In this introduction to the Special Issue “Religion and Democratic Theory,” we sketch how political theory can contribute to understanding contemporary political challenges in the context of religion and democracy. We outline the contributions to this Special Issue in terms of their main claims.

Debates about the legitimacy of democratic decision-making often treat religion as a central category. In contrast, I propose an institutional account of democratic legitimacy that does not rely on the secular–religious distinction. On this view, religion is not politically special. It is socially special, though not uniquely so. Like science, the arts, or the family, religious practices merit appropriate treatment based on their distinctive characteristics. Thus, rejecting the idea that religion is uniquely special does not preclude democratic states from granting it special treatment. I examine Eisgruber and Sager’s egalitarian account of religious exemptions and argue that the institutional account provides a more compelling explanation of their legitimacy.

The question of how to deal with religion is a central problem of the modern state. However, state effects on religious lifeworlds are rarely the object of critical theoretical inquiry. This paper seeks to remedy this lacuna by combining neo-Marxist, Foucauldian, and anthropological theories of the state with critical secularism studies to introduce the framework of state projects. Advocating for more bridge-building between political theory and anthropology, the paper draws on fieldwork in two highly diverse neighborhoods in Munich and London to identify three conflicting state projects organized around the imperatives of security, identity, and diversity. The paper argues that state interventions can sanitize politics from local democratic contestations and fracture the demos by imposing on citizens conflicting demands emanating from different grids of legibility.

When it comes to making political decisions about religion, decision-makers often rely on the testimonies of two kinds of religious experts: religious leaders and academic experts of religion. While such religious experts have epistemic authority for questions of religious identification and religious orthodoxy, their expertise is the wrong kind in a religiously neutral state. Questions of religious identification unfairly treat religion as being uniquely special and questions of religious orthodoxy give priority to religious traditions over individuals. Instead, only the subjective importance of commitments matters for cases of religious freedom, and only the objective interpretation of religious establishment matters in cases of religious establishment. Religious experts having no epistemic advantage here, they should not be playing any special role in making decisions about religion.

This article examines the intertwined political rationalities of “Islamism prevention” and democracy promotion in state-led programs in Germany. Drawing on critical scholarship on prevention, democracy promotion, and securitization, the article pursues two interrelated arguments. First, it shows that the politics of distinction between “Islam” and “Islamism” is not merely epistemological but constitutes a governing tool. Such distinctions racialize Muslim minorities by measuring them against unmarked standards of “proper” religion. Second, the article argues that democracy promotion programs tied to preventive rationalities depoliticize democracy by framing it as a stable order to be upheld instead of as a contested political project. This displaces deeper exclusions embedded in the modern nation-state and its racialized borders into individualized ideals like resilience, tolerance, or civic virtue.

Legal cases in the policy area of religion—concerning religious exemptions, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or religious education—are fiercely contested. Although democratic theory has long debated the role of religion in court, the normative challenges of religious strategic litigation have yet to be discussed. I conceptualize religious strategic litigation as a political practice in which groups take legal action based on norms concerning religion in order to pursue broader political agendas. Challenging the notion that religious strategic litigation is special, that is, that it raises particular concerns of democratic legitimacy, I argue that it shares its problematic features with strategic litigation in other policy areas. Democratic theory should focus on how strategic litigation in any policy area can potentially disempower citizens.