¹ William Park offers a useful framework for assessing whether a policy or practice can be characterized as pro-arbitration. Among the criteria that he identifies is the extent to which it “minimizes, to the fullest extent reasonably possible, the intervention of national courts in the arbitral process.” See William W Park, “Arbitration and Fine Dining: Two Faces of Efficiency” in Patricia Shaughnessy & Sherlin Tung (eds), The Powers and Duties of an Arbitrator (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2017), 251. See also George A Bermann, “What Does It Mean to Be ‘Pro-Arbitration’?” (2018) 34:3 Arbitration Intl 341 at 342.

² Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, 330 UNTS 38 (entered into force 7 June 1959) [New York Convention]; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985, 24 ILM 1302 (1985) (with amendments as adopted in 2006), online: UNCITRAL <uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration> [UNCITRAL Model Law]; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) [ICSID Convention].

³ North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2, (1993) 32 ILM 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA]. In the Canadian context, prior to Canada’s accession to the ICSID Convention in 2013, domestic courts retained jurisdiction over both enforcement and set-aside proceedings when Canada was a party to the dispute and/or the arbitration was seated in Canada. This applied not only to NAFTA Chapter 11 cases but also to other arbitrations in Canada that do not involve the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

⁴ UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 15 December 1976, (1976) 15 ILM 701. Depending on whether the arbitration is conducted under the ICSID Convention or not, Canadian courts interact with different legal frameworks in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In ICSID cases, the system is self-contained, meaning that Canadian courts have no role in annulment or enforcement. In contrast, non-ICSID arbitrations — such as those under NAFTA Chapter 11 — are subject to domestic judicial oversight. Set-aside proceedings fall under the UNCITRAL Model Law, which has been incorporated into Canadian law by competent governments. Arbitral rules (for example, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s [UNCITRAL] or the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s [PCA]) govern procedural aspects of the arbitration but do not override the legal framework for review. This structure underscores the significance of Canadian judges’ interpretive choices in non-ICSID cases, where their reasoning reflects not only legal doctrine but also broader attitudes towards international legal authority and deference. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2; New York Convention, supra note 2. Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Arbitration Rules 2012” (17 December 2012), online: Permanent Court of Arbitration <docs.pca-cpa.org/2025/08/ecdc7ec1-pca-arbitration-rules.pdf>.

⁵ When it comes to the UNCITRAL Model Law, both the federal and provincial/territorial governments have implemented it in largely similar ways through their respective Commercial Arbitration Act, RSC 1985, c 17, or International Commercial Arbitration Act, SO 2017, c 2 (and Quebec’s Code of Civil Procedure, RSQ, c C-25). As such, the arguments made in the article regarding judicial engagement with the UNCITRAL Model Law apply equally to both levels of government and across provinces since the legal framework governing annulment proceedings is substantively consistent nationwide. However, in the context of the ICSID Convention, the situation is different. Only the federal government is a party to the convention and is responsible for its implementation and obligations under international law.

⁶ Canada signed the ICSID Convention in 2006 and ratified it only in 2013, significantly later than other Group of Seven countries. For comparison, the United States and the United Kingdom signed and ratified the ICSID Convention in 1965–66, France and Japan in 1965–67, Italy in 1965–71, and Germany in 1966–69. Even after ratification, the decision to initiate proceedings before ICSID rests solely with the investor, meaning that non-ICSID arbitrations remain common and continue to fall under domestic judicial oversight in Canada. ICSID, “List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention” (updated regularly), online: ICSID <icsid.worldbank.org>.

⁷ United Mexican States v Metalclad Corp, 2001 BCSC 664 [Metalclad]; Canada v SD Myers Inc, [2004] 3 FC 368 [SD Myers]; United Mexican States v Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File no. 03-CV-23500 [Feldman]; Bayview Irrigation District No 11 v United Mexican States, 2008 CanLII 22120 (ONSC) [Bayview]; Mexico v Cargill, Incorporated, 2011 ONCA 622 [Cargill]; Attorney General of Canada v Mobil et al., 2016 ONSC 790 [Mobil]; United Mexican States v Burr, 2020 ONSC 2376 [Burr]; Canada (Attorney General) v Clayton, 2018 FC 436 [Bilcon]; Nelson v Government of the United Mexican States, 2022 ONSC 1193 [Nelson]; Vento Motorcycles, Inc v Mexico, 2025 ONCA 82.

