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Can't get no satisfaction with the Westminster model? Winners, losers and the effects of consensual and direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Julian Bernauer*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz, Germany
Adrian Vatter
Affiliation:
Institute for Political Science, University of Berne, Switzerland
*
Address for correspondence: Julian Bernauer, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz, PO Box D85, 78457 Konstanz, Germany. Fax: +497531884200; E‐mail: julian.bernauer@uni‐konstanz.de

Abstract

Are citizens in consensus democracies with developed direct democratic institutions more satisfied with their political system than those in majoritarian democracies? In this article, individual‐level data from the second wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and an updated version of Lijphart's multivariate measure of consensus and majoritarian democracy covering 24 countries are used to investigate this question. The findings from logistic multilevel models indicate that consensual cabinet types and direct democratic institutions are associated with higher levels of citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, consensus democracy in these institutions closes the gap in satisfaction with democracy between losers and winners of elections by both comforting losers and reducing the satisfaction of winners. Simultaneously, consensus democracy in terms of electoral rules, the executive–legislative power balance, interest groups and the party system reduces the satisfaction of election winners, but does not enhance that of losers.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 The Author(s). European Journal of Political Research © 2011 European Consortium for Political Research

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