¹ It may be noted that the generally used term for the scheduled caste groups in this region is that of chuhre-chamar (scavenger and tanner/leather worker), instead of the word ‘dalit’. They are also refereed to as neechi jati or kamins (literally low castes). These terms emphasise the low caste identification of the dalits and express subjective meanings.

² Chamars, for instance, formed a sizeable proportion of the tenants of the landowners in Haryana–Punjab. For details, see Chowdhry, P., Punjab Politics: The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram, New Delhi, India, Vikas Publishing House, 1984, pp. 61–99Google Scholar.

³ The Jatavs of Agra, Uttar Pradesh, were one such upwardly mobile group. It was the same for other untouchable caste groups like the Shanars located in the south of Madras Province, or the Mahars of Maharashtra, and the Ezhavas of Kerala. See Lynch, O. M., The Politics of Untouchability: Social Mobility in a City in India, New York, Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 32–35Google Scholar; Hardgrave, R. L. Jr., The Nadars of Tamilnad: The Political Culture of the Community in Change, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969, pp. 95–97Google Scholar; Zelliot, E., Learning the Use of Political Means: The Mahars of Maharashtra, in Kothari, R. (ed.), Caste in Indian Politics, Delhi, India, Orient Longman Ltd, 1970, pp. 29–69Google Scholar; Jeffrey, R., ‘The Social Origins of a Caste Association 1875–1905: The Founding of the SNDP Yogam,’ South Asia, October 1974, IV, pp. 43–45Google Scholar.

⁴ Juergensmeyer, M., Religion as Social Vision: The Movement Against Untouchability in Twentieth Century Punjab, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982, pp. 36–37Google Scholar.

⁵ Census of Haryana, 1999, Part VIII (1), Special Tables of Scheduled Castes, Directorate of Census Operations, Haryana, New Delhi, India, 2000, pp. 780–781.

⁶ I am using the term ‘traditional’ panchayat to distinguish it from the statutory panchayat established in the post-independent India. This usage in no way means that this pre-colonial and colonial body was in any way a non-changing, static institution. Like the caste, traditional panchayat has also undergone changes over time. There are a series of such panchayats, not one. This will become clear as we proceed.

⁷ Judge, P. S., Land Reforms in Haryana, in Gill, S. S. (ed.), Land Reforms in India: Intervention for Agrarian Capitalist Transformation in Punjab and Haryana, New Delhi, India, Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 118–136Google Scholar.

⁸ Calculated from Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 1999–2000, Economic and Statistical Organisation, Planning Department, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh, India, 2001, pp. 68–69.

⁹ Calculated from ibid and Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 1988–89, Economic and Statistical Organisation, Planning Department, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh, India, 1990, pp. 60–61.

¹⁰ For details, see Bhalla, S., ‘Liberalisation, Rural Labour Markets and the Mobilisation of Farm Workers: The Haryana Story in an All India Context,’ The Journal of Peasant Studies, January–April 1999, Vol. 26, no. 2 & 3, pp. 25–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ For details, see P. Chowdhry, Punjab Politics, pp. 64–81.

¹² The regional daily newspapers are full of reports and complaints from the public regarding usurpation of common land.

¹³ In less than 10 years' time (1988–1997), the total number of livestock went up from 87,694 to 1,13,574. See Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 1999–2000, pp. 302–303.

¹⁴ Scott, J. C., Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, Delhi, India, Oxford University Press, 1990Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Government of Haryana, Prosperity With Justice, Chandigarh, India, Director, Public Relations 1981, p. 74.

¹⁶ Aggarwal, P. C. and Ashraf, M. S., Equality Through Privilege: A Study of Special Privileges of Scheduled Castes in Haryana, New Delhi, India, Sri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources, 1976, pp. 54–55Google Scholar.

¹⁷ For similar observation, see Prashad, V., Untouchable Freedom: A Social History of a Dalit Community, New Delhi, India, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 126Google Scholar.

¹⁸ See Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 1981–82, p. 65, and 1991–92, p. 73.

¹⁹ See Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 1999–2000, pp. 72, 73.

²⁰ Calculated from Census of Haryana, 1991, Part VIII (1), pp. 780–781.

²¹ Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 1999–2000, pp. 690–691, 708.

²² Cited in Shah, G. (ed.), Dalit and the State, New Delhi, India, Concept Publishing Co., 2002Google Scholar. See Introduction, p. 35.

²³ Aggarwal and Ashraf, Equality Through Privilege, p. 131.

²⁴ I found that a number of dalit candidates were selected on merit, competing in the general category rather than in the reserved.

²⁵ Aggarwal and Ashraf, Equality Through Privilege, p. 128.