⁸ Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 5.

⁹ Bermann, supra note 1 at 342.

¹⁰ The Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) system collects and disseminates information on court decisions and arbitral awards that interpret or apply UNCITRAL texts. See UNCITRAL, “Facts About CLOUT: Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts,” online: UNCITRAL <uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/facts_about_clout_eng_ebook.pdf> [UNCITRAL, “Facts About CLOUT”]; UNCITRAL, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/CN.9/264 (25 March 1985).

¹¹ UNCITRAL, “Facts About CLOUT,” supra note 10.

¹² NAFTA Chapter 11 has been superseded by the investment chapter of the Protocol Replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement with the Agreement between Canada, the United States of America, and the United Mexican States, 10 December 2019, Can TS 2020 N^o 5 (entered into force 1 July 2020) [CUSMA]. However, a sunset clause preserves Canada’s exposure to legacy claims for a three-year period, and cases initiated under NAFTA Chapter 11 continue to work their way through arbitral tribunals and Canadian courts (see ibid, ch 14, Annex 14-C [Legacy Investment Claims and Pending Claims]).

¹³ Maureen Irish, “The Review of International Commercial Arbitral Awards and the New York Convention: Breaking the Link to Administrative Law” (2021) 52:2 Ottawa L Rev 157.

¹⁴ See e.g. Consolidated Contractors Group SAL (Offshore) v Ambatovy Minerals SA, 2017 ONCA 939 at 24; Telestat Canada and Juch-Tech, Inc, 2012 ONSC at 48. For a comprehensive analysis, see Irish, supra note 13.

¹⁵ Deference is indeed embedded within the standard of review, particularly under the reasonableness standard in Canadian administrative law. However, in this article, I purposedly make an analytical distinction between the two concepts. Specifically, a standard of review refers to the legal framework a court applies when reviewing a decision — typically either reasonableness or correctness — whereas the concept of deference refers to the attitude or posture a court adopts towards the decision-maker’s reasoning and institutional role. It reflects a recognition of the decision-maker’s expertise and informs how the standard is applied in practice.

¹⁶ Stephan W Schill, “Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of Review” (2012) 3:3 J Intl Dispute Settlement 577.

¹⁷ See e.g. Sundaresh Menon, “The Transnational Protection of Private Rights: Issues, Challenges, and Possible Solutions” (2015) 5:2 Asian J Intl L 219 at 226.

¹⁸ Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, “The Interplay between Investor-State Arbitration and Domestic Courts in the Existing IIA Framework” in Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, eds, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and National Courts: Current Framework and Reform Options (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 2020) 31 at 65.

¹⁹ Kateryna Bondar, “Annulment of ICSID and Non-ICSID Investment Awards: Differences in the Extent of Review” (2015) 32:6 J Intl Arb 621 at 629.

²⁰ Joshua Karton & Samantha Wynne, “Canadian Courts and Uniform Interpretation: An Empirical Reality Check” (2013) 18:2 Unif L Rev 281.

²¹ Céline Lévesque, “‘Correctness’ as the Proper Standard of Review Applicable to ‘True’ Questions of Jurisdiction in the Set-Aside of Treaty-Based Investor-State Awards” (2014) 5:1 J Intl Dispute Settlement 69 at 72.

²² Irish, supra note 13 at 367.

²³ One recent example includes Vento Motorcycles, Inc v Mexico, 2025 ONCA 82; Vento Motorcycles, Inc v United Mexican States, 2023 ONSC 5964.

²⁴ Frédéric Bachand, “Court Intervention in International Arbitration: The Case for Compulsory Judicial Internationalism Symposium” (2012) 2012:1 J Disp Resol 83–100 at 83 [Bachand, “Court Intervention”]; Fabien Gélinas, “From Harmonized Legislation to Harmonized Law: Hurdles and Tools — Judicial and Arbitral Perspectives” in Frédéric Bachand & Fabien Gélinas, eds, The UNCITRAL Model Law after 25 Years: Global Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration (Huntington, NY: Juris, 2013) 261.

²⁵ See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1986). For international judges, see Martti Koskenniemi, “Between Commitment and Cynicism Outline for a Theory of International Law as Practice” in Jean d’Aspremont et al, eds, International Law as a Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 38.

