Article 292 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes a procedure of limited jurisdiction, directed at securing the prompt release of detained vessels and crews upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other security. The jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has nevertheless repeatedly invoked ‘considerations of humanity’ and ‘international standards of due process of law’ in applying that procedure. This article examines the role and content of due process within the law of prompt release. It argues that due process is a necessary implication of the prompt release regime itself, arising from the object of the regime and operating within the strict limits of Article 292. Through an analysis of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, informed by principles of international human rights law, the article identifies three domains in which due process is engaged: the timing of release, the fixing of a reasonable bond and the process by which confiscation is effected. It contends that attention to procedural fairness in these contexts neither enlarges the Tribunal’s jurisdiction nor entails review of the merits of domestic enforcement action. Rather, it gives effect to the balance struck by UNCLOS between coastal State enforcement powers and the protection of navigational freedoms.