²⁶ The village women opine that even those boys who have studied only up to matric (class ten) and had in fact qualified by nakkal (copying or cheating) wanted jobs in the white-collared professions. This observation is confirmed by another study that similarly comments that a large chunk of the educated and semi-educated rural population under the age of twenty-five in Haryana, ranging from the most difficult category of ‘tenth class failed’ to ‘BA - third class’, want non-farm jobs and cannot get them. Bhalla, S., ‘Islands of Growth: A Note on Haryana Experience and Some Possible Implications,’ Economic and Political Weekly, 6 June 1981, Vol. XVI, no. 23, pp. 1022–1030Google Scholar.

²⁷ Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 1999–2000, pp. 530–531. The caste-wise break-up of the unemployed is not available.

²⁸ Economic Survey of Haryana, 1989–1990, Chandigarh, Government of Haryana, Economic and Statistical Organisation, Planning Department, 1990, pp. 15–17.

²⁹ Yadav, K. C., India's Unequal Citizens: A Study of Other Backward Classes, Delhi, India, Manohar Publications, 1994, p. 70Google Scholar.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 177–179.

³¹ Dainik Tribune (daily newspaper in Hindi), 29 August 2000, p. 4; 6 September 2000, p. 4; 17 September 2000, p. 4; 19 September 2000, p. 7. In Haryana, the demand to do away with reservations, although an unvoiced demand because of political exigencies, exists along with the demand of the Jats to be included among the category of OBC. However, being a dominant caste group the Jats perhaps know that such a demand is impossible to concede. Doing away with reservations, according to them, alone will stop the ‘rise of Chuhras and Chamars’.

³² Jaffrelot, C., India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Low Castes in North Indian Politics, Delhi, India, Permanent Black, 2003, p. 339Google Scholar. M. S. Tikait, leader of Jats of western Uttar Pradesh, also demanded abolition of reservations, which forms a part of his charter of demands.

³³ See a press report on the chief minister in Dainik Jagran (daily newspaper in Hindi), 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 15.

³⁴ Dainik Jagran, 6 September 2003, p. 19.

³⁵ Dainik Jagran, 5 October 2003, p. 7. For general category, this height was raised from 5 feet 7 inches to 5 feet 9 inches. See the chief minister's answers to queries from the janata (public).

³⁶ Personal communication by Lt. General B. T. Pandit, Adjutant-General, Army Head-quarters, New Delhi, India, 1 April 1991.

³⁷ For details, see Chowdhry, P., The Veiled Women: Shifting Gender Equations in Rural Haryana, 1880–1990, Delhi, India, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 32–36Google Scholar.

³⁸ Thus the contribution of states like Punjab and Haryana that had been sending an overwhelming number of recruits had to be whittled down in favour of other states, resulting in their total contribution to be less than what it was under the British. However, it still remains far above their population levels. Personal communication by Lt. General B. T. Pandit, Adjutant-General, Army Head-quarters, New Delhi, India, 1 April 1991.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ For details, see Mungekar, B. L., State, Market and the Dalits: Analytics of the New Economic Policy, in Michael, S. M. (ed.), Dalits in Modern India: Vision and Values, Vistaar Publications, New Delhi, India, 1999, pp. 287–302Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Such social stands have created a demand for English in the whole of northern India.

⁴² Even those who can avail of expensive English education, priority is given to the boys. In the same family the boy goes to the English-medium school and the girl to the Hindi-medium school.

⁴³ P. Chowdhry, The Veiled Women, pp. 388–389.

⁴⁴ Ibid, pp. 194–195.

⁴⁵ Dubey, A. K., Anatomy of a Dalit Power Player: A Study of Kanshi Ram, in Shah, G. (ed.), Dalit Identity and Politics: Cultural Subordination and the Dalit Challenge, New Delhi, India, Sage publications, 2001, pp. 288–310Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ The BSP emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as a force to be reckoned with, in the four north Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh and Haryana. In the 1998 Lok Sabha elections the party polled more than 20 per cent votes in two constituencies of Haryana. The total dalit strength in Haryana is 19.75 per cent. See Pushpendr, Dalit Assertion Through Electoral Politics, in Shah, G. (ed.), Dalit Identity and Politics: Cultural Subordination and the Dalit Challenge, New Delhi, India, Sage publications, 2001, pp. 311–354Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Chowdhry, P., ‘Social Support Base and Electoral Politics: The Congress in Colonial Southeast Punjab,’ Modern Asian Studies, 1991, Vol. 25, Pt. 4, pp. 811–831CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁸ For example, in the April–May 2004 Lok Sabha elections the entire state unit of the BSP including the state president Ashok Sherwal joined the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) of Chautala. It may be noted that it was under the INLD government that the state witnessed a spate of crimes against dalits. This action exposed the BSP concern for the cause of dalits. On April 29, 2004, the lone BSP legislator in Haryana, Bishanlal Saini, declared his support for the INLD candidate from the reserved seat of Ambala. Saini even hailed chief minister Chautala as ‘a well-wisher’ of dalits and backward castes. See T. K. Rajalakhmi, ‘Oppressed and Marginalized,’ Frontline, May 21, 2004, p. 25.

