (Committee of Public Accounts 2021).

In the wake of the collapse of the program, a protest group specifically focused on energy efficiency in homes formed in the United Kingdom. Insulate Britain has two main demands of the government: that it should fund the insulation of all social housing by 2025 and that it should develop a “legally-binding national plan” for a low energy and low-carbon retrofit of all homes in Britain by 2030 (Insulate Britain n.d.). With the outbreak of war in the Ukraine and an ensuing energy crisis in Europe, the United Kingdom was the hardest hit and public pressure forced the government to responded with a new £6 billion fund for insulation and replacing gas boilers with heat pumps in November 2022 (Reference LawsonLawson 2022).

3.4.4 United States

On November 15, 2021, as part of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, $3.5 billion was allocated to budget for the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) for a five-year period. This is a long-standing Department of Energy program rather than a new initiative. Congress created WAP in 1976 under Title IV of the Energy Conservation and Production Act. It is funded through federal appropriations that have averaged between $100 million and $450 million annually. In 2009, it received a massive influx of $4.7 billion under Obama’s stimulus package (in response to the GFC). The program is specifically targeted to provide energy efficiency upgrades in low-income households. The program has been extensively evaluated, particularly following the large injection of funds during the Obama administration. Researchers found that 340,158 units were retrofitted under the program in 2010 at a cost of $2.3 billion ($2 billion of which came from WAP) and the cost to weatherize a unit was $6,812 on average (Reference Tonn, Carroll and RoseTonn et al. 2015).

During the GFC stimulus-funded period, the WAP supported approximately 28,000 jobs (directly and indirectly) and increased national economic output by $4 billion. However, many of these jobs were temporary, with 25 percent of auditors, 27 percent of crew chiefs, and 40 percent of crew members leaving the field of low-income weatherization only two years after their initial involvement in the WAP (Reference Tonn, Carroll and RoseTonn et al. 2015). In terms of environmental impacts, carbon emissions declined by an estimated 7.3 MMT CO₂-e (Reference Tonn, Carroll and RoseTonn et al. 2015). There were also health and social benefits of the program. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory study valued these at $3.8 billion in 2010 or $14,148 per household (Reference Tonn, Carroll and RoseTonn et al. 2015). While some have critiqued the program for not being cost-effective (Reference Fowlie, Greenstone and WolframFowlie, Greenstone, and Wolfram 2015), others stress that the program has numerous nonenergy retrofits, like the removal of asbestos and mold (Reference DetrowDetrow 2015; Reference PlumerPlumer 2015). These retrofits are also done to improve the comfort of low-income households, for example by allowing people to heat their homes more in the winter without increasing their energy bills. Programs like WAP are done “for equity reasons and social service reasons as much as savings” (Nadel quoted in Reference DetrowDetrow 2015). Similarly, Reference KushlerKushler (2015) argues that the GHG emissions reduction benefits “are just a bit of frosting on the benefits cake. No one would suggest WAP should be considered as entirely, or even primarily, a mechanism to fight climate change.”

3.5.1 European Union

The EU released a proposal for a Just Transition Mechanism in January 2020 as part of the European Green Deal (European Commission 2020a). The Just Transition Mechanism provides financial and accountability tools that help address the transition and help unlock the mobilization of funds, particularly of regions and communities most exposed to high employment in fossil fuel production or with GHG-intensive industries. EU member states are expected to develop national just transition plans, commit 30 percent of their recovery spending to net-zero transition, and co-finance/match funding requirements by the European Commission.

The Just Transition Fund is one pillar of the mechanism that will be directed to efforts to “alleviate the socio-economic costs triggered by climate transition,” including “up- and reskilling of workers, job-search assistance and active inclusion of jobseekers programmes” (European Commission 2020a). The European Commission’s initial January 2020 proposal had a budget of €40 billion ($40.6 billion), but only €17.5 billion ($17.8 billion) was approved by the European Council in December 2020. Those countries that have the largest anticipated job losses (Poland, Germany, Romania, and Czech Republic) will be allocated the largest amount of funds. Countries will have to provide matching funding of €1.5–3 for every euro from the Fund (European Commission 2020a). It has been argued that because the fund is small, it should be targeted exclusively to social support and worker retraining efforts (Reference Cameron, Claeys, Midoes and TagliapietraCameron et al. 2020; World Resources Institute 2021b).

3.5.2 Scotland

Between 2014 and 2017, the United Kingdom’s oil and gas sector lost 150,000 jobs due to a sharp downturn in oil prices (World Resources Institute 2021a). The impacts of this were the worst in Scotland. As of 2019, the sector employed 86,000 people (Reference PalmerPalmer 2022). Although the renewable energy sector is growing in Scotland, it employed only 22,600 people in the same year (Reference BlackBlack 2021).