²⁶ Koskenniemi, supra note 8 at 5.

²⁷ Yves Dezalay & Bryant G Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Pierre Bourdieu, “La force du droit” (1986) 64:1 Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 3.

²⁸ Emmanuel Gaillard, Legal Theory of International Arbitration (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2010) at 35.

²⁹ Ibid at 14–15.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ The term “deference” has notably been defined in the context of international adjudication as “the respect that a judge gives to the findings of another institution.” See Johannes Hendrik Fahner, Judicial Deference in International Adjudication (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2020) at 5. It is understood here as the respect judges gives to the findings of adjudicators in another legal order.

³² Koskenniemi, supra note 8 at 474.

³³ In seven of these set-aside applications, the NAFTA parties — either Mexico or Canada — were the applicants, except for the judicial revision of Bayview, where the investors were the applicants.

³⁴ Article 1136 of NAFTA, supra note 3, provides that “a disputing party may not seek enforcement of a final award until, in the case of a final award under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, three months have elapsed from the date the award was rendered, and no disputing party has commenced a proceeding to revise, set aside or annul the award.”

³⁵ UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 4, art 34(2)(a).

³⁶ Ibid, art 34(2)(b).

³⁷ Lévesque, supra note 21 at 71.

³⁸ Henri C Alvarez, “Judicial Review of NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitral Awards” in Emmanuel Gaillard & Frédéric Bachand, eds, Fifteen Years of NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration (New York: Huntington, 2011) 103 at 104. For more context, see J Christopher Thomas, “A Reply to Professor Brower” (2001) 40 Colum J Transnat’l L 433, n 105.

³⁹ New York Convention, supra note 2. See also Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1981) at 350–52 (noting that the New York Convention codifies grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement but leaves annulment to domestic law).

⁴⁰ Metalclad, supra note 7 at paras 114, 118.

⁴¹ Giorgio Sacerdoti, “Investment Arbitration under ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules: Prerequisites, Applicable Law, Review of Awards” (2004) 19:1 ICSID Review 1 at 41; Charles H Brower, “Investor-state Disputes under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back” (2001) 40 Colum J Transnat’l L 43 at 46, 63, 68. Contra Thomas, supra note 38; Alvarez, supra note 38 at 153.

⁴² Irish, supra note 13 at 358, 367–68 157. See e.g. Quintette Coal Ltd v Nippon Steel Corp, [1990] 50 BCLR (2d) 207, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused, 22142 (13 December 1990) [Quintette]; Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones v Stet International, 2000 CanLII 16840 (ON CA) [Corporacion Transnacional].

⁴³ Denis Lemieux & Sabine Mekki, “La révision judiciaire des décisions en vertu du chapitre 11 de l’ALENA (Canada c SD Myers)” (2004) 45:4 Cahiers de droit 791 at 791.

⁴⁴ Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982.

⁴⁵ Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir].

⁴⁶ Feldman, supra note 7 at paras 34–43.

⁴⁷ Ibid at para 37.

⁴⁸ Ibid at paras 29–38.

⁴⁹ ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Doc ICSID/11/Rev. 1 (January 2003); Feldman, supra note 7 at para 39.

⁵⁰ Hilary Delany, “Recent Developments in Administrative Law in Canada: The Implications of Dunsmuir v New Brunswick” (2008) 30 Dublin University LJ 100 at 108; Hubert Reid, “Clause Privative” (20 November 2024), online: Dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien <dictionnaires.caij.qc.ca/recherche#t=edictionnaire&sort=relevancy&m=dico&dico=dictionnaire-reid-6>.

⁵¹ Feldman, supra note 7 at para 40; NAFTA, supra note 2, art 1124(4).

⁵² Feldman, supra note 7 at paras 41–42.

⁵³ Frederic Bachand, “Recent Developments on Grounds for Annulment and Non-Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards in Canada: Report to the NAFTA 2022 Committee Essay” (2006) 13:1 Sw JL & Trade in the Americas 107 at 115, 118–19 [Bachand, “Recent Developments”].

⁵⁴ Bayview, supra note 7.

⁵⁵ Dunsmuir, supra note 45.

⁵⁶ Ibid at para 60.

⁵⁷ Irish, supra note 11 at 368.

⁵⁸ Cargill, supra note 7.

⁵⁹ Ibid at para 30.