⁴⁹ For the social fragmentation of dalits and their inability to come together as a cohesive community that may form the basis of political action, see Roy, R. and Singh, V. B., The Harijan Elite at the Cross-Roads: Results From a Survey, in Mitra, S. K. (ed.), Politics of Positive Discrimination, Bombay, India, Popular Prakashan, 1990, pp. 321–339Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Kulke, E., The Problems of the Educated Middle Class Harijans, in Neelson, J. P. (ed.), Social Inequality and Political Structures, Delhi, India, Manohar Publications, 1983, pp. 135–175Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Confronted with this situation the dalit elite prefers the path of personal salvation through upward social mobility, better jobs and access to power through different political parties. This prevents them from effectively identifying themselves with the problems of their community and making serious attempts to solve them. It puts distance between them and their community and arouses suspicion about their intent. It further fragments the community. See Yadav, India's Unequal Citizens, pp. 177–179.

⁵² In Bihar, for instance, they have formed an informal association that is convened at irregular intervals to discuss topics of common concern.

⁵³ Aggarwal and Ashraf, Equality Through Privilege, pp. 125–126, 146–147.

⁵⁴ Voiced by the dalit candidates belonging to the Indian Forest Service, Gurgaon, in January 2004.

⁵⁵ For details see Chowdhry, P., ‘Caste Panchayats and the Policing of Marriage in Haryana: Enforcing Kinship and Territorial Exogamy,’ Contributions to Indian Sociology, January–August 2004, Vol. 38, no. 1 & 2, pp. 1–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁶ See Census of Haryana, 1991, Socio-cultural tables, series 8, Pt. IV-A, Chandigarh, India, 1994, pp. 22–23.

⁵⁷ Chowdhry, P., ‘Lustful Women, Elusive Lovers: Identifying Males as Objects of Female Desire,’ Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 2001, Vol. 8, Pt. 1, pp. 23–50Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ This self-confidence extends from education, work, behaviour, lifestyle and consequent high self-esteem. Only a minority of the employed, mostly in lower categories, did not feel themselves socially to be equal to other caste groups. See Pais, R., Scheduled Castes, Employment and Social Mobility, in Mitra, S. K. (ed.), Politics of Positive Discrimination, Bombay, India, Popular Prakashan, 1990, pp. 321–339Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Kulke, E., The Problems of the Educated Middle Class Harijans, in Neelson, J. P. (ed.), Social Inequality and Political Structures, Delhi, India, Manohar Publications, 1983, pp. 135–147Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ Calculated from Census of Haryana, 1991, Pt. VIII (1), Special Tables of Scheduled Castes, Directorate of Census Operations, Haryana, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 780–781.

⁶¹ In this connection, P. C. Aggarwal maintains, on the basis of his interviews with certain members of dalits, that in Haryana and Punjab marriage alliances are being offered to educated youth by Jat and Brahmin families. I think further investigations and a more detailed study need to be undertaken to ascertain the validity of this contention. See Aggarwal, P. C., Half Way to Equality, Delhi, India, Manohar Publications, 1983, pp. 8, 22, 44, 107Google Scholar.

⁶² A recent high class, publicly celebrated marriage of a Bania girl and a Chamar boy, both medical doctors by profession in Rohtak, and scions of noted families, is held as a case in point. This is a rare example of pratiloma marriage where an upper caste woman married a low caste man. A high profile inter-caste marriage, it even basked in societal approbation. For example, high government officials, political dignitaries and business people made it a point to attend this wedding. In this case, caste as a marker of identification is subsumed under class, education and personality of the two families and their status in society. It is undeniable that those from the younger generation with increased sense of self-identity, self-worth and education are likely to have a different attitude towards inter-caste marriages.

⁶³ Chowdhry, P., ‘Enforcing Cultural Codes: Gender and Violence in Northern India,’ Economic and Political Weekly, 10–16 May 1997, Vol. XXXII, no. 19, pp. 1019–1028Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ A paper on this aspect is currently under preparation.

⁶⁵ For the bitterly contested marriages in Haryana that breach the principles of village and clan exogamy, see Chowdhry, P., ‘Caste Panchayats and the Policing of Marriage in Haryana: Enforcing Kinship and Territorial Exogamy,’ Contributions to Indian Sociology, 2004, Vol. 38, no. 1& 2, pp. 1–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁶ The semi-secret liaisons tend to be overlooked, as they require no realignment of social relations; as marriage is forbidden, the relationship is also necessarily of limited duration. Marriage, on the other hand, affects the alignment of relationship between groups; it has to be publicly validated by overt transaction and it provides a precedent for similar arrangements in the future.

