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Quel Arrière-plan pour l'esprit?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Pierre Steiner
Pierre Steiner
Affiliation:
Université de Provence, CEPERC
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Abstract

This article analyzes the notion of background capacities as developed by John Searle during the last twenty years in philosophy of mind. Broadly construed, this notion designates non-representational mental capacities as the means by which mental representations are given a precise semantic content and thus are able to be expressed. Though novel and relevant, I intend to show that, according to Searle's description, this notion proves inadequate to attain its descriptive and explicative goals. I go on to regard background capacities in a perspective both externalist and (minimally) representationalist.

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Type
Articles
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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , Summer 2006 , pp. 419 - 444
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2006

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