In the fall of 2020, the Scottish Government launched the National Training Transition Fund (NTTF) and awarded £25 million ($31 million) to Skills Development Scotland, several colleges and universities, Scottish Enterprise, Lantra, and Creative Scotland (Government of Scotland 2020b). Unlike its predecessor, the Transition Training Fund (TTF), which ran from 2017 to 2019, the NTTF was not exclusively focused on oil and gas workers (European Commission 2020b). However, the government emphasized that it would be “targeted towards the most exposed sectors including oil and gas, aviation and tourism” (Government of Scotland 2020b). The success of the TTF, which helped 4,272 oil and gas workers, also informed the development of the NTTF (World Resources Institute 2021). The goal of the NTTF is to “boost the supply of skills in areas such as sustainable green jobs and raise the profile of training opportunities linked to Scotland’s transition to a net zero economy” (Government of Scotland 2020b). In the first year of the program, 6,000 individuals were supported. A second phase launched in 2021 aims to provide more than 20,000 additional training opportunities (Government of Scotland 2021).

In addition to the NTTF, the government launched the North East Economic Recovery and Skills Fund in 2021 to help address the impacts of both the pandemic and the downturn in the oil and gas industry in the Northeast region of Scotland (Government of Scotland 2022). The fund includes projects managed by the Energy Transition Zone in Aberdeen, which provides on-the-job transition training in the renewable energy sector and upskilling of oil and gas sector employees (Skills Development Scotland 2021).

3.5.3 Canada

Across Canada there are hundreds of thousands of inactive and abandoned oil and gas wells. Canada’s COVID Economic Response plan included CAD1.72 billion ($1.37 billion) in funding for well cleanup (Department of Finance Canada 2020). Much of the funding has flowed to cleaning up “inactive wells,” which are those that are still owned by viable companies that could fund the well cleanup themselves. Wells are considered “orphaned” if “there is no known, financially viable operator capable of addressing the environmental liabilities” associated with closure (Parliamentary Budget Office 2022). Wells are designated as “abandoned” if they “do not have a solvent owner and require cleanup in the form of either plugging and/or reclamation but have yet to transition to orphan status” (Parliamentary Budget Office 2022).

The largest portion of funds went to Alberta (CAD1 billion/$800 million) (which had lobbied heavily for the program – see Reference CorkalCorkal 2021), with the remainder divided between Saskatchewan (CAD400 million/$318 million), British Columbia ($120 million/$95 million), and as a loan to the Orphan Well Association in Alberta and in British Columbia ($200 million/$159 million) (Ramsay 2020). No funding was provided to Ontario, even though the wells in the province are some of the oldest in North America, dating as far back as the 1800s, meaning the businesses that created them are near impossible to trace (Reference JeffordsJeffords 2021). Minister Chrystia Freeland defended the decision to leave Ontario out of the program, asserting that the program should be concentrated in the energy-producing provinces (Reference EnsingEnsing 2021).

Indigenous leaders in Canada have been lobbying since the orphan wells program was announced to receive an allotment of funding. There is funding needed to clean up oil and gas wells on First Nations and Métis land in Alberta (Reference BakxBakx 2020). The Indian Resource Council requested to receive 10 percent of Alberta’s funds and although it took half a year, the provincial government eventually agreed. A sum of CAD85 million ($68 million) will be allocated toward First Nations land and CAD15 million ($12 million) toward Métis land in Alberta. This will allow Indigenous communities to have control over the gas sites that will be cleaned up. In addition, Indigenous-owned companies have received CAD1.5 million ($1.2 million) in Saskatchewan (Reference BakxBakx 2020).

While the cleanup of any oil and gas wells would be welcomed in the communities in which they are situated, experts have expressed concern that the program will set a dangerous precedent of leaving taxpayers on the hook for costs that should be borne by oil and gas producers (De Reference Souza and WongSouza and Wong 2020). The key issue, as pointed out by the Parliamentary Budget Office (2022), is that “nearly half the funding in Alberta has been disbursed to firms that are viable.” The Center for International Environmental Law (2021) notes that “Because the grants are distributed not according to an operator’s inability to pay, but based on their overall liability, the producers with the biggest environmental footprints get the largest checks.”

The Government of Alberta has taken some steps to address the concern that public money should not be spent on cleaning up the industry’s mess. Oil and gas companies will be required to spend CAD422 million ($336 million) on cleanup and remediation in 2022 and CAD443 million ($352 million) in 2023, with the amount continuing to increase each year. While this is a positive development, the Parliamentary Budget Office (2022) estimates that the amount Alberta is requiring the industry to provide is insufficient and that the funding gap will grow to CAD642 million ($511 million) by 2025 if additional finance is not secured.

3.5.4 United States

The 2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law included $11.3 billion for the Abandoned Mine Land (AML) program (Department of the Interior 2022d) and $4.7 billion for orphaned well site plugging, remediation, and restoration activities (Department of the Interior 2022c).