⁶⁷ Certain persons however could not marry under this act: those related as sapinda (shared body relationship), unless the custom or usage governing them permitted marriage, those with a living spouse or those of unsound mind, suffering from mental disorder and incapable of giving consent, and those subject to recurrent attacks of insanity and epilepsy. See section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act in S. T. Desai, Mulla Principles of Hindu Law, Bombay, India, N. M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd, 1966, pp. 599–751. The age limit of 15 years for the girl and 18 years for the boy sanctioned under this act was raised to 18 and 21, respectively, by the Child Restraint (Amendment) Act 2 of 1978.

⁶⁸ See Chowdhry, P., ‘Private Lives, State Intervention: Cases of Run-Away Marriage in Rural North India,’ Modern Asian Studies, February 2004, Vol. 38, Pt. I, pp. 55–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁹ See Dainik Jagran for a report of this case, 5 May 2002, pp. 1, 13.

⁷⁰ For details, see Peoples Union for Democratic Rights, Courting Disaster: A Report on Inter-Caste Marriages, Society and State, Delhi, India, Secretary, PUDR, August 2003, pp. 1–21Google Scholar.

⁷¹ The aversion of the dominant caste groups towards women's education is well acknowledged by the officials and remains a matter of grave concern to Haryana Government. Yet, these caste groups also want an educated bride who is able to teach the family children. Many among them even want an earning wife or a daughter-in-law. On the whole the societal opinion on educating women remains divided and uncertain.

⁷² Although not because of the panchayat's decision but because of the demands of political economy such a segregation of sexes at the school level is inadvertently coming to the surface in Haryana. An interesting development is taking place. The girls are being sent to government schools to save money and the boys to expensive English-medium private schools. So stark is the discrimination that the local government schools can now be mistaken for being ‘girls only schools’. See a news report in Indian Express, New Delhi, India, 7 December 2003, p. 1.

⁷³ Out of a total of 15,03,112 females from the scheduled caste groups, only 2,83,490 are literate. See Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 1999–2000, p. 67.

⁷⁴ In rural areas such cases are on the increase, but very few convictions are made as the police act in consonance with the dominant caste groups, who also have political connections. For reports of this case also, see Dainik Jagran, 20 April 1998, pp. 1 and 13; 12 May 1998, p. 4.

⁷⁵ A few instances of the dalit aggression have come to light. In July 2003, in village Jooan of Sonepat district one Jat boy was killed by the dalits. He was known to sexually harass the dalit girls. The dalits maintained that they had a right to ‘protect the honour’ of their women. In retaliation the Jats burnt down the dalit houses.

⁷⁶ Dainik Bhaskar (daily newspaper in Hindi), 25 April 2001, p. 1.

⁷⁷ I was informed of this by the landowners in confidence. The intent, however, is not to kill the errant bull. The severe beating results in killing. Historically, this is a documented fact. See Government of India, F. no. Home Poll, 37/2/35, pp. 53–54.

⁷⁸ In village Dharuheda the police cut off the penis of a dalit boy, accused of having an affair with a Jat girl.

⁷⁹ Even when women are called, which a few instances show, they are either not allowed to speak or are too terrified to speak in a wholly male body. They are also aware of the humiliation of being called by a panchayat.

⁸⁰ This is the stand taken by the caste panchayats when two roughly equivalent caste groups are concerned.

⁸¹ S. Anandhi, J. Jeyaranjan and Ranjan Krishnan, ‘Work, Caste and Competing Masculinities: Notes From a Tamil Village,’ Economic and Political Weekly, 26 October 2002, Vol. XXXVII, no. 43, pp. 4397–4406.

⁸² In an inter-caste marriage, each girl or boy from the scheduled caste receives Rs. 25,000. This amount includes Rs. 10,000 in cash and Rs. 15,000 in fixed deposit for 6 years in the joint account of the couple. Rs. 2 lakh were distributed under this scheme in the year 1999. See Dainik Bhaskar, 10 August 2000, p. 7.

⁸³ Gupta, D., ‘Everyday Resistance or Routine Repression? Exaggeration as Stratagem in Agrarian Conflict,’ The Journal of Peasant Studies, October 2001, Vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 89–108CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁴ In October 2002, five dalits were lynched to death in front of a police post in village Dulina of Jhajjar district allegedly by a mob acting on the rumour that the dalits had killed a cow and were skinning it. For an insightful analysis of this crime, see Peoples Union for Democratic Rights, Jhajjar Dalit Lynching: The Politics of Cow Protection in Haryana, Delhi, India, Secretary, PUDR, February 2003, pp. 1–21Google Scholar.