In Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco, Janine Clark compares the decentralization reforms in Morocco and Jordan to answer the main question of why some authoritarian regimes engage in decentralizing government and administrative institutions (as in Morocco) while others do not (as in Jordan). Her main argument is that these reforms, as (perhaps naively) pushed by global institutions as part of the neo-liberal “good governance” agenda, are in fact a way for authoritarian rulers to remain in power. Clark draws on detailed historical accounts as well as in-depth qualitative field research to build this argument, aided by a logical chapter sequence.

In Morocco, devolving some responsibilities to the municipal level since the 1960s has allowed the monarchy to pursue coalition strategies and co-opt the main opposition parties (most recently, the Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD, Justice and Development Party), while pro-regime parties were able to develop patron–client ties. By pursuing an ambiguous or even cynical decentralization strategy, i.e., one that devolved some powers and responsibilities to local governments while simultaneously undermining their autonomy and developmental capacities (including through the clever use of legal ambiguities about the municipalities’ roles), the monarchy was able to “blame them for all service-delivery failures and then using their failures as justification to ‘come to the rescue’ of the citizens by bypassing elected officials and bringing services directly to the people” (p. 277). The latter was done through “technocratic” programs such as the National Initiative for Human Development (known by its French acronym, INDH), in which appointed officials in the Ministry of the Interior play a decisive role in allocating funds to local civil society actors. In fact, given the widespread phenomenon of local political leaders establishing their own associations, Clark argues that “civil society has become an important arena, if not the most important arena, of political competition with [all] political parties […] pursuing their goals via civil society” (p. 282).

The book also includes a chapter on the PJD's ascent to national power in the 2015 elections, and Clark uses it to argue that “it was only through its civil society activism that the PJD was able to prove its technocratic skills and its commitment to the values of good governance and through its partnerships with civil society activists that it came to power” (p. 282). Clark provides a nuanced argument about the PJD's effects. On the one hand, through its sound management of municipal affairs, the PJD “undermines the foundations on which the representatives of the central authorities justify state interference in municipal affairs,” but on the other hand, “the PJD […] serves to politically elevate a depoliticized civil society” which presents no threat to the dominant power structures (p. 284). Chapter 6 makes it clear that on balance, the PJD does not destabilize the regime.

As for Jordan, Clark argues convincingly that centralization has fragmented pillars of regime support. The processes are similar to the ones taking place in Morocco, i.e., the central government repeatedly imposed seemingly superior technocrats, such as municipal managers or executive directors, who undermine mayors’ positions. However, the main difference with Morocco lies in the fact that centralization has served to undermine political parties and reinforce tribalism (mainly through an electoral system which favors tribal independents at the expense of political parties), “while simultaneously making the latter less effective as a source of regime stability”(p. 284). While the Jordanian monarchy has historically privileged the Transjordanian population as its main coalition partner, shrinking resources and a crisis in municipal service provision have led to increased competition between tribes and fragmentation along clan and family lines, and ultimately, its growing alienation from the regime. In the current context of dramatic shifts in the ethnic makeup of the Jordanian population, the monarchy still relies on the support of the countryside, despite also fostering a new urban elite made up of businessmen and bourgeoisie. Clark uses her extensive fieldwork data to illustrate the municipalities’ dependence on the center (both for financial support and wasta, i.e., connections that allow calling on favors from MPs, ministers, or the king) and local leaders’ frustrations at their inability to develop the municipalities considerable economic (and tourism) potential.

Overall, the book shows that by aiding the spread of elite capture, decentralization strategies have been used to undermine democratic practice rather than aiding any democratic transition. The study's main finding is thus counterintuitive: it shows “how decentralization provides a greater stabilizing function for authoritarian regimes than does centralization” (p. 7). Clark concludes insightfully by arguing that “rather than being the driver of democratization, good governance and decentralization appear to be contingent on democratization” (p. 288), and calls on international donors to pay more attention to elite capture and clientelist ties that pervade the political system. It seems easy to agree with Clark that the solution lies in establishing a strong party system modelled after Western-style democracies. However, it is far from obvious how this could be achieved.

While generally very well written and easy to follow, the book has a few shortcomings. Key concepts such as “state,” “regime,” and “monarchy” are not sufficiently clarified. For example, Clark writes in the conclusion that “while the two states have withdrawn, their disaggregation has allowed a more direct route by which each monarch may engage in coalition strategies” (p. 283). What is meant here by “states”? The state bureaucracy? But if so, does this not contradict the earlier argument about appointed officials undermining elected (political) representatives at the local level? Similarly, the terms “tribes” and “clans” could be more precisely defined. Second, although the bulk of fieldwork for this book was conducted from 2010 to 2012, it is regrettable that the 2015 decentralization reforms in Morocco were not at least referred to; the Municipal Charter (Organic Law) of 2015 brought about quite some significant changes in the local planning process and it would have been useful to update some of the findings, especially with regard to the Municipal Development Plans. Similarly, the discussion on civil society in Morocco could have included some references to the growing grassroots protest movements made up of “unorganized” civil society, namely ordinary and mostly young citizens who do not represent the pro-regime civil society elite which has gained so much from decentralization reforms.

Despite these minor shortcomings, I strongly recommend this book to all students and scholars of local politics in the MENA region for its fascinating account of how power is reconfigured at the local level and what this means for regime stability. By giving voice to local leaders who are notoriously difficult to study, Clark has made a valuable contribution to the scholarly literature on decentralization, which still tends to be dominated by (a-political) macro-level analyses on the effects of decentralization reforms on public investment levels, economic growth, macroeconomic stability, or education and health outcomes, rather than grounded analyses of their actual practice.