⁶⁰ Ibid at para 42. Regarding the term “correctness,” the Court used the same vocabulary as the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir. However, the Court understood the term differently as the one used in Dunsmuir, the standard applicable to the NAFTA Chapter 11 context being “magnified.”

⁶¹ Cargill, supra note 7 at para 35.

⁶² Ibid at para 31.

⁶³ Jennifer Smith, “The Origins of Judicial Review in Canada” (1983) 16:1 Can J Political Science 115.

⁶⁴ Alvarez, supra note 38 at 104.

⁶⁵ Cargill, supra note 7 at paras 29–30.

⁶⁶ Ibid at para 30.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Dunsmuir, supra note 45 at para 59.

⁶⁹ Cargill, supra note 7 at para 42.

⁷⁰ Ibid at para 45, citing Dunsmuir, supra note 45 at para 59.

⁷¹ Cargill, supra note 7 at para 46.

⁷² Ibid at para 53.

⁷³ Dunsmuir, supra note 45 at para 34; Marc Gold, “Judicial Review of International Arbitrations in Canada: Notes on Mexico v Cargill” (2011) 90 Can Bar Rev 717 at 717.

⁷⁴ Cargill, supra note 7 at paras 34–51.

⁷⁵ Ibid at para 48.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid at para 35.

⁷⁸ Gold, supra note 73 at 717.

⁷⁹ Mobil, supra note 7 at paras 31–39; Bilcon, supra note 7 at paras 64–83; Burr, supra note 7 at paras 41–45.

⁸⁰ Bilcon, supra note 7 at para 67.

⁸¹ In Canada, the “dialogue theory” between courts and legislatures emerged in the constitutional context. See Rainer Knopff et al, “Dialogue: Clarified and Reconsidered” (2016) 54:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 609. The theory is here generally used to illustrate the interplay between the judiciary and the legislative and executive branches.

⁸² Bilcon, supra note 7 at para 198. A few months after the issuance of the judicial review of Bilcon, the minister of foreign affairs of Canada, Chrystia Freeland, argued in a joint press conference with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, that “[t]he investor-state-dispute resolution system that has allowed companies to sue the Canadian government is also gone between Canada and the United States. Known as ISDS, it has cost Canadian taxpayers more than $300 million in penalties and legal fees. ISDS elevates the rights of corporations over those of sovereign governments. In removing it, we have strengthened our government’s right to regulate in the public interest, to protect public health and the environment, for example.” See Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister Trudeau and Minister Freeland Speaking Notes for the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Press Conference” (last consulted 13 August 2022), online: Prime Minister of Canada <pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2018/10/01/prime-minister-trudeau-and-minister-freeland-speaking-notes-united-states>.

⁸³ Bilcon, supra note 7 at para 198–200.

⁸⁴ Clayton v Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 58 at para 6 [Clayton].

⁸⁵ Mobil, supra note 7 at paras 31–39; Bilcon, supra note 7 at paras 64–83; Burr, supra note 7 at paras 41–45.

⁸⁶ Cargill, supra note 7 at para 46.

⁸⁷ Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 ([w]e support the majority’s decision to eliminate the vexing contextual factors analysis from the standard of review framework and to abolish the shibboleth category of “true questions of jurisdiction,” at para 200).

⁸⁸ Irish, supra note 13 at 373.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Nelson, supra note 7 at para 33, citing Consolidated Contractors Group SAL (Offshore) v Ambatovy Minerals SA, 2017 ONCA 939 at para 65.

⁹¹ Lévesque, supra note 21 at 373.

⁹² Irish, supra note 13 at 372.

⁹³ Mobil, supra note 7 at paras 31–39; Bilcon, supra note 7 at paras 64–83; Burr, supra note 7 at paras 41–45.

⁹⁴ Irish, supra note 13 at 375–85.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid at 381.

⁹⁷ Cargill, supra note 7 at para 30. See also Mobil, supra note 7 at paras 31–39; Bilcon, supra note 7 at paras 64–83; Burr, supra note 7 at paras 41–45.

⁹⁸ Emmanuel Gaillard, “The Representations of International Arbitration” (2010) 1:2 J Intl Dispute Settlement 271 at 271–72.

⁹⁹ Cargill, supra note 7 at para 46.

¹⁰⁰ This reasoning is notably found in Feldman, supra note 7 at para 37.