Over a period of eleven years, the AML program will provide grants to eligible states and Tribes for projects that “close dangerous mine shafts, reclaim unstable slopes, prevent releases of harmful gases, including methane, improve water quality by treating acid mine drainage and restore water supplies damaged by mining” (Department of the Interior 2022d). Pennsylvania, which is home to a third of the abandoned mine lands in the United States, was eligible for the most funding in 2022 (nearly $245 million), followed by West Virginia, Illinois, Kentucky, and Ohio (Reference GroomGroom 2022). The United States has, since 1977, required companies to reclaim abandoned mining sites. It also has a system where active coal companies pay a per-ton fee into a fund to clean up sites that were abandoned prior to 1977 (Just Transition Fund n.d.). However, the funding is insufficient and as the amount of coal mined in the United States falls, so too does the funding available for reclamation (Reference GroomGroom 2022; Just Transition Fund n.d).

In May 2022, the Department of Interior (Department of the Interior 2022b) released draft guidance on the implementation of the AML program. The guidance contains many elements that indicate a strong potential for the program to contribute to a just transition. The draft guidance instructs states and Tribes to prioritize projects that provide employment opportunities to current and former employees of the coal industry; prioritize projects that are beneficial to disadvantaged communities and support the revitalization of such communities to meet the overall objectives of Justice40 (a Biden administration initiative that aims to “deliver at least 40 percent of the overall benefits from Federal investments in climate and clean energy to disadvantaged communities” – see Reference Young, Mallory and McCarthyYoung, Mallory, and McCarthy 2021); require contractors to support safe, equitable, and fair labor practices by adopting collective bargaining agreements, local hiring provisions (as applicable), project labor agreements, and community benefits agreements; and incorporate input from disadvantaged communities of color, low-income communities, and Tribal and Indigenous communities into the selection of projects to be funded. Moreover, applicants will be required to provide detail in their proposals on how environmental justice issues within coalfield communities will be addressed; how any disproportionate burden of adverse human health or environmental effects of coal AML problems on disadvantaged communities, communities of color, low-income communities, and Tribal and Indigenous communities will be identified and addressed; and whether and to what extent the proposed projects will reduce GHG emissions, particularly methane emissions. Finally, in contrast to the previous AML program, the draft guidance requires that workers be paid prevailing wages (as determined by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the Davis–Bacon Act), which will ensure that contractors do not reduce wages in order to win contracts (Appalachian Voices 2022).

The program and draft guidance for its implementation have been widely praised. Chelsea Barnes, the Legislative Director for Appalachian Voices (a nonprofit focused on advocating for a healthy environment and just economy in the Appalachian region) applauded the prioritization of Justice40 and encouraged the DOI “to collaborate with stakeholders to ensure that this abandoned mine land funding is reaching the most disadvantaged communities” (Appalachian Voices 2022). Eric Dixon, Senior Researcher with Ohio River Valley Institute, argues that the draft guidance “signals a shift toward prioritizing the reclamation workers – from backhoe operators to field scientists – who make mine cleanup possible” although he also wished to see even stronger wording in the final version (Appalachian Voices 2022).

The final guidance for the $4.7 billion orphaned well cleanup program was released in April 2022 and like the AML program, it reflects some of the principles of the Justice40 Initiative. In the “recommended” (not required) section of the guidance, states are asked to provide details of how they will “identify and address any disproportionate burden of adverse human health or environmental effects of orphaned wells on communities of color, low-income communities, and Tribal and Indigenous communities”; any “Training programs, registered apprenticeships, and local and economic hire agreements for workers”; plans to “support opportunities for all workers, including workers underrepresented in well plugging or site remediation, to be trained and placed in good-paying jobs directly related to the project”; and plans “to incorporate equity for underserved communities into their planning, including supporting the expansion of high-quality, good paying jobs through workforce development programs and incorporating workforce strategy into project development” (Department of the Interior 2022a). The payment of prevailing wages is a requirement.

While environmental groups and policy experts have generally welcomed the development of the fund, many have expressed similar concerns to those raised in Canada, that is, that not enough is being done to ensure that the oil and gas industry is held accountable for cleaning up their own mess (Reference BivenBiven 2022; Reference Kretzmann, Koney and HufflingKretzmann and others 2022). The amount of funding is also likely to be insufficient to tackle the problem. It has been estimated that it could cost $280 billion to close over 2.6 million documented unplugged onshore wells in the United States that are at risk of being orphaned (Reference TrackerCarbon Tracker 2020). Since the announcement of the funding, the number of documented orphaned wells (always known to be a substantial underestimate of the true number) has exploded, and some are concerned that states will be incentivized to bail out negligent operators (Reference SadasivamSadasivam 2022).