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How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2026

Lee Savage
Lee Savage*
Affiliation:
Department of European and International Studies, King's College London, UK
*
Address for correspondence: Lee Savage, Department of European and International Studies, King's College London, Viginia Woolf Building, 22 Kingsway, London WC2B 6LE, UK. E‐mail: lee.savage@kcl.ac.uk
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Abstract

How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi‐presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet, yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, it is argued that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by his or her perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi‐presidentialism and executive‐legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors; this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non‐partisan actors.

Keywords

coalition bargaininggovernment formationbargaining durationsemi‐presidentialism

Information

Type
Original Articles
Information
European Journal of Political Research , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , May 2018 , pp. 308 - 332
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 European Consortium for Political Research

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