¹⁰¹ Metalclad, supra note 7 at paras 51–52; SD Myers, supra note 7 at paras 38–39; Feldman, supra note 7 at paras 34–37; Bayview, supra note 7 at paras 11–13, 58, 62, 63, 74; Cargill, supra note 7 at para 33; Bilcon, supra note 7 at para 196.

¹⁰² Quintette, supra note 42; Corporacion Transnacional, supra note 42. For a comprehensive analysis of the interplay between courts and international commercial arbitral awards in Canada over the last thirty years, see Irish, supra note 13 at 375–85.

¹⁰³ Cargill, supra note 7 at para 19, citing Quintette, supra note 42, and Corporacion Transnacional, supra note 42.

¹⁰⁴ These grounds are found in the UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2, art 34(2)(a)(iii).

¹⁰⁵ Bayview, supra note 7 at paras 12–13.

¹⁰⁶ Bilcon, supra note 7 at 78; Clayton, supra note 84; Vento Motorcycles, Inc v Mexico, 2025 ONCA 82.

¹⁰⁷ Irish, supra note 13 at 363–74.

¹⁰⁸ Metalclad, supra note 7 at paras 51–74.

¹⁰⁹ Bilcon, supra note 7 at para 198.

¹¹⁰ Frédéric Bachand, “Judicial Internationalism and the Interpretation of the Model Law: Reflections on Some Aspects of Article 2A” in Fabien Gélinas & Frédéric Bachand, eds, The UNCITRAL Model Law after 25 Years: Global Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration (Huntingdon, UK, Juris 2013) 231 at 239–51.

¹¹¹ Ibid at 239–51.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46.

¹¹⁴ Cargill, supra note 7 at paras 36, 37, 43.

¹¹⁵ Ibid at 36, para 19.

¹¹⁶ Ibid at 38, para 19.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Cargill, supra note 7 at para 48; Lévesque, supra note 21 at 72.

¹¹⁹ Bermann, supra note 1 at 342.

¹²⁰ Desputeaux v Éditions Chouette (1987), 2003 SCC 17.

¹²¹ Bermann, supra note 1 at 342.

¹²² Bachand, “Recent Developments,” supra note 53 at 107, 115, 118–19; Frédéric Bachand, “Kompetenz-Kompetenz, Canadian Style” (2009) 25:3 Arbitration Intl 431 at 453; Bachand, “Court Intervention,” supra note 24 at 93.

¹²³ Cargill, supra note 7 at paras 41–42.

¹²⁴ UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2, art 34(2)(a)(iii).

¹²⁵ Cargill, supra note 7 at para 49.

¹²⁶ UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2, art 34(2)(a)(iii).

¹²⁷ In this regard, the only NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral award (partially) set aside by a Canadian judge, Metalclad, supra note 7, was the result of another reasoning.

¹²⁸ Fahner, supra note 31 at 5; Louis LeBel, “Some Properly Deferential Thoughts on Deference” (2008) 21:1 Can J Admin L & Prac 1 at 2 (“[t]he concept of deference assists us in defining the relationship between courts and other decision-making bodies”).

¹²⁹ In fact, from a judicial attitude of suspicion towards the administrative bodies and the decisions of the specialized courts that marked the Canadian judicial policy before the 1980s, Canadian courts evolved towards a deference principle that led to the co-existence between the courts system and the administrative system after the issuance of the decision CUPE v NB Liquor Corporation, [1979] 2 SCR 22, by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1979. See also LeBel, supra note 128 at 3.

¹³⁰ LeBel, supra note 128 at 7.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Gaillard, supra note 98 at 271–72.

¹³⁴ Bachand, “Court Intervention,” supra note 24 at 83.

¹³⁵ Ibid; Gélinas, supra note 24.

¹³⁶ Gélinas, supra note 24 at 261.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ LeBel, supra note 128 at 7.

¹³⁹ Bachand, “Recent Developments,” supra note 53 at 107, 115, 118–19.

¹⁴⁰ Cargill, supra note 7 at para 46.

¹⁴¹ UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2, art 34(2)(a)(iii).

¹⁴² Bachand, “Court Intervention,” supra note 24 at 83.

¹⁴³ Several avenues exist for a successful dialogue between domestic judges and arbitration practitioners. For a comprehensive account, see Gélinas, supra note 24 at 275.