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Financial risk protection in private health insurance: empirical evidence on catastrophic and impoverishing spending from Germany's dual insurance system

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2023

Philipp Hengel*
Affiliation:
Department of Health Care Management, Technische Universität Berlin, Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany Berlin Centre for Health Economics Research, Berlin, Germany
Miriam Blümel
Affiliation:
Department of Health Care Management, Technische Universität Berlin, Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany Berlin Centre for Health Economics Research, Berlin, Germany
Martin Siegel
Affiliation:
Berlin Centre for Health Economics Research, Berlin, Germany Department of Empirical Health Economics, Technische Universität Berlin, Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany
Katharina Achstetter
Affiliation:
Department of Health Care Management, Technische Universität Berlin, Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany Berlin Centre for Health Economics Research, Berlin, Germany
Julia Köppen
Affiliation:
Department of Health Care Management, Technische Universität Berlin, Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany Berlin Centre for Health Economics Research, Berlin, Germany
Reinhard Busse
Affiliation:
Department of Health Care Management, Technische Universität Berlin, Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany Berlin Centre for Health Economics Research, Berlin, Germany
*
Corresponding author: Philipp Hengel; Email: philipp.hengel@tu-berlin.de
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Abstract

Financial risk protection from high costs for care is a main goal of health systems. Health system characteristics typically associated with universal health coverage and financial risk protection, such as financial redistribution between insureds, are inherent to, e.g. social health insurance (SHI) but missing in private health insurance (PHI). This study provides evidence on financial protection in PHI for the case of Germany's dual insurance system of PHI and SHI, where PHI covers 11% of the population. Linked survey and claims data of PHI insureds (n = 3105) and population-wide household budget data (n = 42,226) are used to compute the prevalence of catastrophic health expenditures (CHE), i.e. the share of households whose out-of-pocket payments either exceed 40% of their capacity-to-pay or push them (further) into poverty. Despite comparatively high out-of-pocket payments, CHE is low in German PHI. It only affects the poor. Key to low financial burden seems to be the restriction of PHI to a small, overall wealthy group. Protection for the worse-off is provided through special mandatorily offered tariffs. In sum, Germany's dual health insurance system provides close-to-universal coverage. Future studies should further investigate the effect of premiums on financial burden, especially when linked to utilisation.

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Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
Figure 0

Figure 1. Flow chart of sample selection.

Figure 1

Table 1. Overview of variables used for analyses, by data source

Figure 2

Table 2. Sample characteristics (weighted)

Figure 3

Table 3. Prevalence of catastrophic and impoverishing health expenditure (main, sensitivity and additional analyses) and of unmet needs due to costs (weighted)

Figure 4

Figure 2. Catastrophic spending curves (weighted).CHE, catastrophic health expenditure, OOPP, out-of-pocket payments; CTP, capacity to pay; values of OOPP per CTP below 0 (i.e. households further impoverished) and above 1 (i.e. households impoverished by OOPP) were set to 1 as in both cases OOPP are catastrophic by definition.

Figure 5

Table 4. Comparison of participants with vs without catastrophic health expenses (weighted)